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Tokyo Calling: Japanese Overseas Radio Broadcasting 1937-1945 
Thesis Summary 
Although largely ignored by Western historians, Japanese overseas radio propaganda 
during W orId War Two was sophisticated and wide-ranging. 
Regular overseas radio broadcasting began in Japan in 1935, after several European 
powers had already begun such services. Following the Japanese occupation of 
Manchuria in 1931, research into short-wave radio broadcasting was expanded, and 
after Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, overseas radio was considered 
essential to present the Japanese government's views abroad. 
Radio Tokyo broadcasts began in Japanese and English and were initially directed at 
the United States. Other languages were soon added and the range of broadcasts 
extended to Europe, South America and the Pacific region. At its height in 1944, 
Radio Tokyo broadcast to fifteen transmission regions in thirty-three languages. In 
addition, Japanese-controlled short-wave stations broadcast from fifteen Asian cities 
under Japanese occupation 
Themes used in broadcasts varied according to the war situation and the target 
country. However, certain common themes were used in broadcasts throughout the 
war, and to most regions. The Japanese analysis of the war situation often formed 
the central element of news broadcasts, and reconstruction in occupied regions under 
Japanese administration was frequently emphasised to indicate the benevolence of 
Japanese rule. Within Asia, independence from colonial rule was advocated, whilst 
in broadcasts to the enemy the strength of Japanese combat forces was emphasised. 
Entertainment programmes were developed gradually from 1935. Most such 
broadcasts were based on Japanese domestic broadcasts and consisted of serious 
talks, news and some classical music. It was recognised that this was not the format 
of popular Western broadcasts and several attempts were made to lighten the output 
of Radio Tokyo. It was allowed to play jazz music, which was banned within Japan, 
but it was only by using prisoners-of-war in the production of programmes that the 
Japanese created truly ''Western-style'' broadcasts. 
This thesis traces the development of Japanese overseas broadcasting from the first 
experimental broadcasts to the closure of Radio Tokyo by the American occupation 
forces in 1945. It also analyses the common themes of radio broadcasts in the China 
Incident and Pacific War and to assess how successful they were as propaganda. 
The thesis concludes that Japanese overseas radio propaganda was both sophisticated 
and flexible in its approaches. It showed little resemblance to the propaganda of 
Nazi Germany, but more to the propaganda of the wartime B.B.C. Many of its 
broadcasts contained a high degree of "truth," albeit "selective truth," favourable to 
Japan. The exception was the propaganda issued by the Army and Navy Ministries, 
which showed little of the sophistication of regular broadcast material. 
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Romanization 
In this study Japanese words are romanized according to the Hepburn system, and long 
vowels are indicated by the use of the circumflex (e.g. Hoso). This has been omitted 
where the word is well known in English, such as Tokyo. 
F or ease of comprehension, Chinese names and words have been romanized according to 
the form of the word most commonly used during the Pacific War. This is also the case 
in regard to other places in East Asia, which underwent name changes under Japanese 
occupation, or during the post-war period. A glossary is provided in Appendix 3, which 
gives the contemporary name, or form of the word. 
Note: Japanese names have been left in the Japanese style, family name first and given 
name second. 
The maps in this thesis were compiled by the author, and so are not referenced. 
Preface 
Definitions of propaganda vary. In 1940, F.e. Bartlett defined it as: 
An attempt to influence opinion and conduct . . . in such a manner that the 
persons who adopt the opinions and behavior indicated do so without 
themselves making any definite search for reasons. 1 
Fourteen years later Leonard Doob defined it as: 
The attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of 
individuals. 2 
The definition given by Jowett and O'Donnell in 1986 was: 
Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired interest of the propagandist. 3 
2 
The essential elements in these definitions seem to be that propaganda is an attempt by one 
party to influence or manipulate another party into thinking and behaving as the first party 
wishes. This is the definition used in this study. 
1 F. C. Bartlett: "The Aims of Political Propaganda" in 
Daniel Katz (ed.): Public Opinion and Propaganda p -1-63 
:! Leonard W. Doob: Public Opinion and Propaganda p 240 
3 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell: Propaganda and Persuasion p l3 
Introduction 
From the 1920s, there were parallel developments in the separate but inter-linked 
fields of propaganda and radio, both of which had been used experimentally during 
World War One. During the 1930s overseas broadcasting became one of the 
principal means by which one state sought to influence the thought or behaviour of 
the population of another. In most economically advanced countries the development 
of broadcasting was under state control. It was, thus, natural that states developed 
broadcasting for state purposes. In the inter-war years, notions of mass psychology 
and the manipulation of public emotion also developed in both democratic and 
totalitarian states. These ideas increased the perceived importance of both domestic 
and overseas broadcasting. By the start of World War Two all the major European 
powers had established regular short-wave broadcasting schedules, along with official 
monitoring posts, which sought to determine the potential threat of incoming 
transmissions. Japan was a member of this group of states, which were international 
broadcasters and Japan's overseas radio broadcasting during the China and Pacific 
Wars (1937-45) was an ambitious and far-reaching operation. 
Despite this, some European scholars to have implicitly dismissed the Pacific aspect 
of World War Two as secondary to the European theatre, and the efforts of Japanese 
propagandists as secondary and inferior to those of Germany.l However, this attitude 
generally reflects the lack of research undertaken by Western scholars into Japanese 
propaganda activities, and into overseas broadcasting in particular. Much has been 
written in both German and English regarding the activities of Josef Goebbels and all 
facets of the Nazi propaganda machine. However, the only major study, which 
analyses Japan's wartime radio operations is Kitayama Setsuro's three volume work 
in Japanese, Rajio T6ky6,2 which was published in 1988. So far, this work has been 
neglected by both Japanese and Western scholars. The objective of this current study 
is to bring Japan's overseas radio propaganda into a more central position in World 
1 TIle propaganda activities of Italy have often been treated in the sanle way. Charles Rolo. writing in 
194-1-. described Italian overseas radio as "Berlin's Branch Office" which "became but an echo of its 
German lord and master after Italy's entry into the war." Japan's "Penny Whistles from the Far East" 
were similarly described as "a crude inlitation of Berlin's." 
Rolo: Radio Goes to War pp 105 & 170 
:! Kitayama Setsuro: Rajio TOhYO: Shinju Wan e no l\fiehi [Radio Tokyo: The Road to Pearl Harbor] 
Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no ,\fiehi [Radio Tokyo: The Road to Greater East Asia] 
Rajio T6h)'d: Haiboku e no Afiehi [Radio Tokyo: The Road Defeat] 
(Tabata Shoten. Tokyo, 1988) 
War Two historical debates. In so doing it seeks to assess whether Japanese 
propaganda was generally inferior to that of the other belligerents, as is frequently 
assumed, and whether it had any distinctive features. Or did it merely follow patterns 
developed by Nazi Germany? Following an important trend in Pacific War studies 3 
, 
this thesis seeks to study Japanese wartime propaganda in broad terms, not 
concentrating on one region, period or theme, but spanning the whole course of the 
war and comparing it to developments in other countries. In so doing it will be 
necessary to trace the development of the changing political and military situation in 
the Pacific War, in order to assess the reliability and significance of Japanese 
propaganda in its complex content. 
Apart from Kitayama's work, there are few studies which examine Japanese radio 
broadcasting, either domestic or international. N .H.K. 4 published two histories to 
celebrate its fiftieth anniversary in 1975, one in Japanese and one in English. The 
Japanese version is more detailed than the English language one, but their very 
nature, 50-Year General Histories, limits their detailed treatment of anyone period. 
In addition, they did not draw upon material from archives in the United States, 
Britain and Australia, being based exclusively on material in N.H.K. and Japanese 
Government sources, which are extremely limited. 
The only major work in English on Japanese overseas broadcasting is L.D. Meo's 
Japan's Radio War on Australia.s Published in 1968, this deals exclusively with 
Japanese broadcasts to Australia and is based on material contained in the monitoring 
reports of the Melbourne Listening Post. This is a very detailed and immensely 
valuable monograph. However, as a result of its narrow regional focus, it does not 
assess Japan's radio propaganda activity in broad terms and thus cannot attempt to set 
Japanese broadcasting into the overall picture of World War Two propaganda. 
In this current study much of the detailed content of broadcasts is drawn from the 
B.B.C. 's Monitoring Reports,6 daily records of all foreign broadcasts picked up by the 
3 See, for example, Christopher Thome's treatment of "Race" as shown in his 1980 Raleigh Lecture on 
History. Racial Aspects of the Far Eastern War of 1941-1945, (Proceedings of the British Academy. 
Vol. LXVI, Oxford University Press, 1980) 
4 Nippon H6s6 Ky6kai [Japan Broadcasting Corporation] . 
It is the national broadcasting corporation of Japan, and like the B.B.C. generates rcycnue by collectmg 
licence fees. 
5 L.D. Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia (Melbourne University Press, Melboume, 1968) 
6 There are three full sets of these monitoring reports of which I am aware. One at the B.B.C.·s 
Writtcn Archiycs also at Ca\'ersham. one in the Imperial War Museum in London.. and one at thc 
5 
monitoring station which date back to 1939. Despite some limitations, which are 
described in Appendix 1, the Summary of World Broadcasts offers a daily account of 
world-wide short-wave broadcasting which is unique and of immense value. 
Much other material has been drawn from the vast volume of material relating to 
wartime radio broadcasting, which is held in the United States' National Archives in 
Washington D.C. Along with the N.H.K. archive this is one of the principal sources 
used by Kitayama in preparing his work. However, Kitayama knew nothing of the 
B.B.C. material, which does not appear to have been consulted previously by 
Japanese, American or Australian scholars. 7 
A further major source of information for this study was Mr. Kitayama Setsur6, the 
author of Rajio Tokyo. In an interview, he indicated the scale of material held by the 
N.H.K. archives, and the best method of approaching it. He also kindly provided 
copies of material from his private collection of broadcasting memorabilia, acquired 
from people he had interviewed during the course of his own research. 
Some historians may assume that there have been few studies of Japan's overseas 
broadcasting in W orId War Two because there is insufficient material on which to 
base such a study. However, this is not the case. There exists an abundance of 
material. The aim of this study is to provide an overview of the whole of Japanese 
overseas broadcasting during W orId War Two in an attempt to fill an important gap in 
scholarship on the Pacific War. It will seek to examine the views and values 
expressed by Japanese broadcasts to different regions, their relation to each other and 
to views expressed within Japan. It will also consider the Japanese approach to 
overseas broadcasting in comparison to that of other belligerents, both Japan's Axis 
partners and the Western Allies. Finally, this study will attempt to assess the 
effectiveness of Japanese overseas radio propaganda in achieving the results, which 
Japanese propagandists sought to achieve. 
London School of Economics' Egham Depository Library in Egham. Surrey. I consulted copies in the 
fomler two. In the text of this study I have used the term Summary of World Broadcasts. in reference 
to the monitoring reports, as tins how they are described by the B.B.e. However, at tile other locations 
the reports are known merely as the B.B.e. 's Monitoring Reports. 
7 A detailed survey of the archiycs uscd and the material available in them is included in Appendix. 1 of 
this study, p 253 
Chapter 1: The Pre-war Development of Short-wave Radio 
Propaganda Outside Japan 
Developments during World War One 
6 
Radio was first used for propaganda in the later stages of World War One. The 
potential of a medium which, unlike the press, was not confined by national borders, 
was clearly recognised, particularly by the British who pioneered the use of 
propaganda of all types during the first "total war." 
Britain had one major advantage from the beginning of the war. London was the 
news capital of the world, so British organisations controlled most of the European 
communication cables. Britain displayed its power early in the war by cutting the 
German trans-Atlantic cable. 1 It was, thus, Germany which first made use of radio to 
transmit news from a German perspective, in several languages, to newspapers 
abroad. Wireless was not dependent on cables and so helped to overcome Germany's 
handicap. 
Other nations followed the German example, but radio was not a major means of 
disseminating propaganda amongst the population at large. The number of receiving 
sets was extremely limited as radio was still in its infancy, and in addition many of 
the transmissions were in Morse code.2 Propagandists were, however, aware that the 
general public in Europe were involved for the first time, in a war which was not 
confined to armies, navies and rulers, but a war in which the opinions and actions of 
the public mattered. The hope of propagandists was, then, that the few people who 
could receive and decode the transmissions would disseminate the views, which were 
expressed on the radio, amongst the rest of the population. 
Whatever the real success of radio during World War One, its potential as a 
significant force in the era after the war was clearly recognised by all the parties. For 
this reason the Treaty of Versailles in 1918 included a three-month ban on 
1 Philip M. Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939;" 
in K.R.M. Short (ed.): Film and Radio Propaganda in World War Two p 29 
2 Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939;" p 29 
... 
7 
broadcasting from certain German stations, and on the German government 
constructing any new radio stations. 3 
Soviet Broadcasts 
One of the reasons why the Allies feared the use of radio for propaganda was that 
they had witnessed Soviet experiments with radio as a tool of the Comintern, 
following the Russian Revolution of 1917. Bolshevik ideology held that class 
revolution in Europe was the inevitable next stage of world history and the Comintern 
was established to aid this. During the tunnoil of the closing stages of W orId War 
One Soviet radio had urged the proletariat, regardless of for whom they fought, to rise 
up and fulfil their revolutionary destiny. Later it urged on British workers on to 
success during the 1926 General Strike and continually encouraged Gennan workers 
to revolt between 1930 and 1933.4 
At the beginning of the 1920s, however, this radio activity was primarily confined to 
medium-wave frequencies within Europe. However, in the 1920s experiments with 
long-wave broadcasting were begun in order to expand the areas reached by radio. 
This was followed by experiments with short-wave frequencies, which proved more 
effective in transmitting radio messages over greater distances. There appears to be 
two opinions regarding when short-wave broadcasting began. Dr. Philip Taylor states 
that it began with the establishment of Radio Moscow in 1922.5 However, the most 
widely ac~epted view is that the Dutch were the first to establish a regular schedule of 
short-wave broadcasts. (Figure 1 overleaf) 
Contacting the Colonies 
The table overleaf clearly indicates that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, the 
states, which made the first short-wave broadcasts were those with colonial Empires 
spanning the globe. The Dutch and the British began experiments in the use of long-
wave frequencies in broadcasting in 1927. However, research switched to the use of 
3 Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939;" p 29 
4 See WhiUon and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 5-7 
5 Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939:" p 30 
8 
short-wave when it became clear that long-wave transmissions were provmg 
unsatisfactory. Dutch short-wave broadcasts proper began on 24th December 1928. 
" These were in Dutch, principally directed at colonists in the Netherlands East Indies,6 
the crews of Dutch steamships, and traders across the world. The aim of these 
broadcasts was to give citizens in Dutch colonies a sense of affinity to the mother 
country by allowing them to hear news directly from home.7 
1928 Holland 
1929 Soviet Union 
1931 France: ''Radio Colonial" 
1932 League of Nations: ''Radio Nations" 
Great Britain: ''Empire Service" 
1933 Germany 
1934 Italy 
Belgium 
1935 Japan 
1936 Yugoslavia 
Iceland 
Czechoslovakia 
1937 Denmark 
United States: NBC and CBS 
Figure 1. Dates when regular short-wave broadcasting 
began in different countries 8 
The British experienced some technical problems and so did not begin their regular 
short-wave service until much later. In the meantime the French ''Radio Colonial" 
(later "Paris Mondial") began regular broadcasts to the French colonies in Asia, 
Africa and the West Indies on 1st May 1931.9 Unlike other mother countries France 
adopted a policy of broadcasting in languages other than the mother tongue from the 
beginning. Broadcasts were thus on topics of general and cultural interest and 
avoided political issues, so as to promote a gradual process of cultural assimilation. 
6 Indonesia 
7 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hasa-sen" [The World Radio War] 
in Kaigai Hasa KenkyU Gurupu (ed.): NHK. Senji Kaigai Hasa [NHK. 's Wartime Overseas 
Broadcasting] p 2 
80110 Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hasa-sen" p 2 
9 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hasa-sen" p 2 
9 
The British Broadcasting Corporation's short-wave service, the ''Empire Service," 
began regular broadcasts from Daventry on 19th December 1932.10 Like the Dutch, 
.. the British broadcasts were directed at British people living in the colonies and 
dominions, so there was a strict policy of broadcasting solely in English. This 
continued until world events forced the British Government to reassess this policy in 
1938. The B.B.C. had two transmitters, which could operate on eight wave-lengths, 
six omni-directional antennae and numerous directional antennae for overseas 
broadcasts. 1 1 From the beginning it divided its broadcasting into five geographical 
transmission regions centred on Australia, the Far East, India, South Africa and 
Canada, and directed one directional antenna at each. 12 Ono claims that the B.B.C. 
negotiated with the national broadcasting corporations in Australia and Canada, to 
have the Daventry broadcasts inserted into their regular schedules. These 
corporations then relayed the B.B.C. 's short-wave broadcasts across the national 
network on medium-wave so that more listeners could hear them. 13 However, 
according to Briggs this was less important to planners at the B.B.C. in 1932 than it 
had been under experimental broadcasting in 1927 or it would be from 1937. 14 
In 1934 Belgium began short-wave broadcasts to the Congo. Later, several countries 
which did not possess colonies but had many nationals living abroad, such as 
Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, began short-wave broadcasts in their own languages 
to maintain links with their fellow countrymen abroad. 
Short-wave broadcasting in Germany 
Experiments with short-wave broadcasting were carried out in Germany from 1929, 
but there was no regular short-wave service until 1st April 1933, after the Nazis had 
come to power. Short-wave broadcasting was on three wavelengths, with two 
10 Asa Briggs: The Golden Age of Wireless p 370 
11 Briggs: The Golden Age of Wireless p 381 
12 Briggs: The Golden Age of Wireless p 381 
13 000 Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen" p 10 
14 Briggs: The Golden Age of Wireless p 381 
10 
directional antennae. Significantly, this service was placed under the directorship of 
the Minister for Propaganda, Josef Goebbels as was all radio broadcasting. 15 
The first area, which German broadcasts targeted was North America as it was there 
that there was the "greatest number of racial Germans"16 living outside Europe. 
There were slots in the schedules when announcers read out "fan mail" sent to the 
station and answered queries, addressing the letter-writer personally. It was 
frequently stressed that all mail to the station was read, and much that was 
complimentary about Germany was read over the air to encourage listening. The 
station also broadcast bulletins in different languages to advertise its schedules in 
advance, and organised "listeners clubs" in different cities in America to overcome 
the lack of short-wave receivers. In addition, American visitors to Berlin were 
invited to send greetings back home and to describe their impressions of Nazi 
Germany over the air. 17 Birthday good wishes and greetings from friends and 
relatives in Germany were also broadcast as an incentive for "German Americans" to 
listen in. Programmes were also broadcast, which were intended to arouse nostalgia 
for the "old country" such as a "Bavarian evening" or "Silesian Hour." ''Fan mail" to 
the station at Zeesen 18 apparently demonstrated that these policies were very 
effective. Many listeners wrote to the station stating that they had ceased listening to 
other stations and spread news about their newly discovered station to friends and 
neighbours, who also began listening. 19 
In general, German overseas broadcasts were shaped to suit the culture, language and 
educational background of their listeners. Programmes were skilfully adapted to suit 
the expected audience. Consequently, on separate occasions they appealed to 
workers or the upper classes, the majorities or minorities. 20 When Zeesen began 
broadcasting in Afrikaans in 1938, it became very popular amongst the Afrikaners in 
15 See Robert Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 176 and Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa H6s6-
sen" p 7 
16 Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" p 19 
17 It can be asswned that only those with favourable impressions broadcast. 
18 Gennan overseas radio was based in Zeesen. a small town some twenty miles South-east of Berlin 
Andrew Walker: A Skyful of Freedom: 60 Years of the B.B.C. World Service p 27 
19 See Whitton and Her;:: "Radio in International Politics·' pp 20-22 
20 See Whitton and Her!.: "Radio in International Politics" pp 12-1-t 
1 1 
South Africa, who abandoned the "Empire Service," which was still only 
broadcasting in English. 21 In addition, German radio made a point of researching and 
celebrating the local festivals of the region to which it was broadcasting, and also 
paid homage to local heroes. Thus a broadcast in Hindi to India claimed; 
We, the German people, respect Mahatma Gandhi just as much as 
we respect Hitler, who has the same principles as Gandhi; National 
Socialism, too, teaches non-violence.22 
The German short-wave radio system was increased ten-fold to an output of 40kw to 
cope with the coverage of the Berlin Olympics in 1936. A separate organisation was 
established at Zeesen to receive eighty radio presenters who arrived from thirty-two 
countries23 to cover the Games. News coverage was increased to twenty-two 
bulletins a day in German, English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch. One hundred 
programmes were recorded each day, and there were 2,897 broadcasts made in a 
twenty-four hour period.24 Caesar Saerchinger, an American presenter commenting 
on the coverage and presentation of the Olympics by German radio, described it as 
"the largest, most powerful propaganda machine in the world. ''25 
The nature of Germany's aggressIve radio propaganda is best illustrated by an 
- examination of its broadcasts within Europe, although these were generally made on 
long-wave frequencies. In the period before the vote in the Saarland on the territory's 
return to Germany,26 Germany waged an intensive campaign to ensure a favourable 
result. Radio was at the forefront of the Nazi campaign. It broadcast a "Saarland 
news" daily, and plays about figures from the Saarland, items for Saarland youth, 
programmes about the Saarland economy and broadcasts of mass rallies by 
Saarlanders abroad. After the Saarland was returned to Germany a powerful radio 
station was established at Saarbrucken, in order to wage a similar campaign against 
the French territory of Alsace-Lorraine.27 
21 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen" p 13 
22 Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 23-24 
23 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 160 
24 Ono: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen" p 7 
25 Ono: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen" p 8 
26 On 13th January 1935 
27 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" pp 1-l-15 
12 
Intensive German radio campaigns towards an area usually preceded diplomatic or 
military action. The case of propaganda towards Austria prior to the entry of the 
German army in March 1938 is a good example. Between 1933 and 1935 German 
radio had attempted to cause riots in Austria in order to bring down the Dolfuss 
government, using Austrian Nazis in Germany to produce and present the broadcasts. 
Broadcasters at Zeesen developed the use of horspiele (radio plays) based on 
historical events and personalities connected with Austro-German unity; these were 
intended to maintain the support of those Austrians who were already sympathetic to 
Germany. 28 
From 1936, another strand of German propaganda, the '1error strategy," was used 
over the radio in order to prepare Austria for Anschlu}. Radio broadcasts claimed that 
Austria was on the verge of being overrun by Bolsheviks and would soon descend 
into anarchy. Listeners were presented with an account of Austria, linked to 
Germany, which was now very strong and able to protect her. Combined with the 
German distribution of free radios, this contributed to an alleged 99.75% of Austrians 
declaring themselves in favour of Anschlu} in a vote taken by the Nazis after their 
entry into Vienna. 29 
Radio campaigns waged prior to the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and the 
rump of Czechoslovakia in 1939 followed similar lines. These campaigns used the 
station at Zeesen and others, such as the 100 kW station in Vienna, which played an 
important part in the propaganda campaign against Czechoslovakia, and in Munich. 30 
Radio Control and the League of Nations 
While major powers stepped up national and international radio propaganda, the 
League of Nations established a station transmitting on short-wave in February 1932. 
Named ''Radio Nations," it broadcast from Geneva principally in order to keep 
League officials working in difficult situations around the world in touch with the 
League's headquarters. However, Radio Nations may also be considered a 
28 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" pp 15-16 
29 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" p 19 
30 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa H6s6-sen" p 13 
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propaganda station, in that it deliberately advertised the ideals and aims of the League 
in an increasingly turbulent decade. 
At the World Disarmament Conference between 1932 and 1934, the Polish delegation 
called for "moral disarmament" with regard to radio propaganda. The League of 
Nations' response was to call on all countries to use radio "to create better mutual 
understanding between peoples."31 There had been previous agreements not to 
transmit propaganda, such as a Union Internationale de Radiodiffusioll (U.I.R.) 
resolution passed in 1926, to prevent nations making broadcasts which might have a 
political religious or spiritual content damaging to international relations. 32 There 
were also "gentlemen's agreements" on similar lines, such as that between Germany 
and Poland in 1931,33 but these were rendered virtually ineffective by 1933. Indeed, 
at the Madrid Telecommunications Conference in 1932, the Italian delegation asked 
for a resolution to be passed which would allow a state to jam "unfavourable 
broadcasts" made by a foreign power. There was, however, little support for the 
resolution and it progressed no further. 34 
In 1936, twenty-eight countries signed a League of Nations convention entitled 
"Concerning the use of International Broadcasting in the cause of Peace." By signing 
it the countries stated they agreed to "prohibit the radiation from their territories of 
broadcasts detrimental to good international understanding, of warlike and subversive 
propaganda and of false news"35 and to promote cultural and peaceful relations with 
other countries. The details of the convention were, however, imprecise and only 
extremely serious infringements were punishable. The convention expressed a spirit 
of co-operation rather than a series of concrete laws. It came into effect on 1 st April 
1938, having been ratified by nineteen of the twenty-eight signatories. 36 It was, 
however, never a serious obstacle to the worsening propaganda war of the late 1930s, 
31 Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939" p 31 
32 Osborne Mance: International Telecommunications p 36 
33 Mance: International Telecommunications p 36 
34 Mance: International Telecommunications pp 36-37 
35 Mance: International Telecommunications pp 37-38 
36 Taylor: "Propaganda in International Politics 1919-1939" p 30 
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for whilst Britain, France and the Soviet Union had signed the convention, Germany 
and Italy had not, and this rendered the agreement virtually impotent. 
The Spanish Civil War and Short-wave Broadcasting 
The civil war in Spain was the first European conflict to occur after the rise of radio. 
General Franco's Fascist Party received strong radio support from Germany. In 
addition, Franco was given a 50kw transmitter by Olympia Sender, the German 
broadcasting company established for the Berlin Olympics, to broadcast his own 
propaganda from within Spain. 
Fascist propaganda portrayed the civil war as a struggle against Bolshevism. This 
propaganda campaign allegedly "led to the total eclipse of democratic parties and 
morale. "37 Most countries did not attempt to intervene and the only foreign radio 
which broadcast on short-wave on behalf of the Republican cause was Radio 
Moscow. The Republican government did broadcast from Spain in an attempt to 
overcome this. However, its tight censorship of news reporters from friendly 
countries, and exaggerated claims followed by truthful reporting of bad news meant 
that many of the potentially friendly countries were convinced by Fascist claims of a 
struggle against Communism rather than the confused themes of Republican 
propaganda.38 
Franco had the full support of the Nazi propaganda machine at his disposal, and 
whilst German and Italian radio 'enlightened' the neutral nations of the world 
regarding Franco's aims, Franco himself was free to use all forms of radio 
propaganda against his enemies. These ranged from warnings of Communist 
atrocities, and threats to those who refused to co-operate. These broadcasts were 
highly emotional and were spiced with gossip giving details of the alleged illicit love 
affairs of Republican leaders, which aimed to disgrace them. 39 
37 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" p 24 
38 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" p 25 
39 Sec Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" pp 24-29 
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The Radio War for the Arab World 
In the 1930s the Middle East was the scene of the first full-scale "war" between 
democratic and fascist short-wave radio stations. This was initiated by the Italian 
station at Bari, which expanded its services from seven to fourteen languages40 during 
its first year of operation, during the build up to the Abyssinian war in October 1935. 
Italian broadcasts to Britain were conciliatory, but those to the Arab world were 
extremely anti-British. Broadcasts to Egypt and Palestine, in particular, portrayed 
Britain as the imperialistic oppressor and Italy as the defender of Islam. Radio 
receivers locked into Italian stations were distributed free to cafes and other places 
where many people gathered. These programmes included popular Arab singers and 
poetry, which were interspersed between propaganda items.41 
British officials were, initially, unconcerned by these broadcasts, and only 
occasionally broadcast very late replies to Italian accusations, from the B.B.C. 's 
station in Jerusalem. By the autumn of 1937, it was clear that this response was 
insufficient, and on 24th October the Postmaster General, G.C. Tyroll, announced to 
parliament that the B.B.C. would begin an "Arabic Service," abandoning its policy of 
only broadcasting in English. In addition, he announced that two 100kw transmitters 
would be built to increase the output from Daventry. The "Arabic Service" became 
operational on 3rd January 1938. However, it failed to respond directly to Italian 
accusations, instead broadcasting talks by "friendly" Muslim leaders, and readings 
from the Koran as though to a British, not an Arab, audience. Indeed, it has been 
described as "objectivity turned to extreme dullness."42 The Italian station at Bari 
ridiculed the B.B.C. 's attempts at foreign broadcasting, but following a "gentleman's 
agreement" between the two countries later the same year Italian attacks died down.43 
This did not however signal the end of attacks on Britain over the air-waves in the , , 
Middle East. Italian attacks from Bari and Tripoli were beamed towards the French 
colonies in North Africa and eventually forced responses from Rabat, Algiers and 
40 Ono: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen. " p 11 
41 Charles Rolo: Radio Goes to War p-tl 
42 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" p 28 
43 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa Hoso-sen" p 11 
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Tunis. In the same years Nazi Germany took over the attack on Britain. The 
Germans dominated the ether in the Middle East from 1938, using Arab exiles as 
broadcasters. Germany also drew on small local anti-British newspapers as sources 
of news, and in return provided the papers with German material so as to wage the 
propaganda war on two fronts - on the radio and in the press. Whitton and Herz claim 
that it is plausible to argue that German propaganda was a significant reason why the 
situation during the Palestine Revolts of 1938-1939 was so serious for Britain.44 
The Radio War for Latin America 
A further important battleground of the "radio war" between the democracies and 
fascists was Latin America. Germany and Italy were in an advantageous position, as 
there were large numbers of expatriate Germans and Italians in several South 
American states. Germany began a co-ordinated radio campaign against South 
America from Zeesen in February 1934, and broadcasts to Central America began in 
May 1935. By 1938 Zeesen was broadcasting twelve hours a day to South and 
Central America and in 1939 a separate transmission was established solely for 
broadcasts to Brazil. 45 
There were few short-wave receIvers In Latin American states, so German 
propagandists developed several ways to disseminate their message. Like the Italians 
in the Middle East, they distributed radios locked into their own station. They also 
had their programme schedules printed in local newspapers. Visitors to Germany 
made their customary microphone appearances to send greetings home, and when 
other countries attempted to broadcast to South America Zeesen jammed their 
frequencies. 46 
As the problem of minimal numbers of short-wave radios in Latin America persisted, 
Nazi propagandists began another tactic. Local South American stations were 
allowed to fill their airtime by relaying German short-wave broadcasts on medium-
wave at no cost. In addition, the German broadcasters produced pre-recorded and 
44 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" p 29 
45 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" pp 30-31 
46 See Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" pp 29-31 
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canned programmes which were sent out for use by these stations, which could often 
not afford to produce many of their own programmes. To strengthen Latin American 
ties with Germany, exchange broadcasts were encouraged, although the South 
American section of the broadcast were usually much shorter than the German. 47 
The themes of German broadcasts to South America were similar to those used in 
Europe, although anti-American material also featured prominently. Following the 
Italian example, propaganda was inserted around entertainment and music 
programmes to increase the popularity of broadcasts, and broadcasts were transmitted 
in German for the German settlers, and in Spanish and Portuguese for the remainder 
of the population. The United States was portrayed as an imperialistic power, run by 
Jews, whose Pan-American "Good Neighbour"48 policy was a cover for the wholesale 
exploitation of South America. Strikes in American industries were frequently 
mentioned. In contrast, it was claimed that German industry did not suffer from 
strikes. 
An effective German policy was to allow local newspapers in Latin America to use 
German news broadcasts as a primary source for their news, without making any 
charge. Thus even people without a medium-wave receiver were very likely to be 
aware of German accounts of world events. Radio-type recording machines were 
sold cheaply to newspapers, and in addition German agents in Latin America edited 
the radio news themselves and presented the already completed type-copy to 
newspaper editors.49 The German "radio assault" on South America was, in fact, an 
assault through all the media. 
47 See Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 30-32 
48 The Good Neighbour policy was introduced by President Roosevelt in 1932. It was a foreign policy 
directed at Latin America which sought to reverse the policies of previous presidents which intervened 
directly in the internal affairs of South American countries in order to further Am~rican ~terests. ~n 
1933 the United States endorsed a series of principles declaring, "No state has the nght to mtervene III 
the internal or external affairs of another." This policy "eventually brought an end to the more heayy 
handed forms of interference, including direct military occupation." .... 
P. S. Boyer, C. E. Clark, Jr., 1. F. Kett, N. Salisbury, H. Sitkoff and N. Woloch: The Enduring 17sion: 
A History of the American People p 887 
49 See Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 30-32 
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Italian radio propaganda was directed to South America with less intensity_ 
Broadcasts began in 1935 but the service did not become a daily one until 1937, after 
which Italy followed the German example and bought local radio time for relays of 
short-wave broadcasts. Italian propaganda to Latin America was centred on the 
Catholic ties, which were alleged to link Italy and the Latin American republics. It 
was claimed that as the Vatican50 was located in Italy, and South Americans were 
primarily Roman Catholics, Italians and South Americans would think in a similar 
way. In addition, Italian radio claimed to be fighting in the Spain Civil War to defend 
the mother country of Latin Americans. A further main theme of Italian propaganda 
was the imperialistic nature of the League of Nations. Italian radio reported that the 
League was controlled by the imperialistic powers, and did not care about great 
power domination of smaller nations. The intention of this propaganda was to 
persuade the states of Latin America to leave the League and thus weaken its 
position. 
The British response to fascist propaganda directed at Latin America was slow. It was 
not until March 1938 that the B.B.C. began its second foreign overseas service, the 
"Latin American Service," which broadcast for three hours a day and included two 
sections in Spanish and one in Portuguese. These sections were generally news 
bulletins and the remaining programmes and talks were usually in English. In 
addition, the B.B.C. failed to provide free services in order to advertise its ideas. 
News from the B.B.C. was copyrighted and so could not be freely used by local 
newspapers. Although British government intervention later released a free news 
service, the B.B.C. continued to charge for its advance programme schedules. The 
combined effect of these policies was that British broadcasts were considerably less 
popular than German ones, and by 1939 there were between two and three hundred 
German programmes relayed or rebroadcast on South American stations for each one 
from Britain. 51 
50 The Vatican, in fact, had its own short-wave station which broadcast in several languages, including 
Latin. 
51 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" p 35 
19 
French broadcasts to Latin America were even less well organised. "Radio Colonial" 
had always included some broadcasts in Portuguese, but these were intended for 
French colonial possessions and were not broadcast specifically for South America. 
With the establishment of a new short-wave station, "Paris Mondial", in the spring of 
1938, South America became one of four zones to which special programmes were 
broadcast. Bad organisation, however, placed Central America in the North 
American zone, which received broadcasts in English, German, Italian and French, 
but not in Spanish. 52 
Fascist short-wave broadcasting in the "radio war" appears, therefore, to have been 
far in advance of that of the European democracies by the outbreak of World War 
Two in September 1939. 
The Eve of War in Europe 
During the Munich Crisis in 1938, the B.B.C. began broadcasting news bulletins and 
translations of talks by British politicians in German and Italian. 53 After the Crisis, 
these became regular broadcasts and formed the ''European Service," which was 
added to the three existing services. 54 By 1939, the B. B. C. was transmitting in 
sixteen languages but its broadcasts were always characterised by the unemotional 
presentation of the information. British schedules were also inflexible, so that 
broadcasts went ahead on time, even if they clashed with a speech by Hitler or 
Mussolini. 55 
The French also began broadcasts in German and Italian at this time, although there 
was a general lack of organisation in much French short-wave broadcasting. In 
addition to the usual problems, French radio was at times further hindered by 
52 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" p 34 
53 The B.B.C. also engaged in subversive "black propaganda" during and after the crisis. See Nicholas 
Pronay & Philip Taylor: "An Improper Use of Broadcasting ... ": The British Government and 
Clandestine Radio Propaganda Operations against Germany during the Munich Crisis and After" in 
Journal o/Contemporary History Vol. 19, No.3, July 1984 ... 
For a discussion of black propaganda see Chapter 4-, fn 79 p 93 
54 The "Empire Senice," the "Arabian Senice" and the "Latin American Service." 
55 See W11itton and Hen: "Radio in International Politics" pp 38-40 
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broadcasts being banned at the last minute by politicians, who were following a 
policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany. 56 
The initial Nazi reaction to all these broadcasts was to ban Germans from listening to 
the "brazen poison plots" expounded by foreign stations. Prior to this, only the 
Communist station, Radio Moscow, had been banned in Germany. 57 German 
retaliation to British broadcasts began from Hamburg in 1939, but the exaggerated 
news claims and excruciating English rendered them highly unappealing to the target 
audience. The nature of these broadcasts improved when William Joyce58 (later the 
notorious German broadcaster "Lord Haw Haw") was put in charge of them He 
claimed that Germany was unafraid of British broadcasts, that the truth would prevail, 
and be recognised by the British public. 59 
The German radio attack on Poland prior to invasion differed slightly from that 
directed at the Saar, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. Poland had had a "non-
aggression" agreement with Germany since 1934 and had sided with Germany 
against Czechoslovakia, in order to gain territory. As a result, the propaganda war 
was less aggressive than in previous campaigns. It began with appeals to Germans in 
Poland, and vague suggestions of atrocities against them. In addition, Ukrainians in 
Poland were reminded that Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia had achieved autonomy 
under the Nazis. This was only subtly implied, however, as peace with the Soviet 
Union was more important to the Nazis than a Ukrainian uprising in Poland. The 
vague sto"ries of atrocities were later replaced by reports of specific atrocities and of 
the mass arrest and torture of Germans in Poland. Zeesen broadcasts claimed that 
German honour required a solution to the '"Polish Question." There were also reports 
of refugees fleeing into Nazi Germany. Zeesen broadcast that Polish aggression had 
resulted in border skirmishes after 26th August, and from then on the reports of 
atrocities intensified. 60 
56 Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 39-40 
57 Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" p 41 
58 Joyce was born in New York and was brought up in Ireland. although he held a British 
59 Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" p 41 
60 See Whitton and Her/.: "'Radio in International Politics" pp 42-43 
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Another principal difference between this radio assault and earlier ones was that 
Germany was not the only nation whose broadcasts reported on the situation in 
Poland. Polish radio retaliated far more vigorously than had Czech radio the previous 
year. In addition, the democratic nations had organised themselves during 1938 and 
1939, and maintained a steady barrage of broadcasts towards Germany. Under the 
Information Department of the Foreign Office,61 the B.B.C. maintained a stream of 
news and commentaries in German, and its broadcasts took on some of the emotion 
of other stations, including direct appeals by British miners to German miners and 
British labourers to German labourers.62 Amid all this radio activity war was 
declared on 3rd September 1939 and the "radio war," spilled over into "total war" in 
Europe. 
Short-wave Radio in the United States of America 
The one major Western power absent from the 1930s "radio war" was the United 
States. American policy towards much of the world remained detached. Americans 
often felt far removed from events in Europe, and the political focus was on events 
and conditions within the United States. A further reason was the nature of radio 
ownership and organisation in the United States. American radio stations were 
private companies and they relied on advertising for their income. There was no 
centralised organisation capable of arranging programmes for transmission abroad, as 
a centralised government station conflicted with the strongly held American ideal of 
private enterprise. 
American companies were granted short-wave licences in 1929, but before 1936 
overseas broadcasting consisted of merely transmitting domestic broadcasts 
simultaneously on the home network and to Latin America. 63 The programmes were 
not adapted for the foreign audience, nor were languages other than English used. In 
addition, no effort was made to persuade local stations to relay American broadcasts 
on medium-wave. Furthermore, no research was carried out by the American 
companies into the conditions and tastes of the audience. 
61 It was latcr to become the Ministry of Infonnation. 
62 Whitton and Herz: "'Radio in Intcrnational Politics" p .. 1-3-4-4-
63 Rolo: Radio Goes to War p 4-5 
Such research was 
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expensive, and not economically viable for a commercial station. Thus, the aim of 
broadcasting American programmes to South America was to familiarise Latin 
Americans with North American radio, in order to encourage sponsorship, which 
would fund research into broadcasting specifically for South America, and later 
Europe. 
American government concern regarding the growing number of German and Italian 
broadcasts to South America resulted in the Chavez Bill. This proposed the 
establishment of a government radio service in order to counter fascist propaganda in 
Latin America, but it was defeated in the Senate. Protected from events in Europe by 
the Atlantic, Americans felt safe from any serious threat from the fascist states. More 
importantly, private companies feared that the establishment of any government 
station would set a precedent and undermine their future operations. In fact, in order 
to protect their interests, the large radio corporations (in whose hands the inquiry into 
radio operations in South America rested) declared that they had never heard any 
fascist propaganda broadcast to South America. Thus there was no need for a 
government station to counter it!64 
Gradually, public pressure mounted, however, and private companies began to review 
their attitudes to short-wave broadcasting, particularly to Latin America. Therefore, 
when the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) accepted the Frequency 
Allocation Bill of the Cairo Conference in 1938 and distributed the new frequencies, 
several companies, including N.B.C. and C.B.S., established International Divisions 
which included foreign language departments. Even after this, however, the 
broadcasts remained non-political, except for promoting the idea of Pan-
Americanism. They strictly avoided any anti-fascist propaganda.65 
The programmes broadcast by commercial stations were usually popular. Listeners 
heard their "fan mail" read out on air and the stations commemorated local festivals 
and holidays. However, the signals from these stations were weak and they were 
generally difficult to pick up. In contrast, two American electric companies (the 
64 Sec Whitton and Herr "Radio in International Politics" pp -l5-47 
65 Sec Whitton and Herz: "Radio in International Politics" pp 46-48 
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World-wide Broadcasting Foundation and the Crasley Corporation) which had also 
been allocated frequencies in 1938, had the resources to experiment with different 
output levels and their broadcasts were usually clearer. 66 The lack of broadcasting 
experience in these companies, however, rendered the programmes uninspiring and 
boring, and they were only broadcast in English. 67 
Whilst the main focus of American short-wave broadcasts continued to be Latin 
America, short-wave broadcasting to other areas of the world expanded in 1939 and 
1940. Programmes were produced in English, German, Italian and French for 
transmission to Europe, but they were not adapted to suit the tastes of the listening 
audience, being direct translations of American network broadcasts. The most 
effective American propaganda to the totalitarian countries was entirely unintentional. 
Entertainment. schedules would be interrupted in order to broadcast translations of 
speeches by Roosevelt, or another speaker, as an important news item. In totalitarian 
regimes, where news from outside was not reported live, but through domestic filters, 
hearing such banned speeches took on a highly political meaning, which was, 
initially, not intended when American stations transmitted them as news broadcasts. 68 
After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on 7th December 1941 the need for United 
States' Government control over short-wave broadcasting was recognised, and in 
November 1942, following its establishment the previous June, the Office of War 
Information (O.W.I.) took over supervision of the broadcasting companies and all 
propaganda. In addition, in February 1941, the Government had established its own 
short-wave station, the Voice of America (V.O.A.) and later established other stations 
such as the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (A.F.R.S.) and the World 
Wide Broadcasting System (W.W.B.S'.).69 As a result, short-wave propaganda 
broadcasting in English and foreign languages developed rapidly. 
Between the two world wars there were enormous developments in both the 
technology of radio broadcasting and the understanding of propaganda. Both 
66 Ono Toshiro: "Sekai no Dempa H6s6-sen" p 16 
67 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" pp 47-48 
68 Whitton and Hen: "Radio in Intemational Politics" p 48 
69 Gno: "Sekai no Dempa H6s6-sen. .. p 16 
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emerged during World War One, but were still primitive at its end. During the 1920s 
the development of overseas radio broadcasting was carried out principally in nations 
with colonial possessions and it was these which began the earliest regular 
broadcasts. Propaganda developed alongside radio, particularly in the U.S.S.R. where 
overseas radio was developed as a means of extending the Marxist-Leninist idea of 
inevitable world revolution. 
In the 1930s radio technology and propaganda became more sophisticated and more 
countries began overseas broadcasting. It was Nazi Germany, which successfully 
combined developments in both fields and broadcasting was regulated by the 
Propaganda Ministry. Overseas broadcasting developed along different lines in the 
United States, where there was no state organisation responsible for radio 
broadcasting. Here, too, however, research was carried out into short-wave 
broadcasting and its feasibility in carrying advertisements, themselves a form of 
propaganda message. 
At the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, all the major European powers broadcast 
regularly overseas in several languages and had already waged several propaganda 
battles over the airwaves. Soon after its entry into the war in 1941, America also 
established regular short-wave broadcasting to most regions of the world. At the 
outbreak of war in the Pacific, therefore, most of the major belligerents had 
established and well practised systems of overseas radio broadcasting and 
propaganda. How, then, did Japan compare at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor? 
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Chapter 2: The Development of Short-wave Broadcasting in Japan 
Early Research 
Radio broadcasting in Japan began in March 1925. That autumn N.H.K. received a 
letter from Wrangell, Alaska, stating that a Japanese station had been picked up 
there. l Almost a year later, on 30th August 1926, the Japanese Ministry of 
Communications Electric Laboratory picked up its first foreign broadcast from 
K.G.O. in Oakland, California, which was beginning to make experimental medium-
wave broadcasts to Japan. 2 From this time Japanese interest in international 
broadcasting grew, as it was growing in advanced countries in Europe and the United 
States. 
N.H.K. began two types of research into international broadcasting. The first was an 
investigation into research and experimental broadcasts already made by European 
broadcasting organisations. In addition, from February 1926 JOAK (Tokyo Central 
Broadcasting) received Ministry of Communications permission to make monthly 
short-wave transmissions for one year. It transmitted a request to amateur radio hams 
overseas, asking them to write in if they had received the transmissions, which were 
made on 30 and 35 metres short-wave. 3 These transmissions were principally 
directed towards Australia and the West Coast of the United States.4 
In 1928 N.H.K. 's domestic radio stations were formed into a national network and 
their power was increased to five kilowatts. 5 Following this Japanese stations were 
frequently audible on the West Coast of Canada and the United States and in 
Australia. 6 The Sendai Central Broadcasting station's signal was often heard clearly 
abroad. Indeed, when the Sendai station became aware that its domestic broadcasts 
were often audible on the Pacific Coast of the United States it began to quote a San 
1 Kitayallla Setsuro: Rajio Tok.")'o: Shinju Wan e no Michi [Radio Tokyo: TIle Road to Pearl Harbour] p 14 
2 Kitayallla: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 16 
3 These transmissions would probably have been in both Japanese and English in order to receive as many 
responses as possible from the United States and Australia. 
4 Kitavama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Miehi p 19 
. . 
5 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Miehi p 19 
6 Kitnyalllu: Rujio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Miehi p 15 
Francisco Japanese newspaper, Shillseka(l as one of its regular news sources. This 
marked a clear recognition of the station's popularity amongst the Japanese 
community in California. 
In July 1929, N.H.K., aware of the growth of international broadcasting in Europe, 
announced the establishment of a department for research into broadcasting to 
Japanese communities abroad and Japanese colonies. Korea, Taiwan and the 
Liaotung8 Peninsula in Southern Manchuria, had been able to receive Japanese 
network medium-wave broadcasts from March 1925. It was decided that research 
should be conducted into producing broadcasts specifically for these regions (which 
included Manchuria9 after 1931) in order to bind them together more effectively. 
This research became the basis for Japan's later East Asia Relay Broadcasting. Local 
stations were opened by the government in Liaotung in 1925, Korea in 1927 and 
Taiwan in 1931.10 Besides transmitting local programmes and relays of Japanese 
network programmes, these stations co-operated in research into short-wave 
broadcasting. 
Interest in broadcasting to Europe followed. The first planned Japanese short-wave 
broadcast to Europe was in August 1929, when the German airship, Graf Zeppelin, 
reached Japan on its journey around the world. A broadcast of greetings to Germany 
by diplomatic officials and the airship pilots was planned, but the quality of Japanese 
equipment proved inadequate and the transmission failed. 11 
Plans for another overseas broadcast were made in an ambitious project to broadcast 
from the Naval Arms Limitation Talks in London in 1930. The opening ceremony 
and a later conversation between the Japanese Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo (as an 
English speaking representative of Prime Minister Hamaguchi), President Hoover and 
7 The New World 
8 Liaodong 
9 Dongbei 
10 In Taiwan stations in Tainan and Taichung (Taizhong) were added to the network in 1932 and 1935 
respectively, and in Manchuria stations were opened in Mukden (Shenyang) and Harbin in 1931, and Hsinking 
(Changchun) in 1933. 
N J1K. Radio llild T. V. Cultural Research Institute: The History of Broadcasting in Japan pp 110-113 
11 N.H.K. Radio and T.v. Cultural Research Institute: 50 Years of Japtmesc Broadcasting p 63 and Kitayama: 
Rajio T6h6: Shinju Wan c no Michi pp 23-5 
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Prime Minister MacDonald were to be broadcast to Japan by the B.B.C. N.H.K. was 
to relay them on its medium-wave network whilst the American station K.G.O., 
which was involved in a joint development venture with N.H.K., was to use the 
Japanese experimental short-wave station to boost the transmission signal in order to 
transmit the broadcasts to the United States. Transmission of the opening ceremony 
on 8th February failed due to problems at the British end. The first K.G.O. 
transmission to America also failed, as the output of the Japanese-made equipment 
proved inadequate. Following adjustments by K.G.O. engineers, however, the 
conversation between the three national leaders was successfully transmitted to the 
United States. This was the first overseas short-wave broadcast to be made from 
Japan. 12 However, the Wall Street Crash the previous year and subsequent recession 
had already weakened the position of K.G.O. It was forced to relinquish its share in 
research at the Japanese experimental station and further joint development plans 
were abandoned. 13 
In the period following this first successful transmission to the United States 
Japanese-American exchange broadcasts flourished. On Christmas Day 1930 songs 
and greetings from San Francisco were broadcast to Japan and these were returned in 
a Japanese transmission starting at 12.30pm the next day. 14 The President ofN.H.K., 
Iwahara Kenzo, acknowledged these broadcasts in his New Year speech and called 
for further development in international broadcasting in the New Year. 15 An 
exchange with American stations to celebrate the Emperor's Birthday took place in 
ApriP6 and there were further exchanges to celebrate the American MemoriaP7 and 
Independence Days.lS The famous film star, Mary Pickford, broadcast from San 
Francisco in August 1931, and previewed the Los Angeles Olympics of 1932.19 
12 See Kitayama: Rajio Tok.')'o: Shinju Wan e no Miehi pp 25-8 
13 Kitayama: Rajio Tok.")'6: Shinju Wan e no Miehi p 28 
14 Kitayama: Rajio Tok.')'o: Shinju Wan e no Miehi p 30 
15 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Miehi pp 30-31 
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However, the development of Japanese-American broadcasting relations suffered 
significantly after 18th September 1931, when Japanese forces began the conquest of 
Manchuria. 
The Manchurian Incident 
The Manchurian Incident [ManshCt liken] changed the direction of Japanese 
broadcasting development. Hitherto overseas broadcasting had lacked a strong 
political mission, and was principally concerned with maintaining links with Japanese 
abroad, and raising Japanese technical prestige to the level of that of major Western 
powers. From this time, the Japanese government saw it as a means of defending 
Japanese actions in Manchuria in the face of international criticism. Radio was also 
considered essential in the attempt to establish the puppet state of Manchukuo 
[ManshCtkoku]. In the early stages of the Manchurian Incident N.H.K. staff and 
transmission equipment were sent to assist the Kwantung Army. The army used the 
equipment to establish radio exchanges between Tokyo and the capital of Manchuria, 
Hsinking,20 under the "Kwantung Army Special Communications Section."21 The 
aim of these broadcasts was to encourage the colonisation of Manchuria by Japanese. 
Broadcasts from Hsinking, which defended Japan's presence in Manchuria, were also 
made to the United States, Europe, China and the Soviet Union. 
Following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, radio became increasingly 
important to the Japanese in the dissemination of propaganda, for in the face of 
League of Nations criticism of Japanese action in Manchuria, overseas radio became 
one of Japan's primary tools to inform the world of Tokyo's views. 22 As a result 
tighter government control over broadcasting became a priority. A meeting of 
government officials established the basis for the formation, in September 1932, of 
the "Information Committee"23 which was to "guide" the output of radio propaganda. 
20 Changchun 
21 Kitayama: Rajio T6k.)'6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 41 
22 Arowld this time the KokLlSai Bunka Shink6kai (International Cultmal Friendship Society) was established 
with similar aims, of promoting Japanese cultlU'e abroad. 
23 .16h6 Iinkai 
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In early January 1932 the League of Nations established the Lytton Commission to 
investigate the situation in Manchuria, and on 7th January the United States 
announced its adoption of the Stimson Doctrine. 24 A week later an American 
journalist, Floyd Gibbons, was permitted to broadcast to the United States on short-
wave from Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria. This broadcast was an 
example of Japan's new use for short-wave broadcasts. During the course of the 
broadcast Gibbons said, 
I ate and slept with the Japanese Army for three weeks prior to its 
triumphal entry into the Kum region and I respect and admire the 
rigour of its military discipline and the strength of its sense of 
righteousness. Having seen the plunder, rape and insatiable atrocities 
of the rebels I consider it natural that the Japanese Army subjugate 
them.25 
This led the New York Times to describe the report as the first clear war broadcast 
from Manchuria. 26 
The mam topic of short-wave radio reports during 1932 was the situation m 
Manchuria. On the 1 st March the "independent" puppet state of Manchukuo was 
established. Its creation was celebrated by a "Manchurian Night" on Japanese radio, 
which included exchange broadcasts between Tokyo and Hsinking.27 These, and later 
broadcasts to American and Britain, were highly critical of the Lytton Report, and 
criticism was increased throughout the latter part of 1932 and 1933. The League of 
Nations accepted the Lytton report on 24th February 1933 whereupon Japan withdrew 
from the organisation. 
Japan's increasing isolation from the international community m 1932 and 1933 
necessitated the use of radio to express the Japan's viewpoint to the rest of the world. 
On 1 st June 1932, N .H.K. began broadcasting a weekly English language programme 
on short-wave entitled "Current Topics." The Japanese script was translated into 
English, and the programme presented by a teacher at the Osaka Foreign Language 
24 TIle Stimson Declaration stated that the United States of America would not recognise any changes in the 
situntion in the Far East brought about by force or which would impair U.S. treaty rights or Chinese adnlinistrative 
integrity. Natlmllly this was a criticism of Japanese operations in Manchuria. 
25 Kitayama: Rajio To1-.)'o: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 43. 
26 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 42 
27 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjfl Wan e no Michi p 4-l 
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School, Glenn Shaw. Its aim was to present current affairs to the English speaking 
world from a Japanese perspective, at a time when Japan was the object of 
widespread international suspicion. 28 
After September 1932 all radio output was scrutinised by the government's 
Information Committee, which met weekly as part of Japan's aim to increase 
overseas transmissions.29 The Committee decided that news reports from the 
established news agencies gave the news from a British or American perspective. In 
an attempt to rectify this situation the Japanese government formed its own news 
agency, Domei, to provide news from a Japanese perspective, not merely for the 
Japanese press and radio. This began operations on 1st January 1936.30 
Radio Diplomacy 
The Japanese government observed the rise of Hitler from its own isolated position, 
and fostered its own, somewhat vague, concept of "National Polity" [Kokutai].31 This 
involved bringing the media in line with government policy and preventing criticism 
of the Emperor. In 1933 Germany also withdrew from the League of Nations, and to 
many Japanese, Germany increasingly appeared a natural ally. To encourage links 
with Germany, N.H.K. began exchange broadcasts with the German short-wave 
station, Zeesen, in November 1933. These were usually musical exchanges, such as 
live broadcasts of concerts, and they proved to be popular in Japan. 32 However, in 
contrast, broadcast links with America became less popular with the Japanese 
authorities. On 18th November 1933, N.H.K. was permitted to participate in an 
28 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo Shinju Wan e no Michl pp 47-8 
29 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michl p 51 
30 In the past Japanese news had always been handled by Reuters as part of Asia. There had been previous 
attempts by the Japanese authorities to break the Reuters hold on news in Japan such as the establislunent of the 
Kokusai agency in 1914 and its successor, Rengo, fonned in 1926 in conjunction with AP., but Reuters 
maintained a strong int1uence. Domei was fonned by merging Rengo (The Japml Newspaper Association) and its 
counterpart for telegraphic messages, Dentsu, in 1936, when the Reuters influence was greatly diminished 
following a long battle with AP., so it becmne the first real Japanese news agency. 
See Roger W. Purdy: "Nationalism and News: 'Infonnation Inlperialism' mld Japan 1910-36" in the Journal of 
Americml-East Asian Relations Volume 1, Number 3, Autullm 1992 
31 Kitayama: Rajio T6k.-yo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 64 
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international musical celebration of the opening of the new NBC Radio Centre by 
transmitting music to the Rockefeller Center in New York. However, the Japanese 
government refused to allow the broadcast of the programme on the domestic 
Japanese network.33 This was the first indication of a policy whereby German culture 
had governmental approval, and was encouraged, but that of 'the West' (particularly 
America) was restricted in Japan. The transmission made to New York reflected a 
desire to maintain Japan's "international image." 
Despite the growing political attraction of Germany, exchanges between Japan and 
America did not cease. In April 1934 a very ambitious broadcast was planned for the 
Emperor's Birthday, which aimed to create a radio link across the Pacific, involving 
stations in San Francisco, Manila, Bandung, Bangkok, Hsinking and Tokyo.34 
Following its success, there were other broadcasts involving several stations, which 
aimed to forge "links across the Pacific." One occasion when this technique was 
employed was in the transmission of reports from the Far Eastern Games in Manila in 
1934, the last Far Eastern Games to be held before the Second World War. 35 
The technical quality of programmes improved throughout 1934, as experience of 
broadcasting increased, and Germany continued to be the favoured country for radio 
exchanges, particularly after the opening of a German Cultural Institute in Kyoto 
during that year. On 30th October, there was an exchange broadcast to celebrate the 
70111 birthday of the German Composer, Richard Strauss,36 and four days later there 
was another to commemorate the anniversary of the birthday of the Emperor Meiji. 37 
In 1934 the B.B.C. was given the honour of a Christmas exchange. The Japanese 
government decided on this so as to promote Japanese political, economic and 
cultural ideas to a wider audience than Germany and America. 38 A Federation of 
British Industries Mission led by Lord Bamby had visited Japan and Manchuria the 
33 Kitayama: Rajio Tok-yo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 67 
34 Kitayruna: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjft Wan e no Michi p 78 
35 Kitayama: Rajio T6k-y6: Shinjft Wan e no Michi p 80 
36 Kitayama: Rajio T6k-yo: Shinjft Wan e no Michi p 93 
37 Kitayama: Rajio Tok-yo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 94 
38 Kitaymna: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjft Wan e no Michi p 98 
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previous September. 39 Its report had stated, "We expect and hope Britain to export 
capital goods to Manchurian cities, which are developing rapidly" and concluded that 
there were good prospects for Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the development of 
cities in Manchuria. 40 It is a reasonable supposition that the Christmas good-will 
exchange broadcast was part of the Japanese policy of improving ties between Japan 
and Britain to encourage Britain to recognise, and trade with, Manchuria. 
Exchange broadcasts continued to increase, and by the end of 1934 Japan had 
transmitted a total of forty successful short-wave broadcasts to nations overseas.41 In 
1935, there were further exchanges, beginning with a broadcast in Japanese from 
Germany when the Saarland was returned to Germany. Japan reciprocated by 
broadcasting greetings and congratulations in German. This was followed by the first 
N.H.K. exchange with fascist Italy, which took place on 24th February, and included 
greetings in Italian and Japanese. 42 
During this period of increasing overseas radio activity there were several changes in 
political attitudes towards broadcasting in Japan. In October 1934, the Army 
Ministry published a pamphlet regarding national defence based on their new policy, 
which stated that "A battlefield is the Father of Creation and the Mother of 
Culture."43 This dealt principally with propaganda concerning the role of Manchuria 
in Japanese policy, and the Japanese role in developing Manchuria. It was published 
at the same time that talks were being held in London over the limitation of naval 
armaments in October and November 1934. 
39 The Mission was officially an illlofficial trade mission which the government allowed illlder pressure from 
British exporters who feared that the continued non-recognition of Manchuria would result in the loss of a 
potentially valuable market. The mission was illlofficial as the British government had to consider the political 
repercussions StUTOilllding trade with a COillltry the recognition of which had been forbidden by the League of 
Nations. However, during the mission's trip the members of the mission received an audience \\ith the Japanese 
Emperor, an honour incompatible with the illloflicial status of the mission. 
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From the end of October 1934, there was much discussion about the repeal of the 
1922 Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty, which had set the level of British , 
American and Japanese capital warships at a ratio of 5:5:3.44 On 3rd December the 
Cabinet decided to repeal the treaty.45 This was a significant step, which led to 
deteriorating relations between Japan and the United States. 
The Start of Overseas Broadcasting Proper 
Research into short-wave broadcasting continued in late 1934 and early 1935, and on 
March 3rd 1935 N.H.K. applied to the government for permission to broadcast a 
regular short-wave overseas service. The specified aims of the service were "to 
communicate truly authentic news, and all cultural truth to concerned Japanese 
abroad and to other peoples."46 March 23rd marked the tenth anniversary of N.H.K. 
broadcasting and its President, Iwahara Kenzo, announced the establishment of an 
overseas service to celebrate the event.47 Following detailed planning and 
consultations with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Mfairs (although 
there were none with representatives of the Ministry of Communications which 
became responsible for radio output) official governmental permission to establish the 
overseas service was granted on 4th May.48 
At 1 0.30am on 1st June the N.H.K. overseas service opened, a month after its planned 
opening,49 with the words, "Toku kaigai Minasama! Kochira wa Nihon Hoso Kyokai, 
Tokyo Atagoyama no sutajio de-arimasu."50 Broadcasting on 14,600 kilocycles per 
44 Jrulet HlUlter: The Emergence of Modern Japrul p 274 
45 Kitayama: Rajio Tok)'o: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 96 
46 Kitayama: "Kaigai Hoso ShOshi (lehi)" [A Brief History of Overseas Broadcasting (part One)]; in Kaigai How 
Gurupu (eds.): N.H.K. Senji Kaigai Hoso [N.H.K.'s Wartime Overseas Broadcasting] 
p 115 
47 In the same speech Iwahara also annolUlced that a domestic schools service would also be established to 
celebrate the mmiversary. It begml broadcasting of 15th Apri11935. 
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49 Lcttcr dated 15th April 1935 from the Head of the Overseas Section to Mr. J. D. Benzie, of the B.B.C.'s 
Foreign and Overseas IXpartmcnt. 
B.B.C. Written Archivc: File El/1 035: COlUltries: Japrul. Short-wave TratlSmission File 1 1935-1938 
50 Grl.'Ctings everyone in far otT 1mlds! This is the N.H.K. studio at Atagoyama, Tokyo 
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second (kc/s) with a call sign of JVH, the service's 50kw transmitter was second only 
to the B.B.C. 's Empire Service in output power.51 
The initial overseas broadcasts of one hour per day were directed at the Pacific Coast 
of America and Hawaii, where there were large Japanese communities. 52 On 21 st 
June these transmissions were moved to 2.00-3.00pm, which was considered a much 
more convenient time for the listeners, being 6.00-7.00pm in Hawaii and 9.00-
10.00pm on the Pacific Coast.53 Other transmissions were also soon begun, 
beginning on June 21st with broadcasts to the Eastern United States and South 
America. 54 A European service was begun on 4th September with transmissions on 
Tuesdays and Saturdays from 4.00 to 5.00am, and at the beginning of 1937 a 
transmission to Java and the Straits Settlements55 was added. 56 
Following the beginning of overseas broadcasting, reports were received from many 
areas of the Pacific regarding the first programmes. Radio Peking reported that on 1 st 
June it had heard the initial broadc'ast clearly between 9.30 and 1 0.30am. 57 This was 
significant for previous experimental broadcasts to most of China had frequently been 
plagued by "crackling" and a lack of clarity. Reports from Canada and San Francisco 
also indicated that the transmission was clearly audible. By the end of July N.H.K. 
had received 175 reports from listeners abroad. 58 
51 N.H.K.: Hoso Goju Nen-shi [50 Years of Broadcasting] Volume One. pp 99-100 
52 In 1941, there were 160,000 Japanese living in Hawaii, the third largest group of Japanese living abroad after 
China and Brazil. In the smaller total population of Hawaii, however, their presence was more noticeable than in 
either of the other countries, and the Japanese constituted the largest ethnic group, making up about 40% of the 
total population of Hawaii. 
John J. Stephan: Hawaii Under the Rising Sun. Plans For Conquest After Pearl Harbor. p 23 
53 Kitayanla: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 115 
54 Kitayarna says that transmissions to Eastern America and South America began on 21 st June, broadcasting on 
Tuesdays and Fridays. (Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 115) However, N.H.K.'s Hoso Goju Nen-shi 
claims that this transmission began on 25th June. (p 99) It is unclear whether this is the date when it was decided 
to make it a daily service, or whether there is some confusion regarding the starting date. 
55 Singapore and Malaya 
56 N.H.K.: Hoso Goju Nen-shi p 99 
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5g Ofthcsc, twenty-seven reports carne from Japanese embassies and consulates. 
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During the first few weeks of broadcasting there was one feature or radio play per day 
in the transmission. These included an interview with a touring American baseball 
team and a "Radio Review" from the Moulin Rouge, in Paris. 59 Scheduling, 
however, was learnt through trial and error, as precise scheduling had not been 
necessary for exchange broadcasts when the two halves of the exchange had been on 
different days. On June 9th the feature ran over time by two minutes and the news in 
Japanese had to be shortened at the last minute. The next day the schedulers were 
careful to ensure that everything ran to time.60 
The first few months of radio broadcasting proper were, then, a time of learning for 
the seven members of the overseas section at N.H.K., which included one American, 
Newton Edgars.61 
Censorship of Overseas Broadcasts 
From the beginning, censorship was an integral element of overseas broadcasting. 
This was understandable as the impetus to begin short-wave broadcasting derived 
from the need to improve Japan's international image following the Manchurian 
Incident. Thus the government had an important role in scrutinising broadcasting 
output from a very early stage. Before the license to broadcast regular overseas 
programmes was issued on 4th May, there were no specific rules regarding censorship 
of short-wave broadcasting, although all broadcasts which were to be relayed abroad 
did pass through the Ministry of Communications for checking. 
The formal permission to broadcast overseas, issued on 4th May, contained clauses 
relating to government censorship of the broadcasts. All programme outlines were to 
be passed to the Department of Communications in the Ministry of Communications 
for approval seven days prior to transmission. The contents of scripts not under the 
direct jurisdiction of the Department of Communications were then to be resubmitted 
to the Heads of the Departments of Communications and Electrical Affairs two days 
59 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 114 
60 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 114 
61 Kitayama states that Edgars was one of the original seven members of the overseas broadcasting team at 
N.H.K. However, I have been unable to locate any biographical details about him. Thus it is not possible to 
establish who he was, or why he was selected for inclusion in the group. 
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before going on air. In addition, N.H.K. was required to submit a monthly report to 
the Head of the Department of Communications via the Head of Electrical Affairs.62 
From December 1926 N.H.K.'s domestic transmitting stations had been equipped 
with circuit breakers which allowed Ministry of Communications censors to interrupt 
a programme for as long as material strayed from the approved script,63 and these 
were also installed in the overseas broadcasting studios. In addition, on 8th May, after 
the licence was issued to N.H.K., a direct line telephone was installed in Atagoyama 
to the Ministry of Communications for the purpose of programme surveillance.64 The 
Ministry had the power to shut-down a transmission at any point if it was not 
considered suitable. Thus a comedy transmitted on 15th July was cut because it was 
considered to dishonour Japanese troops in Korea.65 
As well as removing and altering offending passages, the censors also added passages 
to scripts in order to reinforce traditional values or Japanese views, if it was 
considered that broadcasts did not present them with sufficient emphasis. At this time 
several broadcasts by prominent academics were censored. A speech entitled "The 
Japanese Spirit and World Peace" by a leading Tokyo Imperial University Professor, 
Shioya Atsushi, on 26th June had a passage removed which criticised Mussolini, 
Hitler, the Soviets, the British, the French and the Americans.66 Presumably the 
government was unwilling to offend all the leading nations simultaneously. In 
addition, the first attempted simultaneous domestic and overseas radio broadcast, of a 
film drama, ''Breakthrough Wireless," was dropped because it dealt with the Ministry 
of Communications' cable boats, which carried out repairs to undersea cables in 
Japanese coastal waters. It was considered that the image of the boats' operations 
given by the programme revealed too much about the Japanese emergency first line 
of defence, so the domestic broadcast was made, but it was dropped from the overseas 
schedules. 
62 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Miehi plIO 
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Japanese broadcasters admired the impartiality of the B.B.C.'s "Empire Service" 
from its establishment in 1932, and had hoped to emulate it in their own short-wave 
broadcasts. However, the importance of censorship and propaganda to Japanese 
international broadcasting was incompatible with a B.B.C.-style approach. From its 
very beginnings the Japanese governement saw N.H.K. 's role as to present a positive 
Japanese image in the face of much international criticism. 
The Development of Overseas Broadcasting 
Criticism of the American government was an important element in Japanese 
broadcasts from soon after regular overseas broadcasting began. In August 1935, the 
first broadcasts appeared which discussed the issue of possible war with America 
resulting from American policy in the Pacific. 67 However, it was recognised that 
Japanese Americans were generally loyal to the United States and that it was 
important not to alienate them. Under the title of "Observations and Studies of the 
Fatherland," N.H.K. began a series of broadcasts, which aimed to increase the 
awareness of Japanese in America of "things Japanese. "68 
On 1st October 1935, the frequency and call sign ofN.H.K.'s overseas service were 
changed from JVH on 14600kc/s to JUN broadcasting on 10660kc/s, 28.14m69 and 
this coincided with a change in the tone of output from Atagoyama. The portrayal 
and exaltation of the "Japanese Spirit," and its uniqueness became a dominant theme. 
Takashima Heisaburo summed it up for overseas listeners on 11th October, in a talk 
entitled "Concerning the Japanese Spirit," which defined the Spirit in terms of 
A Clear Heart 
A Pure Heart 
A Just Heart 
An Honest Heart 70 
67 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 120 
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70 Nihon Seishin ni Tsuite 
Aki kokoro 
Kiyoki kokoro 
Tadashiki kokoro 
Jiki kokoro 
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Growing hostility to the West in overseas broadcasts did not, however, prevent 
exchange broadcasts taking place, and music broadcasts from other countries were 
still relayed on the Japanese domestic network. These exchanges included broadcasts 
to the United States to celebrate American Independence Day.71 In August 1935, 
there was an exchange with Germany which discussed the preparations for the Berlin 
Olympics to be held the following year,72 and on 28th October the German station at 
Zeesen relayed a Japanese broadcast to Germany across Europe for the first time.73 A 
further exchange, with France, included a relay of Saint Saens' opera Samson and 
Delilah on the Japanese network.14 
Whilst emphasising the 'Shinto nature' 75 of Japan in domestic broadcasts, the 
Japanese maintained an international Christmas broadcast on the overseas service in 
1935, as they had done in previous years. On 20th December, a speech on the national 
network denounced the celebration of Christmas, but on 22nd a Bach Christmas 
Concert was relayed from Leipzig.16 A choral broadcast to Italy had been planned by 
N.H.K. for midriight on Christmas Eve, but it was finally cancelled after a three-hour 
delay due to technical faults in the transmitting equipment.77 At the end of 1935, 
N.H.K. had by no means perfected its overseas broadcasting technology. 
Soon after the beginning of 1936, on 28th January, King George V broadcast to Japan 
on the B.B.C. following the conclusion of the Naval Arms Limitation Talks in 
London. However, throughout his two broadcasts, music by Beethoven was played 
by JOAK (Tokyo Central Broadcasting) on the same frequency.78 It is not 
unreasonable to presume that this was an organised attempt to mask the King's voice 
and prevent his speeches being audible in Japan, rather than a coincidental clash of 
71 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjo. Wan e no Michi pp 125-6 
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frequencies, and was probably the first occasion on which the Japanese authorities 
attempted to jam a foreign transmission. 
On 26th February 1936, an attempted coup d'etat by a radical military faction (the 26th 
February Incident) occurred in Tokyo. The overseas broadcasting station at 
Atagoyama was not overrun79 and the broadcasters there tried to maintain the usual 
schedules, although the government imposed a news blackout regarding the incident. 
A brief statement, in the form of a short announcement by the War Ministry, was 
made in Japanese language reports on both domestic and overseas broadcasts late on 
26th February. 80 It stated that early that morning, "junior officers" had attacked and 
killed or wounded the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, and other government 
officials. 81 However, this item was not inserted into the English language schedules 
until the following day.82 Generally, coverage of the situation in English did increase 
as the situation unfolded. Reports in Japanese also increased, and besides the usual 
news reports, these included messages to Japanese diplomats abroad, who, caught by 
surprise, had no other means of obtaining information or instructions from Japan, as 
the situation was so confused. 83 The International Department tried to adhere to its 
approved schedules, but some allowance was made for the increase in news coverage, 
and songs were omitted in order to make room for it. 84 The attempted coup was 
eventually put down and the 26th February Incident came to an end at 2.00pm on 
February 29th 1936, following a radio appeal to the rebel troops. The Emperor 
ordered the suppression of the rebels on the morning of 29th. The radio appeal 
pointed out that the troops had not realised that their actions were treasonous when 
they joined the rebellion, but that they were now in direct rebellion agianst the 
Emperor, and should respect his orders and surrender.85 
79 Once the incident had started rebel troops did consider overrunning N.H.K., but by this time it had become too 
heavily guarded. 
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Subsequently, Japanese overseas broadcasting's treatment of the incident was 
criticised by two sides. The Ministry of Communications was extremely unhappy at 
the detailed information, which had been broadcast abroad about a domestic situation , 
and it began research into the standard of censorship at N.H.K. Criticism from 
outside Japan, however, was directed at the slowness of N.H.K. to report that a 
serious incident was occurring. Western journalists had transmitted reports regarding 
the attempted coup as the story had broken, and maintained a steady stream of 
transmissions to the West throughout the three-day period. 86 Besides the brief 
statement in Japanese on 26th February, N.H.K. did not report the situation until the 
following day, and even then the reports remained very brief for a further day. In 
addition, foreign broadcasters outside Japan were critical of the programme 
schedules, which they claimed had been too inflexible in not allowing sufficient news 
reports to be inserted. The International Department was caught between these two 
opposing criticisms, and whilst seeking not to damage its image abroad, as a serious 
journalistic broadcasting station, it could do little except bow to the pressure of its 
own government and agree to an increased level of censorship. 87 
In fear of further trouble the Okada government subsequently mounted a "Tranquility 
Campaign," in order to bring calm, and this was reflected in both domestic and 
overseas radio schedules. This media campaign stressed the qualities of Japan and 
the Japanese, and coincided in time with flowering of the cherry blossoms, the 
symbol of Japan. 88 In addition, programmes were broadcast on overseas radio which 
attempted to repair the damage caused by the 26th February Incident, and improve 
Japan's image abroad. One such programme was "An Introduction to Japan"89 a 
thirty minute 'D.J.-style" programme, which was broadcast weekly for seven 
episodes. It attempted to describe "J apaneseness" to foreigners and dealt with such 
topics as "Summer in Japan," "Kamakura" and "Summer Holidays."9o The need to 
86 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 144 
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repair the image of Japan was considered urgent, as Japan was eager to be approved 
as host for the 1940 Olympics.91 
The Italian occupation of Addis Ababa, in Abyssinia92, on 5th May 1936 provided an 
early example of the dual nature of Japanese broadcasting with different perspectives 
marking domestic and overseas transmissions. Within Japan the public position of 
the government was that Italy had recognised the Japanese position in Manchuria, and 
that of Germany in the Rhineland, so Japan would naturally recognise Italian gains in 
Abyssinia. This position was also expressed in broadcasts aimed at Germany and 
Italy. However, the Emperor expressed his wish to Japan's political leaders that good 
relations with Britain should also be cultivated, and quite differing sentiments about 
Abyssinia were expressed in broadcasts intended for British listeners.93 
The Berlin Olympics dominated the summer of 1936 on the radio. In June the 
Director of the Overseas Section and two assistants flew to Berlin and in July there 
were broadcasts from various places -in Germany on both domestic and overseas 
radio. Japanese commentators at the Olympics used both the Japanese-made, carbon 
microphones, which they had taken with them, and more advanced German-made 
crystal microphones, which they brought back to Japan after the Olympics, in order to 
assist N.H.K. 's research into radio equipment.94 
Increasing Government Control 
Following the 26th February Incident the political value of broadcasting was 
increasingly recognised. During the incident the rebels had paralysed other 
communications systems, but broadcasting operations had continued almost without 
change. However, following criticism that N.H.K. was too liberal, on 2nd May the 
cabinet agreed to establish a new body to oversee the media, the Cabinet Information 
91 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 150 
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93 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 150. 
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Committee.95 Its establishment on 1st July removed responsibility for censorship 
from the Ministry of Communications. The Information Committee consisted of 
representatives of each of the ministries, Domei, (representing the press) and N.H.K. 
It was claimed that a body with a single task would be more effective in censorship of 
the media than the previous system of circulating N.H.K. scripts, for example, around 
several departments in the Ministry of Communications. The expansion of N.H.K. 
and other communications networks had rendered this an enormous burden on the 
Ministry. 
The Cabinet Information Committee removed this burden from the Ministry of 
Communications, and meeting daily, it reported directly to the Cabinet, thus avoiding 
the system of circulating scripts around several departments. Scripts continued to be 
submitted a week in advance for the approval of subject matter, and two days in 
advance of transmission for approval of details. However, the daily discussions 
between representatives of the Ministries, who had previously not met when 
. considering the censorship of a script, meant that government control over N.H.K. 
broadcasting was greatly strengthened, as the possibility of the Department of 
Communications misinterpreting the censorship comments of other bodies was 
removed. 96 
The Cabinet Information Committee became increasingly important. In September 
1937 it was expanded and elevated to the status of ''Division. "97 It was further 
expanded in 1940 to ''Bureau'' status, and remained the body in charge of media 
censorship until the end of the war. 98 
Post-Olympic Broadcasting 
After the 1936 Olympics, N.H.K.'s Overseas Section began an autumn senes of 
broadcasts which, it claimed, was to build on the feelings of international goodwill 
95 N aikaku JobO Iinkai 
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generated by the Berlin Olympics. These broadcasts began in September with a 
programme introducing the Japanese poetic form, haiku, to an American audience. In 
this the announcer encouraged the audience to write haiku and send them in. 99 In 
October the presenters of the sequel programme read out some of the haiku by 
Americans, and English translations of some famous Japanese haiku. loo The aim of 
the programmes was to introduce Japanese culture to foreigners and thus spread 
foreign acceptance of'1hings Japanese." 
The Autumn schedules were not, however, based solely on exporting Japanese 
culture, but also on demonstrating that Japan accepted other cultures. As part of this, 
on 21& September a broadcast was relayed by N.H.K., which surveyed different 
musical styles and backgrounds across America. lol In October, a programme entitled 
"Radio Cabaret" began. As an experiment in attracting foreign listeners, it included 
jazz records and songs as part of the promotion of a good image of Japan, although 
jazz was rare on domestic radio broadcasts as it was considered an evil of the 
"decadent West."102 
On 15th November 1936 N.H.K. joined N.B.C. and other broadcasting companies in a 
world broadcast of cultural items to celebrate the anniversary of the founding of 
N.B.C. N.H.K. relayed both the Chinese and Australian sections of the broadcast on 
the domestic network, as well as broadcasting the Japanese section on short-wave. 
The broadcast involved many of the world's leading broadcasting companies and 
corporations, and according to Kitayama Setsuro was the final "goodwill" broadcast 
involving Japan, Germany and the United States, before the beginning of World War 
Two. lo3 
The unstable situation in China deteriorated further in the summer of 1936, and in 
August two Japanese journalists were killed in Chengdu. lo4 There were other anti-
99 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjl1 Wan e no Michi p 169 
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Japanese incidents in China, and on 28th September, as tension mounted, the Cabinet 
Information Committee issued a report on the situation. It condemned the actions of 
the Chinese in attacking Japanese nationals and issued a policy statement, which 
called for propaganda to promote the Japanese view of events, particularly within 
China105. As N.H.K.'s Overseas Section was well placed to promote the Japanese 
case abroad it was given this task. The strict radio censorship, which began in the 
autumn of 1936, was the forerunner of the censorship system, which became standard 
in foreign propaganda after the outbreak of fighting with China in July 1937. 
With the conclusion of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact106 in Berlin on 25th 
November 1936, the Cabinet Information Committee was faced with the need for a 
propaganda line to justify the Pact to the rest of the world. On 21 st, in preparation for 
the signing, the Committee announced to N.H.K. and Domei that the Pact was to be 
presented as a treaty to confound the activities of the Comintern. They were still 
faced with the problem that Japan was seen to be allied to fascism, but the strong 
promotion of the anti-Communist line was intended to overshadow this, and radio 
news stressed this point at every opportunity. 107 
On 13th December 1936, all the Japan~se morning newspapers carried reports of a 
coup in China, and the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek. The first reports concerning the 
Xian Incident [Seian Jiken]108 were made to the rest of the world over N.H.K.'s 
overseas radio service, and this increased the international prestige of N.H.K. In line 
with Cabinet Information Committee propaganda, the coup was attributed to the 
105 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 166 
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Comintern, which, it was claimed, had initiated the coup solely as part of its plan to 
overrun Japan. 109 
In mid-December the Vice-Chairman of the House of Representatives, Okada 
Tadahiko, broadcast a summary of the year's events for overseas listeners. In it he 
commented on the Comintern rallying left-wing elements against the peaceful 
Germans and Japanese, but recognised that this was damaging to Japanese relations 
with both the Soviet Union and China. Regarding the Xian Incident specifically, he 
stated that Japan was the defender of peace in the Far East, and would maintain that 
peace by all means, by opposing any extremist groupS.110 
On 1 st January 1937 the Overseas Section was expanded, in accordance with plans 
approved the previous June and broadcasting time was increased to four hours daily. 
The broadcasting day began with a transmission to Europe at 4.30am.1l1 Newscasts 
were ten minutes long and were followed by a record, and although the broadcasts 
were in English, it was announced that items in French and German would soon be 
added to the schedules, when a second 50kw transmitter came into operation. From 
6.00 to 7.00am the transmission was directed at the Eastern United States and South 
America, consisting of ten minutes of news in Japanese, and records and news in 
English. The transmission to Hawaii and the Western United States continued at the 
same time, 2.00 to 3.00pm, including on New Years Day a relay of the celebrations 
for the "10,000 Year Anniversary" of the Atsuta Shrine1l2 in Nagoya, which followed 
the news in both Japanese and English. Between 11.00pm and 12.00am N.H.K. 
began a transmission to the Straits Settlements and Java. 113 
109 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: ShinJo Wan e no Michi p 172 
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112 The Atsuta Shrine [Atsuta Jingu] is a Shinto shrine in the Atsuta Ward of Nagoya, which is said to hold the 
sacred sword, Kusanagi no Tsumugi, [Grass-cutting Sword], one of the three Imperial Regalia According to 
tradition, the consort of the legendary hero, Prince Yamatotakeru, whose life was miraculously saved by this 
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Generally, all the features broadcast during the following weeks were based around 
promoting Japanese culture and the "Japanese Spirit." "Japan Invites You" and 
"World Radio," both broadcast to Europe in January 1937 are examples of this type 
of programme, which attempted to increase interest in Japanese culture, whilst 
playing jazz records to persuade Europeans to listen in.114 
The Prelude to War (January - July 1937) 
On 27tn January 1937 the ''News of the Japanese Homeland," a round up of news for 
Japanese in the United States, reported the fall of the Japanese cabinet on 23rd. On 
11th February the new Prime Minister, Hayashi Senjuro, (the former Army Minister), 
used N.H.K. microphones to speak to the overseas audience. His speech emphasised 
that the "completion of military preparations for national defence [was] necessary for 
the realisation of national policy. "115 The March edition of Hoso magazine116 said 
that this was the first time a new Prime Minister had presented the policies of his 
cabinet primarily by radio.117 
In February a film produced jointly by Japan and Germany was released, ''which it 
was hoped would show 'the unity of the Nazi group spirit and the racial spirit of the 
Japanese as opposed to the weak spirit of the democracies. "'118 Entitled Atarashiki 
Tsuchi [New Earth] and given the English title Daughter of the Samurai, it was 
publicised heavily on Japanese overseas radio. The aim of the film was to "'praise 
the Japanese family system and particularly stress the volcano-like sacrificing spirit 
of Japan' by portraying the conversion of the Japanese hero from democracy back to 
a belief in the Japanese family system,"119 in order to familiarise Germans with their 
new ally. On 11th February the director, Arnold Fank and the Japanese female star, 
Hara Setsuko, were interviewed during the morning broadcast to Europe and the 
theme song was played. 120 A special broadcast in German reviewed the film in more 
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detail and the broadcast was simultaneously relayed across the German domestic 
network as German-Japanese co-operation in producing the film was considered 
extremely important. 
On 1 st April the French and German language programmes which had been promised 
in the New Year expansion of the Overseas Section finally began. However, the 
upgrading of the 20kw Nazaki transmitter, which had been planned to accompany this 
did not occur until lOth May. 121 French broadcasts were transmitted on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays for ten minutes at S.lSam, following a shortened 3/4 hour broadcast in 
English. German broadcasts occupied the same place in the schedule on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays. Both broadcasts were presented by a Japanese speaking 
presenter and a native speaker.122 With the increase in output after lOth May, the 
schedules again changed slightly as the range of the transmitters was increased and 
transmissions to the Straits Settlements and Java were extended in range to include 
Australia and New Zealand. 123 The growth of overseas broadcasting resulted in the 
Overseas Section being upgraded and renamed the International Department on 26th 
May, with a staff, which had been increased from seven to twenty. 124 The size of the 
staff continued to rise as the International Department played an increasingly 
important role in Japanese political propaganda. 
During the Spring and Summer of 1937 the political situation in Manchuria became 
increasingly tense. Japanese and Soviet troops clashed several times along the 
Manchurian-Soviet and Manchurian-Mongolian borders. In June, Soviet troops 
landed on an island in the Amur River border at Kanchasu. The first report from the 
scene was broadcast in the transmission to the Straits Settlements, Java and Australia 
in Japanese and English.125 The news was considered too important to delay its 
broadcast in French until the regular French language broadcast the following day, 
and reports on the situation in English, German and French were made during the 
transmission to Europe. However, as the regular schedule called for a German-
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language news programme, the length of the French report was carefully 
monitored. 126 Once N .H.K. had received permission to report on the incident, 
information about the situation in Kanchasu dominated the news on overseas 
broadcasting, with forty-eight reports made between 30th June and 3rd July. 127 
On the evening of 7th July 1937 Japanese troops on the outskirts of Peking clashed 
with Chinese forces and seized control of the Marco Polo Bridge. The Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident signalled the end of skirmishes in China and the outbreak of a full 
scale, though undeclared, Sino-Japanese war, which contributed to a serious 
worsening of relations with the United States. 
In the 1930s Western visitors to Japan were often highly critical of Japanese 
broadcasting. In 1943, John Morris a Briton who had lived in Japan from 1938 to 
1942, wrote of his experience of Japanese broadcasting, ''Little attention had hitherto 
been paid to microphone technique, with the result that nearly every talk opens with a 
burst of thunder, the speaker, clearing his throat. This is followed by frequent 
coughing and the crackle of pages being turned over." He was also critical of the 
N.H.K. studios at Atagoyama which, "were situated in a converted mansion, and 
there were none of the faculties one finds in a modem studio. Not one of the rooms 
was soundproof and loose wires trailed all over the floor. I talked once or twice to 
America from this building ... and before I got to the end I nearly always heard the 
gentleman in the next room clearing his throat and warming up . " ."128 However, 
contrary to this contemporary view, by 1937 the overseas broadcasting operation of 
the Japanese was not primitive. Although, like other broadcasting companies, many 
of the techniques of timing and programming were learnt by trial and error, the rapid 
rate at which the Japanese caught up with European overseas broadcasting displayed 
a significant advance in technical capability. This continued after the outbreak of war 
in China and enabled Japan to participate fully in the world "radio war," which began 
during the "China Incident" and developed into a wider conflict with the Western 
powers after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. 
126 Kitayarna claims that this was on 31 st June, so one must assume he means June 30th. 
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Chapter 3: From War in China to War in the Pacific 
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Overseas Broadcasting 
On the night of 7th July 1937, Japanese troops conducting manoeuvres near the Marco 
Polo Bridge, south-west of Peking, engaged in a skirmish with Chinese forces, after 
hearing shots. 1 Details regarding the start of the "China Incident" still remain unclear. 
However the "Incident" was first reported on Japanese overseas radio during the 
transmission to the Western United States on 8th July 1937. The report consisted of a 
translation of a report previously made on the domestic network: 
The Japanese military authorities at Peking made the following 
announcement at 7 0' clock this morning. About 10 0' clock last 
night, while detached Japanese troops were engaged in night 
manoeuvres about 1,000 metres north of Lukouchiao, a sudden 
attack was made by Chinese soldiers under the cover of several 
guns.2 
The Information Committee directed N.H.K. to explain the "Incident" in terms of the 
Japanese people making a sacrifice to stop Chinese aggression, in order to keep the 
peace in East Asia and oppose Communism in Asia. 3 The International Department 
was instructed to increase the length of news reports in overseas broadcasts, to tighten 
the censorship of them and to double the number of political speeches broadcast. 
Hence French and German news reports became daily broadcasts in the European 
transmission. 4 
Broadcasts were strictly regulated, not only to prevent sensitive material from being 
broadcast, but also in order that the language used was not overtly anti-Chinese. It 
was considered that such language would not appeal to potential foreign listeners and, 
combined with media reports in their own countries, would tum them against the 
Japanese view. Instead, the need to protect Manchuria, now stable under Japanese 
1 David J. Lu, in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 5 p 113 
2 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: ShinjO-Wan e no Michi p 197 
This was, in fact, a translation of part of the military communique which appeared in a similar foml 
in The Japan Times and Mail, July 8th 1937 pi 
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control, from China, and the need for stability in Asia were stressed, and the military 
language used more frequently in domestic broadcasts, was toned down or omitted. 5 
In August 1937, newscasts in Spanish and Chinese were added to the overseas 
schedules. Newscasts in Spanish were inserted into the transmission for the Eastern 
United States and South America. The first newscast in Chinese6 consisted of three 
news items read in very faltering Chinese, by an announcer with a heavy Japanese 
accent. It was in retaliation to the Chinese station XGOA which broadcast on short-
wave in Japanese and indicated the start of the "radio war" in China. This was 
recognised by the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun which called it AK's7 sound-wave bombing."8 
Overseas broadcasting and the Gaichi 
In the 1930s and 1940s the Japanese Empire was considered to fall into two parts, the 
naichi (internal region) and the gaichi (external region). The naichi consisted of the 
four Japanese mainland islands, the RyilkyU Islands and Karafut09 and the gaichi, the 
South Sea Islands and other areas of Asia under Japanese administration. The co-
operation of the gaichi radio stations with those in the naichi had been discussed at 
conferences in Tokyo and Seoul in 1936.10 These conferences resulted in the 
establishment of a Broadcasting Liaison Councilll to ensure co-operation on policy 
between the Japanese government and the broadcasting stations in Japan, Manchuria, 
Korea and Taiwan. 
5 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinjil-Wan e no Michi p 205-6 
6 Kitayama uses the term Shinago for "Chinese" here. Shina was the derogatory term for China used 
by the Japanese during the 1930s and 40s instead of the more usual Chugoku. Kitayama does not 
specify, but as short-wave broadcasts in various Chinese dialects began later, it is probably safe to 
assume that Shinago here means Mandarin Chinese (Putonghua). 
7 AK was used to mean Tokyo Central Broadcasting, the call sign of which was JOAK. The JO 
signified a station in Japan, and AK the Tokyo station. JOBK signified the Osaka station. 
8 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Alichi p 205 
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10 These were attended by members of the broadcasting censors, and representatives of the regular 
Japanese Army, the Kwantung Army and the army in Korea. 
11 H6s6 Renraku Kaigi 
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At the time of the China Incident, the Japanese gaichi radio stations were brought into 
the plan to explain the Japanese position to foreign audiences. The 10kw Dairen12 
station in Manchuria began broadcasting news reports in English and Manchu for 
China and the Straits Settlements on 13th July.13 In addition to the regular broadcasts, 
following the opening of the Tientsin14 station on August 1937, weekly North China -
Manchuria radio exchanges took place. These concentrated on current affairs, and 
discussed political developments and important speeches made during the week. 15 The 
Hsinking station also began broadcasting in English, Manchu and Japanese on 1st 
September, and by the end of the year the Manchurian Cable and Telegraph Company 
received 174 listener reports from overseas, 147 of which were in the United States. 16 
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The lOkw station in Taipei was employed to counter the broadcasts of the Nanking17 
station to Southern China. In July it began two daily news broadcasts in the Fukien 18 
dialect and a third in the Peking dialect. 19 By the end of the month a further newscast, 
in English, was inserted into the Taipei schedule, bringing the total daily overseas 
broadcasting time of the station to one-and-a-quarter hours.20 
The Peking Radio Station, itself, which the Japanese had been keen to restore to 
operation, was re-opened on 17th October 1937 with an increased power of 500w. It 
was to be "engaged in the important task of enlightening the local public by the 
distribution of news, cultural matters, and means of recreation. "21 
In Korea, the Seoul station's powerful 50kw transmitter began broadcasting a daily 
five-minute newscast in Russian in December 1937. This was picked up and relayed 
by the smaller transmitter at Chongjin, in north-west Korea, to explain Japanese 
actions to the USSR, the most powerful neighbour to the north of Japanese occupied 
territory. 22 
New Year Expansion 
In his annual New Year broadcast for 1938 Komori Shichiro, the Head of N.H.K., 
stressed the important role of international broadcasting in the current political climate, 
and officially announced an expansion and re-structuring of the International 
Department. The four transmission regions were increased to five, South America and 
the Eastern United States being separated. As the South American transmission no 
longer included the Eastern United States, English language items were dropped from 
the schedules and replaced by newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese on alternate 
days.23 
17 Nanjing 
18 Fujian 
19 Beijing 
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The transmission to the Eastern United States was further divided into two half-hour 
transmissions; one in English and the other in Japanese, although this arrangement 
remained experimental until 1 st July 1939.24 Both the European and the Java, Straits 
Settlements and Australia transmissions were increased by thirty minutes. In addition, 
the latter began newscasts in French, Dutch and Spanish, for people in French Indo-
China,25 the Netherlands East Indies26 and the Philippines. From January 1938 the 
daily schedule for the International Department was as in figure 2 below.27 
04.30 - 06.00 to Europe Japanese; English; French; 
German 
06.30 - 07.30 to South America Japanese; Portuguese; 
Spanish 
08.00 - 08.30 to the Eastern United 
States 
- English 
09.00 - 09.30 to the Eastern United Japanese 
States 
14.00 - 15.30 to Hawaii and the Western Japanese; English 
United States 
22.00 - 23.30 to Java, Australia and the Japanese; English; French; 
Straits Settlements Dutch, Spanish 
Figure 2: The International Department schedule from January 1938 
During the spnng of 1938 programme planners at N.H.K. decided that more 
entertainment was needed in the overseas schedules, particularly in the broadcasts to 
Europe and America. Generally, Japanese radio was very serious in content, and 
overseas broadcasting had followed the same pattern. However, it was noted that 
American and European broadcasting was based on a greater proportion of 
entertainment programmes, and in order to coax listeners to tune in to Japanese 
broadcasts, it was decided that N.H.K.'s schedules should reflect the Western stations 
more closely. Entertainment focused on classical music and music of Japanese 
composers living abroad, such as Hayasaka Fumio, and Germanic and Italian 
composers, such as Mozart and Rossini were included in the schedules.28 
24 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 230 
25 Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
26 Indonesia 
27 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 230 
28 See Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no jfichi pp 240-3 
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Extension of the War in China 
At the end of July 1938 the structure of the International Department ofN.H.K. was 
again re-organised. The target audience of broadcasts to Java, the Straits Settlements 
and Australia was extended to include people who felt "the waves of the Japan Current 
... (and) ... its great ripples in the Southern Regions,"29 and on 15th August it was 
renamed the transmission for "China and the South Seas." New technology meant that 
this service could use two transmitters simultaneously. This allowed for greater 
diversity in the languages, which could be transmitted or the areas which could receive 
a broadcast. 30 Figure 3, overleaf, shows the transmission schedule for 15th August 
1938, the first day that the new system operated.31 
The start of direct short-wave broadcasts to China precipitated a senes entitled 
"Chinese Dispatch,"32 which examined various issues relating to China including "The 
Fallacies of the National Government's Propaganda."33 This expansion programme 
was completed on 18th August when N.H.K. announced it was to introduce broadcasts 
in Dutch as part of the broadcast to the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, as 
it was "aiming at the presentation of correct facts and news concerning Japan and 
things Japanese. "34 
Besides the expanded short-wave broadcasting to China, the "Propaganda Plan and 
Outline for Strategic Propaganda"35 also made provision for the opening of medium-
wave stations in occupied China. 36 The first of these stations to go into operation was 
the one in Japanese occupied Nanking, which began broadcasting on 10th September 
1938. Previously a National Government station, it was rebuilt and refurbished by the 
Japanese and was given a 10kw transmitter by Tokyo Central Broadcasting (JOAK). 
29 Hoso Magazine, August 1938; 
op cit. Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 252 
30 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 252 
31 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi pp 252-3 
32 Shina no Tsushin 
33 Kokumin Seifu Senden no Kyogi 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 253 
34 Japan Times and Mail, 5th August 1938 
35 Senden Keikaku, Boryaku Senden Yoryo 
36 The plan stated that ideally these should be only lOkm apart to ensure clear reception for everyone. 
Kitayama: Rajio TOkyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 254 
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Time Signal 1 Signal 2 
22.00 Opening statements in Japanese Opening statements in Japanese 
and English and English 
22.05 News in Japanese News in Japanese 
22.15 Two folk songs (records) Two folk songs (records) 
Chimes - Start of Split Transmission 
22.25 News in English News in English 
Talk in Chinese: ''Ending 
22.35 Continuing News in English Dependence on the Europeans and 
the Americans." 
22.45 Continuing News in English News ·in Chinese 
Chimes - Start of Split Transmission 
22.55 Chinese records Chinese records 
Chimes - Start of Split Transmission 
News in Dutch with Wilhelm Josias 
23.05 Van Dienst37 and Kumakura News in French 
Miyasu 
Chimes - Start of Split Transmission 
Talk in Japanese: "The August Talk in Japanese: "The August 
23.15 edition of News of the Mother edition of News of the Mother 
Country" Country" 
23.25 
Closing statements in Japanese and Closing statements in Japanese and 
English. English. 
23.30 Close down Close down 
Figure 3: The transmission schedule for "China and the South Seas," August 15th 1938, the first day 
the new "split transmission" came into operation. 
37 Dienst was a Dutch Buddhist Priest who went to Japan from Java long before the war, and who was 
notorious for being very anti-European. He was described by Peter Mendelsson in 19-1-l as "a 
renegade well known to the Dutch authorities." 
Peter Mendelsson: Japan's Political Warfare p 39 
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The "new" station went into operation using its former Chinese call sign of XGOA. 38 
The Japanese deliberately planned this, because when the National Government had 
abandoned Nanking for Chungking,39 it had begun broadcasting from there, with the 
same call sign, as it was recognisable to listeners as the National Government station. 
By using the same call sign the Japanese hoped to trick listeners into tuning into the 
Japanese station instead of the Chinese one.40 
In the latter half of 1938, most exchange broadcasts were with the Axis nations. A 
group from the Hitler Youth Movement visited Japan in August and September, and a 
broadcast of greetings from them entitled "A Present to our Anti-Communist Ally, 
Germany"41 was transmitted to Europe on 23rd September.42 A visit of Japanese 
students to Italy in August prompted a Japanese-Italian radio exchange on 8th 
August,43 and a Manchurian Economic Mission trip to Italy in September produced a 
Manchurian-Italian exchange, which was also broadcast on the Japanese overseas 
network. 44 
New Year Campaigns 
The New Year, 1939, began with a campaign in the International Section ofN.H.K. 
which incorporated two key themes; "The Japanese Spirit" and "The New Order in 
East Asia. "45 It included a new series of broadcasts, the "Japan Culture Series. "46 The 
38 Whilst 'T' is the prefix for the call sign of all Japanese stations, "X' is used in the call signs of 
Chinese stations. 
39 Chongqing 
40 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 255 
41 B6ky6 Meih6 no Doitsu e no Okurimono 
42 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 261 
43 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 261 
44 Kitayama: Rajio Toky6: Shinjl1 Wan e no A1ichi p 262 
45 Nippon Seishin and Toa Shinchitsujo . . .." . 
Japan's "New Order in East Asia" reflected th~ NazI cl~lms ~o be establIshmg a New Ord~r in 
Europe" free from the influence of the democracIes. Japan s. cl~m was that she sought to establIsh a 
"New Order" whereby East Asia was free from Western dommation. 
46 Nihon Bunka Shiriizu 
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initial talk in the series described the essence of the "Modern Japanese Spirit"47 as a 
"S pirit of patriotism and loyalty to the country. "48 
The start of a campaign to stress that the task of the Japanese was to build a New 
Order in East Asia, was hailed by a broadcast by Tokyo Imperial University Professor 
Royama Masamichi49 entitled, "The Intention to Build a New Order in East Asia." In 
it Professor Royama stressed that although intellectuals supported the Japanese effort, 
the prospects for the establishment of the New Order were fraught with difficulties and 
Japan would have to tread a "careful path through the rose bushes. "50 
A campaign, which also began in early 1939, was aimed at nisei, second generation 
Japanese immigrants, particularly on the Pacific Coast of America. It began with a 
talk in Japanese, "The Education of the Second Generation,"51 which claimed that 
American society failed to accept the nisei. 52 Other broadcasts included an 
examination of the importance of having Japanese blood, even for those born abroad, 
and stressed that nisei needed access to Japanese culture, by radio. 53 
On loth April 1939 N.H.K., the Korean Broadcasting Corporation, the Taiwan 
Broadcasting Corporation and the Manchurian Cable and Telephone Company jointly 
established the East Asia Broadcasting Corporation to relay broadcasts to Chungking. 
This was a direct response to the opening on 6th February of a 35kw station in 
47 Gendai Nihon Seishin 
48 Chiikoku Aikoku no Seishin 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjii Wan e no Michi p 270 
49 Royama Masamichi was a political scientist who in November 1936 joined the Showa Research 
Society (Showa KenkyU Kai) which advised Prince Konoe on long-term political and econo~c 
planning. Along with other fonner Marxists in the Society, Royama advocated a controlled domestic 
economy in order to curb Capitalism and a militaristic foreign policy in order to expel Western 
Imperialism from East Asia. 
Ben-Anti Sltillony: Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan pp 111-112 
50 bara ni itaru michi 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 270 
51 Dainisei no Kyoiku 
52 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjil /Van e no Afichi p274 
53 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinjil Wan e no lYfichi p 274 
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Chungking by the Chinese National Government, which was to broadcast on short-
wave. 54 The May edition of H6s6 magazine explained, 
While we have been prosecuting our Holy War to establish a New 
East Asian Order in the Orient, China has put all her energies into a 
skilful radio propaganda war and broadcast convenient and 
exaggerated news, regardless of whether it was truth or lie, in 
order to attract the sympathy of Chinese abroad, and to inspire in 
them feelings for the Chinese in China. 55 
In Spring 1939, N.H.K. began a campaign entitled, "Creating Culture for China."56 
The aim of the broadcasts was to reverse the Chinese view of Japan by exerting 
'correct' cultural influences on the population. One of the themes seized upon in this 
series was that Chinese antagonism towards Japan stemmed from the large proportion 
of anti-Japanese music in China. It was, thus, considered necessary to "match the anti-
Japanese (songs) by writing a lot of pro-Japanese songs about interesting things, and 
making them popular with the Chinese youth. "57 Music broadcasts, of songs using 
Chinese history and Sino-Japanese relations as their themes, became more important in 
the N.H.K. schedules of broadcasts to China. 58 
N .H.K. moves and the International Section Expands 
On 13th May 1939, N.H.K. moved from its Atagoyama studios to a new larger 
headquarters at Uchisaiwaicho.59 An article by Komori Shichiro, Head ofN.H.K., in 
the Japan Times and Mail detailed the role of overseas broadcasting: 
54 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 277 
55 Togo ni oite shintoa chitsujo kensetsu no ware ga seisen ga suiko sareteiru toki, shina no rajio ga 
gaikoku no dojo 0 jakugi kokunai no tsuchiki 0 kobu suru tame, koryo na rajio sendensen ni zenryoku 
o shuchushi, uso mo honto mo kamai nakuku katte ni kodai na nyz1zu 0 hoso shita. 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 277 
56 Taishi Bunka Kosaku 
57 Ko-Nichi ni hitekki suru shin-Nichi uta no sukoburu omoshirioi mono 0 takusan tsukutte Shina no 
shonentachi no aida no hayasashimeru koto 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 279 
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59 N.H.K.: 50 Years of Broadcasting p 400 
Programmes for the overseas broadcasts are selected with care and 
designed to appeal to all our listeners. Material covers, besides 
news reports of the day . . . musical entertainments, talks and 
commentaries on various subjects and occasions. In short, we are 
making an effort to present to the listener a complete picture of 
Japan, the melting pot of the Orient and the Occident, of its present 
as well as its past.60 
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The opening of the new site was celebrated on the domestic network with musical 
relays from abroad on 13th, 14th and 15th. On the 13th, ten-minute broadcasts were 
transmitted to Japan from Germany and Italy. The following day it was the turn of the 
American stations, N.B.C. and C.B.S. 
On 15th May the B.B.C.'s congratulatory broadcast was made to Japan. This 
consisted of greetings and music; Elgar's Pomp and Circumstance March No.1 in D, 
played by the B.B.C. Empire Orchestra. From the B.B.C. 's files it appears that 
N.H.K. had contacted the B.B.C. in preparation for this broadcast on 22nd April, 
suggesting that the broadcast include a Handel Oratorio. The B.B.C., it appears, had 
made a recording, of a performance of the orchestra playing the Elgar March, on a 
recent Empire Service broadcast61 and hence sent a return telegram suggesting that 
this be played in preference to the Handel work. A telegram from N.H.K. confirmed 
that this was acceptable, and the ten-minute transmission to Japan was incorporated 
into the B.B.C. schedules at 12.30pm on 15th May. On 1st Maya letter was also sent 
to the Press Attache of the Japanese Embassy in London to obtain a translation of the 
greetings for the broadcast. 62 
On 1st July N.H.K. 's International Section was further enlarged, to fifty-five people, 
and elevated in status. The International Section63 became the International 
Department64 which was headed by Tanomogi Shinroku, and was divided into 
60 Japan Times and Mail Special Broadcasting Issue, 31st March 1939 
61 This was fairly unusual at the time, as most orchestral pieces played on air tended to be live 
performances. 
62 All the telegrams and letters mentioned here are in the B.B.C. File ElI1026: Countries: Japan; 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation File 1, 1939-40, at the B.B.C. Archive in Cavershanl Park. 
63 Kokusai-ka 
64 Kokusai-bu 
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Sections One and Two. 65 The work of Section One was concerned primarily with 
technical aspects of broadcasting and was also responsible for carrying out checks into 
the clarity of N.H.K. overseas broadcasts. Section Two was responsible for the 
content of the news, announcements in the broadcasts, and for translating items for 
the different transmissions. It was also agreed that an increase in broadcasting time 
should accompany the elevation of the International Section to Department status. 66 
The five broadcast regions remained the same, but the total broadcasting time was 
increased to eight hours a day and an Italian news service was inaugurated, bringing 
the total number of languages used to nine. 67 
Summer Campaigns 
Overseas broadcasting incorporated several different themes during the summer of 
1939. News editor, Yokoyama Sei, described the first of these in the May edition of 
Hoso. He wrote that the aim of Japanese language news was to bring Japanese who 
were living abroad up to date on events in and concerning Japan; that of Chinese 
language news was to pacify China and to reconstruct Chinese culture, and that of the 
English language news was to build friendly relations with the United States and Great 
Britain. 68 
Music played a vital role in attracting listeners to the station, so that the news and 
reports could serve their purpose. Playing gramophone records had been part of 
programming since the start of overseas broadcasting in 1935, but the songs were 
almost exclusively Japanese. In order to include different music in the schedules some 
Hawaiian bands had been featured from February 1939,69 but the entertainment part of 
any broadcast was really aimed at Japanese living in the target country. As previously, 
it was decided that jazz music, which was considered decadent and corrupt in Japan, 
should lead the way, and several programmes were added to the schedules of the 
65 Dai-Ichi Ka and Dai-Ni Ka 
66 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi pp 282-3 
67 These were: Japanese, English, Chinese, Gennan, Italian, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 283 
68 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Alichi p 284 
69 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 284 
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American transmissions, such as "Musical Variety." It had its own resident band the , 
"Japanese Swing Singers," which was intended to sing up-beat swing and jazz during 
the programme. The songs sung, however, were still in Japanese and whilst they 
included songs such as "Birthday Afternoon",7° a large number of the songs were on 
Japanese themes, such as ''Nihonbashi in the Edo Period"71 which were not popular 
with American audiences. Other programmes, such as "Rhythm Cocktail", which 
included medleys of hit records such as "Japanese Sandman" and "Tiger Rag"72 would 
probably have had a wider appeal in America. 
A further experiment began on 2nd July. National domestic broadcasts were 
simultaneously transmitted to the Western United States between 3.00 and 3.25 on a 
Saturday afternoon. This made use of the system, previously mentioned, of 
transmitting two programmes at the same time in two different directions so that 
whilst domestic listeners heard a Japanese announcer, a second announcer was making 
an announcement in English via the transmitter directed to America. As it was 
primarily a domestic Japanese broadcast, the music was generally classical, with some 
Japanese songs and did not include any of the jazz and swing music, which was 
included in other broadcasts to the United States, but it was hoped that the programme 
would -appeal to Japanese Americans. This dual broadcast on Saturday afternoons 
continued until just prior to the outbreak of war in the Pacific in late 1941.73 
An anti-British radio campaign was sparked by the "Tientsin Incident''74 on 9th April 
I 939, when a Japanese Maritime Customs Inspector was killed in the British 
concession in Tientsin. Although the local British authorities initially promised to 
surrender the four suspected assassins for trial by the Chinese puppet court, the British 
Foreign Office refused. After two months of fiuitless discussion, the Japanese Army 
imposed a stringent blockade of the British Concession in mid-June. 75 
70 Tanjobi no Gogo 
71 O-Edo Nihonbashi 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Ali chi pp 284-5 
n Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 286 
73 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 286 
74 Tenshu Jiken 
75 See Joseph Michael Boyle: British Foreign Policy During the Tientsin Crisis, 1939-1941 pp 78-87 
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Despite using strong language in domestic broadcasts, N.H.K. was directed to avoid 
using military language in its overseas broadcasts. News reports and commentaries on 
the overseas service thus concentrated on Japanese and British attempts to find a 
solution to the crisis. Hence on 22nd July a speech in English to the Western United 
States by Uno lehimaro, the Japanese-American Relations correspondent of the Rafu 
Hoshin,16 was entitled "Consideration of Peace between Japan and Britain."77 
In May 1939, a clash began between Japanese and Soviet backed troops at Nomonhan 
on the ManchurianIMongolian border. This developed into a full-scale border war, 
with both sides mobilising aircraft and armoured units. In late August the Japanese 
Kwantung army was completely routed. Along with the signing of the non-aggression 
pact between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23rd August, this defeat prompted 
Japan to sue for a cease-fire, which came into operation on 15th September.78 
Overseas radio played a central role in presenting the Japanese case during the four 
months of the crisis. Both Mongolian and Russian were added to the list of languages 
used in broadcasts from Tokyo, and in June a lecture series was begun in Mongolian 
regarding the situation in East Asia. The station at Hsinking was heavily employed in 
the radio campaign, using both medium- and short-wave transmitters to broadcast 
news in Mongolian, Manchu and Russian, and a daily "North Manchuria Hour" which 
was aimed directly at the border region. In order to diversify the range of 
transmissions Hsinking also began broadcasts on short-wave frequencies to Europe 
and America and the South Seas. 
War in Europe 
The Japanese cabinet under Prime Minister Konoye, which was formed on 30th 
August, was faced with a critical situation in Europe when Germany invaded Poland 
on 1st September 1939. At lOam that day Hitler's speech from Berlin was received by 
76 Los Angeles News 
77 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: ShinjO Wan e no A1ichi p 288 
78 Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Vol. 6 P 34 
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N.H.K. and relayed live across the domestic network, as was Chamberlain's speech 
declaring war on Germany, two days later. 79 In Japan, it was announced that 
Although this present war has broken out in Europe, Japan will not 
intervene, but will press on towards a conclusion of the China 
Incident. 80 
Japanese overseas broadcasting, then, maintained strict Japanese neutrality, with 
regard to the war in Europe, and continued the campaign to stress the 're-building' of 
Chinese culture and the establishment of a New Order in East Asia. Typical 
broadcasts were programmes such as "This is the Mission of the People of East Asia" 
which were broadcast to Asia and the Pacific during September 1939.81 On 25th 
September the German military attache in Tokyo made a speech regarding German 
successes in Poland during the transmission to Europe. 82 Apart from this, there was 
little reference to the European war in broadcasts to Europe, and most programmes 
concerned events in China, and on the Manchurian-Mongolian border where a cease-
fire agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union came into operation on 15th 
September, following Japan's defeat in the Nomonhan Campaign. 
In his 1940 New Year speech, which was broadcast to all the transmission regions, 
Komori Shichiro, Head of N.H.K., stated that radio was the most important of the 
media in increasing the consciousness of people abroad as to the greatness of the 
Japanese Empire. He also stated that radio was helping to strengthen reverence 
towards the Emperor in Manchuria and China. Thus, the International Department of 
N.H.K. received instructions in January that it was to be a "Guiding Spirit in Asian 
Development"83 and the "Developing Countries' Guide in Hakk6-Ichiu."84 
79 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi pp 296-7 
80 Konji Oshu ni senran no boppatsu shitaru ni saishi, teikoku wa dore ni kainyr1 sezu, moppara 
Shina Jiken no kaiketsu ni maishin sentosu. 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 297 
81 Toa Minzoku Kore Shinmei 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 299 
82 Tokyo in German for Germany, 25th September 1939 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts; Number 57, 26th September 1939 
83 Koa no Shido Seishin 
84 Hakko-Jchiu no Kenkoku Seishin 
Hakko-Jchiu is usually translated the "Eight Corners ofthe World under One Roof." It was a Japanese 
propaganda slogan used to imply universal Asian brotherhood 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Jvfichi p 308 
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On 14th February 1940, the International Department at N.H.K. began its first 
correspondence course for foreigners wanting to learn Japanese. Aimed at English 
speakers, it was transmitted to the Western United States and to Europe. The 
broadcast lessons continued into the summer and were presented by the Italian 
linguist, Oreste Vaccari. Later, the course was adapted for native Spanish speakers 
and re-broadcast to South America and Europe during the late summer and autumn of 
1940. After the war, "Nihongo no K6za," as the course was known, became a regular 
and popular programme on the N.H.K. Overseas Service, but in 1940 according to the 
May edition of H6s6 Magazine, its aims were to, 
Accompany the development of a New Order in East Asia, ... to 
plan large scale training of Japanese teachers for the continent, .. . 
(and to) give short-term, three month, positive assistance to the 
cultural sectors of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Asian Development Institution. 85 
Between April and July 1940 the German army swept through Europe in its historic 
blitzkrieg. However, Germany's military achievements events had little effect on 
Japanese broadcasting, and news reports to Europe continued to report Japanese 
victories in China and the crisis in the Chinese Nationalist Government. In particular, 
the collapse of the Chinese dollar86 and the Chinese Government's pleas to the United 
States and Britain for financial aid to stabilise its currency87 were reported. 
Changes -in the International Department 
On 1 st June 1940, the fifth anniversary of Overseas Broadcasting proper, the 
International Department of N.H.K. was once again re-organised, and expanded. 
Because of static interference in broadcasts to Hawaii and the Western United States, 
the transmission was split and a separate Hawaiian transmission was established.88 In 
addition, the Ministry of Communications considered it essential to keep Asian 
85 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 311 
86 Tokyo in German and English for Europe, 3rd May 1940 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Nwnber 290, 4th May 1940 
87 Tokyo in English and German for Europe, 7th May 1940 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 29 .. 1-, 8th May 1940 
88 Kitayama: Rajio Toky6: Shinju rYan e no Afichi p 319 
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broadcasting separate from broadcasts to the West, because of the special "Asian 
Spirit" being cultivated by Japan. Thus a transmission for "South-west Asia" was 
established to transmit one hour a day specifically to the countries of the Middle East. 
As part of this transmission, Thai, Burmese, and Hindi news reports were incorporated 
in to the schedules, bringing the total broadcast operation of the International 
Department to ten hours a day, for seven broadcast regions using a total number of 
eleven languages. 89 In addition, the Ministry of Communications established a 
Monitoring Service of foreign radio broadcasts in June 1940.90 
The gaichi stations, too, were involved in increasing the number of overseas 
broadcasts. In February 1940 the Korean Army Information Section began broadcasts 
in Russian the ''Propaganda Emphasis''91 of which was said to be, -"Military Operations 
within Mongolia," "The Intensification of the Dispute between the Countries," and the 
"Development of a Movement to Establish the New Central Chinese 
Administration. ''92 What relation the radio operations of the Korean Army 
Information Section bore to the Korean Broadcasting Corporation is unclear, but 
Kitayama Setsuro suggests that the Army probably broadcast from the Corporation's 
Chongjin station, in north-west Korea. 
The Taiwan Broadcasting Corporation had been broadcasting to Mainland China from 
the start of the China Incident. In July 1937 it began newscasts in the Fukien dialect, 
and between then and the start of December 1939 added reports in English, Peking 
dialect, Cantonese, Malay and Vietnamese. 93 In the far north of Japanese-controlled 
territory, the short-wave broadcasts of the Manchuria Cable and Telephone Company 
were transmitted daily to four regions by June 1940. The first was a transmission to 
Europe in English. Transmission Two was to the Western United States in English 
89 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 319 
90 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 320 
91 Senden no JiJfen 
92 Naimo Sakusen, Kokkyo Koso no Gekka and Shin-Chuo Seiken Juritsu Undo no Tenkai 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 323 
93 They began on 29th and 20th July 1937, 8th August and 1st October 1938, and 1st December 1939 
respectively. 
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and Transmission Three to "All East Asia" in Mongolian and Russian. The final 
transmission was in Chinese and English and was directed at Southern China and the 
South Seas.94 By the third anniversary of the China Incident on 7th July 1940 there 
was, therefore, a complete radio network across East Asia, which served to promote 
Japanese ideas on both medium-95 and short-wave. 
During the Summer of 1940 the slogan ''New Order in East Asia" was officially 
revised by a cabinet policy decision to ''New Order in Greater East Asia" 96 so as to 
include a larger area of possible Japanese operations. With the scope of Japanese 
interests in Asia widened to "Greater East Asia," on 8th August the International 
Department in Tokyo began a daily service of news in Cantonese. Cantonese 
broadcasts aimed at South China and Hong Kong were also transmitted daily on 
Tokyo's second medium-wave broadcasting network.97 
The Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Pact for mutual defence was signed in Berlin 
on 27th September 1940. The following day the first half of the Japanese broadcast to 
Europe was conducted mainly in German, though it did include one address in Italian. 
The usual schedule was abandoned and recent news was omitted completely, in favour 
of opinion and commentary regarding the new agreement. The second half of the 
transmission was in English and French and this stressed the special relationships, 
which now existed between Japan and Germany and Japan and Italy. 
1940 was the official 2,600th anniversary of the mythical first Emperor, Jimmu's, 
ascent to the Japanese throne. Official celebrations to mark the event began in 
February and reached their climax in the latter three months of 1940. Exchanges with 
94 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 324 
95 Medium-wave transmissions were made by the Japanese in all the gaichi and in China but as they 
were directed at listeners in the local area they do not fall into the scope of this thesis. 
96 T6a Shin-chitsujo and Dait6a Shin-chitsujo 
97 The second medium-wave network in Japan was established on 1st July 1937 to broadcast 
intellectual programmes, local broadcasts for the larger cities, and broadcasts for the gaichi. 
N.H.K.: H6s6 Go-Ju Nen-Shi p 128 
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Berlin98 on 17th November and 30th December concentrated on these celebrations and 
the regular schedules of the International Department also included recordings of 
rallies throughout Japan and concert performances by the specially created "2,600 
Years Celebration Symphony Orchestra. "99 These were performed solely for the 
overseas audience and included music by French, Italian, German and Hungarian 
composers. 100 
To further strengthen the integration of propaganda broadcasting, the Third East Asia 
Broadcasting Conference took place in Taipei at the end of November 1940. It was 
attended by representatives of N.H.K., the International Department, the Korea 
Broadcasting Corporation, the Manchuria Cable and Telephone Company, the North 
China Broadcasting Corporation, the Mongolian Posts and Communications Bureau, 
the Taiwanese Broadcasting Corporation, and the China Broadcasting Section as well 
as the Japanese Minister of Communications and other political officials. Despite the 
Conference's name, however, with the exception of the Head of the North China 
Broadcasting Corporation, Zhou Tai-wen, the delegates were exclusively Japanese. 101 
Overseas broadcasting was the principle topic of discussion at the conference and the 
resolutions, which it passed dealt in large part with the expansion of the International 
Department, which took effect from January 1941. 102 This was the first time that the 
term "Radio Tokyo" was coined to describe the overseas broadcasting operations 
based in Tokyo, and from this time the Overseas Service became known as "Radio 
Tokyo" until the end of the Pacific War. 103 
98 Germany and sometimes Italy continued to be the usual exchange countries. A rare exchange was 
the "Exchange of Music and Addresses regarding Japanese-Australian Friendship" (Nichi-Go shinzen 
ni kansuru Ongaku to Koen no Kokaku) which was planned for on September 27m following the 
exchange of ambassadors between Japan and Australia. (This exchange of Ambassadors was an 
indication of Japan's growing commercial and political importance to Australia.) September 27m was 
the day the signing of the Tripartite Pact was announced. The first part of the broadcast went ahead 
as planned from Japan, but the Australian half ,vas cancelled after news of the pact was received. 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinja Wan e no Michi p 331 
99 Kigen Ni-sen Roppyaku-nen Hoshuku Kokyogakudan 
100 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinja Wan e no Afichi p 334 
101 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinja Wan e no kfichi p 336 
102 Kitayama: Rajio To!t.yo: Shinja Wan e no Alichi p 336-7 
103 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinja Wan e no .J\fichi p 337 
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Changes in the Media 
On 6th December 1940 the Cabinet Information Bureau (C.I.B.)104 was established. It 
was in fact a larger version of the Cabinet Information Department,105 and was 
responsible for general surveillance of the media. 106 For radio the new Bureau created 
a complicated series of relationships between N.H.K., the C.I.B., and the Ministry of 
Communications. The new Bureau took over the guidance and surveillance of most of 
N.H.K. 's activities, but matters relating to the censorship of individual programmes, 
and surveillance of broadcasts remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Communications. 107 Under a Cabinet decision, also effective from 26th December 
1940, corporate surveillance of N.H.K. itself was the joint responsibility of the C.I.B. 
and the Ministry of Communications. 108 
The expansIOn of N.H.K. 's International Department discussed at the East Asia 
Broadcasting Conference was announced by Komori Shichiro, the Head ofN.H.K. on 
1 st January 1941. This expansion was, he said, to ''Build the Nation and the National 
Defence State" and to "Establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."109 As 
part of this expansion the total broadcasting time of the International Department was 
increased from ten hours to twenty-five hours twenty minutes daily, llO transmitting to 
twelve transmission regions as shown in figure 4 overleaf 
The January-February 1941 edition of H6s6 magazine outlined the aims of the new 
broadcasting system. In broadcasts to America the aim was to portray the situation 
from a new angle, and to explain the New Order and the Co-prosperity Sphere to the 
American audience. This was in addition to the earlier aim of cultivating the pro-
104 Naikaku J6h6-kyoku 
105 Naikaku J6h6-bu 
106 29% of the total bureau personnel was military, and in certain sections this figure rose to a third. 
Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 339 
107 N.H.K.: H6s6 Go-ju Nen-shi p 137 
108 Kitayanla: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 339 
109 K6do Kokub6 Kokka Kensetsu and Dai-T6a Ky6eiken Kakuritsu 
110 Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 344 . ' 
There seems to be some confusion as to what the increased broadcast time was. Kltayama lIsts 
different interpretations, which range from 25 hours 20 minutes to 34 hours. He only gives the 
schedule for the former, however, so I have quoted this one. 
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Japanese feeling of Japanese Americans. In broadcasts to China, the importance of 
employing the Fukien and Cantonese dialects, alongside Mandarin was stressed and , 
scriptwriters were encouraged to use both of these dialects more frequently. 
Japanese, English, 
Transmission 1 00.00-01.55 South East Asia Thai, French, 
Malay, Chinese 
Transmission 2 02.00-03.30 Middle East Japanese, English, Arabic 
Transmission 3 04.00-07.30 Europe 
Japanese, English, 
French, German, 
Russian, Italian 
Transmission 4 08.00-09.30 South & Central America Japanese, Spanish, 
Portuguese 
Transmission 5 10.00-12.00 Eastern United States Japanese, English 
Transmission 6 12.30-15.00 Western United States Japanese, English 
Transmission 7 15.30-17.30 Hawaii Japanese, English 
Transmission 8 18.00-19.00 South & Central America Japanese, Spanish, 
Portuguese 
Imperial Troops 
Transmission 9 18.00-20.00 
(renamed Front-line Japanese Broadcasting after 
February 1 st 1941) 
Transmission 10 19.30-20.25 Australia & New Zealand Japanese, English 
China & the South Seas 
Transmission 11 20.00-23.30 
(the broadcast to China Japanese, English, 
was also transmitted on Dutch, Chinese 
medium-wave) 
Transmission 12 20.30-23.30 South Seas Japanese, English, Dutch, Chinese 
Figure~: Total broadcast operation ofN.H.K.'s International Department as of 1st January 1941 111 
111 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinja Wan e no Afichi pp 3~~-5 
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French language broadcasts were extended to include French exiles in Britain and 
, 
broadcasts were begun to South East Asia for French speakers in Indo-China. The use 
of the Dutch and Malay languages was also increased in broadcasts to South East Asia 
and the South Seas in order to counter Western propaganda, and to reassure local 
inhabitants of the value of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. l12 
On 29th January 1941, N.H.K. signed a broadcasting agreement with Italy, similar to 
the one which it had already reached with Germany. This allowed for regular 
exchange broadcasts between the two countries. The first exchange broadcast under 
the new agreement occurred at 5.35pm (Japanese time) on 16th February and was 
relayed across the Italian domestic network. It included Japanese and Italian songs 
and greetings in Japanese to Italy. The return half of the exchange, from Italy to 
Japan, took place ten days later, and followed a similar format. 113 
Prelude to War 
For five months from the end of July 1940, two N.H.K. employees had carried out a 
"Grand Tour" of countries on the Pacific rim in order to monitor the reception quality 
and clarity of broadcasts from Japan. Their findings were published in H6s6 magazine 
in early 1941. Anazawa Tadahira, Head of the N.H.K. Engineering Department, 
visited Australia, New Zealand and South East Asia, and in his report he noted that in 
general the signals of overseas broadcasts seemed haphazard and indistinct. He wrote 
that in Asia he was treated with suspicion in every radio station, which he visited to 
enquire about Japanese broadcasts, because as an N.H.K. official asking about 
Japanese strategic broadcasting he was considered a spy. He reported that his 
attempts at research in South East Asia were, thus, hampered by the prejudices of 
those he visited, and the results, he claimed, could not be regarded as conclusive. In 
the English speaking countries, however, he stated, that people who listened to short-
112 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Alichi pp 345-6 
113 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 349 
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wave broadcasts considered N.H.K. broadcasts inferior to those of the B.B.C. in both 
reception and content. As a result Radio Tokyo's audience was very smalP14 
The second investigator, Sato Taiichiro, Head of Section One of the International 
Department, visited North America and reported in the March 1941 edition of H6s6 
magazine that there was a huge audience for N.H.K. short-wave broadcasts in the 
regions of the United States and Canada bordering the Pacific. 115 However, his report 
stated that it was very difficult for the average family receiver on the eastern side of 
North America to pick up Japanese transmissions, as the signal appeared to be 
insufficiently strong. In general, he added, Japanese announcers needed to be allowed 
more freedom to ad lib between items, as American presenters did. In contrast, the 
Japanese presenters sounded stiff, as though they were merely reading from a prepared 
script. 116 Sato was also critical of speeches made in foreign languages by the 
Japanese, which he said were unpopular for similar reasons. They were stiff in 
comparison to speeches made on Radio Tokyo by native speakers. He concluded that 
if it was accepted that all countries were expanding short-wave broadcasting, Japan 
faced formidable enemies in the "radio war" and needed to improve its overseas 
service. 117 These reports, particularly the criticism contained in the latter, were 
extremely influential in improving the monitoring service in Japan and in encouraging 
experimentation in some of the programme formats used in foreign broadcasts. 
The issue of jazz versus classical music in overseas broadcasts was further discussed in 
March and April 1941, after an article had appeared in the New York Times criticising 
Japanese broadcasts for being dominated by classical music. A review of the music 
played in the first three months of 1941 showed that classical, orchestral performances 
had been broadcast eight times a week, in various transmissions, and the inclusion of 
more jazz music in the overseas schedules was once again made a priority. A jazz 
group NORO (New Order Rhythm Orchestra)118 was introduced into the regular 
114 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Alichi p 351 
115 Presumably this was amongst the Japanese community, although he did not state this. 
116 This was, of course, the case. 
117 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no A1ichi p 351 
118 The group consisted of Kami Kyosuke, (Leader and arranger), Kukuchi Shigeya, (piano and 
arrangements), Sano Suki, (trombone) and Taniguchi Matatsuchi (saxophone). 
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schedules. It had been performing irregularly in N.H.K. transmissions since October 
1940, but from the spring of 1941, it became part of the new drive to diversify the 
types of music played in overseas broadcasts. 119 
Programmes and music regarding Japan and Japanese traditions also continued to be 
important in the spring schedules in 1941. Broadcasts were made which presented 
both traditional and modern Japan to the outside world. Broadcasts in Japanese and 
English were most frequent, including "The Life of the People under the New 
System,"120 by Ogata Taketora a representative of the Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association (I.R.A.A.).121 There were, however, addresses made to virtually all the 
transmission regions in most languages, including ''From New System Japan," in 
French by Robert De Biere, Head of the Japanese-French Cultural Association. 122 In 
addition, a "Japan History Series" was broadcast to all the broadcast regions, as the 
emphasis on popularising Japanese culture continued. 123 
Diplomatic events in the spring and summer of 1941 played a dominant role in the 
news reports on both the domestic network and the overseas service. Border 
skirmishes between Thailand and French Indo-China in January had ended with a 
cease-fire negotiated by the Japanese on 31 st January. Throughout February and 
March news reports to all the broadcast regions covered the peace negotiations and 
stressed Japan's role as the peacemaker. 124 Broadcasts to South East Asia also sought 
119 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 355 
120 Shintaisei-ka no Kokumin Seikatsu 
121 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 357 
After the outbreak of the China Incident, the concept of a single mass political party, on the lines of 
the German National Socialist Party, grew in popularity among Japanese leaders. The IRAA was 
established in 1940 and all three other parties spontaneously disbanded. The IRAA was headed by 
the Prime Minister and operated throught local branches throughout Japan. However, it became little 
more that a national bureaucratic control tool and took over some responsibilities from the ministries, 
and absorbed many independent organisations. It was disbanded in June 1945. 
See Janet Hunter: The Emergence of Modern Japan pp 225-6 
122 Shintaisei no Nihon kara 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 358 
123 Nihon no Rekishii Shiriizu 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no A1ichi p 358 
124 See for exanlple: Tokyo in French for Europe, 2nd March 1941, and Tokyo in German for 
Germany, 19th April and 8th May 1941 th 
B.B. c.: Summary of World Broadcasts Numbers 593, 641 and 660, 3rd March, 20th April and 9 May 
1941 
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to explain the ''New Order in East Asia" and the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere" to the inhabitants of the Thailand-Indo-China region, and presented them with 
a favourable picture of what benefits would accrue from formal links with Japan. The 
Japanese troops stationed in French Indo-China were presented on all overseas 
broadcasts as a mutually agreed and mutually beneficial defence force, not an 
occupation army. 125 
Speeches in languages other than the usual Japanese, English, German and French 
became increasingly frequent on Radio Tokyo during the summer of 1941, as it was 
felt that there was a need to widen appreciation of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
explain its meaning to a much wider audience. ''What is the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere?"126 was an Arabic address made in a broadcast to the Middle East 
and "Japan and the South Sea Islands"127 was an address in Burmese, which aimed to 
explain the mutually beneficial relationship between Japan and her colonies. 128 
On 12th March 1941 the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Matsuoka Yosuke, left 
for an official visit to Europe. Over the following month, there were regular 
broadcasts between Europe and Japan regarding Matsuoka's progress. An address in 
German on 25th March stressed that the visit was a significant indication of the close 
collaboration between the three Axis powers, as Japanese Foreign Ministers rarely 
travelled abroad, and this was the first visit by a Foreign Minister to Europe since 
1905. 129 There was also a broadcast from Europe of greetings by Matsuoka and the 
Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, on 2nd April, which was relayed across the domestic 
and East Asian Relay Networks. l3O 
During his tour, in May 1941, Matsuoka signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet 
Union. This meant that when war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union 
125 Kitayama: Ra}io TOkYO: Shin}u Wan e no Michi pp 360-2 
126 Daitoa Kyoeiken towa Nan ka 
127 Nihon to Nanyo 
128 Kitayama: Ra}io Tokyo: Shin}u Wan e no Michi p 368 
129 Tokyo in German for Germany, 25th March 1941 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts number 616, 26th March 19-11 
130 Asahi Shinbun. 3rd April 1941 
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in June, the Japanese, having treaties with both sides, had to devise a plan regarding 
their presentation of the war. On 2nd July, an "Outline of Imperial Policy concerning 
the Change in the Situation" was issued. It instructed N.H.K. to use overseas 
broadcasts to explain fully the situation in Asia, the New Order in East Asia and the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Overseas broadcasts thus neatly side-
stepped the problem of war between two Japanese allies for they rarely mentioned 
it. 131 
Re-organisation of Overseas Broadcasting 
During the last week of September 1941 the International Department was once more 
re-organised, and a new schedule, which increased the total transmission time to 
thirty-two hours fifty-five minutes a day, became effective from October.132 The 
twelve former regional transmissions were reduced to seven new transmissions to 
allow for more overlapping in the time schedules and to prevent interference between 
transmissions. Each of the seven transmissions was broadcast on two different 
wavelengths so that if there were interference, from other Radio Tokyo transmissions, 
or from local stations, the broadcasts would usually be audible on another wave-
length. The frequency of English language news reports was increased in each 
transmission. Figure 5, overleaf, shows the new schedule. 
At the start of the week of re-organisation in the N.H.K. International Department, a 
new N.H.K. station on the Pacific Island of Palau was opened. In February 1940, it 
had been planned that the station would open in January 1941,133 but it finally became 
operational on 24th September, opening with a twenty-minute broadcast of greetings to 
the South Sea Islands, which was relayed across the Tokyo domestic network. 134 The 
inhabitants of the South Sea Islands had previously been the only inhabitants of 
Japanese-controlled territory who were encouraged to own short-wave receivers and 
131 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no A1ichi p 370 
132 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Tran e no Afichi p 377 
133 Japan Times and Mail, 24th February 1940 
134 Japan Times and Advertiser, Morning edition, 8th September 1941 
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listen to short-wave broadcasts because short-wave had been the only means of 
broadcasting Japanese programmes to the South Sea Islands. 135 
Transmission 1 London, Paris, Berlin, 03.55-07.30 3 hours 35 minutes Rome, Moscow 
Transmission 2 New York, Chicago, 07.55-11.30 3 hours 35 minutes Bayliss, Rio 
Mexico, San 12.25-17.00 (with a Transmission 3 Fransisco, and Hawaii close down from 4 hours 30 minutes 
15.25-15.30) 
Front-line, Peking, 
Nanking, and 17.55-19.00 (1 hour 5 minutes) 
Transmission 4 Canton
136 
Sydney, Singapore, 
Saigon137, Bangkok, 19.00-21.55 2 hours 55 minutes 
Nanking, Canton 
Transmission 5 Saigon, Bangkok, 21.55-00.00 2 hours 5 minutes 
Canton, Rangoon138 
Transmission 6 Batavia,139 Singapore 21.55-00.00 2 hours 5 minutes 
Transmission 7 India and Tehran 00.25-03.30 3 hours 5 minutes 
Figure 5: The schedule of N .H.K. 's International Department from 1st October 1941 140 
The new transmitter overcame this by allowing the islands to participate in the East 
Asia Relay Network. The station also transmitted on short-wave to Hawaii and to 
China and the South Pacific. The aim of these broadcasts was to convince the 
inhabitants of the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea that Japan was 
the nation to lead them into overthrowing the oppression of the Americans, Dutch and 
135 Owning a short-wave receiver was banned throughout the rest of the area controlled by the 
Japanese. 
136 Guangzhou 
137 Ho Chi Min City 
138 Yangon 
139 Jakarta 
140 Kitayama: Rajio Toky6: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 377 
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British, and to liberate them into full participation In the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. 141 
The Diplomatic Situation Deteriorates 
During 1941 relations between Japan and the United States worsened steadily. Japan 
was criticised for moving troops into French Indo-China, although she claimed this 
had been mutually agreed between the two governments. As a response to Japanese 
expansion, which caused concern for the safety of the oil-rich territories of the Pacific, 
in July and August 1941 the United States placed economic sanctions on Japan, which 
included an embargo on oil exports, and froze Japanese assets. Diplomatic 
negotiations continued throughout the autumn with a forlorn hope that the United 
States might make concessions before Japanese stockpiles dwindled too far, but by 
November few members of the Japanese government thought there was any alternative 
to a pre-emptive strike on America. 
Amid this diplomatic crisis, the cabinet of T6j6 Hideki carne to power in Japan in 
October 1941. One of the initial consequences of the formation of the new cabinet 
was an alteration in the emphasis of newscasts in broadcasts overseas. News 
programmes and commentaries contained fewer news items, and placed greater 
emphasis on the Japanese standpoint in the negotiations with the United States. 142 
During November 1941, Liaison Conferences between the cabinet and the Emperor 
came to view war as increasingly inevitable. 143 At the 69th Liaison Conference on 15th 
November it was agreed that, 
Strategic propaganda against the United States will be stepped 
up; emphasis will be placed on enticing the American main fleet 
to come to the Far East, persuading Americans to reconsider 
their Far Eastern policy, and pointing out the uselessness of a 
Japanese-American war; American public opinion will be directed 
towards opposition to war. l44 
141 Kitayama: Ra}io Tokyo: Shin}u Wan e no }'lichi p 378 
142 Kitayama: Ra}io Tokyo: Shin}u Wan e no Michi p 381 
143 For a full description of these discussions refer to Nobutaka Ike: Japan's Decision for War; the 
Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. 
144 69th Liaison Conference, 15th November 1941, Policy Summary Clause 3a, ~. 
op cit. Nobutaka: Japan's Decision for War: the Records of the 19-11 Policy Conferences p 248 
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It continued, "Attempts will be made to break the ties between the United States and 
Australia."145 At other meetings it was also decided to increase the emphasis and 
energy put into overseas broadcasts to South America. 146 
During November 1941, the Navy also began using overseas broadcasts to send coded 
messages. On 19th November it was first revealed to Japanese diplomats abroad in 
coded messages during newscasts, that information regarding the outbreak of war, if 
war became inevitable, would be given during the regular transmissions in the form of 
a weather forecast. 147 The weather forecast message, coming both in the middle and 
at the end of a regular transmission, would be de-coded as follows: 148 
East wind· Rain 149 , 
North wind; Cloudy150 
West wind· Fair151 , 
War has begun between Japan and the United States. 
Bum all important documents. 
War has begun between Japan and the Soviet Union. 
Bum all important documents. 
War has begun between Japan and Britain. Burn all 
important documents. 
On 5th December, this code was replaced with another and these codes became 
obsolete. 152 Despite this, however, ''West wind; Fair" was read on overseas 
transmissions on the night of 7th_8th December 1941 as Japanese forces prepared to 
attack Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong. The signal for the Navy to start the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, "Go Climb Mount Niitaka,"153 also to be given out over short-wave 
radio, was similarly decided at the beginning of December. 
On 7th December 1941, short-wave newscasts indicated only that Japanese raids on 
Lushih, near the Yellow River in China on 6th, had been successful, and that the Thai 
government had increased the number of troops on the border with Malaya owing to a 
145 69th Liaison Conference, 15th November 1941, Policy Summary Clause 3a, 5. 
op cit. Nobutaka: Japan's Decision/or War: the Records o/the 1941 Policy Conferences p 248 
146 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 383 
147 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi pp 384-5 
Weather forecasts were not generally given on overseas broadcasts. 
148 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 385 
149 Higashi no Kaze; Ame 
150 Kita no Kaze; Kumo 
151 Nishi no Kaze; Hare 
152 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Shinju Wan e no Afichi p 399 
153 This is the usual English version of the Japanese signal, which was, in fact, Nitake Nobore J,208. 
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build-up of Australian troops on the other side of the border. 154 At 01.30 (Japanese 
time)155 on 8th December, Japanese troops and aircraft moved into action, as short-
wave radio transmitted the weather forecast "West wind, Fair." By 02.15 the 
Japanese forces were approaching Hawaii and landing in Malaya, and at 03.22156 the 
Japanese pilots over Hawaii radioed back "Tara! Tara! Taraf'157 the signal that the 
attack on Pearl Harbor had been successfully carried out. War in the Pacific had 
broken out. 
Between the beginning of the "China Incident" and the outbreak of war in the Pacific, 
the role of overseas radio became increasingly important to the Japanese government. 
The research trips made by two N.H.K. employees are indications of the serious 
commitment made to overseas broadcasting. In line with its increasingly significant 
role the International Department of N.H.K. was re-organised and expanded four 
times in the period, and moved to a large purpose built broadcasting complex at 
Atagoyama. The operations of the gaichi stations were incorporated into this plan and 
their equipment upgraded and schedules altered to include overseas broadcasting. For 
the government to oversee the increased propaganda activity, the Cabinet Infonnation 
Committee was also expanded and became the Cabinet Information Bureau. 
In tenns of content, the development of Japanese radio was also considerable from 
1937 to 1941. New drives were made to increase the number of overseas listeners. 
Programmes for nisei and speeches in less widely spoken languages were developed to 
widen the interest in Japanese broadcasting abroad. However, news reports 
concentrated on Asian themes, and rarely mentioned the war in Europe after its 
outbreak. Despite this at the outbreak of the Pacific War Japanese overseas 
broadcasting was a sophisticated and wide-ranging operation. 
154 Tokyo in English for England, 7th December 1941 
B.B.c.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 873, 8th December 19 .. U. 
155 This would have been 06.00 and 11.30 on the 7th December in Hawaii and Washington 
respectively. 
156 This would have been 07.52 and 13.22 on the 7th December in Hawaii and Washington 
157 Tiger! Tiger! Tiger! 
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Chapter 4: Pearl Harbor and the Development of Greater East Asia 
{December 1941-June 1942) 
The Outbreak of War in the Pacific 
There is some confusion concerning when the announcement of Japan's Declaration 
of War on the United States and Britain was made on overseas radio. It centres, 
principally, on whether the broadcast to the United States was made before or after 
the attack on Hong Kong. What is clear, however, is that following the 
announcement of the Declaration of War within Japan at 7am on 8th December 1941, 
translations were broadcast on a general transmission to all overseas regions, starting 
with a statement in Japanese, continuing with the Axis languages and ending with the 
translation in English. 1 
From immediately pnor to the outbreak of the war a new body, the Overseas 
Broadcasting Liaison Council2 was established to unify all overseas broadcasting. 
Consisting of representatives from the Cabinet Information Bureau (C.I.B.), the War, 
Navy, Communications and War Ministries, Domei and N.H.K., it met daily with the 
C.I.B. The meeting of December 8th agreed a series of five points, which outlined the 
information and propaganda policy to be employed in the war against Britain and the 
United States. They were issued by the C.I.B. Point 1 dealt with domestic broadcasts 
and the other four were as follows: 3 
Radio is-
To ensure the co-operation of Axis countries and the indivisible link to 
both Manchuria and China. 
To obstruct enemy collaboration, resulting in the loss of their war 
aims, and to produce a split between the enemy countries. 
To bring the peoples of the Southern Regions into co-operation and 
alignment with us. 
1 The English and Italian translations were made directly from the Japanese, but the German who 
produced the Gennan translation was unable to speak Japanese, and his translation was made from the 
previously prepared English version. ". . ,. 
Kitayama Setsuro: Rajio Toky6: Dai-T6a e no Alichi [RadiO Tokyo: The Road to Greater East ASla J 
pp 17-24 
2 Kaigai H6s6 Renraku Ky6gikai 
3 eIB: "Outline of Information Propaganda Policy towards Japan's War with Britain and America" 
("Nichi-Ei-Bei Sens6 ni tai suru J6h6 &nden H6saku Taiko") 
op cit. Kitayama: Dai-T6a e no Afichi p 27 
To prevent neutral countries moving towards the enemy, and to bring 
them in line with us. 
80 
Within ten days of the outbreak of the "War for Greater East Asia," a plan for 
propaganda to be broadcast to different regions was produced. It was the result of 
high level discussions for propaganda themes between the C.I.B., the Navy and War 
Ministries, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and N.H.K. Within Asia, the main aim of 
broadcasting was to turn the native inhabitants against Britain and the United States, 
so a strong anti-British campaign was waged in broadcasts for Malaya and Burma.4 
In Hong Kong and India, too, anti-British feeling was to be encouraged.5 In addition, 
the attraction of Japanese policies to the inhabitants of China proper was emphasised 
in broadcasts to the former, and British cruelty in the campaigns in Malaya (and later 
Burma) was stressed in broadcasts to both. The broadcasts frequently declared that 
British troops committed "every kind of atrocity"6 claiming "Thousands of Indians 
and Malays have already been sacrificed."7 
As part of the same strategy, the inhabitants of the Philippines and Indonesia were to 
be persuaded that co-operation in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was 
advantageous to them, and thus prised away from the Western powers.8 In addition, 
both Burma and the Philippines were to be tempted with the prospect of 
independence.9 Broadcasts to Thailand and French Indo-China were to encourage the 
inhabitants of that region to strengthen their existing co-operation with Japan in the 
name of Asian unity. 10 
4 United States Records ofthe Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (F.B.I.S.): Daily Report, Official 
Radio Broadcasts, 5th December 1941 pp F4-F5 
5 On 26th December 1941, the Nanking Ambassador to Japan, Hsu Liang, made a broadcast to Hong 
Kong. In it he claimed that Japan would soon rescue Hong Kong form British "ex-ploitation and 
ruthless plunder." 
Japan Times and Advertiser, Morning Edition, 2th December 1941 p 4 
6 Tokyo in English for the United States, 14th January 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 911, 15th January 1942 
7 Tokyo in English for Europe, 9th January 1942 
B.B.e.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 907, 11th January 1942. 
8 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 6th December 1941 p 
F3 
9 In January 1942, Prime Minister Tojo declared that Bunnese and Philippine independence within the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were Japanese aims. 
Tokyo in German for Germany, 23rd January 1942 
B.B.C. Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 920, 24th January 1942 rd 
10 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 23 December 1941 
pH4 
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The Japanese also aimed to break the ties between the United States and Latin 
America, and between Britain and Australia. Plans were made to ridicule the United 
States' "Good Neighbour" policyll in broadcasts to Latin America,12 whilst Pan-
Asian unity was stressed to portray Japan in a favourable light to Australians. 
Broadcasts suggested that as Australia was geographically closer to Asia, its future 
was inextricably linked to Asia and Japan, not to a former colonial power in remote 
Europe. To Britain and the United States broadcasts were to criticise Anglo-Saxon 
aggression in the Far East and emphasised weak points in the American economy, 
such as the production surplus. l3 In addition, all enemy nations were to be told of the 
weakness of enemy strategies and the decadence of the West, illustrated by the 
Prisoners-of-War's love of jazz. These were compared unfavourably with the 
physical and moral superiority of the Imperial Japanese army and" navy. 
The stations, which had already been opened in the Japanese occupied areas, were 
also to play an important role. The Korean and Manchurian stations called for the 
maintenance of East Asian security and stressed the need for continued co-operation 
with Japan. The stations of the Central China Broadcasting Corporation, which had 
been established in March 1941, were involved in transmitting propaganda to 
Chungking, and in broadcasting to consolidate the Japanese position in the region. I4 
In November 1941, the proportion of propaganda broadcasts to the Chinese 
Nationalist capital, Chungking in Radio Peking's schedule was increased, and after 
the outbreak of war in the Pacific, it also began broadcasting regularly to San 
Francisco, Sydney and London. 15 
The Japanese also established an "Emergency Broadcasting Planning Committee"16 
in Peking, which met every morning to review all enemy broadcasts to China made 
the previous day, concentrating particularly on those made by the Nationalist 
11 See Chapter 1 p 17 ff above 
12 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts 10th December 1941 
pF2 
13 Kitayama: Rajio Toky6: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 28 
14 Kitayama: Rajio T6kyo: Dai-Toa e no A1ichi p 30 
15 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 31 
16 Rinji H6s6 Kikaku J'inkai 
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Chungking station. Discussion of these broadcasts produced "guidance policies" for 
Radio Peking broadcasts on both short- and medium-wave. The victories of the 
Japanese army and the improved stability and lifestyle of people in occupied Northern 
China were emphasised in broadcasts to China, along with speeches urging the 
Chinese to resist the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In broadcasts to Chinese living outside 
China, particularly to those in Malaya and Singapore, the news was to concentrate on 
the strength and discipline of the Imperial army, whilst seeking to damage the image 
of the Chungking government. 17 
The committee also considered transmissions to Indonesia and decided that in all 
broadcasts, the script-writers were to make a point of using the term "Indonesia" not 
the ''Netherlands East Indies," as the Netherlands had become an ally of Britain and 
the United States following its invasion by Germany in 1940. Broadcasts from Japan 
were to hold up independence as a temptation, whilst damaging the image of Britain 
and the United States amongst the native population in a strongly news-based 
schedule. 18 As a result, the North China Broadcasting Corporation was permitted to 
begin broadcasting to Indonesia in 1942, under the strict supervision of the Japanese 
Army in China. 19 
Hong Kong, the Philippines and Singapore 
The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong and Malaya on 8th December 
1941 were celebrated as great victories on all the transmissions throughout December. 
In news reports, as well as features, Radio Tokyo revelled in the attacks and the 
continuing advances of the Imperial army. A report on 20th December claimed that 
"Secretary Knox2o had told the graduating class at the U.S. Naval Academy that the 
Japanese navy and airforce 'were so powerful that they succeeded in knocking out the 
American fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. "'21 Two days later there was a lengthy 
17 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 32 
18 Kitayama: Rajio T6kyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 32 
19 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 33 
20 American Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox 
21 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts 20th December 19.tl 
pHS 
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report claiming that the British blamed the attack on U.S. negligence. 22 Britain, 
which benefited immensely from America's entry into the war, was very unlikely to 
have made such a statement. This seems, then, to have been one of Radio Tokyo's 
wilder accusations. 
On 20th December, N.H.K. 's International Department was expanded, as broadcasting 
to the Southern Regions became increasingly important. Broadcasts to Japanese 
troops on the front-line23 increased by thirty minutes daily. In addition, two new 
services were established; one to Indonesia and the Philippines in Malay, Dutch, 
Tagalog, English and Fukien dialect began broadcasting from 20th December. 24 The 
other, to French Indo-China, began broadcasting in Burmese, Malay, Thai, 
Vietnamese, Cantonese, English and Spanish.25 Following the conquest of the Malay 
peninsula, Japanese language newscasts were added to the latter in February 1942, 
and after 1st August 1942, the English and Spanish languages were dropped in favour 
of Hindi and increased coverage in Malay. 26 
The surrender of Hong Kong on 25th December 1941 was immediately announced in 
news flashes to all the transmission regions, announcers for all the seventeen 
languages used being rushed to the Tokyo studios to make the announcements. 27 
Japanese broadcasts stressed the significance of 100 years of British tyranny in Hong 
Kong and the potential power of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, following the 
eradication of British influence from Asia. 28 "The Meaning of the Capture of Hong 
Kong" was explained to several of the transmission regions, this message being 
broadcast in Vietnamese, Fukien dialect, Cantonese, Mandarin, English and Arabic. 29 
22 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts 2tJd December 1941 
pH2 
23 Transmission Four 
24 Transmission Six 
25 Transmission Five 
26 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Afichi pp 45-50 
27 These were Japanese, English, French, Gennan, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Bunnese, 
Vietnamese, Thai, Malay, Peking Chinese, Fukien Chinese, Cantonese, Arnbic and Tagalog. 
Kitayama: Rajio TOky6: Dai-Toa e no Afichi p 52 
28 Kitayama: Rajio TOkYO: Dai-Toa e no Afichi p 54 
29 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Afichi p 55 
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Broadcasts citing British atrocities against the Chinese in Hong Kong were also made 
following the colony's fall. The atrocity theme was also used in broadcasts regarding 
United States' action on Mindanao.3o "The Slaughter of Chinese on Mindanao: the 
Responsibility of the American-Philippine Army" was a talk in English which 
claimed that American Soldiers slaughtered Chinese women and children there.31 
Japanese troops were said to be discovering feelings of anger towards the United 
States in all regions of the island. 
It is not clear what the Japanese intended by citing the mistreatment of Chinese in 
Mindanao, rather than making a general accusation of atrocities committed against 
the local population, as was the case in broadcasts regarding Malaya and Hong Kong. 
It is probable that these broadcasts were aimed directly at overseas Chinese, who 
were generally sympathetic to the Chungking government, an ally of Britain and 
America. Perhaps the intention was to disillusion overseas Chinese, who had 
sufficient wealth to support the Chungking government financially, and to cut off this 
potential revenue supply. 
As the Battle for the Philippines intensified in late December 1941 and January 1942, 
the emphasis of overseas broadcasts switched. America was increasingly accused of 
cultural atrocities and cultural imperialism against the Philippines. Broadcasts 
charged America with supplanting Filipino culture by that of the United States. In 
addition broadcasts to South and Central America concentrated on the common , 
Catholic heritage of the Philippines and Latin America, and denounced American 
bombings of churches in raids on Manila. 32 
Broadcasts to the Philippines itself were largely appeals to the native population to 
throw off American oppression. Programmes entitled "A Plea to Filipino Soldiers" 
and "The Filipinos have become the Americans' Human Sacrifices" claimed that 
American troops were only concerned for their own safety. 33 In tum the example of 
30 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e nolvlichi p 57 
31 Kitayama: Rajio Tof..yo: Dai-Toa e no lIfichi p 57 
32 Kitayama: Rajio Tof..yo: Dai-Toa e no lIlichi p 59 
33 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Afichi p 60 
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Filipinos was held up to the rest of Asia to inspire overthrow of Western oppression, 
and a programme entitled "The Rising of All Filipinos" was broadcast to Indonesia. H 
At the end of December 1941, the Japanese authorities in Tokyo decided that 
overseas broadcasts should not be permitted to mention the "Liberation of the Peoples 
of East Asia,"35 as it was felt that this would inspire the peoples of East Asia to fight 
for freedom from the Japanese. The phrase agreed was the ''Liberation of East 
Asia,"36 to emphasise that it was Greater East Asia (not a series of independent states) 
that was to be created by the overthrow of the Western powers. As Japan was the 
leader of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere it was hoped that this would 
ensure that the initial pro-Japanese feeling of native revolutionaries would not be 
dispelled. 37 The agitation of nationalist movements was encouraged, and announcers 
on the Indonesian language programmes were permitted to play the Indonesian 
national anthem (Indonesia Raya) which had been banned by the Dutch authorities. 38 
However, local independence sentiment was not encouraged, and nationalist 
movements were encouraged to act only within the framework of the ''Liberation of 
East Asia." Hence a meeting of the Imperial Headquarters and Government Liaison 
Committee on 3rd March opposed proposals to encourage Javanese nationalists to 
think in terms of independence. 39 
In broadcasts to the Pacific region in January 1942 Australia was portrayed as the 
"Orphan of the Pacific. "40 Overseas radio waged a campaign to arouse Australian 
fears of isolation as Japanese troops advanced southwards across the Pacific towards 
New Britain and New Guinea. 41 Broadcasts frequently cited English and Australian 
newspapers which, it was claimed, showed that the English cared little for Australia. 
They reported that British troops were being pulled back from the front line in North 
th 
Africa, whilst Australians were forced to stay and fight for them. On January 29 
34 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 60 
35 Toa Minzoku Kaiho 
36 Toa Kaiho 
37 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 62 
38 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 63 
39 Taiheiyo no Sutego 
Kitayama: Rajio TokyO: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 63 
40 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 78 
41 Landings were made on New Britain, New Guinea and British Bomeo on 24th and 25th January 
1942 
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Radio Tokyo reported that Britain had completely withdrawn her own forces from 
Libya leaving only the inhabitants of her colonies to fight. 42 It is now known that 
Australia was unhappy at having her forces deployed in the Middle East. This was, 
then, an occasion where Japanese propaganda accurately reflected the mood of its 
target. However, whether it acquired more regular listeners is impossible to 
determine. The context of reports and the quality of radio reception are important to 
listeners, before they accept a propaganda message. 43 These reports may have 
reflected the prevailing Australian feeling, but most Australians would probably need 
more than one such example of Japanese empathy to overcome their suspicion of an 
enemy radio station. 
America, it was claimed, was interested in Australia, but only in order to be able to 
use Darwin as a naval base. In order to divide Australia from the "mercenary" and 
"arrogant"44 Americans, Radio Tokyo promised Australia co-operation in the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and aid in securing Australian independence from 
Britain, in return for her withdrawal from the anti-Japanese forces. 
Japanese radio directed at South and Central America attempted to separate the 
countries of Latin America from the United States, and the "Good Neighbour Policy" 
of the United States was frequently derided in broadcasts. A C.I.B. policy for 
"Information Propaganda concerning the Greater East Asian War,"45 established 
immediately prior to the outbreak of war, stated that neutral countries in South 
America were to be enticed away from America by emphasising the historical, 
cultural, ideological and linguistic differences between them and the United States. 46 
When Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama and Cuba declared war 
42 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 80 . th 
See also United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, OffiCial RadIO Broadcasts, 12 December 
1941 p G6; and Tokyo in English for the United States and Europe, 4th February 1942 
B.B.C. Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 933 5th February 1942 
43 See Chapter 9 pp 215-217 
44 The most common adjectives used to describe Americans in broadcasts to Australia were: 
"Synonyms of 'mercenary,' 'immoral,' 'unscrupulous,' 'vainglorious,' 'arrogant,' 'luxury-.loving,' 
'soft,' 'nauseating,' 'superficial,' 'decadent,' intolerant,' 'uncivilised,' 'barbarous,' 'sataruc,' and 
'diabolical. ", 
L.D. Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pIll 
45 Daitoa Senso ni Taisuru Joho Senden 
46 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Jdichi p 92 
87 
on Japan and Mexico, Columbia, Costa Rica and Venezuela broke off diplomatic ties 
with her in December 1941, a policy of inducing fear though broadcasts was planned. 
In December a feature on Radio Tokyo warned that these countries were to be 
sacrificed for the United States.47 The language was similar in tone to that used to 
Australia regarding the sacrifice of Australian troops by the British.48 In addition, 
Spanish language newscasts suggested that the "crafty strategy of the Americans in 
South America"49 was to destabilise South American governments by introducing 
Communist elements into the countries, in order to increase their dependence on the 
United States. 50 There were also programmes such as, ''We Hope South American 
Politicians Use Discretion," broadcast in English, Spanish and Portuguese, which 
questioned the diplomatic stance of South American countries. 51 The reassurance that 
Japan had no quarrel with Latin America was also reported in Spanish and Portuguese 
to those republics that remained neutral. 52 
As Japanese troops advanced in Malaya, Radio Tokyo regularly announced their 
victories. News reports to all the transmission regions at the end of January and the 
beginning of February 1942 concentrated on the situation in Malaya and Singapore. 
This was probably a deliberate policy to deflect attention from the situation in Bataan, 
in the Philippines, where the military campaign had reached stalemate. 53 
On 11th February a broadcast to Italy stated: 
Tonight we cannot talk of anything else . . . the hoisting of the 
Rising Sun [over Singapore] means the end of the Union Jack ... 
From the suburbs the Malayan and Indian populations have 
flooded into the street to watch the passage of our glorious 
infantry, waving improvised flags of the rising sun and shouting: 
"Banzai! "54 
47 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e nolvfichi p 92 
48 Presumably these broadcasts were in Spanish and Portuguese, not Japanese, as they cannot have 
been directed at the Japanese population of South America. 
49 Amerika nabei kosaku ni akuratsu na sakubo 
50 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no A1ichi p 94 
51 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 95 
52 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Alichi p 93 
53 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 10 1 
54 Tokyo in Italian for Italy, 11th February 1942 
B.B.C. Summary o/World Broadcasts NWllber 940, l2th February 1942 
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Continuing the theme used first in broadcasts to Australia,55 the same broadcast 
claimed one quarter of the troops fighting in Malaya were British, the rest being 
Australians, Malays and Indians: "Thus the British government confirms the English 
habit of fighting with the blood of others."56 The figure of one quarter British troops 
to three quarters Empire troops in the Malaya campaign was, in fact a fairly accurate 
one, although naturally the British did not draw the same conclusion from the figures 
that the Japanese radio reports did.57 The same theme reappeared later in the war in 
broadcasts to India and to Indian troops in Africa, where the Japanese aimed to 
disillusion Indians with British rule. 
On 14th February 1942 after Japan's complete occupation of Singapore, it was 
renamed 'Sh6nant6', and the port 'Sh6nanko.' The United States Records of the 
F.B.I.S. records that Radio Tokyo explained to its listeners; 
The root words of both names are 'Sh6wa,' which is the name of 
the present Imperial era, and 'nan' which means self. ... 'Sh6nan' 
symbolizes the supreme ideal of Japan for the establishment of a 
new order in the world and especially in Greater East Asia. 58 
However, the characters for 'Sh6nan' are the character for 'light' or 'bright,' which is 
indeed the first character of 'Sh6wa,' and that for 'south,' not 'self.' Kitayama claims 
that the Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Committee meeting which 
agreed the name, chose these characters to symbolise the light being spread through 
South and East Asia by the extension of the rule of the Sh6wa emperor. 59 It was not 
55 That the British never fought themselves but deserted the battle field to let the people of the colonies 
fight for them 
56 See also United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts 12th 
December 1941 p G6 
57 According to official British records, Britain's total losses (primarily as prisoners) during the 
campaign from 8th December 1941 to 31st January 1942 were 138,708. These comprised 38,496 
British, 18,490 Australians, 67,340 Indians and 14,382 Volunteer troops. (Louis Allen: Singapore 
1941-1945 p 270) It is not clear what nationality the volunteer troops were, but it is possible that they 
were Malays and Chinese as many British officers refused to recruit Malays into the regular army as 
they were not considered a martial race, and Chinese as they were afraid of unwittingly anning the 
Communist Chinese army. (Louis Allen: Singapore 1941-1945 ppI85-6) Britons thus comprised 
27.75% of the total losses during the Malaya campaign. It is probable that as British soldiers tended to 
comprise the higher ranks their casualty rate may have been slightly lower than that of some of the 
other groups, but if one assumes that the number of losses is a true reflection of the number of combat 
troops, it would appear tImt British troops comprised a little over one quarter of those fighting on the 
British side in Malaya. 
58 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 17tl1 February 1942. 
pA4 
59 Kitayama: Rajio T6Ay6: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 104 
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unusual for Radio Tokyo to provide a different version to an enemy audience, from 
that given by radio stations to domestic or East Asian audiences. However, given that 
the renaming of Singapore, the former prized centre of British rule in South-east Asia , 
was a propaganda device in itself, in this case this is unlikely. It must be assumed, 
therefore, that the confusion caused by the F.B.I.S. report is merely a case of the 
monitor having misheard 'self for 'south' during the course of the programme. 
Radio Tokyo celebrated the Fall of Singapore with a series of programmes to all the 
transmission regions on the day of "The First Congratulatory Party to Celebrate 
Victory in Greater East Asia."60 To Britain, a talk, entitled ''Let Them Speak," 
claimed that in a change "from the usual, confident, bellicose Churchill" the British 
Prime Minister "admitted that Britain did not have the slightest. chance against the 
Japanese even if she had been prepared." The speech also aimed to produce discord 
between the British and the Americans, accusing the United States of drawing Britain 
unnecessarily into a war in the Pacific, and then abandoning her when help was 
needed asking; 
What does Churchill really think about his Ally, who pulled him 
along in a reckless policy against Japan only to leave him in the 
hour ofneed?61 
The Situation in China 
Alongside the Malaya campaign Radio Tokyo also gave broadcasting time to 
discussion of the situation of Chiang Kai-shek in China, particularly after the Fall of 
Moulmein in Burma on 31st January 1942.62 Overseas Chinese were urged to stop 
sending aid to Chiang's Government, as it was claimed his position would be 
hopeless following the inevitable fall of Rangoon and the closure of the Burma 
Road.63 
60 Daitoa Senso Senshi Dai-ichi-ji Shukugakai 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 107 
61 Tokyo in English for Europe, 17th February 1942 
B.B.C. Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 946, 18th February 1942 
62 For details of the capture of Moulmein see W. Yoon: Japan's Occupation of Burma 1941-1945 pp 
126-128 
63 The Bunua Road was the Allied supply route from India and Bunua to Chiang' s Governm~nt in 
China. As the Japanese controlled the Chinese coastline an overland supply route was essentIal to 
Chiang's anny, and the neutrality of the Soviet Union in the Pacific War precluded a supply route, 
which crossed Russian soil. 
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In February 1942 the role of Radio Peking was reviewed, and an increase in budget 
was agreed in order to increase pressure on the Chinese Government.64 In addition, 
news services to Chungking from the stations in Nanking and Hankow were 
established. This review agreed that several propaganda themes to be used by these 
stations; the main ones being to emphasise Chungking's isolation when the Burma 
supply route was cut, and to drive a wedge between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist 
troops and their allies the Chinese Communists. Ideologically, the two groups had 
little in common besides opposition to Japanese occupation.65 Hence alongside 
appeals such as ''Ladies and Gentlemen of Chungking! Volunteer for the Spirit of 
East Asia!"66 which resembled those made to people in other areas of Asia outside 
Japanese control, there were talks such as, "The Chinese Communist Offensive 
against Chungking."67 This claimed that the Communists had deliberately caused the 
isolation of Chiang Kai-shek, through their control of the Burma frontier region.68 
Radio Battle Across the Pacific 
At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, America mobilised its piece-meal short-wave 
broadcasting69 and in February 1942, established a government short-wave station, 
the Voice of America.70 The San Francisco station, KGEI, was expanded and 
upgraded under this reorganisation, in order to broadcast to Asia and the Pacific 
nations. The programme schedule was expanded to include broadcasts in Mandarin, 
Cantonese and Fukien dialect, and contained news and speeches in Japanese. 
However, these programmes would only have been heard by the Japanese radio 
64 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 102 
65 Indeed after the end of the Pacific war in 1945, the Nationalist Government which was formed, was 
thrown almost immediately into Civil War against the Communists, which ended in the establishment 
of Mao Tse Tung's Communist Government in 1949. 
66 Chokyo Shokun yo Toa Seishin ni Teishin serareyo 
67 Chokyo no taisho Kosei 
Kitayama: Rajio Toly6: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 103 
68 A further broadcast to Italy claimed that Chungking was unhappy about Communist activities. 
Tokyo in Italian for Italy, 22nd May 1942 
B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1040 23rd May 1942. 
69 For a description of American short-wave broadcasting before World War Two see Chapter 1 
pp 22-24 
70 Julian Hale: Radio Power: Propaganda and International Broadcasting p 32 
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monitors as listeners in Japan and occupied Asia were forbidden to own short-wave 
receivers. In January 1942, KGEI made a broadcast claiming that the Japanese had 
not in fact sunk the United States aircraft carrier U.s.s. LeXington, as Japanese 
broadcasts had claimed, and that, although it had been damaged, repairs were being 
carried out to restore it to full service. It was reports such as this, which prompted the 
Japanese government to respond directly to KGEI's Asian broadcasts. 
On 11th February 1942, N.H.K. began a programme, "Answering to KGEI.',?1 Many 
of these broadcasts followed a pattern of announcing ''War Results," as Radio Tokyo 
did on other transmissions. These consisted of lists of the numbers of troops and 
machinery killed or destroyed and captured. In "Answering to KGEI," however, the 
figures conflicted directly with figures claimed by American stations in recent 
broadcasts, the American figures being quoted and directly refuted. Thus the first 
reply broadcast took issue with a KGEI broadcast, which, it claimed, had stated on 5th 
February that there had been 6,082,500 Japanese killed in China. The first edition of 
"Answering to KGEI" stated, 
This figure bears no relation to the number of people who have 
died in the China Incident. Just over 100,000 Japanese have been 
killed in the action in China."72 
It would appear that the radio battle did not progress to anything more than a conflict 
over the "truth" of figures, and that the broadcasts took on the nature of haggling 
rather than achieving any noticeable propaganda aims. 
"Answering to KGEI" and programmes which made direct reference to the broadcasts 
of other nations continued throughout the war and the regular round up of "War 
Results" was a feature on all Japanese. transmissions in the ''Radio War" over 
figures. 73 Japanese and American broadcasters were not the only ones to quote from 
71 Although the English sounds a bit odd, this was the title the Japanese gave the programme 
Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Dai-T6a e no Michi pIll 
72 Kono sUji wa Shina Jiken no senshisha-sU to wa nanira kankei ga nai mono dearu. Nihon no Shina 
ni okeru senshisha waju-yo man dearu. Kitayama: Rajio Toky6: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 112 
73 For examples of these "War Results" see the results of 5 years of war in C~ina, in English for 
Europe, 6th July 1942, B.B.C. Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1085, 7 July 1942~ or the 
results from the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway battles broadcast in Italian on August 8th, B.B.C. Summary 
of World Broadcasts Number 1121, 12th August 1942. In the latter part of the war, the battle over 
figures concentrated on disagreements over the number of American 'planes shot down in raids oyer 
Japan. 
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specific enemy broadcasts. The B.B.C. employed George Orwell to make weekly 
commentaries on the war situation to India between December 1941 and March 1943. 
Many of these were clearly answers to Axis broadcasts to India. On 25th July 1942 
part of Orwell's review refuted the "World picture presented by Axis propagandists," 
which stated that the Axis nations were "fighting the unjust [British and American] 
oppression" of the rest of the world "not in any way for their own interests, but 
simply in order to set the enslaved peoples free."74 Orwell continued his commentary 
as follows: 
Thus the Japanese assure the Indians if they invade India, it would be 
with no intention of settling there, but merely in order to drive the British 
out after which they will retire again. Simultaneously, the Germans and 
Italians are assuring the Egyptians that they have no desire whatever upon 
Egyptian territory, but are merely invading Egypt in order to expel the 
British, after which they, too, will retire to their own territories. 75 
This was certainly a direct response to a ''Message to Indians" broadcast by Sub has 
Chandra Bose on the Azad Hind76 on 20th July, in which he had described the British 
Empire as having two lungs, Egypt and India. He had claimed that one lung had 
collapsed after the Axis powers had declared the independence of Egypt, and that 
only the Indian "lung" needed to collapse for the British Empire to die completely. 77 
The Radio Attack on the Netherlands East Indies 
Following the occupation of Singapore on 14th February 1942, Japanese radio 
attention turned to the Netherlands East Indies. There was a steady stream of news 
items in Dutch, English and Malay indicating the inevitability of a Dutch capitulation, 
which included such items as ''Brothers and Sisters in Indonesia, Stand-up for 
Yourselves Right Now!"78 In addition, the station in Saigon played an important role 
in the radio war on the N.E.I. Under the joint control of N.H.K. and the Japanese 
military authorities, a special team gathered there to prepare broadcasts to the N.E.I. 
74 w. J. West: Orwell: The War Commentaries p 121 
75 W. J. West: Orwell: The War Commentaries p 121 
76 Azad Hind was a Free Indian station broadcasting from Berlin, which began operations on 19th 
January 1942 under Indian Nationalist, Subhas Chandra Bose. After Bose's es~pe to the .Far ~st .(he 
arrived in Tokyo on June 13th 1943) following a six month journey, the Azad!find was gIven alr-tJ.~e 
in the Shonan transmitter schedule by the Japanese authorities. Azad Hmd broadcasts to India 
continued for an hour a day from Shonan until the end of the war. 
77 W. J. West: Orwell: The War Commentaries Appendix 8 p 225 
78 Kitayama: Rajio 7()/.:y6: Dai-T6a e no A1ichi p 115 
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Broadcasting from the Saigon station as "Radio Bandung," the team of ten (four 
N.H.K. personnel, an accountant from the Japanese forces, a Dutch announcer, two 
Malay speaking Prisoners-of-War from Japan, and Dutch and Malay translators) 
began transmissions on 3rd March 1942, claiming that the station was broadcasting 
from within the N.E.I. For the first few days broadcasts were intermittent and this 
was explained as being on account of the difficult war conditions. On 5th March the 
station claimed that the Japanese military authorities had launched a full-scale attack 
around Batavia, and that they were officially changing the name of Batavia to 
Djakarta. To give Radio Bandung credibility the Dutch announcer, Kreufel, 
broadcast over official Saigon radio on 6th March appealing to the Dutch to throw 
down their arms. This allowed Radio Bandung to "reply officially" the following day 
that the Dutch administration in Batavia was considering starting negotiations with 
the Japanese, as Britain, America and Australia were providing little support. 
Saigon Radio proper announced the fall of Rangoon on 8th March and the same 
evening, "Radio Bandung" announced that negotiations for the surrender of Indonesia 
had begun. The Japanese authorities announced the complete surrender of Indonesia 
at the following day, and ''Radio Bandung" was "forced" off the air with the words 
"Long live Queen Wilhelmina!"79 
The key to this sort of black propaganda80 is that the listener believes that the station 
is what it purports to be, and in the N.E.I. this does seem to have been the case. 
Kitayama suggests that the station had a large influence on the attitude of the civilian 
Indonesian population, particularly those in the more remote areas who had little idea 
of the true situation around Batavia. However, N.E.I. troops also responded to 
''Radio Bandung." This, he suggests, is because the Japanese had swept through 
Malaya so quickly, and had already captured the "impregnable British fortress" of 
79 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi pp 116-9 
80 There are two types of propaganda. The first is "white propaganda," whereby the. source is 
recognised and attempts to persuade one by means of the logic of his argument or by causmg doubts 
about the respectability of one's own side. The second, "black propaganda," was d~el~ped. by all 
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Singapore with comparative ease. It seems possible that belief in inevitable collapse, 
by a force already thought to be weakened by the fall of the mother country in 1940, 
was perhaps less surprising than it at first appears. The resigned defeatism of a 
"Dutch" station seemed to hasten the surrender by confirming the inevitability of a 
Japanese victory.81 
The Radio War on Australia 
An article in Denshin Ky6kai Kaishi,82 "War Becomes the Mother of Culture,"83 in 
March 1942 described the role of Japanese radio as being to build and strengthen an 
"Asian Culture" whilst discrediting that of the West. It claimed that an "Asian 
Culture" had existed in the nineteenth century, before Western influence in Asia had 
become strong, and stated that radio's role was to recreate this. The article claimed 
that if radio started with art and music, the whole ideology and culture of Asia would 
eventually revert to its natural "Asian Culture."84 As it was felt that Western 
languages necessarily promoted Western culture, in February and March 1942 the use 
of English loan words in Japanese language broadcasts to occupied Asia was reduced 
dramatically. 85 Thus, the term 'A naonsaa , [Announcer], a broadcasting term 
borrowed from English, was dropped, and radio presenters became 'H6s6in' 
[Broadcasters].86 
Also in March 1942, Prime Minister Tojo issued a statement that Australia and India 
were to be the next targets in the Japanese propaganda war, and announced a large 
increase in the budget ofN.H.K. 's International Department. 87 In the propaganda war 
against Australia, the broadcasts of Prisoners-of-W ar played a major role and letters 
from Australian troops captured by the Japanese were read out by the presenter 
81 See Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Dai-T6a e no Michi pp 116-120 
82 Communications Corporation Magazine 
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84 See Kitayama: Rajio T6ky6: Dai-T6a e noJ.1ichi pp 124--5 
85 H6s6 Kenkytl [Broadcasting Research] April 1942, p 118 
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during transmissions. The first prisoner letter was in the transmission to Australia on 
19th December 1941 88 and it was introduced thus: 
Calling 1st Lieutenant Borden's Mother, Mrs. F. Borden. Are you 
listening to this broadcast from Tokyo Japan? Are you listening to this 
broadcast of a letter from your most important and beloved son in the 
world? Your important son 1 st Lieutenant Borden is safely with the 
Japanese Army after receiving hospitable nursing he said there's no 
need to worry.89 
However, following Tojo's statement the prisoner letters campaign intensified. 
Initially, letters were inserted into the schedules between other broadcasts, to entice 
Australians to listen regularly to Radio Tokyo. Hence, "The reading of news was 
customarily interrupted merely by an announcement, . . . that the messages would 
begin. Thus continued listening was necessary or the messages would be missed."90 
The stations in the N.E.!. were particularly important to the Japanese radio assault on 
Australia and prisoner letters were an integral part of the transmissions from the 
summer of 1942. On Sth June, Radio Bandung made the following announcement, 
which was followed by a list of prisoners' names: 
. . . The best thing for you to do is to listen to our radio service from 
Batavia. Just turn on the radio and listen in. . .. The information you 
eagerly wish to know about Australian officers and men now interned by 
the Nippon Army comes to you at 12.1 S midday and again at 9.1 S in the 
. h 91 mg t .... 
Letters written by prisoners themselves were also incorporated into programmes from 
early in June 1942. The first one was picked up by monitors at the B.B.C. on 14th 
June although reception was bad and the name of the prisoner was inaudible. It was 
written by a medical officer who stated that he was fine, although missing his wife in 
Melbourne, was learning Japanese and bridge at the camp, and was enjoying the 
warmer climate of Indonesia. He begged people not to judge the Japanese harshly, 
but claimed that many were nice and had a good sense of humour.92 This was not the 
88 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 127 
89 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 126 
90. Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 163 
91 Bandoeng in English for Australian Listeners, 5th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 1054, 6th June 1942 
92 Batavia in English for Australia, 14th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 1063, 15th June 1942 
96 
first prisoner letter broadcast from Batavia, but the reception of the previous ones had 
been too indistinct for the monitors to be able to record what had been said. 
Many of the prisoner letters gave the names of two or three of their companions and 
asked the addressee of the letter to pass on details to their relatives. Most described 
similar scenes of camp life, a prisoner vegetable garden was common, as were classes 
set up by the prisoners themselves, and church services on Sundays. Problems with 
obtaining money and clothing were also frequently mentioned in early broadcasts, 
although the statement that there were problems was usually qualified with one that 
the Japanese had promised to pay prisoners. Most of the letters expressed gratitude to 
the Japanese for their good treatment of the letter writer.93 From the end of June 
1942, the Prisoner Letters became a regular feature of Radio Batavia broadcasts to 
Australia and New Zealand, which became known as "Australia Home News Hour." 
Usually one or two letters were read followed by a list of prisoners' names. 
Broadcasts of prisoner letters were also made by Radio Tokyo in transmissions to 
North America. It was announced on 1 st January 1942, that 
... fully aware of this universal sentiment,94 the Japanese military 
authorities now are planning to broadcast the names or 
whereabouts of those American and British soldiers and sailors 
who have either been killed or made prisoner.95 
The United States Department of Transport Monitoring Station at Point Grey in 
Vancouver monitored the broadcasts and sent the details to the Federal 
Communications Commission (F.C.C.) in Washington. 
Generally the letters broadcast in the "Postman Calls" programme were much shorter 
than those kept by the B.B.C., and they tended not to contain details of camp life. 
For example, a message from Alvard Lucy Davis on 27th October 1944, read, "Hello 
Mother and the rest of the folks back there. I am well. I would like to take this 
93 For examples of typical letters see one to Mrs. Alfred Campbell from her husband, (Bat~via in 
English for Australia, 16th June 1942, B.B.e.: Summary of World B~o~dcasts .No. 1065, 17. Jun~ 
1942) and one from Captain F. Kellow to his wife in Melbourne (BataVIa m Engbsh for AustralIa, N 
June 1942, B.B.e.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 1073, 25th June 1942). 
94 That is the desire to have news of missing loved ones 
95 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 1st January 1942 p 
Bl 
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opportunity to wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year."96 There 
were also longer reports, sometimes recordings of the prisoners' voices, which were 
broadcast under the title of "Humanity Calls." One from Private Ralph Knox in 
Tokyo Camp, gave details of a hospital for prisoners-of-war he had visited "where 
our own doctors, working under the direction of the Japanese doctors, ... have ____ _ 
supply of drugs and equipment. "97 Many of the messages in both the programmes 
aimed at America mentioned the prisoners' financial provision for their families at 
home, or the fact that letters and parcels from home had reach them. However, 
descriptions of life in the camps were absent, as these tended only to feature in 
transmissions from Radio Batavia, which broadcast to Australia. 98 
It is difficult to ascertain the effect of the broadcast of prisoner letters on the 
populations of Australia and North America. The prisoners genuinely wrote much of 
the material contained in the letters, as they contained personal details. This ensured 
that the audience remained interested. However, the Japanese authorities tampered 
with the letters and 
It was noticed, especially from Batavia, that stock phrases would 
appear time and again about the good food and living conditions, 
the excellent treatment of prisoners and the strength of the 
Japanese forces. 99 
According to an official survey carried out by the AIF Women's Association in 
November 1942, for the Australian Government's Sub-Committee on Enemy 
Propaganda, generally the few people who had both leisure time during the day and a 
short-wave receiver did listen in to Radio Batavia, as did unofficial monitoring 
organisations such as the Prisoner-of-War Relatives Association. The response of the 
Australian Government to these findings was two-fold. Firstly, it refuted the claims 
of Japanese kindness to prisoners over the national broadcasting networklOO, citing 
96 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to American Prisoners of War. 
27th October 1944. 
97 The gap in the report (----) preswnably indicates a few inaudible words were broadcast. From the 
tone of the letter it can probably be assumed that the missing words are "a g~" . th 
United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to American Prisoners of War, 29 
October 1944 
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Japanese atrocities. WI Secondly, in January 1943, it formed a body to ensure that the 
full text of letters monitored was sent to the addressees in order to negate the 
Australian public's need to listen to Japanese broadcasts. 102 
The Radio Battle for India 
The second radio offensive of 1942 was on India. Anti-British feeling had been 
mounting in India since the outbreak of the European war in 1939, when Britain had 
postponed India's promised dominion status until the end of the war. Unrest 
intensified during 1942, following the fall of Rangoon, climaxing in the outbreak of 
the "Quit India" campaign of civil disobedience in July. 
Japan's radio war on India was signalled by an increase in broadcast time to the sub-
continent in March 1942. Transmission Seven103 broadcast in Japanese, English, 
French, Hindi and Arabic. A broadcast in "Indian Languages" was inserted into the 
schedules to include news and features in Urdu, Bengali, Tamil and Punjabi. 
Unfortunately, Radio Tokyo did not have announcers who could speak all of these 
languages so broadcasts began in Punjabi only until a Tamil announcer began 
broadcasting in April. Urdu was added in December 1942 and Bengali broadcasts did 
not begin until March 1943.104 
Rash Behari Bose, leader of the Indian Independence League (I.I.L.) had been 
resident in Japan since escaping the British police in Calcutta in 1915. 105 The I.I.L. 
was encouraged by the Japanese authorities, which allowed an I.I.L. Conference to be 
held in Tokyo in March 1942.106 Following the fall of Singapore, Japanese radio 
appealed to Indians across Asia to join the Japanese in throwing off the oppressive 
regime of the British, and these broadcasts continued as Britain's position in Malaya 
101 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 169 
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For a fuller discussion of the prisoners' letters campaign on Australia, and its effectiveness see Chapter 
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103 To India and the Middle East 
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106 The Conference was due to open on lOth March 1942, but transport problems in Greater East Asia 
delayed its opening until 28th 
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and Burma worsened. The radio station in Singapore, which was re-opened by the 
Japanese on 28th March 1942, became the second most important Japanese overseas 
radio station after Tokyo. It was the centre of Indian Independence broadcasting, and 
on its opening day it included transmissions in Tamil and Hindi besides English, 
Japanese, Thai, Malay, Fukien dialect and Cantonese. The Hsinking station in 
Manchuria also began broadcasts for India at this time, as did captured stations in 
Burma, which were "patched up" sufficiently to be able begin broadcasting to India 
as soon as the fighting allowed. 107 
This increasing broadcasting activity coincided with the failure of the Cripps mission 
to India 108 and the heightening of Gandhi's campaign of Civil Disobedience. The 
Cripps Mission itself was the subj ect of frequent derision in broadcasts to most 
regIOns. A commentary in March claimed that Indians had previously been 
frequently fooled, and questioned if the British could dupe them again through 
Cripps.109 Another talk claimed that the tricks used by the British in their chicanery 
in deceiving Indians were well known. 110 The British offer to India of dominion 
status at a later date was ridiculed as a mere "sweetener" to keep Indians as enemies 
of Japan, for Britain was unable to resist her without Indian resources and manpower. 
Broadcasts by George Orwell 111 in the weeks prior to the arrival of the mISSIon 
stressed Cripps' good character, "a man of great personal austerity, a vegetarian, a 
107 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no Michi pp 140-1 
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teetotaller and a devout Christian"112 countering derisive Japanese broadcasts 
describing him as a British stooge. Following the break-down of negotiations British 
broadcasts to India referred frequently to Japanese broadcasts, refuting their claims 
directly. A commentary described as "a direct lie" Axis attempts to "represent the 
breakdown as a refusal on the part of India to defend herself and an actual Indian 
desire to pass under Japanese rule."113 In contrast, Japanese broadcasts used the 
break-down of negotiations to point to India's refusal to be bribed with promises of 
American money, without immediate independence114 and described the situation as 
"the beginning of the end of the British Empire."1l5 
This coincided with a new policy in broadcasting to India and plans were made to 
strengthen the stations in Saigon, Bangkok and Bandung already broadcasting to 
India, in order to become the basis of a radio onslaught on India. 116 Links between 
these outlying stations and the major Japanese newspapers were also strengthened in 
order to improve the perceived credibility of news reporting to India. 117 
The Doolittle Raid 
A broadcast from Tokyo on 16th April dismissed a Reuters' claim that three American 
'planes had bombed Tokyo as an "idiotic" and "laughable"118 fiction, which did not 
worry the Japanese. 119 On 18th April, however, sixteen American B-2Ss, each 
carrying four bombs, carried out air raids on Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Kobe. 120 
The aircraft involved in the so-called ''Doolittle Raid," named after its commander, 
then flew on to bases in China. 
112 West (ed.): Orwell: The War Commentaries p 61 
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The Japanese authorities decided that it would be impossible to make no admission of 
the raid, so it was agreed that overseas radio would explain the "real situation" 
regarding the raid. The raid was admitted in a news report broadcast to the Pacific 
coast of the United States. This news report was subsequently translated into all the 
broadcast languages and re-broadcast during each of the transmissions over the next 
twenty-four hours.121 The report closely followed guidelines set out by the 
authorities, and admitted a raid had occurred, but stressed it had been inhuman , 
targeting hospitals, schools, residential areas and temples. It emphasised that the 
bombs had fallen in suburban areas killing only the innocent, as others were at work 
in the city centres. The only result of the inhuman raid, it claimed, was to increase 
Japanese patriotism and to deepen the Japanese desire for victory over the inhuman 
enemy. 122 Broadcasts using similar language continued in subsequent days. A 
further broadcast described the American airmen deliberately directing their machine-
gun fire at children in a school playground in Tokyo, killing thirty of them. 123 
Of the American airmen that flew on to bases in China, three died when their 
parachutes failed to open, and a further eight were arrested when they landed in 
Japanese occupied China. They were transported back to Tokyo on 21 st April to 
stand trial andit was reported on April 27Th that airmen who surrendered themselves 
having bombed Japan would be shown no mercy. 124 
Occasional references were made in Japanese overseas broadcasts to the fact that the 
American public had no knowledge that four fifths of those who took part in the raid 
had not returned during the Summer of 1942,125 but the trial did not take place until 
October 1942. On 21 st October, Radio Tokyo reported that officials had hinted that 
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the airmen would be sentenced to death 126 and a day later it reported that they had 
confessed to bombing non-military targets. 127 Reports concerning the trial were 
accompanied by further reports that the United States' government had withheld news 
of the capture of the American flyers,128 but news of the trial and the fate of the 
airmen disappeared from the news schedules before the end of October 1942. 
The Battle of the Coral Sea 
The Fifth Conference of the East Asian Broadcasting Corporations took place in 
Tokyo in April 1942. Representatives of the Broadcasting Corporations in Korea, 
Taiwan, Manchuria, North and Central China attended along with delegates from the 
Japanese military authorities, the C.I.B., the Ministry of Communications, the Asia 
Development Institute and the Manchurian Government. Representatives from the 
Mongolian Broadcasting Corporation also attended as observers. The Head of 
N.H.K., Komori Shichiro attended, although there were no representatives of the 
International Section. This was largely as it coincided with Tanomogi Shinroku's 
announcement that he was intending to resign in order to stand in local Tokyo 
elections. On his resignation the leadership of the International Section was taken up 
by the Head of the Operations Bureau, Seki Masao, who held the two posts 
concurrently. 129 
The Broadcasting Conference itself discussed the role of the smaller stations in Asia 
in broadcasting to the enemy. A list of which stations broadcast to whom and in 
which language was compiled 130 and it was agreed that there should be several 
medium-wave and 2-3 short-wave stations in each area producing programmes for 
broadcast overseas. 131 
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In May 1942, the military situation in the Pacific was the main topic of Radio Tokyo 
news broadcasts. Reports were made concerning the island of Corregidor in the 
Philippines. It was reported that Corregidor, had been shelled heavily by the 
Japanese132 and a Japanese military communique was issued on 7th, following the 
island's complete occupation by the Japanese the previous day. This was broadcast 
first to China and Australia, and then to the other transmission regions. 133 
In April 1942, the Japanese had launched OperationMo in the South Pacific's Coral 
Sea, in an attempt to capture Port Moresby, in New Guinea and just off the 
northernmost tip of Australia. American intelligence knew the main features of the 
plan and diverted aircraft carriers to meet the Japanese attack. The battle of the Coral 
Sea occurred on 7th and 8th May and was the first major naval battle between Japan 
and America. Compared to later battles, losses were not heavy, but they were 
significant and were suffered by both sides. 
On 8th May, a Special Announcement was made over Radio Tokyo in "German, 
Italian, French etc. for the World." It stated that 
... The Imperial Navy ... east of New Guinea, located Anglo-American 
naval forces on 6th May in the Coral Sea south-west of New Guinea. Our 
ships at once attacked them and sank an American battleship ... inflicted 
irreparable damage on a British cruiser ... and also heavily damaged a 
British battleship. .. Today ... our naval forces sank two American 
aircraft carriers . .. The offensive operations of our ships is still in 
progress. 
This battle shall be named the 'Battle of the Coral Sea.' 134 
Within five days the u.S.S. LeXington had been added to the list of American aircraft 
carriers the Japanese claimed to have sunk. l35 In the same period the American 
Government admitted to having lost the u.S.S. LeXington only, and claimed to have 
sunk seventeen Japanese ships. The Japanese admitted losses of one light aircraft 
132 Tokyo in Gennan for Europe, 2nd May 1942 
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carner and thirty-one aeroplanes. 136 In reality, both sides had lost two aircraft 
. 137 F l'f! . f fi carrIers. a SI lcatlOn 0 Igures seems, then, to have been a feature of reporting on 
both sides, as they both wished to make their own destructive power appear greater. 
However, Japanese exaggeration grew increasingly wild as the war continued and 
, 
Japanese propaganda was forced to continually exaggerate further, in order not to 
undermine previous propaganda. 
On 10th May the Japanese transmission to Australia claimed: 
The naval battle of the Coral Sea ... ended on 8th May with a shattering 
blow for the Americans .and the British ... The United States of America 
has now been reduced to a third rate naval power, its naval forces will 
hardly suffice to protect its own shores ... 138 
Over subsequent weeks broadcasts to Australia stressed the vulnerability of Australia, 
following the huge American defeat, and claims such as this were made; 
. . . the naval forces in defence of Australia have dispersed; . 
nothing stands now to defend her before the onslaught of the 
Japanese forces139 
The atmosphere at the Imperial Headquarters Press Section when the news of the 
actual Japanese defeat in the Coral Sea was received, gives some indication as to why 
a policy of fabricating such reports was pursued: 
Who would have thought that the Akagi, Kara, Soryll and Hiryll would 
be sunk! Who would have imagined that our first and second air units 
would be annihilated! ... "The most important thing is to keep it 
secret," said the chief of the First Section. "If even a part of the truth 
should become known it would be difficult to control the nation." No 
one spoke. These were people who were not trained for defeats ... 140 
Features concerning the glorious results of the Battle of the Coral Sea continued to be 
broadcast occasionally over the next month, such as a report which claimed to report 
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the "truth" about the battle. 141 The mam content of news reports, however, 
concentrated on the war in China and the "mopping-up" operations being carried out 
around Mandalay in Burma, the fall of which was announced on 3rd May 1942.142 
Japanese pressure on Australia was increased when the Head of the Navy Information 
Section, Captain Hiraide Hideo, announced that three Japanese submarines had 
entered Sydney harbour undetected on 31 st May and had successfully shelled the city, 
sinking one warship. This was transmitted over the next few hours in all the English 
language broadcasts to the Pacific and East Asian regions in order to stress the 
vulnerability of Australia. 143 In fact the attackers sank one non-military vessel, and 
failed to hit an American cruiser anchored in the harbour. l44 
The Battle of Midway 
The Battle of Midway, 4th_6th June 1942, is generally regarded as the turning point of 
the war in the Pacific. The Japanese attack on the Midway Islands, a stepping-stone 
to Hawaii, was intended to lure the depleted American fleet into an inescapable trap. 
It was preceded by a dummy attack on the Aleutian Islands. American Intelligence, 
however, had again cracked the Japanese codes and knew that the main target was 
Midway. The American victory was resounding. Japan lost all four large aircraft 
carriers and a heavy cruiser in twenty-four hours. 
The United States announced complete victory in the naval battle on June 7th . The 
domestic Japanese audience was told that it was a total Japanese victory. However, in 
overseas broadcasts there was silence from Radio Tokyo regarding the battle until a 
military communique concerning Japanese landings on the Aleutian islands, issued on 
141 It claimed that following the sinking of the u.S.S. Yorktown and the u.s.s. Saratoga the aircraft 
carriers the u.S.S. Hornet and the u.S.S. Enterprise fled without fighting at the sight of Japanese 
aeroplanes. 
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June 10th, mentioned that there had been reports of attacks on American ships near 
Midway on 4th and 5th of June. 145 
The following day, reports quoted the United States Government as having admitted 
that the Japanese navy was now operational in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It 
stated that if the Aleutians fell to Japan, the America-Europe communications and 
supply lines across the Pacific would be cut, and that if the United States lines of 
defence were forced to retreat America would be "weakened by dispersal defensive 
action." It also claimed that Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was clearly cautious 
about the outcome of the Midway Battle. 146 On 12th June, a news commentary 
regarding the significance of both the Midway and the Aleutians battles claimed that 
both battles were proof of the outstanding power, mobility, and superior tactics of the 
Japanese navy. 147 
The following day, however, the tone was entirely different. In a talk entitled 
"Australian Anxiety," Radio Tokyo admitted the American victory at Midway, 
reporting that Australians, worried by the Japanese occupation of several strategic 
points in the Pacific,148 had warned the Americans not to become "intoxicated with 
the victory at Midway. "149 Radio Manila hinted at a similar admission on 15th June 
when a broadcast to America and the Orient claimed that "Japanese losses at Midway 
will be more than compensated for by the occupation of the Aleutians."150 However, 
on 28th June, a German language talk claimed that the Japanese attacks on Midway 
and the Aleutians were a planned and simultaneous attack comparable to the 
combined attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. 151 The implication was that 
145 Tokyo in English for Europe, 10th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1059, 11th June 1942 
146 Tokyo in English for Europe, 11th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1060, 12th June 1942 
147 Tokyo in English for the United States, 12th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1061, 13th June 1942 
148 In the monitoring report itself the monitor has written "Aleutians?" indicating that the words were 
probably unclear and the monitor has guessed that this is what was said 
149 Tokyo in English for Australia and New Zealand, 13th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1062, 14th June 1942 
150 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts 15th June 1942, 
Highlights, p 1 
151 Tokyo in German for Gennany, 28th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1077, 29th June 1942 
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both had been entirely victorious. The battle of Midway was rarely mentioned on 
overseas broadcasts after this so it is difficult to surmise what, if any, plan existed for 
reporting it. It may have been that the American victory was treated as common 
knowledge in broadcasts to Australia and the Orient, but there is little continuation of 
the theme in the monitoring reports regarding what was said on other occasions so it 
is impossible to establish any clear trends. 
From mid-June 1942 reports regarding the reconstruction of the newly occupied areas 
in the Pacific and China were the most frequent in all the transmissions, such as a 
report that the oil wells at Surabaya had been restored and that the Singapore rubber 
works were scheduled to re-open. 152 Occasional references to Midway and the Coral 
Sea were made153 but these were isolated reports late in a news programmes' running 
order. Their positioning was intended to emphasise the lack of importance the 
Japanese wished to attach to these reports. 
At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the speed and success of Japanese victories 
provided impressive propaganda. Radio broadcasting was reorganised to present this 
propaganda overseas immediately, and new languages were added to the schedules to 
promote it. Broadcasts sought to split the less powerful states from the main Allies of 
Britain and the United States. Campaigns were waged on Latin America, Australia 
and India, which questioned the reasons for their loyalty to their "imperial 
aggressors. " The states of East Asia were urged towards independence from the 
colonial powers, but independence only as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Broadcasts to all regions often listed impressive lists of '\var 
results" a trend which continued even after the true "results" were not victories. , 
However, from May 1942 the Japanese victories were slowed and turned into defeat 
at the Battle of Midway. Overseas radio continued to broadcast news of great 
victories, but this line became increasingly difficult to sustain as the tide of war 
turned against Japan. 
152 Tokyo in English for Europe, 22nd Jillle 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 1071, 23rd Jillle 1942 
153 For example, America was accused of inventing results for the Coral Sea and Aleutians battles 
Tokyo in English for Europe, 18th Jillle 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 1067, 19th Jillle 1942 
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Chapter 5: Initial Defeats (June 1942 - July 1944) 
Developments in the War Situation 
During the two years from June 1942 the Axis powers suffered a series of defeats on 
all fronts, and the areas under Axis occupation were reduced significantly. In June 
1942 Japan's position in the Pacific began to deteriorate. The Battle of Midway 1 was 
the first United States' victory in the Pacific. At the same time, bitter fighting in the 
Solomon Islands, to the north-east of Australia, followed a naval and land attack by 
the American forces. The battle for the Solomon Islands continued into 1943, but in 
order to make regular claims of victory, Japanese communiques divided the battle into 
several smaller battles. Hence the start of the Third Battle of the Solomon Islands was 
announced in November 1942. 
Japan finally began to withdraw her troops from Guadalcanal, a small island in the 
Solomon Islands chain, on January 22nd 1943 and the withdrawal was officially 
announced on 9th February. Japanese troops had seized the. island before the 
Americans in August 1942, and the American attempt to capture it had originally been 
expected to take little more than a week.2 
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The American push northwards continued during 1943, and on 17th February 1944 an 
air raid was carried out on Truk Island, the first American raid within Japan's "Inner 
Waters." This was followed in June 1944 by attacks on the strategic islands of Guam 
and Saipan, which were captured a month later. 
While American troops were carrying out attacks on Japanese positions in the South 
Pacific, the situation on the Burma front became increasingly tense. Despite Japanese 
claims that the British position in North Eastern India was precarious, the expected 
Japanese victory at Imphal never occurred. Instead, eight weeks of some of the worst 
hand-to-hand fighting of World War Two took place in the city from March to May 
1944.3 
In China, Japanese forces launched an ambitious and successful offensive in May 1944. 
The Ichi-go Offensive sought to provide a land supply route extending from between 
Manchuria and North China through to Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, as Japanese 
merchant shipping had been decimated by Allied attacks. One of the principal 
purposes of the campaign was to prevent the United States from using bomber bases 
in China for attacks on Japan. 4 
The middle years of the war saw a similar reversal in Axis fortunes in Europe. In 
January 1943 the Allied capture of Tripoli in Libya was announced and a few days 
later Allied reports described the first German setbacks on the Russian front at 
Stalingrad. The battle for Stalingrad had been raging since September 1942, and it 
concluded "in Germany's first major defeat in February 1943. Allied troops attacked 
Italy across the Mediterranean Sea from positions in North Africa, and on 8th 
September 1943 the Italian Badoglio Government surrendered to the Allies, after 
secret negotiations. 5 On 6th June 1944 the Allies opened the awaited second front in 
Europe with the D-Day landings in Normandy and began the final push towards 
Berlin. 
On the political front, III 1943 the leaders of the Allies met in at conferences at 
3 Calvocoressi. Wint and Pritchard: Total War p 1124 
4 Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard: Total War pp 1145-7 
5 Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard: Total War p 400 
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Casablanca in January and Cairo and Tehran in November. At the former meetino 
'=" 
between Roosevelt and Churchill, it was agreed to leave the initiative in military 
operations in the Pacific to the United States. The Cairo conference, between 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, resulted in the signing of the Cairo 
Declaration, which detailed the division of Japanese territories amongst the Allies, 
which would follow her defeat. The day following the declaration Churchill and 
Roosevelt met Stalin at Tehran to discuss plans for the conclusion of the European 
war. 
From 5th to 6th November 1943 the Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo, 
which included the leaders of Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, Manchukuo, Occupied 
China and the Provisional Government of Free India. This meeting was intended to 
strengthen solidarity and co-operation between these countries and Japan. It also 
sought to embarrass the Allies and deter them from pressing on with plans for the re-
conquest of Asia, by demonstrating that total independence had become the political 
objective of Asian states. 6 
The Joint Declaration issued by the Conference stated that the countries of East Asia 
would "respect their mutual autonomy and independence."7 However, it's language 
was not completely anti-Western and it sought to prepare for an eventual end to 
hostilities.8 In so doing it partially paralleled thinking in the United States' State 
Department, which belied the "menacing words" of the Cairo Declaration.9 
Radio Tokyo's Response to these Developments 
The Japanese short-wave radio response to developments in the middle years of the 
war was frequently two-fold. Often Japanese reports sought to deflect the listeners' 
attention from news of Allied successes, and news programmes would frequently 
devote little time to major battles if the situation did not appear favourable to Japan. 
Hence after the occupation of the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu, their renaming 
6 Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard: Total War p 1105 
7 Akira Iriye: Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 19,/1-19./5 p 119 
8 Iriyc: Power and Culture p 153 
9 Sec Calvocorcssi, Wint and Pritchard: Total War p 1112 and Iriyc: Power and Culture p 153 
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to Narukami and Atsutu was announced in programmes on 25th June,10 being more 
favourable news than the defeat at Midway. United States' denials of huge losses 
were described as "useless,"11 and the strategic importance of Kiska and Attu for 
attacks on North America was stressed.12 
The other strategy for broadcasting news about battles in the South Pacific was to pay 
little regard to the true situation, and celebrate each battle as a glorious Japanese 
victory. During the battles for the Solomon Islands in the second half of 1942, Radio 
Tokyo often made "bombastic" claims of losses inflicted on American forces. "War 
results"· were issued frequently, which omitted many of the Japanese losses and 
exaggerated those of the United States. A Japanese report on 28th November claimed 
that American losses in the Third Battle for the Solomon Islands had mounted to two 
battleships and eleven destroyers, rendering the battle a great Japanese victory. In 
reality, American losses were much lighter than Japanese reports claimed, amounting 
to three light cruisers and four destroyers. Japanese losses of two battleships, one 
destroyer, and eleven of their nineteen transport vessels were not reported.13 An 
American report of January 1943, declared that the Japanese propaganda situation 
regarding the Solomon Islands could not "be redeemed by anything short of an 
American defeat as crushing in actual fact as those that Tokyo has claimed in 
extravagant propaganda. "14 
Radio Tokyo ridiculed the United States' publication of the Pearl Harbor casualty 
figures late in 1942. It claimed that publication had been delayed for a year in order 
that it would not seem so devastating to the American public and continued that the 
Japanese public had learnt the "crippling truth" after ten days, but Americans had to 
wait twelve months. IS 
10 Tokyo in English for Europe, 25th June 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1074 26th June 1942 
11 Tokyo in German for Europe, 22nd June 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1071, 23rd June 1942 
12 Tokyo in English for Europe, 26th June 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1075, 27th June 1942 
13 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 238 
14 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Reports #40. "The Japanese Propaganda 
Commitment in the Solomon Islands," 7th January 1943 
15 Tokyo in English for Europe, 7th December 1942 
SSC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1239. 8th December 1942 
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The first anniversary of the outbreak of war in the Pacific on 8th December 1942 was 
marked by "flashback" reports of news reports of a year previously and descriptions of 
patriotic rallies held in Japan. An outline for the radio commemoration of the 
anniversary had been drawn up in October and it was to consist of seven days of 
celebratory programmes. 16 A speech to Italy over Radio Tokyo stated, "Like the 
Italo-German victories, the achievements of Japan during the last twelve months have 
made the position of the Japanese Empire unshakeable and have strengthened Japan's 
faith in final victory."17 
Overseas radio features in 1943 continued to claim high American losses in the Battle 
for the Solomon Islands. Interestingly, although Radio Tokyo used the word 
"withdrawal" in regard to Guadalcanal, in some of its English language broadcasts, the 
Imperial Headquarters statement used the phrase "shift in army positions" [tenshin] 
and this was used in domestic broadcasts and Japanese language broadcasts. 18 It is not 
clear why overseas radio was allowed to use '~ithdrawal" in its English broadcasts, 
but it is probably reasonable to assume that it was a mistake, or a misunderstanding by 
the censor. 
On 30th May 1943 the Japanese authorities announced the first ''Honourable Defeat"19 
of the war following reports of American landings on Attu Island on 14th May. This 
was reported on overseas broadcasts on the same day, the communique being read out 
over the air. It said that the garrison had been virtually wiped out as Japanese 
preferred death to dishonour.2o Although reticent at first about publishing figures 
Tokyo soon ''fell back on its stock propaganda lines."21 The withdrawal from Kiska 
Island was announced on 22nd August. The evacuation of the island was described as 
successful for three reasons; the close collaboration between army and navy, 
16 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 250 
17 Tokyo in Italian For Europe Broadcast, 8th December 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1240, 9th December 1942. 
18 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 288 
19 Gyokusai 
Although usually translated as "Honourable Defeat" the term "gyokusai" implies that the defenders 
were all killed before the island could be taken, an implication absent in the English term. 
20 Tokyo in English for Europe, 30th May 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1413, 31st May 1943 
21 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Reports #82, "Radio Tokyo and the Attu Attack"', 
19th May 1943 
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providence which always favoured the Japanese (in this case by sending fog to shield 
the withdrawal) and the self-sacrificing spirit of the soldiers on Attu.22 
The battle in the Solomon Islands continued into the winter of 1943 and the "5 th Air 
Battle for Bougainville" announced by the Japanese Army Headquarters on 1 7th 
November claimed that there had been increased United States shipping losses. 23 
Later that month reports of results for the Gilbert Islands were also included as 
American troops began landing on Tarawa and Makin on 19th November.24 
On 20th December 1943 the Japanese authorities announce the ''Honourable Defeat" 
of these islands, nearly a month after it had occurred.25 The radio announcement 
stated that all the 3,000 garrison troops had died the death of heroes against more than 
50,000 American troops, but that they had inflicted heavy losses before being wiped 
out. 26 These reports are remarkable examples of Japanese exaggeration. In fact the 
invading American force numbered some 17,000 to 18,00027 whilst those in the 
Japanese garrison numbered close to 5,000.28 The Japanese garrison was almost 
wiped out, although seventeen prisoners were taken,29 and it had -inflicted heavy losses 
on the invading force. The losses of 3,301 US Marines killed, wounded or missing30 
were, however, lower than the Japanese garrison losses31 and constituted less than 
twenty percent of the attack force. 32 
With the continued announcement of ''Honourable Defeats" Japanese radio turned 
away from ''War Results," and sought to deflect attention to events elsewhere in the 
Co-Prospe"rity Sphere. It adopted a theme of "moral superiority." Japan was 
22 Tokyo in Italian for Europe, 25th August 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1500, 26th August 1943 
23 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 398 
24 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 412 
25 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 420 
26 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 20th December 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1617, 21st December 1943 
27 A. Russell Buchanan: The United States and World War II, Volume 1 pp 285-6 
28 Buchanan: The United States and World War II p 283 
29 Gary R Hess: The United States at War 1941-1945 p 91 
30 Buchanan: The United States and World War II p 285 
31 4,690 killed according to Hess: The United States at War 1941-1945 p 91 
32 Buchanan: The United States and World War II p 286 
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portrayed as the educator of East Asia, sending textbooks,33 and opening schools34 in 
Macassar in Indonesia. A further commentary claimed perceptively that time could 
not go backwards in international affairs and that the countries of East Asia could 
never be passively exploited again by the imperial powers.35 However, when 
American raids on the Marshall Islands began at the end of January 1944 the lists of 
Japanese "War Results" re-appeared in broadcasts, with a report listing the American 
air losses in the first two weeks of 1944 over Rabaul. 36 
The American air attack on Truk Island in February 1944 was, unusually, reported 
immediately on Japanese-controlled overseas radio. Manchurian radio made the 
announcement on 18th February.37 In the days, which followed the surrender of the 
island, however, broadcasts tended to concentrate on the war on the Indian front. An 
exception was a commentary to Germany on ''The Situation in the Pacific Ocean" 
which claimed that the battle in the Pacific would reach its decisive stage when Japan 
released for action the hundreds of divisions it had on stand by. 38 
As action on the Burma front became increasingly critical Japanese broadcasts devoted 
more news time to reports of Indian activity, both in the fighting and in Greater East 
Asia. On 23rd March Radio Tokyo reported that the Indian National Army (LN.A.) 
had crossed the Burma-India border.39 The battle for Imphal was closely followed in 
radio broadcasts and reports were made daily regarding Japanese successes. Radio 
Shonan declared on lOth April that the ''British Empire is heading for collapse" and 
33 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 6th January 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1634, 7th January 1944 
34 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian, 9th January 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1637 10th January 1944 
35 Japanese Overseas Service in English for the United Kingdom, 13th January 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1641, 14th January 1944 
This was an accurate prediction. Despite efforts by some of the former colonial powers in East Asia 
to re-establish colonial rule following the war, most former East Asian colonies gained their 
independence in the years following the Second World War. 
36 Japanese Overseas Service, 19th January 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1647, 19th January 1944 
Rabaul is the main city in New Britain. 
37 Manchuria in German, 18th February 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1677, 19th February 19-14 
38 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 28th February 19-1-l 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1687, 29th February 19-1-l 
39 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 23rd March 19-14 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1711, Hlh March 19-1-l 
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accused the British of calling on Indians to fight the Japanese invader not for the good 
of India but that of the Empire.40 This was not an unreasonable supposition for the 
Japanese to make about the British regarding Indians in the British army. Naturally, 
Britain wished to defend her empire from both invasion and uprisings. 
On 14th June 1944 the Japanese authorities announced that American planes had 
attacked Saipan and Guam,41 and on 20th Japanese General Headquarters announced 
that the Japanese defenders were inflicting heavy losses on the American troops whilst 
awaiting reinforcements.42 The broadcast did admit, however, that Allied landings had 
been made. Generally, in stark contrast to domestic broadcasts, overseas broadcasts 
made infrequent references to the battle for Saipan, simply reporting that violent 
fighting was continuing,43 or accusing Allied radio stations of hiding details of the 
fighting in order to conceal huge Allied 10sses.44 
The Japanese authorities admitted the American occupation of Saipan on 18th July 
1944.45 Following pressure for reconstruction of the Japanese cabinet, this major 
defeat drove the Tojo cabinet to resign at 6.30am on 20th July 1944. This was 
reported to all overseas transmission regions that day. The achievements of the 
cabinet in perfecting "the internal system of Japan and in prosecuting the war" and in 
endeavouring '10 liberate all peoples and countries of Greater East Asian from Anglo-
American and Dutch oppression" 46 were also broadcast to all regions. Erwin Wickert, 
a regular commentator on the German transmission, admitted that ''Enemy propaganda 
will undoubtedly try to exploit Tojo's resignation" but said that the Allies would 
quickly learn that '1he immediate future will show up the enemy's fatal error in 
believing that Tojo's resignation means any weakening of Japan's will to prosecute the 
40 Shonan in Arabic, lOth April 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1729, 11th April Is944 
41 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Michi p 63 
42 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Michi p 64 
43 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 22nd June 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1802, 23rd June 1944 
44 Japanese Overseas Service in German for Europe, 3rd July 1944 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Nunlber 1813, 4th July 1944 
45 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Alichi p 69 
46 Japanese European Service in German. 20th July 194-1-
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1830, 21 0t July 19-1--1-
war. "47 Listeners were reassured that 
The Japanese people desired the formation of a new cabinet capable of 
grasping the present excellent opportunity48 to force a decision; and the 
Tojo cabinet resigned in the expectation that a new and powerful 
cabinet would be able to fulfil the people's ardent desires. 49 
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Generally Japanese radio had little to say in regard to the war in Europe in these 
months. Significant events did cause a few comments, but most programmes 
concentrated on the situation in Asia and the Pacific. Reacting to the surrender of the 
Badgolio Government in Italy on 8th September 1943, the Government Liaison 
Committee declared that there should be "strong domestic control concerning this 
case."so On overseas radio hostility towards Italy, which appeared in domestic 
broadcasts, was largely absent. However, it was decided "as a reflection of present 
Italian feeling," Japan would "for the time being temporarily suspend for an 
unspecified period" the Italian weekly exchange broadcasts which were relayed across 
the Japanese domestic network. S1 
Both the British capture of Tripoli and German difficulties at Stalingrad were 
mentioned in Radio Tokyo news broadcasts. These events were, however, played 
down, appearing late in the running order of news, in short reports, whilst the main 
headlines concentrated on Asian reconstruction news and reports about the war in 
China. The first report was an English language broadcast on 26th January which 
claimed that Allied optimism regarding the capture of Tripoli and German setbacks 
was unjustified. Typically, this was the eleventh item in the news following reports 
about the China front and Asian celebrations of ' 'Indian Independence Day."s2 
The D-Day landings on 6th June 1944 were reported by Japanese radio as hastening the 
47 Japanese European Service in Gennan, 20th July 1944 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1830, 21 st July 1944 
48 The "excellent opportunity" mentioned referred to the fall of Saipan. Previously in the 
commentary Wickert stated that this had had a stimulating effect upon the morale of the Japanese 
people. 
49 Japanese European Service in German, 21 st July 1944 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1831, 22nd July 1944. 
so Honken ni kanshite kokunai no torishimari 0 gen nisu 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no lvfichi p 376 
51 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Afichi pp 376-7 
52 Tokyo in English for Australia and China, 26th January 1943 
BBC: Summary a/World Broadcasts, Number 1289. 27th January 1943 
117 
decisive turning point of the war. The second European front was, however, said to be 
developing "according to German expectations"53 and Radio Tokyo claimed that in 
finally opening the second front the Allies had walked into a German trap, which would 
be as devastating as the Japanese strike for victory in India.54 
Radio Tokyo's response to political and diplomatic events in this period was also 
muted. It largely ignored the Casablanca Conference, between Roosevelt and 
Churchill in January 1943, although a news item in a German broadcast did ridicule the 
Allied leaders for having to hold the Conference in an air raid shelter. 55 Other 
broadcasts concentrated on the Chungking government's disappointment with the lack 
of substantial discussions at the conference and a report to Australia and China 
declared that Chiang Kai-shek had had to order that the volume of criticism regarding 
this be limited. 56 
At the end of January 1943 criticism of the Casablanca Conference was broadcast to 
all regions and a "Pat to Charlie"57 broadcast to America inferred that both Stalin and 
Chiang Kai-shek turned down the American and British invitations to attend the 
Conference as the talks were "nothing but buffoonery."58 In a separate feature Radio 
Tokyo claimed that the Soviet Union was only of use to Britain and the United States 
in providing men to die on the European front. 59 The perceived split between the 
Soviet Union and Britain and America was frequently played upon and on 17th 
February a news item claimed that Britain was "Warning of Soviet Expansion" in the 
Baltic States. This, it was claimed, was the reason for Stalin's exclusion from the 
53 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 9th June 1944 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1789, 10th June 1944 
54 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 14th June 1944 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1794, 15th June 1944 
55 Tokyo German for Germans in Europe, 27th January 1943 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1290, 28th January 1943 
56 Tokyo in English for Australia and China, 29th January 1943, 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1292, 30th January 1943 
57 A regular feature on Radio Tokyo entitled "Pat to Charlie" (it's Japanese title was Beijin fori 
Beijin E - "One American to Another") consisted of "a dialogue in which the naIve questions of 
Charlie [give] Pat chance to put [tile Japanese] line across." 
U S S. I R #90 "Radio Tol~. '0 commentators and ruted States Records of the F.B.I..: pecia eports, 1\., 
Features," 16th August 1943 
58 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi pp 283-4 
59 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no ,\fichi p 284 
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conference. 60 Here, Japanese propagandists seized on the enormous ideological 
differences between Stalin and Churchill and Roosevelt and made logical assumptions 
in their accusations, for the Allies had little in common besides their joint war against 
the Axis powers. Churchill's concern over Soviet expansion was real, and although 
Japan did not have access to confidential British documents Radio Tokyo made a 
reasonable assessment of the situation. 
Following the Cairo and Tehran Conferences, Japanese Prime Minister Taja made a 
radio speech "to the whole world"61 which was broadcast simultaneously on the 
domestic and East Asian networks. In it he accused the Allied leaders of making plans 
which bore no relevance to reality in the light of Japanese successes at Bougainville 
and in the Gilbert Islands.62 Radio Hsinking claimed that Churchill and Roosevelt 
delighted in talking about a rosy post-war period in order to take their minds off the 
real situation. 63 Amid the usual overt denials of the true situation, however, a 
broadcast from Tokyo revealed to the British audience that Churchill had disliked 
having to treat Chiang Kai-shek as an equal at the Cairo Conference, but that 
Roosevelt had insisted on this. He considered Chiang extremely important in the war 
against Japan owing to the unfavourable position of American troops in the Pacific.64 
This is another case where Radio Tokyo may have reported something closer to the 
truth than seemed usual. As leader of the British Empire Churchill rarely regarded 
non-whites as equals, as they were usually in inferior positions beneath British colonial 
officials. The same was true in British concessions in pre-war China. In fact, 
Churchill's racism was well known and he frequently referred to the Chinese as 
"Chinks," "Pigtails" or ''Little yellow men. "65 Hence, it was reasonable to assume that 
the imperial leader would dislike being forced to treat someone he considered inferior 
as an equal. In addition, the military contribution to the overall war effort of Chiang'S 
60 Soren no Shinshutsu 0 Keikaisu 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no lvJichi p 285 
61 zensekai muke 
62 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 414 
63 Hsinking in English, 20th December 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1617, 21't December 1943 
64 Japanese Overseas Service in English for the United Kingdom, 21't December 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1618 22nd December 1943 
65 Sec Christopher Thorne: Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan 
pp5-6 
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ground war in China was slight, and this was a further reason that Churchill may have 
resented his attendence as an equal contributor. 
Surprisingly, the evidence that exists implies that Radio Tokyo devoted little broadcast 
time to the Greater East Asia Conference. The opening of the conference with forty-
six delegates in attendance was mentioned in a report to Germany,66 as was a public 
meeting attended by many of the senior delegates.67 In addition, President Laurel of 
the Philippines, who was in Tokyo for the conference, made a speech from Radio 
Tokyo extolling the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.68 However, the 
conference was a great propaganda event and would have been expected to draw huge 
coverage. It is possible that there was blanket coverage in broadcasts to Southeast 
Asia, the target of the propaganda. As neither the B.B.C. nor the National Archive 
material cover stations which their own monitors could not receive clearly, such 
broadcasts would not appear in these monitoring reports. However, the conference 
was called as a propaganda device, so it would be expected to be broadcast 
worldwide. It must be assumed, therefore, that what evidence exists must be 
inadequate. 
Changes in the structure ofN.H.K.'s Short-wave Broadcasting (1942-1943) 
On 1st September 1942, as the war situation was increasing the importance of overseas 
broadcasting in projecting Japan's cause, the status of the International Department 
was raised to that of the International Bureau69 and a Southern Regions Office70 was 
established to reflect the importance of broadcasting to that region. The new 
International Bureau consisted of two Departments and one Section. Department One 
was in charge of "editing, broadcast programming and business concerning overseas, 
international and East Asian broadcasts" and Department Two was responsible for 
"execution [presumably of C.I.B. directives] and translation.',?1 The newly established 
66 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 5th November 1943 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1572, 6th November 1943 
67 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 7th November 1943 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1574, 8th November 1943 
68 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 8th November 1943 
BBC: Summary a/World Broadcasts, Number 1575, 9th November 1943 
69 Kokusai-"-yoku 
70 Nanbvo Shitsu 
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Administration Section took over responsibility for ensunng that orders regarding 
censorship limitations were observed and for ensuring that necessary programme 
announcements were made. It also dealt with issues of copyright and ensured that any 
other legal or political matters concerning the rest of the Bureau were observed. 72 
September 1942 
I 
Department One 
Sawada Shinshijo (Head) 
International Bureau 
Seki Masao (Head) 
I 
Department Two 
Sato Taiichiro (Head) 
"Editing, Broadcast 
programming and 
Administration concerning 
overseas, international and 
East Asian broadcasts." 
"Execution [presumably of 
C.I.B. directives] and 
translation" 
Administration Section 
Takano IOkishu (Head) 
April 1943 
I 
Department One 
As previously 
August 1943 
I 
Department of 
Editing 
Ogimi Jun 
(Head) 
Censorship orders, 
Announcements, Copyright 
and LegaVpolitical matters 
International Bureau 
I 
r r 
Department Two Department Three 
As previously, but News for broadcast 
responsibility for overseas 
news reports moved 
to Department Three 
International Bureau 
Muto Yoshi (Head) 
(former Japanese Consul in Hong Kong) 
I 
Department of 
American 
Affairs 
Muto Yoshio 
(Head) 
f 
Department of 
European 
Affairs 
Sato Taiichiro 
(Head) 
I 
Department of 
Asian Affairs 
Sawada 
Shinshijo (Head) 
Administration 
Section 
As previously 
I 
General 
Administration 
Sato Taiichiro 
(Head) 
Figure 6: Structure of the International Bureau between 1942 and 194473 
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The Southern Regions Office was in charge of broadcasts to the occupied areas, where 
broadcasts promoting the unification of Greater East Asia were considered to have the 
highest priority. The office received notification of military and legal decisions 
regarding broadcasts to the occupied areas and ensured that the N.H.K. broadcasters 
strictly followed these. The office was also in charge of carrying out requests made by 
the army or navy that radio stations be established in the occupied areas. In June 
1942, an army report regarding operations in South East Asia requested that a means 
be established to send propaganda directly to Chungking, India and Australia, which 
were the most important targets to be convinced of Japan's good intentions. This 
resulted in the rapid rebuilding and establishment of short-wave stations in Singapore 
(50kw), Manila (lOkw) and Rangoon (10kw). Operated by the army and staffed 
partially by N.H.K. employees, these stations were transmitting programmes by the 
end of October 1942. 
Following a navy request for broadcasts for Japanese living in the occupied areas, the 
Southern Regions Office supervised the despatch of N.H.K. staff to Burma, the 
Philippines and Macassar to establish local broadcasts in Japanese for each of these 
regions. 74 
From 20th December two daily broadcasts were made to most of the seven 
transmission regions over three 50kw and one 20kw transmitters, a total of thirty 
hours a day.75 In October 1942 broadcasts in Persian began and during December 
74 Kitayama Setsuro: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 225 
75 These were as follows: 1 01.30-03.30 
2 01.30-02.45 
3 04.00-07.30 
4 08.00-11.45 
5 12.00-14.00 
6 14.30-17.00 
7 17.15-19.15 
8 17.30-19.45 
9 19.30-20.45 
10 20.00-22.15 
11 21.00-22.15 
12 22.30-01.15 
13 22.30-01.15 
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1942 and January 1943 Russian, Tamil and Bengali language broadcasts were added 
to the schedules, as the radio battle for India became increasingly important, bringing 
the total number of languages being broadcast to twenty-three. 76 
The use of an increased number of languages, however, created problems for the 
censors and in many cases the censor checked only the Japanese version of a script, as 
the target language was unknown to anyone in the C.I.B. Hence, particularly with the 
less widely spoken languages, the translator was often left to alter freely the nuances 
of a Japanese script whilst still translating what was actually written. Even native 
English speakers tried to do this in translating English scripts, although English was 
more widely understood by members of the C.I.B. than many of the other languages. 
This technique was used in the writing of "Zero Hour," Radio Tokyo's most notorious 
wartime programme. 77 In the light of this problem, the censors concentrated on 
ensuring that the Japanese scripts, particularly those the contents of which were for 
broadcast in Greater East Asia, were entirely accurate, hoping that what was broadcast 
did not stray too far from the original meaning. 
In the Spring of 1943, following American attacks on Truk Island, the schedules of the 
International Bureau were further revised, as broadcasts to enemy soldiers, now 
frequently out of range of their own domestic stations, were considered increasingly 
important. The special news and Chinese language news broadcasts across the Pacific 
to the United States, Canada, South America and Australia were replaced by further 
news bulletins in English. The Japanese language news, which was broadcast to 
Australia was also shortened and the English language news correspondingly 
expanded. These changes, along with a fifteen-minute extension to Transmission One, 
virtually doubled the length of time in overseas broadcasts devoted to English 
language news bulletins.78 
On 1 st April 1943 the cabinet's ''Epoch-making reforms of International Propaganda" 
76 Arabic. Bengali, Burmese, Cantonese, Dutch, English, French, Fukien Dialect Chinese, Gennan, 
Hindi, Italian, Japanese, Malay, Mandarin Chinese, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Tagalog, 
Tamil. Thai, Turkish and Urdu. 
Kitayama Setsuro: Dai-Toa e no Michi p 246 
77 See Chapter 6 pp 138-144 below. 
78 Kitayama Setsuro: Dai-T6a e no A1ichi p 307 
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were put into effect, having a significant effect on overseas broadcasting. A new 
"Inquiry Office"79 was established, which consisted of the president, vice-president and 
department heads of the C.I.B., the head of Army Ministry's Information Department, 
the head of Section Four of the Navy Ministry's Business Bureau and the head of the 
General Business Section of the Greater East Asia Ministry It was intended to 
develop C.I.B. prosecution of the ideological war and to tie the C.I.B. more closely to 
military operations in "a single relationship."80 The effect of this on overseas 
broadcasting was initially to confuse. However, it was established that under the new 
system overseas broadcasting was separated from broadcasting to East Asia. The 
latter became the responsibility of the Broadcasting Section of the C.I.B.'s Department 
Two, which dealt with domestic broadcasts and relays. This indicated a shift of 
perception regarding the status of the occupied regions. They' were now seen as 
"domestic" not "overseas" regions. Naturally, the International Bureau continued to 
broadcast to those parts of the Southern Regions which could only pick up short-wave 
transmissions, and to those parts of Asia, which were not occupied, but the job of 
tying the occupied territories to Japan was removed from the International Bureau. 
On 15 th May 1943, a new President, Dr. Shimomura Hiroshi, a member of the House 
of Peers, was installed as the head of N.H.K. On 17th August the new President. 
announced his ''Plan to Strengthen Domestic and Overseas Broadcasting. "81 This 
included a further expansion of the International Bureau: the previous three 
departments and one section became five departments. 82 The effect on broadcasting 
was for the thirteen transmission regions to be extended to fourteen as broadcasts to 
the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada were separated from those to 
South America. 
The Radio Battle for India (1943-1944) 
On 13th June 1943 Subhas Chandra Bose, brother of Rash Behari Bose, head of the 
Indian Independence League in Japan, arrived in Japan from Germany, and on 21 st 
79 Shi~i Shitsu 
80 i Ita' kankei 
Kitayarna Setsuro: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 320 
81 Naigai ni Taisuru Hos6 Kyoku 0 Hakarll 
82 See Figure 6 p 121 
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broadcast to India over Radio Tokyo, assuring Indians of his well-being. He reminded 
Indians of the situation in Europe and Africa but said that, 
As far as India is concerned, what is most important of all is the 
situation near India. No amount of Anglo-American propaganda can 
either ignore or hide the fact that after achieving brilliant victories in 
Hongkong, in the Philippines, in the East Indies, in Malaya and 
Singapore and in Burma, the forces of the Imperial Japanese Army 
now stand on the frontier of India. 83 
He reminded Indians that the Japanese "Prime Minister has offered active assistance 
should the Indian revolutionaries need it" and "has repeatedly declared [the Japanese 
Government's] fullest support to Indian Independence."84 The following day he made 
a further overseas broadcasts to Italy comparing the conditions in Italy before 1860 to 
those in India in the 1940s, and told Italians that this "had enabled your countrymen to 
understand so well the aims and purposes of another independence movement like 
ours."85 
On 21 st October Subhas Chandra Bose announced the establishment of the Provisional 
Government of Free India and the Indian National Army (I.N.A.); "two vital 
prerequisites in India's fight for freedom."86 On 24th the Provisional Government 
declared war on Britain and the United States and six days later Rash Behari Bose 
broadcast to India from Tokyo, declaring, 
Never before were circumstances for India's freedom more favourable 
or more opportune. You have, today, not only a National Army of 
your own outside the borders of India ready to come to your aid, but 
also the powerful co-operation and support of mighty Japanese Empire 
and the inexhaustible resources of entire East Asia87 
He drew a comparison with Burma which, he said, "after one long century under 
British tyranny and exploitation did not fail to seize the opportunity for freedom . . . "88 
and urged that "One united, concentrated blow at this hour will seal [Britain's] fate 
forever. "89 
83 Nippon Times Evening Edition, 22nd June 1943, p 1 
84 Nippon Times Evening Edition, 22nd June 1943, p 2 
85 Nippon Times Evening Edition, 23rd June 1943 p 1 
86 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 22nd October 1943 p 1 
87 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 31st October 1943 p 2 
88 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 31st October 1943 p 2 
89 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 31 st October 1943 p 2 
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Overseas broadcasts to Japan's European allies also continued. On 16th November 
Subhas Chandra Bose broadcast from Radio Tokyo to Germany, thanking the Gennan 
Government for its recognition of the Provisional Government. He compared the 
"pious wishes and false promises for the future" of the Allies' Atlantic Charter with the 
"principles of justice, national independence, reciprocity and mutual co-operation" on 
which the Joint Declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asian Nations was 
based. 90 
On 5th December the 50-kilowatt transmitter of the Singapore station was completed, 
and its operations changed. On the establishment of the Provisional Government of 
Free India the Japanese authorities handed two hours of the station's daily schedule to 
Bose's government to make "Azad Hind''91 broadcasts directly to India using N.H.K. 
equipment. The broadcasts usually consisted of news concerning India, and a 
commentary denouncing British actions.92 
As the battle for Imphal intensified in Spring 1944, Subhas Chandra Bose declared it a 
"decisive fight to the finish" and on 21 st March, the Japanese established Azad Hind 
broadcasts also from Tokyo, for half-an-hour daily, under the leadership of Rash 
Behari Bose. ''Free India Hour" began at 9.15pm with the Indian National Anthem 
and proceeding with a commentary in English and recorded commentaries in Hindi, 
Bengali, Gujarati and Tami1. 93 Despite its name, the broadcast was made over Radio 
Tokyo and was established to present "Our developments in the India-Burma War"94 
Hence it was subject to the censorship laws of Radio Tokyo programmes. In reality, 
then, it was probably subject to closer censorship than those made from Singapore, 
where the censorship structure was less complex. 
90 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 17th November 1943 p 1 
The Atlantic Charter, which was issued by Churchill and Roosevelt, stressed the Allies' broad war 
aims in order to demonstrate public solidarity. The Joint Declaration made by the Assembly of 
Greater East Asian Nations on 6th November 19 .. 1-) was a similar statement regarding their war aims. 
91 Free India 
92 For example see Provisional Govenmlent of Free India (Shonan) in English for India, 16th 
December and 21st December 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Numbers 1613, 17th December and 1618, 22nd December 1943 
93 Conmlentaries in Hindi, Bengali and Gujarati were broadcast on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, 
Fridays and Saturdays and in Tamil on SWldayS and Wednesdays. 
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During a visit to China Subhas Chandra Bose also broadcast over Radio Nanking to 
unoccupied China. He reminded his listeners that he had once tried to visit 
Chungking, and had been promised a warm welcome by the Chinese consulate in 
Calcutta, but had been refused a passport by the British. He described Sun Vat Sen95 
as "one of the great personalities of Asia" for Indians, and having attempted to 
establish his credibility with his Chinese audience, he sought to assuage Chinese fears 
of Japan. He presented Japan as the defender of the New Order in East Asia rendering 
"possible the realisations of the dreams of Dr. Sun Vat Sen - for China, for India and 
for Asia." He sought to persuade Chungking China to unite with Nanking to "bring 
about peace with Japan ... economic recovery and national prosperity."96 Rash 
Behari Bose broadcasting to India also warned Chiang Kai-shek, "Asiatics will win 
final victory ... It is your duty to join with the people of Asia and not the enemy.''97 
Greater East Asia and the War in China (1942) 
Throughout the Pacific War, many of Radio Tokyo's news reports to all transmission 
regions concerned the progress of the China War and the reconstruction of Greater 
East Asia under Japanese rule. On the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the war in 
China98 reports to all regions reviewed the "War Results" for the period. In features 
regarding the fifth anniversary, Radio Tokyo claimed that the Japanese forces could 
finish the war against the collapsing Chiang Kai-shek regime at any time, but that 
Japan, the "elder brother" of Asian countries, had chosen not to pursue this course. 
Instead she sought to show her "younger brothers" the way. In other words, Japanese 
patience was the reason why Japan had never declared war on China.99 
A further strand of broadcasting regarding East Asia concerned the reconstruction of 
Asia following centuries of Anglo-Saxon domination. In November 1942, Radio 
Tokyo adopted a policy of promoting East Asian culture and East Asian unity. Even 
before Greater East Asia Broadcasting's shift in emphasis from an "overseas" to a 
95 Sun Wen 
96 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 6th December 1943 p 3 
97 Nippon Times Morning Edition, 16th December 1943 p 3 
98 7th July 1942 
99 Tokyo in German For Europe, 7th July 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1086, 8th July 1942. 
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"domestic" operation In April 1943, co-operation between Greater East Asia 
Broadcasting and the domestic network produced a weekly programme, "Calling East 
Asia,"loo which was designed to promote Japanese culture in the occupied areas. It 
included patriotic songs, a weekly war round-up, and features such as "The Bloody 
Battle for Reverence of the Emperor and the Expulsion ofBarbarians."lol The start of 
the project coincided with the Greater East Asia Writers' Conference which took place 
in Tokyo between 3rd and 5th November 1942102 and which sought to develop a 
"system of culture for Greater East Asia."103 
Although as a Christian festival Christmas was not celebrated on domestic radio in 
Japan,104 special Christmas programmes were included in overseas broadcasts. For 
much of December Radio Tokyo appealed to Australians to pressure their government 
into allowing short-wave broadcasts of messages to Australian prisoners-of-war in 
Indonesia. The first offer, made on 1 st December, was that a message of no more than 
forty words broadcast from Australia would be delivered to the prisoner by the 
Japanese authorities105 and similar offers were repeated most days on the Australian 
Home News Hour. This programme broadcast prisoners' Christmas messages from 
21 st December. 106 The monitor of one such message, which the Japanese announcer 
stated was' read by British Group Captain Bish of the Royal Air Force for Britons in 
Australia, noted that the reader had a "Voice, delivery and manner (which) seemed 
entirely genuine,"107 suggesting that the Japanese did allow some of the prisoners to 
read their own messages. 
100 It was broadcast between 7.20 and 8pm on Sundays. 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Taa e no Michi p 239 
101 Sonna Jai no Kessen broadcast on 22nd November 1942. 
"Restore the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian" was the slogan used by Restoration activists before the 
1868 Restoration of the Emperor. 
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102 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Taa e no Michi p 239 
103 Japan Times andAdvertiser Moming Edition, 4th November 1942, pl. . . 
104 An exception to this was made for the relay of a Gemlan short-wave transnuSSlOn of a Christmas 
concert from Berlin on 26th December. 
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105 Batavia in English for Australia, 1st December 1942. 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, NunIber 1233, 2nd December 1942 
106 Batavia in English for Australia, 21 st December 1942 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Nunlber 1253, 22nd December 1942 
107 Batavia in English for Australia, 22nd December 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Nwnber 1254, 23rd December 1942 
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Moves Towards East Asian Independence (1943-1944) 
From the end of January 1943 the topic of Burmese Independence became an 
important theme in Japanese overseas radio broadcasts. The Burmese leader under the 
Japanese occupation, Ba Maw, visited Tokyo in March 1943 and broadcasts 
concerning the visit were transmitted to all regions. It was reported that he received 
an audience with the Emperor, visited the Diet108 and was decorated by the 
Emperor. 109 A Liaison Conference on 10th March 1943 issued a "General Plan for the 
Independent Burmese Leaders" which fixed the date of independence as 1 st August 
1943. Despite the continuing war on the Burma - India border and British claims to be 
penetrating parts of Burma, which were denied in Japanese broadcasts,110 Ba Maw 
declared Burmese Independence and simultaneously declared war on Britain and the 
United States on that date. News broadcasts to all areas reported the messages of 
congratulation and official recognition sent by other Axis countries such as Nanking 
Chinall1 and ItalyII2 and broadcasts to India in particular stressed the importance of 
Burma's co-operation with Japan in the struggle against Britain. Il3 
In March 1942 when Japanese troops had occupied Rangoon the Rangoon radio 
station had been burned by the retreating army and become inoperable. It was 
reconstructed and began operation again on 15th August 1942 with a staff of N.H.K. 
personnel and an output of 300w. Upgraded to a 10kw output in September 1942 it 
broadcast in Burmese, Hindi and Bengali to Burma and India, concentrating on 
independence issues. After the promise of Burmese independence had been made in 
March 1943 the scope of the station's overseas broadcasts was increasingly toward 
108 Totr.ro in German for Europe 23rd March 1943 and English for Europe, 25th March 1943 ft) , th th 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, NWllbers 1345 & 1347,24 & 26 March 1943 
109 Tokyo in German for Europe, 24th March 1943 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Nwnber 1346, 25th March 1943 
110 For example, see "British boasts about taking Burma are wishful thinking," Tokyo in Russian for 
Russia 31st March 1943 and "British 14th Division and Other Units Annihilated, Burma," Tokyo in 
English for Europe, 15th April 1943 
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113 For example: a commentary by Abdul Wahid declared "Burma is Free - India Must Follow," 
Batavia in English for India, 1st August 19·B 
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India and from April 1943 it broadcast over seven hours daily In thirteen Indian 
languages. 114 
On 14th October 1943 it was announced that the Philippine Islands, too, were to 
become independent of Japan, under Jose Laurel. Radio broadcasts claimed that this 
move to grant independence would weaken the British-American propaganda position 
significantly, as the former United States' colony, like the former British colony of 
Burma, could no longer be perceived as passively occupied by Japan. Both countries 
had entered the war on the Japanese side, against their former colonial rulers.115 Prime 
Minister T6j6 sent greetings and congratulations to the Philippines on its independence 
in a radio message on 15th October.116 
A Radio Tokyo talk in October was entitled ''East Asia Rejects Anglo-Saxon 
Influence." It stated that the declarations of independence of Burma and the 
Philippines, along with the establishment of the Provisional Government of Free India 
under Sub has Chandra Bose,117 demonstrated that East Asian nations had abandoned 
their begging attitude towards the Allies. 118 President Jose Laurel made a speech from 
Tokyo on 8th November, while attending the Greater East Asia Conference. In it he 
expressed the gratitude of the Philippine people towards the Japanese Empire and 
urged East Asian countries ''to fight Western imperialism and emancipate themselves." 
He served "notice to outside powers that they have no reason to differ from us about 
the maintenance and enforcement in our hemisphere of our ideal and principles." He 
concluded "we wish to assure them that we shall be guided, not only by the . . . 
attitude of 'live and let live' ... but the attitude of 'live and help live', which is the 
golden rule within our sphere"119 
The commemoration of the second anniversary of the start of the Pacific war on 8th 
114 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no A1ichi p 254 
115 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 385 
116 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 385 rd 
117 The Provisional Government was officially recognised by the Japanese Government on 23 
October 
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December 1943 was more low-key than the celebrations a year earlier. There was a 
talk to Germany by the President of the Patriotic Association of Japal\ Professor 
Kanokogi, on the second anniversary of the German declaration of war on the United 
States. In it the Professor described Badoglio's surrender of Italy as a breach in the 
Axis relationship but affirmed that things were back on course. He also expressed 
Japanese horror at the reports of the bombing of German cities and asserted that Japan 
and Germany would not be defeated. 120 
The New Year of 1944 began with optimistic talks regarding the war situation to most 
regions. A talk to Germany declared, ''Evil cannot triumph over good," and reiterated 
that Japan opposed Western imperialism and fought to free East Asia and for lasting 
peace. 121 The Premier of Manchukuo, Chang Ching-hui,122 gave his "Message to the 
Nation" address on 2nd January and it was summarised for the Gennan audience. In it 
he declared East Asia was one family with a single destiny. 123 
In May 1944 the Japanese Government announced a major propaganda offensive to 
coincide with the military Ichi-go Offensive in China, and to prevent "the deterioration 
of public peace and order."124 Thus at the start of May, stations in Manchuria, 
Mongolia and China began a broadcasting campaign to counter "the evil of 
communism."125 Japanese concerns were for the rural areas where the number of 
communists was said to have increased dramatically by 1944, as there was little direct 
Japanese control in these areas. Twelve North Chinese radio stations were brought 
into the o·peration. All were included in plans to broadcast separate programmes for 
Communists, which outlined Japanese war aims for rebuilding China, and to the people 
of Chungking, which sought to bring disillusionment with the division between the 
Nationalist and Communist leadership, and focused on internal squabbles between 
120 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 11 th December 1943 
BBC: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1608, 12th December 1943 
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them. 126 Previously Radio Tokyo had described differences between Chiang Kai-shek 
and the communist leadership in broadcasts to other areas of the world127 but this 
propaganda offensive was directed at China alone and was increasingly emphasised as 
the seventh anniversary of the start of the "China Incident" approached in July 
1944. 128 This further illustrates the reasonable assumptions used in Japanese radio 
propaganda. The ideological differences between Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and 
Mao's Communist Party caused severe friction even during the war, finally erupting 
into civil war after the Japanese surrender. 
Atrocity Broadcasts 
On 20th August 1942 the first Japanese repatriation ships from America, the Asama 
Maru and the Conte Verde arrived in Yokohama carrying a total of 1,421 people, 
including the two Japanese Ambassadors to the United States, Nomura Kichisaburo 
and Kurusu Saburo.129 Conferences held by the Japanese authorities to discover 
details of the domestic situation inside America in late August and early September 
1942 established that Radio Tokyo was widely listened to in the United States. l3o In 
addition, the conferences provided the basis for a new propaganda campaign in 
overseas broadcasting, which emphasised the inhumanity of Americans. Reports 
regarding American mistreatment of Japanese internees were broadcast to all 
regions,131 including a series of thirteen talks on Radio Tokyo immediately following 
the conferences, entitled 'We Reveal American Inhumanity."132 Radio Tokyo claimed 
that although many internees were over seventy years old, all were made to work for 
their food. 133 This is unlikely. Some internees did work and received between twelve 
126 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Michi pp 49-51 
127 Communists were said to "hamper Chinese operations in Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet" in a 
broadcast from Tokyo in English to Europe on 18th October 1942 
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130 As those interviewed were returning Japanese, it must be assumed that this was the case amongst 
the Japanese community in America, but was not necessarily so amongst other communities. . 
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and nineteen dollars a month for a 44-hour week.134 However, other former internees 
remember their internment as follows: 
You were not a student. 
You were not really employed. 
You were 
a 
something that the government took care of 135 
It would appear therefore that not all internees were forced to work to earn their food. 
Besides making general statements about the conditions of Japanese in internment 
camps, Radio Tokyo also took up the cases of other groups in its broadcasts to 
America. A series in late 1942 presented the cause of Californian Japanese. "Lost 
Democracy"136 and "The Moral War"137 denounced the moving and interning of 
Californian Japanese as expressions of American hysteria, and claimed that in general 
the United States was interning elderly, peaceful farmers, thus displaying its fear 
following a year of Japanese successes.138 It is probable that the scriptwriters were 
able to base their writing on information gleaned from returnees who had been able to 
read American newspapers and noted the reality of the anti-Japanese hysteria in the 
United States. 139 
The arrival in Yokohama of an exchange ship from Australia on 9th October, however, 
produced a different reaction. N.H.K broadcasts described Australian permission for 
the ship to sail "an act of chivalry."140 Presumably the reason for this lies in Japan's 
differing propaganda campaign to Australia. The start of the broadcasts of prisoner-of-
war messages from Batavia in June 1942 was intended to inspire Australian confidence 
in Japanese broadcasts, and presumably the use of recently returned Japanese to 
criticise Australia (as in the American campaign) would have been considered too 
134 Ann Koto Hayashi: Face of the Enemy, Heart of a Patriot: Japanese-American Internment 
Narratives p 41 
135 Hayashi: Face of the Enemy, Heart of a Patriot p 137 
136 Oshinahareru Demokurashii 
137 D6ginaki Sens6 
138 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Afichi pp 216-7 
139 The war with Germany and Italy did not provoke this e~1reme reaction, and the German and 
Italian communities in America did not receive the same treatment as Japanese Americans. It was 
only the Japanese community which was interned as a whole. 
140 L.D Mco: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 70 
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damaging. 141 
Two further incidents added to the "atrocity campaign" in broadcasts to the United 
States. The first was the American bombing on 1 st October 1942 of the Lisbon Maru , 
a Japanese ship carrying Allied prisoners-of-war. 142 The British survivors were said to 
have denounced the United States143 and in contrast the Japanese rescuers were 
described as having had only one thought; that of saving their enemy prisoners. 144 
The second incident cited as evidence of American cruelty and injustice was a report, 
which appeared in the Detroit News on 12th December 1942. It reported that after the 
war the American government would be under no obligation to restore nisei Japanese 
who were United States citizens to their pre-war status. This, claimed Radio Tokyo, 
exposed the real intention of the American government - to keep· Japanese Americans 
in a low legal and social position. The response of Radio Tokyo was to issue appeals 
to "Our Brothers Overseas"145 on 23rd December 1942 and 13th January 1943, 
although the contents of these broadcasts are unclear. 146 
A further accusation was made by Radio Tokyo in broadcasts to mark the first 
anniversary of the implementation of United States' internment policy towards 
Japanese, on 2nd February 1943. A talk, "The Interned Japanese and Agricultural 
Manpower," claimed that the interned Japanese were soon to be put to work on farms 
owing to the shortage of American manpower. 147 This was another piece of relatively 
accurate broadcasting by Radio Tokyo for Japanese internees were, indeed employed 
141 Australia did not have a policy of interning Japanese as America did so this was not a theme, 
which could have been used. (Japanese were only interned on the American mainland, not in Hawaii) 
However, there was also no overt policy by Radio Tokyo of criticising Britain and Australia using the 
reminiscences of those who returned on the ship. 
142 The prisoners were variously described as 1,800 Britons (Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: T6a e no Afichi 
p 230 and Tokyo in English for Europe, 8th October 1942, BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Number 1179, 9th October 1942) and more than 1,000 Americans (Tokyo in German for Europe, 8th 
October 1942, BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1179) 
143 Tokyo in English for Australia and New Zealand, 8th October 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1179, 9th October 1942 
144 Tokyo in English for Europe, 11th October 1942 
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1182, 12th October 1942 
145 Kaigai D6h6 Shokun 
146 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e noAlichi pp 290-1 
147 Hiyokuryu Nihonjin to N6gy6 R6d6ryoku 
Kitayama: Rajio ToAyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 291 
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on American farms. 
Programmes at this time also reviewed a riot, which had occurred in the Manzanar 
Internment Camp near Los Angeles on 6th December 1942, during which one person 
had died. 148 After the riot the word "atrocity"149 was used increasingly frequently in 
references to Americans.150 A ''Pat to Charlie" broadcast on 25th January 1943 
entitled "Is this Humanity?"151 claimed that the majority of Americans agreed with the 
views of US Naval Commander William Halsey, whom Radio Tokyo accused of 
stating that "Japanese are monkeys. Therefore one United States soldier is worth four 
Japanese soldiers."152 The Radio Tokyo Special News of 9th February, however, 
accused Americans of being animals. ''Look at the Wild Animals"153 claimed that 
whilst the Japanese attended to their injured "Enemy planes swoop down very low 
over the injured soldiers and hurl bombs into the confusion."154 
On May 17th Major-General Yahagi Nakao, chief of the Army Press Section, 
introduced a new charge of American inhumanity when he accused the United States 
of using poisonous gas on two occasions during the attack on Attu Island. This 
newest American inhumanity was linked to the continuing atrocity campaign, which 
accused the United States of attacking Japanese hospital ships in the Pacific. 
Enemy America has repeatedly revealed its tendencies for 
inhumanitarianism in the Greater East Asian War. They have bombed 
or attacked our hospital ships carrying clearly visible Red Cross 
mSlgnia. On the South Pacific they are using their beast like tactics 
against our fighting forces and now they have dared to carry out poison 
gas warfare, defying humanitarianism. . . . It is time to further our 
determination to crush America, the enemy of humanity. 155 
Accusations of attacks on hospital ships continued, and on 7th February 1944 Radio 
Tokyo reported that the Red Cross had formally protested to Britain and America 
148 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Afichi p 292 
149 b6gyaku 
150 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 293 
151 Kore ha Ningen ka 
152 Kitayama: Rajio ToAyo: Dai-T6a e no Michi pp 293-4 
153 Yajusei 0 Aliyo . 
154 Jush6 by6hei no zuj6 sure sure ni tekiki ga maisagatsute mechakucha ni bakudan 0 tatakltsukeru 
Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-T6a e no A-fichi p 294. " 
155 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Reports #82, "Radio Tokyo and the Attu Attack 
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regarding such attacks. 156 
In addition, the confessions of Allied prisoners-of-war were introduced into broadcasts 
as evidence of the lack of British and American humanity. Information gleaned from 
interviews with captured pilots in Rabaul was forwarded to N.H.K. for use in 
broadcasts. 157 Generally the messages revealed how the prisoner now understood that 
responsibility for Pearl Harbor lay with the United States, but some, such as a message 
from Ensign J.F. accused Roosevelt of not caring for human life.158 
The intensification of the atrocity campaign coincided with accusations in early 1944 
by Britain and America of Japanese atrocities against Allied prisoners-of-war. Radio 
Tokyo denied such atrocities, and reported that the Allies had begun to make such 
accusations for several reasons; the most important being that they sought to make 
barbarism reciprocal, diminishing their own inhumanity; others included concealing 
America's inhuman actions towards Japanese civilian internees, diverting the attention 
of their people from the true situation of the war, and relieving war-weariness amongst 
their own people. 159 Accusations of atrocities continued to appear regularly in Radio 
Tokyo broadcasts into the Summer and Autumn of 1944, although the types of 
atrocities reported remained much the same. 
After the Battle of Midway, Japanese overseas radio reports became increasingly 
removed from the war situation as official news sought to portray the worsening 
situation for Japan positively. When the propaganda line became unsustainable 
overseas radio ignored the situation, concentrating on news from elsewhere in the Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Within Asia promises of independence became increasingly 
important propaganda themes, both within Japanese-controlled territories, and to 
India, which was encouraged to throw off colonial rule. 
The new situation faced by Japan following the resignation of the Taja cabinet in July 
156 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian for Europe, 7ili January 1944-
BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1666, Sili January 1944 
157 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Michi p 24-
158 Kitayan1a: Rajio Tokyo: Haiboku e no Michi p 24 . . . 
159 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Reports #113 "Japanese AtroCItIes Agamst War 
Prisoners. 
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1944 presented a new challenge to Japanese overseas radio. It was recognised that 
enemy propagandists would seize upon Tokyo's fall, and attempts were made by 
N.H.K. to present the situation positively. As the war entered its final year Radio 
Tokyo operated for more hours a day than ever before. However, it faced an 
increasingly difficult task to present positive but credible news, and concentrated more 
and more on affairs in China and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, regions 
where positive developments continued to occur. 
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Chapter 6: Broadcasts by Allied Nationals and Prisoners-of-\Var 
Criticism of Radio Tokyo Broadcasts 
On 1 st June 1942, the Japanese Ambassador to Iran, Ichikawa Hikotaro, arrived in 
Japan. During the course of his visit he related to N.H.K. and C.I.B. staff his 
impressions of Japanese overseas radio. Generally he was critical. He stated that 
reception of Radio Tokyo programmes was not good as there was frequent 
interference from British, Russian and French stations. He also indicated that in 
general, broadcasts by Germany, America and Britain were more appealing to the 
listener, as there was variety in the schedules, which included plays, different styles 
of music, and interviews with interesting people. He was particularly impressed 
with the B.B.C.'s techniques of incorporating propaganda into programmes and in 
broadcasting on both short- and long-wave. In comparison, he declared, Radio 
Tokyo broadcast too many speeches and not enough entertainment.! This was, in 
fact, very similar to the format of Japanese domestic programmes. 
As a result of this, more music and entertainment programmes were inserted into the 
schedules of the overseas stations. Plays and dialogues, such as Who Will be the 
Next President? And }Esop's The Rabbit which Lost its Fur were transmitted, 
emphasising American defeats. 2 A monologue, Twilight, was broadcast during the 
Battle for Guadalcanal, in which a dying American youth questioned the validity of 
the war. It ended with announcer cutting in and pleading with Americans to stop 
fighting for Roosevelt. 3 It was also decided that Allied prisoners should be used in 
overseas broadcasts, as they understood what would be appealing to potential 
listeners. 
The Japanese had used allied prisoners in broadcasting from early in the Pacific 
War. The first "prisoner broadcast" was a letter, read by the announcer, to the 
mother of an Australian prisoner on 19th December 1941.4 The number of similar 
broadcasts made to Australia increased in the early months of 1942, and in June the 
1 Kitayama: Rajio To/..yo: Dai-Toa e no'\fichi pp 178-179 
2 Kitayama: Rajio To/..yo: Dai-Toa e no "fichi p 179 
3 Kitayama: Rajio To/..y6: Dai-Toa e no "fichi p 180 
4 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyd: Dai-Toa e no .\fichi p 126 
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Japanese-controlled station In Batavia also began to broadcast prisoner-of-war 
messages to Australia and New Zealand. This feature later became the "Australian 
Home News Hour," and as the programme developed, recordings of prisoners 
reading their own letters were also broadcast. The aim of these broadcasts was to 
attract listeners to the Japanese stations in the hope that they would listen to the 
propaganda messages while listening for news of relatives and friends. 5 
"Zero Hour" 
Probably the best known of Radio Tokyo's overseas programmes was "Zero Hour," 
which began on 1st March 1943. It was presented and later written by allied 
prisoners, and became notorious after the war for having been the inspiration for the 
Tokyo Rose myth. 6 It was christened "Zero Hour" for three reasons. To the 
American troops, for whom the programme was broadcast, the "Zero Hour" was the 
moment before an attack began, and so it was felt that they could identify with the 
name. In addition, the most successful of the Japanese fighter aircraft was the 
Mitsubishi "Zero," and the sun in the centre of the Japanese flag was considered to 
represent a "Zero." Hence the title was also thought to be strongly Japanese. 7 
The central figure in the development of the programme was an Australian prisoner-
of-war, Major Charles Cousens, who had been captured by the Japanese at 
5 For a fuller description of prisoner letter broadcasts see Chapter 4 pp 94-97 above. 
6 Tokyo Rose was the name given to Japanese female broadcasters, who presented informal 
programmes for the American troops in the South Pacific in an attempt to undermine their morale. It 
was a pet name invented by the troops. Iva Toguri D' Aquino, an American nisei who had worked on 
"Zero Hour," was prosecuted and imprisoned for being Tokyo Rose after the war, but was a 
scapegoat. She was eventually pardoned in 1976. 
For a full description to the Tokyo Rose hunt and trial see Masayo Duus: Tokyo Rose: the Orphan of 
the Pacific (Kodansha International Ltd, Tokyo, 1983) and Russell Warren Howe: The Hunt for 
"To/"yo Rose" (Madison Books, Maryland and London, 1990). These books were written to seek 
redress for Iva Toguri, and concentrate less on the programme, "Zero Hour" or matters in wartime 
Japan, than on the way the programme was used in her trial, and the injustice served on her by the 
American legal system in the post-war period 
7 Duus: To/"yo Rose pp 76-77 
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Singapore.8 Before joining the army he had worked as a broadcaster and producer 
for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in Sydney.9 
In June 1942 the C.I.B. decided to use prisoners in broadcasts from Tokyo as part of 
the drive to add more variety to overseas broadcasts. Cousens was transferred to 
Tokyo on 31 st July from where he broadcast radio essays prepared both by Japanese 
and himself 
In October 1942, Cousens was joined there by American, Wallace Ince,1O and 
Norman Reyes, a Filipino Eurasian, both of whom had been captured on Corregidor. 
Prior to their capture they had been involved in an American underground station, 
the "Voice of Freedom." Ince, who broadcast under the name of Ted Wallace, and 
Reyes were initially employed at N.H.K. to check English language scripts.ll 
When it began in March 1943, "Zero Hour" was a twenty-minute mUSIC 
programme12 presented by Reyes, who loved jazz music. It was a DJ-style 
programme copied from the fonnat of American broadcasts, which was unfamiliar 
to N.H.K. staff. The records, which Reyes frequently played included those of 
popular American jazz and swing musicians, such as Louis Armstrong, Duke 
Ellington and Glenn Miller, as well as Japanese jazz and swing bands such as the All 
Star Jazz Band and the All Star Swing Sisters.13 The broadcasts also included songs, 
which were intended to make the audience of American troops feel homesick, such 
as the "St. Louis Blues" and ''Home on the Range."14 The news scripts in the 
broadcasts concentrated on bad news items from America, such as a train crash or a 
flood, as it was assumed that these would lower the morale of the listeners. IS 
8 A broadcast from Singapore in February 1942 mentioned an Australian major, who had previously 
worked for a radio station in Sydney and who was "anxiously awaiting the end of the war." 
Presumably the prisoner referred to in the report was Cousens, although no name was given. The 
same broadcast also stated that as Australia was being treated as a scapegoat, Japan would allow 
Australian prisoners to broadcast home, although it did not state when such broadcasts would occur. 
Hongkong News, 28th February 1942 
9 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e noA1ichi p 184 
10 Soon after joining Radio Tokyo Ince was interviewed by Domei. During the inteniew he stressed 
his good treatment by the Japanese, and it was reported that he did not think his first broadcast would 
have been popular at home as it contained "nothing but the truth of the Philippines fighting." 
Hongkong News, 26th October 1942, p5 
1\ Duus: Tokyo Rose p 75 
12 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no .Jfichi p 400 
13 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no A[;chi p 317 
14 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Dai-Toa e no ;\fichi p 318 
15 Duus: Tokvo Rose p 76 
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In August 1943 the programme was extended to forty-five minutesl6 and Cousens 
and Ince also began presenting sections of it. Japanese wrote the news, but the 
prisoners tried to "sabotage" it by skipping lightly over bad news and joking about 
other items in order to turn it into entertainment.17 
In November 1943, it was decided that "Zero Hour" should be further extended to an 
hour-and-a-quarter. The prisoners were concerned that the expansion would mean 
an increase in the number of Japanese staff. This, they feared would decrease the 
amount of the programme over which they had control, and would hence increase its 
propaganda content. Cousens requested time to consider the plan, in order to find a 
new female presenter, who would be sympathetic to the prisoners' aims in the 
broadcast. I8 Iva Toguri, a nisei English language typist, who had been stranded in 
Japan in December 1941, was sympathetic. Cousens asked her to join the team 
because her voice was not the sweet or gentle type which would be expected of a 
female DJ, and he hoped to use it to make a comedy of Japanese propaganda. At the 
suggestion of Cousens, Iva Toguri took on the name of "Orphan Ann" in the 
broadcasts; "Ann" because in the script the word announcer was abbreviated to 
"ann." and "Orphan" because the Allied soldiers in the South Pacific were often 
referred to as "Orphans of the Pacific."19 She told investigators in 1946 that Cousens 
had told her "to pretend that I was among the boys and to speak as if I were talking 
directly to them."zo 
The new "Zero Hour" format from November 1943 began at 6pm with Arthur 
Fiedler's Boston Pops Orchestra playing "Strike Up the Band," which became the 
"Zero Hour" theme tune. It was followed by five minutes of prisoner messages read 
by Cousens and the fifteen to twenty minute "Orphan Ann" spot, a light music spot 
for which Iva was the DJ, and read a script prepared for her by Cousens. The 
"American Home Front News" which followed, was written by Japanese and read 
by Ince. It was given a five- to ten-minute slot, but frequently there was not enough 
16 Duus: Tokyo Rose p 77 
17 Duus: Tokyo Rose pp 77-78 
18 Duus: Tokyo Rose p 78 
19 Duus: TokyoRosepp81-81 
:!o Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose ,. p 108 
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material to fill the slot and it ended with more light music records. At the end of the 
slot, Iva, who introduced each slot, repeated, "Thank-you, thank-you" five or more 
times at the instruction of Cousens. This was repeated after each of the sections not 
written by the prisoners themselves, in order that the material written by the 
Japanese would be ''wiped'' from the listeners' memory. The "American Home 
Front News" was followed by Reyes' "Juke Box," a fifteen to twenty minute jazz 
slot, in the format of the original "Zero Hour" programme, and "Ted's Highlights 
tonight." This was a five to ten minute slot written by Japanese using news 
monitored from foreign short-wave broadcasts. It was edited and read by Ince, but 
again was ''wiped'' at the end of the slot by Iva repeating "Thank-you" several times. 
Occasionally this was followed by a commentary by Charles Y oshii, a "renegade 
nisei" described as the "Japanese Lord Haw Haw," who had worked at N.H.K. since 
1935.21 "Zero Hour" ended with a military song and a sign off by Ince. 22 
Cousens and Iva usually chose British bands for the light music "Orphan Ann" spot. 
They considered that British music would be less popular with the American 
audience and in their attempts to make a mockery of the Japanese broadcast, they 
often included pre-World War One accordion pieces, such as Ketelby' s "in a Persian 
Market," in the s10t.23 In addition, Iva spoke quickly and used many slang 
expression and puns in her chatter between the records in order to make it difficult 
for the Japanese censors to follow what she said. Hence she could slip in things, 
which were not flattering to the Japanese without the censor halting the 
programme. 24 As part of the mocking tone of the programme, Iva's scripts included 
pseudo-Japanese translations such as "you onable boneheads" and ''you are liking, 
please???25 and her scripts described her own chatter as propaganda. For example, on 
27th March 1944 Iva began: 
Ann.: Greetings every body! This is your little playmate, I mean 
your bitter enemy, Ann, with a program of dangerous and wicked 
propaganda for my victims in the South Pacific. 
On April 21 st, she read: 
~l United States Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (F.B.I.S.): Special Reports 
#90, Radio Tokyo Commentators and Features." . 
22 See Duus: TOhYo Rose pp 81-82, and Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 50 regarding the format 
of the "Zero Hour" broadcasts. 
~ Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 50 
~4 See Duus: TOhyo Rose p 83 
::5 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 113 
Ann.: Dangerous enemy propaganda, so beware! Our next 
propagandist is Arthur Fiedler with the Boston Pops Orchestra 
playing Ketelby's "In a Persian Garden."26 ... Please to listening. 27 
l·n 
Ince tended to state the German or Japanese sources and datelines in his news 
segment in order to make it less believable to the listeners. In addition, he read very 
quickly to that listeners would not bother to listen properly to his section.28 The plan 
of the "Zero Hour" team to minimise the Japanese propaganda value of the 
programme was made easier as the censors did not check the scripts every day, or 
make the participants pre-record any of the broadcast.29 Hence censorship often 
relied solely on the ability of the censor listening to the broadcasts to understand 
English. The tactics of using slang expression and speaking quickly made it much 
simpler for the team to convey meanings other than the Japanese intended without 
the censor questioning them. Similarly, the Japanese censor had little idea of what 
kind of Western music appealed to American troops so the choice of out-dated tunes 
was not queried. 
Ince became ill in December 1943, owing to mistreatment in the prisoners' camp.30 
He continued to work on "Zero Hour" until the end of April 1944, when a severe 
beating following a fight with a camp officer left him too ill to present the 
programme. 31 He later appeared in radio broadcasts as an actor in dramas, but he did 
not return to "Zero Hour" and the other prisoners assumed that he had been 
executed. He was replaced by Kenichi Ishii, a Eurasian Japanese with a voice very 
similar to that of Cousens. 32 
The name "Tokyo Rose" was first heard by Cousens in the spring of 1944. A report 
from Sweden mentioned it was the nickname given by American troops to the 
presenter of a Sunday programme. The report described the sweet voice of the 
presenter. Cousens and George Mitsushio, the Japanese in charge of "Zero Hour," 
26 TIle title of the song here seems to be a mistake. There are two melodies, which seem to have been 
confused, "In a Persian Market" and "In a Monastery Garden." 
'27 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 113 
:cs Howe: The Huntfor "TokyoRose"p98 
29 Iva Toguri D' Aquino during the war crimes investigation, 30th Apri11946 
Howe: The Huntfor "Tokyo Rose" pp 110-111 
30 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 171 
31 Howe: The Huntfor "Tokyo Rose" p 57 
3~ Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 57 
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concluded it would be Myrtle Lipman, a former Miss Manila, who had just begun 
broadcasting to American troops from there, or Ruth Hayakawa, who took Iva's 
place on the Sunday programme.33 Indeed, a United States Office of War 
Information (0. W.1.) report issued shortly before the Japanese surrender in 1945 
concluded: 
There is no Tokyo Rose; the name is strictly a GI invention. The 
name has been applied to at least two lilting Japanese voices on the 
Japanese radio ... Government monitors listening in 24 hours a day 
have never heard the words Tokyo Rose over a Japanese controlled 
station. 34 
Cousens left "Zero Hour" following a heart attack on 15th June 1944.35 Reyes, a 
"friendly alien" following the establishment of the "independent" Philippines under 
Laurel in October 1943, was given more responsibility, and increasingly new nisei 
were given parts in the programme. The Japanese put increasing pressure on Iva to 
allow the politicisation of the "Orphan Ann" spot. She resisted, re-working 
Cousens' old scripts, using traditional English tunes, and visiting him in hospital for 
advice. Although an American herself, she even tended to continue using Cousens' 
British English grammar in her scripts. In one such script, dated 14th August 1944, 
her introduction began: 
Ann.: Hello, you fighting orphans of the Pacific. How's tricks? 
This is the after-the-weekend Annie back on the air, strictly on the 
Zero Hour. Reception OK? Well, it had better be, because this is an 
all-request night and I've got a pretty nice program for my favorite 
little family - the wandering boneheads of the Pacific islands. 36 
In it Iva used the grammatically correct "it had better be" rather that the American 
"it better be," and "I've got" rather than "I've," both of which are more common in 
British English. To the censor this would have been an imperceptible difference, but 
it is possible that an American speaking British English would have seemed odd to 
the listeners. At times Iva surpassed Cousens in her mocking tone. A script dated 
May 3rd (but with no year) reads: 
Ann.: You are liking, please? Well, keep listening in because in a 
few moments you'll be hearing your News from the Americ~n 
Home Front. But first we'll hear from George Scott-Wood and his 
33 Howe: The Hunt for "TOkYO Rose" pp 56-57 
34 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 65 
35 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 78 
36 Howe: The Hunt for "TOkYO Rose" pp 199-200 
accord eon. (sic) A lousy little tune, "In a Gypsy Tea Room," but 
nicely played. 
Howe concludes that, "Cousens . . . would probably have ruled that the phrase 
'lousy little tune' was going too far in self-mockery."37 
As the format of "Zero Hour" altered from entertainment to propaganda, Iva Togun, 
whose "Orphan Ann" slot remained, tried to leave the programme on several 
occasions, but was not given permission. Increasingly in late 1944 and 1945 she did 
not arrive at work to present the slot, and regularly failed to turn up if there was an 
air raid. This was partly as she feared that those loyal to Japan would seek revenge 
on a pro-American announcer as the war situation worsened for Japan. 38 
During her periods of absence, Iva's place on "Zero Hour" was- taken by several of 
the other female presenters, who did not write scripts to undermine the propaganda 
role of the programme. One of the more frequent replacements was Miyeko Furuya 
and an occasional replacement was Ruth Hayakawa, presenter of the Sunday 
programme, whom the prisoners suspected of being a kempei39 agent.40 In May 1945 
Miyeko married Kenichi Oki, the producer to the programme, and under her and the 
other replacements the "Orphan Ann" spot changed, and like the rest of the 
programme, increasingly contained more propaganda than entertainment. Hence in 
the latter months of the war, the programme reverted to the kind of heavy 
propaganda broadcasting, which the Ambassador to Iran had criticised, and which 
"Zero Hour" had sought to counter. 
"Hi no Mar" Hour,,41 
In May 1943, at the suggestion of the Joint Chief of Staffs' office, N.H.K. began 
work on creating a programme for the West Coast of the United States, to have a 
similar content to "Zero Hour" which was broadcast to American front-line troops. , 
From September 1943 forty prisoners in Japanese camps throughout the Empire 
were moved to Tokyo Camp, as it was considered that their background and 
37 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" pp 200-202 
38 See Duus: ToJ..yo Rose p 96 and Howe: The Hunt for "ToJ..yo Rose " p 57-62 
39 Military Police 
40 Howe: The Hunt for "ToJ..yo Rose '.' p 97 
41 Hi no A/aru is the Japanese name for the Japanese flag, 
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personality made them suitable for work on this programme. Once they had arrived 
in Tokyo Camp, N.H.K. representatives visited them ten times in three weeks42 to 
interview them in more detail. Through this, the "mysterious men," as the 
interviewers became known in the camp, selected thirteen prisoners, whom they 
considered particularly suitable, and these were transferred to a separate camp.43 
The thirteen prisoners arrived at the former Suragadai Cultural Institute (Bunka 
Gaku-in), in Kanda, Tokyo, on December 1st 1943. On 18th they were joined by 
Cousens and Ince, but as a "friendly alien" from October 1943, Reyes was forbidden 
to enter the camp. On 7th January 1944, four further Americans joined the camp, 
which became nicknamed "Bunka Camp."44 
The first "Hi no Maru Hour" broadcast was scheduled for 2nd of December 1943, so 
work was to begin immediately on the prisoners' arrival at the camp. First, 
however, the thirteen prisoners were taken into the camp garden, where the camp 
rules were read out. Essentially these were that the prisoners were to co-operate 
with the Japanese until the end of the war, and that if they did not the Japanese could 
not guarantee to safeguard their lives. On 9th, at a repeat of this, the prisoners were 
asked if they agreed to co-operate and a British officer, Charles Williams, replied, 
''No, Sir." He was removed from the camp by the kempei. 45 He was not executed 
and survived the war in a mine worked by prisoners-of-war. 46 However, the other 
prisoners in Bunka Camp presumed that he had been executed, and this had a 
profound effect upon their willingness to co-operate.47 
After the rules had been read on 2nd, three American prisoners, Edwin Kalbfleisch, 
George Henshaw and David Provoo, were taken to the studio to rehearse for the first 
broadcast, which had been written three weeks previously by the Japanese involved 
42 Ikeda: Hi no MaruAwd p 23 
43 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awd p 24 
44 Ikeda: Hi no .Alaru Awd pp 28-30 
45 TIle British government decorated Williams after the war for this act. 
Ikeda: Hi no.AlaruAwd p 55 
46 It was decided not to send him back to an ordinary prisoner-of-war camp, as it was felt that he 
would reveal sensitive material regarding the propaganda war on America to other prisoners. At the 
suggestion of Ikeda Norizone, who was in charge of "Hi no Maru Hour" he was sent somewhere 
where he could not be expected to live very long. 
Ikeda: Hi no ,\faru Awd p 56 
47 Ikeda: Hi no Afaru Awd pp 42-3, 53-6 
in the programme. 48 The following day the same three prisoners arrived at Studio 
Five of the Uchisaiwaich6 broadcasting complex at 11 am, and had a second 
rehearsal before the broadcast. They were joined on the programme by a Japanese, 
who played the records, while the prisoners performed the spoken slots, Provoo 
acting as radio host.49 As the programme was, like "Zero Hour," broadcast live, the 
director and censor sat in a room next to the studio, with the "cut button" near them. 
"Hi no Maru Hour" was a daily half-hour show broadcast at 1 pm, and the lives of 
the prisoners at Bunka Camp were structured around it. Five hours of the day were 
spent writing scripts and making copies, whilst a further one-and-a-half hours were 
spent at the studio.50 
Initially, the prisoners read scripts and news commentaries previously written by a 
Japanese, like Ikeda Norizone, but from the start it was envisaged that, as with "Zero 
Hour," the prisoners would write the material themselves. However, the Japanese 
produced a list of appropriate propaganda themes and ideas. Roosevelt was 
portrayed as a ruthless imperialist, who ignored the wishes of his people, and who 
had established a secret police to spy on them in the form of the F.B.I.5! The 
Japanese queried the American alliance with Stalin, emphasising their own strong 
stance against Communism, in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, and asking, "Who 
is the real enemy of America?"52 Asia was compared to eighteenth century America, 
fighting for its freedom from the European powers, and black soldiers were warned 
that although they fought for their country, the Ku Klux Klan would be waiting for 
them on their return. In addition, all soldiers were reminded of the Government's 
mistreatment of the "Bonus Army, "53 which had marched on Washington in 1932.54 
48 Ikeda: Hi no MaruAwa p 47 
49 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awa p 79 
50 The exceptions to this schedule were Cousens and Ince, whose hours at the studio were greater and 
at a different time of day to the other prisoners. 
Ikeda: Hi no MaruAwa p 72-3 
5! Ikeda: Hi no MaruAwa pp 88-9 
52 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awa p 91 
53 The "Bonus Anny" consisted of more than 15,000 World War One veterans, who marched ~n 
Washington to demand immediate payment of a veterans' cash bonus that Congress had yot~d 10 
1924. When the bill was voted down and Congress went into the Swnmer recess, the Presldent 
became nervous at the number of veterans still in Washington, and ordered General Douglas 
MacArthur to clear their shantytmm. His troops burnt tlle shant)10\\n to the ground, directly 
violating a Presidential order. 
George Brown Tindall and David E. Shi: America: A Narrative History pp 725-6 
54 Ikeda: Hi no A1aru Awa pp 92,94-5, 98-9 
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It is plausible that this topic was chosen as the person responsible for the destruction 
of the Army's shanty town was General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief 
of the American Army's Pacific operations. 
Ikeda drafted a British officer, John McNaughton, who had been an actor before the 
war, into assisting him to write a series of thirty-minute dramas to be performed 
weekly in "Hi no Maru Hour" broadcasts. The first, broadcast on 3rd December 
1943, was entitled "The Issue of the Monroe Doctrine"55 and claimed that just as 
President Monroe had declared in 1823 with regard to European affairs, America 
should refuse to interfere in Asia.56 "I Met Napoleon," broadcast in early January 
1944, was based on George Bernard Shaw's The Man of Destiny. Ikeda writes that 
the play was not very good,57 but was considered good propaganda, as it was based 
around a quote of Napoleon, "Blood is cheap but wine costs money." It was 
followed by two plays, which dramatised the capture of two Allied prisoners. The 
first, "The Story of the Shooting Down of Major Cox" detailed the capture of one of 
the group of four prisoners at Suragadai, who arrived in January 1944. The second 
was about the capture of a prisoner who was held in Omori Camp in Tokyo, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pike, who had been shot down over China. Tsuneishi, 
Commander of Bunka Camp, asked that this story be used as it contained several 
good propaganda points. Pike had been shot down following a raid on Japan, and 
had received horrific bums to his face. The Chinese farmers who had found him 
were terrified at his burnt face, and had handed him over to Chiang's Army, but it 
had lost him to the Japanese in ground fighting. The story contained many elements 
considered good propaganda - the failure of a raid on Japan, the Japanese power to 
inflict horrific injuries, the unwillingness of ordinary Chinese to help an injured 
American, and the inability of Chiang's Army to keep hold of him. The Japanese, 
55 5th American President James Monroe, incorporated what later became known as the "Monroe 
Doctrine" into his annual 'message to Congress on 2nd December 1823. It had four points: ~i) ~t 
"The American continents ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future coloruzatIon 
by any European powers;" (ii) that the political systems of European powers was different to. that of 
the United States~ (iii) that the United States would not interfere with existing E~opean colo.rues; and 
(iv) that the United States would keep out of the internal affairs of European natIons, and therr wars. 
The Monroe Doctrine, and the latter point in particular, was frequently cited in the years before Pearl 
Harbor, to justify American isolationism with regard to the war in Europe. 
Tindell and Shi: America p 244 
56 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awd p 102 
57 However. he does not clarify whether it was the play or the production which was not good 
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therefore, acquiesced to a request by McNaughton that the drama be extended over 
two days.58 
For the second set of broadcasts it was decided to adapt English language anti-war 
novels and plays for broadcast. The first, John Steinbeck's OJ Mice and Men was 
criticised by some in the Bureau of International Broadcasting for being short on 
propaganda, and because it was felt the prisoners enjoyed producing it too much. 
However, Ikeda and other Japanese associated with "Hi no Maru Hour" justified 
their use of the drama by quoting research done by the British in World War One. 
This stated that the propagandist needed to create a "favourable atmosphere" in the 
target country prior to broadcasting strong propaganda, in order to make the 
audience receptive to the second wave of propaganda. 59 
The second adaptation was of R. C. Sherriff's Journey's End, the story of the final 
three days in the lives of three British soldiers in the World War One trenches, who 
die when they go "over the top" in March 1918. The anti-war message was 
obvious. 60 Ikeda claims that all those in the studio during the broadcast were touched 
by the story, including McNaughton, Provoo and Henshaw, who acted the parts of 
the soldiers, "even though it was not their propaganda. "61 
The final radio play in the series was Irwin Shaw's Bury the Dead, originally a 1936 
Broadway production, set "in the second year of the world war beginning the eve of 
the day after tomorrow." It was the story of the ghosts of American soldiers, who 
remained unburied as the ceremonies were always reserved for senior officers. As 
producer, Ikeda did not like the story as much as Journey's End, but as it was an 
American anti-war play it was thought it would have wider appeal in America. 62 
Despite Radio Tokyo's portrayal of Japan as the true enemy of Communism, it was 
decided that the next series of plays would be based on socialist writers, beginning 
with Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, as much socialist writing was out of print in the 
58 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awd pp 103-5 
59 Ikeda: Hi no MaruAwd pp 106-7 
60 Ikeda: Hi no Alaru Awd pp 109-11 
61 Ikeda: Hi no Afaru Awd p 112 
62 Ikeda: Hi noA1aru Awd pp 112-114 
United States. Anti-war novels also considered for future adaptation included 
Hemingway's Farewell to Arms and Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front. 63 
The use of such material to produce subtle propaganda, which appealed to the 
audience, is a clear indication of the sophisticated approach to propaganda that 
developed at N.H.K. over the course of the war. 
Despite criticism in February 1944 that "Hi no Maru Hour" broadcasts in January 
had included the word "peace" fifteen times,64 the broadcasts continued and on 1 & 
April they were renamed. It was felt that the reference to the Japanese flag in the 
title of the programme was too strong a propaganda reference, so the broadcasts 
became ''Humanity Calls," although the format remained the same. In addition, a 
new programme, ''Postman Calls," was begun on 18th September,65 in the half-hour 
slot immediately following ''Humanity Calls" (1.30 - 2.00pm) doubling the length 
of the prisoners' programmes. This was a programme devoted to prisoner messages. 
"Humanity Calls" included one or two prisoner messages, but these were generally 
very short extracts indicating that a given prisoner was in Japanese hands, such as 
one on October 13th 1944 from Edward L. Kirkpatrick, interned in Fukuoka, which 
read: 
Dearest Mom, hope you are well. I am in good health, don't worry. 
When you write send some pictures. 
Best wishes to everyone, Love Ed.66 
''Postman Calls" was a programme devoted exclusively to prisoner messages, and it 
included much longer messages, similar to the prisoner letters broadcast by the 
Batavia station to Australasia, such as one from Private Angelo Pluchino on 13th 
November: 
Dearest Mother Dad and Sister, I am happy to have the opportunity 
once more of getting word to you. I have recently received a 
radiogram from you which made me very happy. I am enjoying good 
health here in our camp. I seriously hope you are also in excellent 
63 Ikeda: Hi nolvlaruAwa p 116 
64 Ikeda: Hi noAlaruAwa p 117 
65 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 120 
TIlere is some confusion about when "Postman Calls" was started. Ikeda recalls in Hi no Afaru Awd 
that it began on 1st April 1944, the same day that "Hi no Alanl Hour" was renamed "Humanity Calls." 
However, Kitayama, whilst acknowledging that this is how Ikeda remembers the programmes, states 
that the records show it actually started on 18th September. . 
66 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to American Prisoners of If ar 
J9.J.I-45. 13th October 1944 
health. I am looking forward to the day I shall again be with you. I 
hope Emily is fine and enjoying herself I am doing my regular 
duties as a Medical Orderly in our Prisoner of War Hospital Camp. 
We have American and British doctors and orderlies. We have 
patients of all nationalities and are able to treat them very well. In 
our spare time we can read, listen to music and play cards. Therefore 
please do not worry about me. I am getting along fine. Please take 
care of yourself mother and tell dad (sic) and Emily to do the same. I 
am longing to eat your excellent cooking and smoke Dad's cigars. 
God bless you, 
Your loving son, Angelo. 67 
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In anticipation of this new programme Ikeda and Yamaguchi, another of the 
Japanese involved in the broadcasts, spent a week in March 1944 visiting prisoner 
camps in K yushu to obtain material. Although the Japanese at the camps knew the 
nature of their visits, they went under the guise of Red Cross -workers when they 
spoke to the prisoners. 68 The usefulness of the material they gathered regarding the 
lives of the prisoners, particularly their lives in the camps, varied between camps, 
and depended on how closely supervised the visit was. When the prisoners were 
allowed to meet the ''Red Cross" representatives without close supervision, they 
were, naturally, more inclined to talk than when there were camp officials close by. 
In December 1944 messages read by the pnsoners themselves were broadcast 
increasingly frequently as Christmas approached. One on Christmas Eve is typical: 
This is Walter Adam Shapcunic, Warrant Carpenter, U.S. Navy 
formerly 16th Naval District, Cavite P.I. I am broadcasting to my 
brother, Mr. John P. Shapcunic, Cementon, Penn. U.S.A. 
Hello folks. My treatment as prisoner of war is as good as can be 
expected under the present conditions. My health is good. Weight 
now 165 pounds. Hope that every one at home is in good spirits and 
sound health. I pray daily that we may be reunited very soon. My 
thoughts often wander to days of past, recalling the various party 
celebrations and good times we had together. It has been a very long 
time since I have been on a good fling. So keep your keg (?) [sic] 
filled to the brim. We will be in all probabilities remain here [sic] 
until the hostilities cease. Convey my best wishes and regards to all 
67 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to American Prisoners 01 War 
1944-45, 13th November 1944 . . 
68 Ikeda, as a genuine member of the Red Cross, states he was uncomfortable \\1th this, but he 
completed the tour of camps in any case. 
Ikeda: Hi no Afaro Awd pp 127-132 
our friends and relatives. A very Merry Christmas and a Joyous New 
Year to every body. Your loving brother, Walter. 69 
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''Humanity Calls" and "Postman Calls" continued to be broadcast until the Japanese 
surrendered in August 1945. However, as with "Zero Hour," problems in 
broadcasting increased as the war situation became grave for Japan. As food 
became increasingly scarce for all, rations were reduced for both the prisoners and 
Japanese at the camp. However, the prisoners in Bunka Camp received better 
rations than those at other prisoner-of-war camps. Rice was replaced by kaoliang, a 
variety of millet, and when the prisoners complained that it was unhealthy to eat the 
cereal alone, they received a ration of bread to accompany it. 70 In addition, camp 
commander, Tsuneishi provided money for the wives of Japanese soldiers in the 
camp to buy meat and vegetables for the prisoners on the black market, and tacit 
approval was given for them also to obtain tobacco, the supply of which remained 
constant throughout the war. 71 In fact, this practice was approved at the highest 
levels, and when one person was discovered buying for the camp on the black 
market and reported to the General Staff Headquarters, the only action taken against 
the camp was to limit the smoking of cigarettes to work time.72 The powerful camp 
commander, Tsuneishi, was simultaneously head of Section Eight of the General 
Staff Hence, when one of the prisoners, Quille, lost the use of his arm, Tsuneishi 
ordered a military hospital, unwilling to treat a mere prisoner, to operate 
immediately, overriding the local kempei.73 
As many of the Japanese at Bunka Camp returned to their home regions to prepare 
for the ''Decisive Battle for the Japanese Fatherland" in the Spring of 1945, 
however, replacements became involved in the broadcasts. One was a German, who 
had previously been involved in anti-enemy broadcasting. Often these people, sent 
by the Foreign Ministry, prepared broadcasts before the group from Bunka Camp 
arrived at the studio, so the nature of the broadcasts changed. Increasingly the 
69 The query after "keg" is in the original. . 
United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to American Prisoners of if ar 
1944-45, 24th December 1944 
70 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awd pp 75-6 
71 Ikeda: Hi no Maru Awd p 77 
72 The person caught buying from the black market, however, lost his job. 
Ikeda: Hi no Afaru Awd pp 77-8 
73 Ikeda: Hi no Alaru Awa pp 82-4 
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prisoners had less involvement in the preparation and writing of programmes. As 
with "Zero Hour," the programme gradually reverted to the strong propaganda, 
which it had been established to replace. 
John Holland 
Japanese overseas broadcasting did not only rely on prisoners for native English 
speakers. John Holland was an Australian, who voluntarily broadcast regular 
strongly anti-British commentaries over Radio Tokyo in 1942-3. 
Holland had lived in Shanghai since 1937 and from April 1941 broadcast as David 
Lester for XGRS, the German-run station in Shanghai.74 He took over the Walla 
Walla broadcasts, which were transmitted in ''English for Occupied China," 
broadcasting local news and some entertainment features. 75 
In the winter of 1942, monitors detected the same voice broadcasting from Tokyo 
under the name of John, or Jack, Holland. 76 The first such broadcast monitored in 
Britain was a commentary in the transmission to Australia and New Zealand entitled 
"Americans' Warmongering," on 6th December.77 The following day, Holland 
repeated the Japanese claim that the United States was trying to blame the outbreak 
of war in the Pacific on Japan, by labelling the Pearl Harbor attack the cause. He 
continued that the November 26th note clearly showed that the blame lay with 
America. 78 
Generally, Holland's commentaries reflected that world situation more than other 
regular commentators on Japanese radio stations, who tended to concentrate on 
74 Willi A. Boe1ke: Die Macht des Radios: Weltpolitik undAuslandsrundJunk 1924-76 p:t.33. th 
75 For an example of the Walla Walla broadcasts see Shanghai in English for Occupled China, 4 
December 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary oJ World Broadcasts, Number 1237, 6th December 1942 
76 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Report #90, "Radio Tokyo Commentators and 
Features," 16th August 1943 
77 English for Australia and New Zealand, 6th December 1942 
B.B.e.: Summary oJ World Broadcasts, Number 1238, ~ December 1942 
78 English for Australia, 7th December 1942 
B.B.e.: Summary oJ World Broadcasts, Number 1239, 8th December 1942 . 
111ere were of course also critics of Roosevelt's actions in the United States, who blamed him for 
starting the war. 
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Asian affairs.79 On 17th Holland returned to German affairs in a commentary, which 
described the 1940 Franco-German Armistice as an example of German generosity, 
in stark contrast to the harsh war terms inflicted on Germany in 1918.80 At the end 
of December he analysed Allied problems caused by the situation in North Africa, 81 
and a commentary in February 1943 described the affront caused to Stalin in , 
particular, and Chiang Kai-shek in being excluded from the meeting between 
Churchill and Roosevelt at Casablanca.82 
The other recurring theme of Holland's broadcasts was Roosevelt's incapacity to 
lead, and the growing resentment against him. Holland described Roosevelt's 
inability to recognise his own limitations as "a tragedy for America",g3 and stated 
that the American public doubted his ability to uphold the naval and military 
strength of the American forces.84 He also criticised Roosevelt's lack of judgement 
in appointing Flynn, a man with "no international diplomatic experience," 
Ambassador to Australia. 85 
American monitors in San Francisco suspected that Holland was never in Tokyo, 
and that his daily commentaries in the Winter and Spring of 1942-3 '~ere recorded 
in Shanghai and shipped to Tokyo."86 Commentaries indicating the situation in 
Shanghai, such as one in March 1943, which detailed new restrictions on the 
businesses and residences of Jews in Shanghai,87 seem to bear out this supposition. 
However, after March 1943, neither John Holland nor David Lester was heard in 
79 Radio Batavia's Abdul Wahid, for example, broadcast to India, urging unity against Britain, and 
Erwin Wickert broadcast from Radio Tokyo to Germany during exchange broadcasts, offering 
insights into aspects of life in Japan and other Greater East Asian countries for German listeners. 
80 English for Australia and New Zealand, 1 th December 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1249, 18th December 1942 
81 English for Australia and China, 23rdDecember 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1255, 24th December 1942 
82 English for Australia and China, 3rd February 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1297, 4th February 1943 
83 English for Australia and China, 26th December 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1258, 2? December 1942 
84 English for China and Australia, 22nd January 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1285, 23m January 1943 
85 English for Australia and China, 13th January 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1276, 14th January 1943 
86 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Report #90, "Radio Tokyo Commentators and 
Features," 16th August 1943 
87 English for Australia, 5th March 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1327, 6th March 1943 
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broadcasts from Tokyo or Shanghai. There was "no excuse or reason given for his 
sudden precipitation to oblivion,"88 so it is impossible to ascertain precisely where he 
was when his broadcasts were made, or why they stopped suddenly. 
The Use of Prisoners in Propaganda Broadcasts 
The use of prisoners for propaganda purposes was undoubtedly a violation of the 
1929 Geneva Convention. Whilst the employment of prisoners-of-war was 
permitted, Article 31 of the Convention stated: 
Labor furnished by prisoners of war shall have no direct relation with 
war operations. It is especially prohibited to use prisoners for 
manufacturing and transporting of arms or munitions of any kind, or 
for transporting material intended for combat units. 89 
Propaganda, although not mentioned specifically, must be considered as having a 
direct relation with war operations, as its purpose is to weaken the enemy's 
prosecution of the war. Indeed, early in the war the Japanese authorities declared 
short-wave radio broadcasting "munitions." As such, then, it must have been subject 
to the Geneva Convention. In addition, Japanese officials posing as Red Cross 
members in order to obtain information from prisoners for use in propaganda 
broadcasts must be considered a violation of the spirit of the Convention, as well as 
a violation of that organisation's regulations. The T6j6 cabinet justified these 
violations, stating that Japan had never signed the Convention, and was not, 
therefore, bound by it. 
Nazi Germany also violated the 1929 Geneva Convention. 90 From late 1941 the 
number of prisoners working in agriculture, construction and mining was steadily 
reduced, while those working in such "other employment" as the armaments 
industry, became the government's top priority.91 However, there is no evidence to 
show that prisoners were used in propaganda in the same way as in Japan. There 
were foreign nationals working for German overseas radio, such as William Joyce,92 
88 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Report #90, "Radio Tokyo Commentators and 
Features," 16th August 1943 
89 United States Department of State: Multilateral Agreements 
~ cit. Van Waterford: Prisoners o/the Japanese in World TVar 11, Appendi~ A, p 347 
As a result of the treatment of prisoners by Japan and Gennany dunng World War Two, the 
Convention was revised in 1949, being e>..-panded and more forcefully worded. 
91 See Martin Kitchen: Nazi Germany at War p 157 
92 The notorious Lord Haw Haw 
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who broadcast to Britain, and the German-American, Fred Kaltenbach, who 
broadcast to America's Mid-West under the name of Lord Hee-Haw.93 Like John 
Holland, these were individuals who had volunteered to work for the enemy, and 
were employed for their expert knowledge of their own countries' tastes in 
programmes. In the same way, Japanese-Americans volunteered to be involved in 
American broadcasts to Japan, and many Europeans, who had escaped Nazi 
occupation, broadcast from the B.B.C. to their home countries on behalf of the 
Allies. As volunteers, none of this group was subject to the conditions of the 
prisoner broadcasters in Japan. For the prisoners, however much they influenced the 
programme, there were inevitably sections of the broadcasts, which directly opposed 
their own beliefs, and although conditions at Suragadai Camp were better than 
elsewhere, the broadcasts were made under duress. 
For Iva Toguri D' Aquino, the situation is less simple. As a Japanese brought up in 
the United States she could have easily volunteered to broadcast for Japan, as many 
did in her situation. The unfortunate circumstances surrounding here entrapment in 
Japan indicate that Howe and Duus are correct in their claims that she was not a 
totally willing participant in anti-American propaganda. However, both books were 
written seeking to redress Iva's treatment by a hysterical government. A discussion 
of whether or not she was a traitor is, however, not the subject of this study. As Iva 
was neither a prisoner nor an internee, and volunteered to work for N.H.K., 
whatever her motives, she was not subject to the Geneva Convention, and must be 
classed with the other volunteer broadcasters. 
The use of Allied prisoners-of-war in overseas broadcasts was very important to the 
Japanese radio propaganda campaign. There had been several attempts to increase 
the entertainment value of Japanese broadcasts before the war, and jazz music, 
banned on domestic broadcasts, was permitted in short-wave broadcasts because of 
this. However, after the outbreak of war, it was felt that it was essential to increase 
the number of listeners, and broadcasts to Australasia began to include letters from 
prisoners-of-war. 
93 Rolo: Radio Goes to War p 77 
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The use of prisoners in producing and presenting programmes under Japanese 
supervision was the next step for Japanese programme makers, who recognised that 
their own knowledge of western entertainment was minimal. The use of prisoners 
with a background in broadcasting and entertainment was intended to ensure that the 
programmes appealed to western listeners. Hence for much of the time the , 
prisoners working on "Zero Hour" and "Hi no Maru Awd" were allowed 
considerable freedom in producing entertainment slots for the programmes. The 
news segments of programmes, however, remained the preserve of Japanese writers. 
The Japanese invested considerable time and money in the prisoner broadcasts; an 
indication of the importance of these programmes. First, all the camps in the 
Japanese Empire were scoured for prospective broadcasters and then the most 
promising were transported to Tokyo. Initially, Cousens, Inee and Reyes were 
installed in the Dai-Ichi Hotel, one of the most prestigious hotels in Tokyo before 
the war. 94 It was reported that there they were "treated as any other guest" and had 
"living conditions and food ... better than even those of the average Nipponese. "95 
Once Japanese officials had selected the remaining prisoners, following numerous 
visits, Suragadai Cultural Institute was converted into Bunka Camp, and the 
prisoners moved there. Whilst conditions at Bunka Camp were harsh by peacetime 
standards, they were better than in other Japanese prisoner-of-war camps, as it was 
considered imperative that these prisoners remained healthy and contented. Thus, 
on Christmas Eve 1943, the prisoners were allowed a Christmas meal, consisting of 
three courses, and were permitted to decorate the camp with their national flags. 96 
They were also all presented with an extra Christmas ration of tobacco.97 The more 
lenient policy continued throughout the war. As the war situation deteriorated in 
1944-5, many Japanese suffered from malnutrition and disease owing to shortages of 
food and clean water. The protected position of these prisoners was, therefore, 
frequently very good by comparison. It is clear that the installation of a powerful 
official as commander of BUllka Camp, and the money and time invested in seeking 
94 It had, in fact, been built for the 1940 Tok'yo Olympics which were never held 
95 llongkong News, 26th October 1942, p 5 
96 Naturally, the Japanese flag remained in the centre of the camp. 
97 Ikeda: Hi no Afaru Awn pp 64-5 
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out the prisoners and then ensuring that they remained healthy and co-operative, are 
clear indications of the importance attached to the prisoner broadcasts by the 
Japanese authorities. They are also perhaps indications of the depth of Japanese 
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of their overseas broadcasting, following 
criticism from their own Ambassador to Iran. 
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Chapter 7: The Final Stage of the War (July 1944-September 1945) 
Developments in the War Situation 
Military: 
The military situation in the South Pacific continued to deteriorate in the final year of 
the war. In June and August, Saipan and Pulao 1 were captured by American forces 
and at the end of September the Japanese authorities announced the "Honourable 
Defeats" of Guam and Tinian. The capture of Saipan and Tinian were particularly 
significant, as they enabled the United States to mount air attacks on Tokyo using 
land-based bombers. 
The battle for the Philippines continued throughout the winter of 1944. On 16th 
December the Manila broadcasting station was bombed and one of the station's 10kw 
transmitters destroyed.2 Despite this, the station continued transmitting both locally 
and overseas on its remaining transmitter. 
In February 1945 the Japanese authorities announced that American forces had landed 
on Iwojima and on 17ili March they announced that the island had been lost. This was 
a great psychological blow to the Japanese for Iwojima was formally under the 
administration of Tokyo City and was hence the first part of the "Japanese mainland" 
to be surrendered. This preceded the intensification of Allied air raids over Japanese 
cities in March and April 1945. 
Following their occupations of Iwojima and Manila American troops pressed north to 
Okinawa. American progress was slow and casualties high, during the bloody battle 
for Okinawa, which lasted almost three months and ended with both the Japanese 
commander and his deputy committing ceremonial seppaku. 3 Over a hundred 
thousand Japanese were killed in the battle, and the number who survived as prisoners 
were very few. 4 
1 This is sometimes also written Palao or Palau 
2 Kitayama: Haiboku e no A1ichi p 143 " .. " . 
3 Seppaku is the true name for Japanese ritual suicide, often mistakenly referred to as hara kin 10 
the West. 
4 Calvocoressi. Wint and Pritchard, Total War p 1163 
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In Europe, the advance on Germany begun by the Normandy landings in June 1944 
culminated in the surrender of Germany on 8th May 1945. 
Political: 
The political and diplomatic situation developed rapidly in the last year of the war, in 
line with the rapidly changing military situation. In Japan the formation of the Koiso-
Yonai cabinet was announced on 21 st July 1944. This replaced the Tojo cabinet, 
which had resigned on 20th. The new cabinet represented a compromise between the 
Army and Navy factions, removing some of the power of the Army Ministry. It was 
headed by General Koiso Kuni aki , with Admiral Y onai Mitsumasa as unofficial 
Assistant-Premier. The appointment of the moderate Yonai, who had opposed the 
Tripartite Pact, was an encouragement to those in Japan who hoped to find a way for 
peace.s 
In February 1945 the Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin 
completed Allied plans for the defeat and the post-war administration of Germany. An 
agreement was also reached that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan some 
three months after the defeat of Germany. This agreement for Japan was not included 
in the Yalta Communique, and was denied by Russian Foreign Minister Molotov when 
the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow visited him. However, Kitayama claims that in 
its meeting on 19th February the Japanese Supreme War Guidance Committee6 
concluded that it was very likely that the Yalta Conference had discussed Japan. 7 
In March, a crisis in the Koiso-Y onai cabinet, which had been developing for months, 
finally erupted. It concerned the developing war situation in the Pacific, and the 
cabinet's failure to agree to make peace with the Chinese government in Chungking. 
The Prime Minister resigned on 4th April and a new cabinet was formed under Admiral 
Suzuki Kantaro. 
On 13th April 19458 President Roosevelt died and was replaced by Harry Truman, but 
the policies of the United States and the Allies remained basically unchanged. Hence it 
5 See Robert 1. C. Butow: Japan 's Decision to Surrender pp 30-38 
6 Saik6 Sens6 Shid6 Kaigi 
7 Kitayama: Haiboku e no A1ichi p 178 
8 This was 12th April in the United States 
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was Truman who met with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam in July to discuss the 
political and economic principles which would govern the treatment of Germany. 
During the conference, a general election in the United Kingdom removed the 
Conservative Party from power, and Churchill left the conference to be replaced by the 
new Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Before Churchill's departure from the 
conference, however, he, Truman and Chiang Kai-shek issued the Potsdam 
Declaration, calling for the unconditional surrender of Japan. It was broadcast to 
Japan in Morse code, and on both short-wave and medium-wave radio. 
Radio Tokyo's Response to these Developments 
News of the capture ofPulao in August 1944 was not broadcast until 18th September, 
when the Japanese authorities announced enemy landings on the island. However, the 
broadcasting station on Pulao, which broadcast on short-wave to Australia and the 
Southern Regions, suddenly stopped transmitting on 1 st August, indicating that 
conditions on the island were no longer favourable to the Japanese. 
The capture of Saipan, Guam and Tinian were commemorated on domestic radio.9 
However, in overseas broadcasts news reports concentrated on rumours of Allied 
plans to attack Burma. The Japanese Commander-in-Chiefin Burma, General Kimura, 
vowed that Japan would not confine herself to defence, but would fight on into India 
to free her from Western imperialism. 10 
Broadcasts concerning the battles in the Pacific continued to ignore the true situation, 
making optimistic claims of great Japanese 'war results." Broadcasts from Tokyo 
continued to emphasise that the American troops, despite dropping leaflets asking the 
Japanese to stop fighting,l1 were being "exposed to death defying Japanese assaults.,,12 
9 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 97 
10 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 1st October 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1903, 2nd October 1944 . rd 
II Japanese Overseas Service in Japanese for Australia and the South Pacific, 3 February 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 2028, 4th February 1945 
12 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 4th February 1945 
R R f"' . <:ummnYV of rr 'orld Broadcasts, Number 2029, 5th February 1945 
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American landings on Iwojima were admitted in Japanese overseas broadcasts 
, 
although they reported that Japanese troops on the island were "in high spirits".13 
Broadcasts sending tributes to the "brave heroes on Iwojima,,14 were transmitted on 
domestic and Greater East Asian services. 15 Radio Tokyo continued to report on the 
battle on Iwojima, describing it as a "whirlpool of American blood" where no Japanese 
soldier had died without killing at least ten of the enemy. 16 As with other defeats, 
Iwojima's capture was not openly admitted on overseas radio, but reports concerning 
Iwojima soon disappeared and were replaced by news of fighting elsewhere. Reports 
on Greater East Asia broadcasting described Iwojima's capture as within the Japanese 
plan. A commentary on 13 th March declared that the Japanese had allowed enemy 
landings on the Philippines and Iwojima, and that the enemy had "pigheadedly 
approached within our reach" and "the supreme time to crush him (had) arrived.,,17 
American air raids over Tokyo prompted accusations of "indiscriminate bombing from 
above the clouds,,18 but they were mentioned infrequently in overseas broadcasts. 
However, occasional reference was made to the number of American planes shot 
down over Japan, such as a broadcast 3rd April which claimed that forty-five to fifty 
planes had been destroyed or damaged over Tokyo the previous day.19 Despite 
reports that raids caused only slight damage,20 other news items gave some indication 
of the damage that was being inflicted on Japan by the continual bombing. 21 A 
13 See Japanese Overseas Service in Gennan and in Japanese for Australia and the South Pacific, 20th 
February 1945, and Japanese Overseas Service in Japanese for Australia and the South Pacific and in 
Gennan, 21st February 1945, 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Numbers 2045, 21st February 1945 and 2046, 22nd February 
1945 
14 Iwojima yUshi 
15 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 183 
16 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 24th February 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2049, 25th February 1945 
17 Japanese for the Japanese Empire, 13th March 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2065, 14th March 1945 
18 unj6 yori m6baku 
19 Japanese European Service in Italian, 3m April 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2087, 4th April 1945 
20 For example see Japanese Overseas Service in Gemlan, 4th April 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2088, 5th April 1945 
21 These included reports that all Japanese express train services would be halted, ~resumably due to 
damaged track and a shortage of fuel and rolling stock, and that rice and wheat pnces woul~ have to 
be adjusted. It can be asswued that the price adjustment would have been upwards ~wmg to a 
shortage of supplies, as good news of any food surplus would have been reported e~1enslvc1y as an 
example of Japanese efficiency 
Japanese Overseas Service in English, 19th and 24th March 1945 
R R ('. Summary of World Broadcasts, Numbers 2072 and 2077, 20th and 25th March 1945 
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broadcast to Italy reported that a supplementary budget was to be drawn up for repairs 
to air raid damage,22 an indication of the extensive damage being caused by the Allied 
raids. 
American bombing of Okinawa was regularly reported in overseas programmes. 
Radio Tokyo reported that Okinawan civilians were fighting alongside Japanese 
troops23 and that the mounting American losses being inflicted by the combined force 
showed that "an enemy landing on Japan would have as little success as his bombing 
attacks.,,24 The news that Okinawa had finally fallen25 was not broadcast directly in 
overseas transmissions. However, over the next few days, the focus of broadcasts 
shifted to developments elsewhere, as was usual when a battle had been lost. A 
commentary declared that this blow had renewed the confidence of the "hundred 
million,,26 and reminded the United States that it could not ignore its own losses in the 
Okinawan campaign. 27 
Rumours of Hitler's suicide prompted a defiant response from Radio Tokyo. A report 
on I st May declared that Japan would be unaffected by it, as she had long been 
preparing for the worst in Europe.28 A day later it claimed that the unconfirmed 
German surrender was because Hitler had failed to bring about the solidarity of all the 
peoples of Europe for aNew Order. This was compared to the Asian solidarity 
achleved by Japan?9 The predominant theme in Japanese broadcasts about the end of 
the war in Europe was that although it left Japan with no ally in Europe, Japan would 
22 Italian for Europe, 22nd March 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 2075, 23rd March 1945 
23 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 19th May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2133, 20th May 1945 
~4 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 13th May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2127, 14th May 1945 
25 This was reported in an "Emergency Announcement" on 23rd JWle which stated that United States 
planes were only one hour from Kyushu. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 254 . 
26 The number of citizens in Japan. They were to figl1t any invader hand-to-hand until the last 
person, as the Japanese troops on many oftlle Pacific islands had done. 
27 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 26th JWle 1945 
B.B.e.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2171, 27th June 1945 
28 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 1st May 1945, 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2115, 2nd May 1945 
29 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian, 2nd May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2116, yd May 1945 
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succeed in creating a New Order in Asia; "Evil may temporarily prevail but it cannot 
completely destroy us. ,,30 
The political events of 1944-5 also prompted reponses by Radio Tokyo. Kitayama 
claims that its response to the Yalta Conference is unclear, but that from headlines in 
the Japanese press it would seem that broadcasts would have accused Britain and 
America of flirting with Communism in order to end the war.31 Although the 
conference did not conclude in any precise arrangements for post-war Europe, it is 
true that Stalin succeeded in side-stepping Churchill's proposal for early and free 
elections in Poland.32 He used Roosevelt to assist him in forcing Chiang to agree to 
the continued "independence" of Communist Outer Mongolia, 33 a Russian share in the 
both the Manchurian railways, and in Port Arthur, a Russian naval base in South 
Manchuria. 34 
The B.B.C. 's Summary of World Broadcasts records several overseas broadcasts by 
the Japanese which dealt with the Yalta Conference. Broadcasts based on press 
reports certainly accused Britain and America of trying to cover over their own 
withdrawal from the European political scene in deference to the Soviets35 and 
described the outcome of the conference as proof of British and American humiliation 
by the U. S. S.R. 36 However, commentaries broadcast to Germany also described the 
plan to complete the European war by the end of September 1945 as optimistic and 
arrogant. 37 
The resignation of the Koiso-Yonai cabinet on 4th April and the formation of a new 
cabinet under Admiral Suzuki Kantaro were discussed little on Japanese overseas 
radio. Tokyo reported that the new cabinet would meet any day, at any time of the 
30 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian. 5th May 1945, 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 2119, 6th May 1945 
31 Kitayama: Haiboku e no A1ichi pp 177-8 
32 Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total War p 369 
33 It was then to be virtually dependent on the U.S.S.R. 
34 Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard, Total JV ar p 70 
35 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian, 14th February 1943 
B.B.C.: Summarv of World Broadcasts, Number 2039, 15th February 1945 
36 Japanese Ove~eas Service in Italian for Europe, 13th February 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2038, 14th February 1945 
31 Japanese Overseas Service in Gennan, 14th February 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 2039, 15th February 1945 
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day or night (unlike the previous cabinet, which had met on Tuesdays and Fridays).38 
In addition, a commentary to Italy stated the change of cabinet was due to a need for a 
more vigorous cabinet, just as the Koiso-Y onai cabinet had been more energetic than 
the T ojo cabinet. 39 
The death of Roosevelt prompted an unusually sympathetic response from Radio 
Tokyo. Prime Minister Suzuki sent his condolences to the American nation and this 
was reported in international broadcasts. It was, however, omitted from domestic 
broadcasts, as it was considered that it would be seen as a move towards peace.4O A 
commentary to Germany stated that Roosevelt was responsible for the war, but 
described him as a great politician and a huge loss to the United States.41 
Broadcasts from the Provisional Government of Free India in Singapore were less 
generous. In November 1944, Subhas Chandra Bose, on a visit to Tokyo, had been 
told by Rash Bihari Bose, leader of the IlL. in Japan, that he "should not increase our 
number of enemies.,,42 This was a reference to the strongly anti-American 
propaganda, which was frequently broadcast from the I.I.L. 's Rangoon station. 
Despite this "last advice,,,43 however, the station continued in its propaganda campaign 
against the United States. On 13 th April 1945, a commentary entitled ''Roosevelt, the 
Arch-Enemy of the Asiatic Peoples" claimed that it was impossible to feel sympathy 
over his death as he had entered the war because of his own greed and ideas of world 
domination. His death was, the commentator concluded, a relief 44 This was a strange 
propaganda line for Bose to take, as Roosevelt was, in fact, well known for presenting 
anti-colonial views. 
Radio Tokyo's response to the Potsdam Conference was to ridicule the conditions in 
which the conference took place. It compared the conference to the earlier San 
38 Japanese Overseas Service in Japanese for China, 10th April 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Nwnber 2094, 11th April 1945 
39 Japanese European Service in Italian, 9th April 1945, 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Nwnber 2093, 10th April 1945 
40 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 214 
41 German for Europe, 13th April 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Nwnber 2097, 14th April 1945 
42 A.M. Nair: An Indian Freedom Fighter in Japan p 258 
43 A.M. Nair: An Indian Freedom Fighter in Japan p 258 
.HProvisional Government of Free India (Shonan) in English for India, 13th April 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 2097, 14th April 1945 
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Francisco conference, which had established the conditions for establishing the United 
Nations to replace the League of Nations. It claimed that there were more press 
representatives than diplomatic delegates at San Francisco, which is possible since the 
conference had included large numbers of countries, and security had been low key. 
On the other hand, Radio Tokyo reported that the Potsdam Conference dealt with real 
business and Stalin "held all the cards" so security was tighter and the media were 
absent. However, it concluded no security curtain was "thick enough to disguise 
American and British anxiety.'.45 This was a reasonable assumption for Japanese 
propagandists to make, for having seen the Soviets take control of much of East and 
Central Europe following the defeat of Germany, Britain and America were naturally 
anxious about the consequences of such action. 
Japanese-controlled stations capitalised on Churchill's election loss, describing it as an 
indication of war weariness in Britain. They claimed that the wartime election was an 
indication of the major domestic problems Churchill had been facing. 46 In response to 
the issue of the Potsdam Declaration, itself, the C.I.B. immediately placed a complete 
ban on reports about the ultimatum within Japan. For overseas listeners the first 
response of the Japanese was transmitted in Morse code by Domei and declared that: 
It is authoritatively learned that Japan will ignore the joint proclamation 
. . . calling upon the Japanese to announce their unconditional 
surrender. Japanese will prosecute the war of GEA to the better end, 
in accordance with her fixed policy ... 47 
An early evening broadcast on the Greater East Asia broadcasting network dismissed 
the declaration as a British and American attempt to save face having failed to draw 
the Soviet Union into the Pacific War during the conference. It preceded a report of 
the terms of the declaration with the following comment: 
The American diplomacy that attempted to draw Stalin into the 
Japanese issue at Potsdam has failed . .. The Chungking Regime, 
which has no actual power, was allowed to participate, a joint 
declaration was issued ... in order to patch up the situation. 48 
45 Tokyo in English, 27ili July 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 2202, 28ili July 1945 
46 See Singapore in English for Australia, 28ili July 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 2203, 29ili July 1945 
41 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afichi p 268 ili 
48 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Dai~v Reports of Foreign Radio Broadcasts, 28 July 1945, P 
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Although the situation for Japan became increasingly desperate in 1944-5 and finding 
"Good News" to report increasingly difficult, Radio Tokyo succeeded in presenting 
the listener with broadcasts from festivals and celebrations. 1 st August 1944 marked 
the first anniversary of Burmese independence under Ba Maw and it was celebrated 
over five days in Japan and in Japanese broadcasts.49 The first anniversary of 
Philippine independence on 14th October 1944 was similarly celebrated. 50 Similar 
radio exchanges were broadcast to Germany and Italy to celebrate the anniversary of 
the Tripartite Pact on 27th September/I and to countries of Greater East Asia. 52 
However, as 1945 progressed this type of programme virtually disappeared from the 
schedules, and the reporting of "good news" was restricted to reporting of internal 
Japanese celebrations, such as Navy Day,53 or news ofa good harvest. 54 
Changes in the Structure of N.H.K. Broadcasting 
The establishment of the Koiso-Y onai cabinet on 22nd July 1944 coincided with a 
change in the structure of N.H.K. This was initiated to ensure that N.H.K. worked 
more closely with the War Ministry, and to minimise the risk of radio transmissions 
being used for navigation purposes by American aircraft. 55 A new Director-General's 
Office56 was established which included a new Department of Defence,57 and a 
Wartime Radio Research Institute. 58 In addition, the International Bureau59 became 
the Overseas Bureau60 and the Southern Regions Office,61 which had been established 
to handle broadcasting to the occupied islands of the South Pacific, was abolished as 
49 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 79 
50 A major part of the celebrations was an exchange of radio messages between Prime Minister Koiso, 
Philippine President Laurel, Prime Minister Chang of Manchuria, Cheng Kung-Po, vice-president of 
Occupied China, and Prime Minister Kovit Abhai Wongse of Thailand 
Japanese Overseas Service in German, 14th October 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 1916, 15th October 1944 
51 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 96 
52 One such broadcast was to celebrate the third anniversary of the Thai Defence Treaty on 21 st 
December 1944. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 141-2 
53 Tokyo in German, 27th May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 214-1, 28th May 1945 
54 See Tokyo in Italian, 28th May 1945, 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts No. 214-2, 29th May 1945 
55 It was common for all the belligerent nations to close down radio transmissions during air raids, so 
that the raiding aeroplanes could not use the signal entitted by the transntitters for navigation 
56 Kaich6-satsu 
57 B6ei-bu 
58 Senji Dempa Kenkyll-sho 
59 Kokusai-kvoku 
60 Kaigai-Ay~ku 
61 NamoO-satsu 
the situation in the region became increasingly difficult for Japan. Its remammg 
business was incorporated into the Private Secretary's Section62 of the Director-
General's Office. 63 In addition it was decided to run-down certain transmitters in 
anticipation of Allied air raids, as bombers may have used the signal as aids to 
navigation. Hence from 1 st August 1944 the output of the smaller relay stations was 
reduced. 
On 5th November the Overseas Bureau was once more enlarged, to its largest wartime 
operating size. Broadcasts for the Southern Regions were removed from Transmission 
Thirteen, which broadcast to Thailand, Vietnam and Burma only, and a new 
Transmission Fourteen was established broadcasting to the Philippines and 
Indonesia.64 At its largest, then, Radio Tokyo broadcast fifteen transmissions, for 
thirty-three hours and five minutes a day, in twenty languages. 65 The complete Radio 
Tokyo schedule was as follows: 66 
Transmission 1 Western United States 00.00-03.40 (3 hours 40) 
Transmission 2 India 00.00-01.45 (1 hour 45) 
Transmission 3 Middle East 02.00-03.40 (1 hour 40) 
Transmission 4 Europe 04.00-07.00 (3 hours) 
Transmission 5 Eastern United States 07.15-09.15 (2 hours) 
Transmission 6 South America 09.30-10.30 (1 hour) 
Transmission 7 India and Middle East 10.45-11.45 (1 hour) 
Transmission 8 Western United States 12.00-17.00 (5 hours) 
Transmission 9 Europe 17.15-20.00 (2 hours 45) 
Transmission 10 Australia and the Central 17.15-19.15 (2 hours) 
& Western Pacific 
Transmission 11 China 19.30-21.15 (1 hour 45) 
Transmission 12 South America 20.15-21.15 (1 hour 30) 
Transmission 13 Thailand, Vietnam, Burma 21.30-23.40 (2 hours 10) 
Transmission 14 Philippines and Indonesia 21.30-23.40 (2 hours 10) 
Transmission 15 Eastern United States 22.00-23.40 (1 hour 40) 
At the same time as the expansion of overseas radio, the East Asia Relay Broadcasts 
were also re-organised, following the destruction of several transmitters in an air raid. 
62 Hisho-ka 
63 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 74-5 
64 The fonner Transmission Fourteen, to the Eastern United States, became Transmission Fifteen, a 
repeat of the Transmission Eight broadcast to the Western United States. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 120-121 
65 This was fewer languages than previously, as Urdu became treated as a dialect of Hindi, and items 
in Gujarati, Turkish and Dutch were dropped from the schedules completely. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 117-118 
66 k' it~v~ma: Haiboku e no Afichi p 118 
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The short-wave network broadcast from S.30am to IO.20pm and relays were made via 
Shanghai, Hsinking, Peking, and Taipei. 67 On Sth October the network was separated 
from overseas broadcasting and renamed East Asia Broadcasting. It established 
transmissions to twelve regions, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Central China, Northern 
China, Singapore, Malaysia, Java, Burma, Celebes, Vietnam and Thailand 
broadcasting for sixteen-and-a-halfhours daily. The re-organisation included a plan to 
strengthen Japanese news broadcasting to Asia, and the daily number of Japanese 
news broadcasts was increased to nine. 68 The network included some Japanese 
domestic broadcasts, but the re-organisation sought to create a new "Asian section" of 
overseas broadcasting. Hence it attempted to create local programmes for East Asia, 
and used programmes from domestic and international broadcasts.69 
The expansion of broadcasting activity in both overseas and East Asia broadcasting, 
and the collapse of the Pulao station in August 1944 meant that the larger stations in 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere became increasingly important in 
maintaining the level of overseas broadcasting. The Korean Broadcasting 
Corporation's Chongjin station broadcast regularly on medium-wave for Russia and 
the Taiwanese Broadcasting Corporation's Taipei station broadcast to much of South-
east Asia, Australia and North America. It also relayed Radio Tokyo broadcasts for 
Burma, India and overseas Chinese. Radio Amoy broadcast to Nationalist and 
overseas Chinese and the Hainan station broadcast for China and the Pacific. Radio 
Hsinking's "Voice of Manchuria" broadcast for America, China, Europe and Russia. 
The Kalgan station of the (Inner) Mongolian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast to 
China, Mongolia and Chungking. It also co-operated with Radio Hsinking to produce 
anti-Communist broadcasts. 70 
Within China there were two broadcasting corporations, one based in Peking and one 
in Shanghai. The former broadcast on short-wave for Chungking and on medium-
wave for the Chinese Communist stronghold of Yenan and the Shanghai station 
67 Kitayama: fIaiboku e no Afichi p 121 
68 At 06.30,08.00,09.00, 12.00, 15.00, 17.00, 19.00,21.00 and 22.00 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no A,fichi p 121 
69 Kitayama: fIaiboku e no Alichi p 121 
70 Kitavama: Haiboku e no .Hichi pp 122-3 
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broadcast for Chungking, "Chinese in a third country" and Australia. In addition a 
station in Canton operated by staff from Taiwan also broadcast to Chungking.71 
Radio Shonan72 was the most important of the Greater East Asian stations, and 
Japan's most important overseas station after Tokyo. In addition to the Provisional 
Government of Free India broadcasts, it broadcast Japanese short-wave programmes 
to India, Australia and enemy troops in the South Pacific. In 1944 it expanded its 
operation and began broadcasts to Chungking (lsi: January), Europe (lsi: February) and 
the Middle East (lsi: March). It also relayed Radio Tokyo's European transmission in 
order to boost the signal.. 73 
The Saigon station broadcast to Australia and India and Radio Bangkok also 
broadcast to India, although its transmitter output was low. A further station in the 
radio war on India was Rangoon, which broadcast programmes for India, along with 
those for Chungking. Like Radio Shonan, Indians operated part of Radio Rangoon's 
schedule. In this case the operator was the I.I.L. not the Provisional Government, but 
in reality this station, too, came under the control of Bose. In addition, Kitayama 
claims that there was a ''Free Ceylon" station operated over Radio Rangoon, although 
details regarding it are unclear. 74 
Radio Manila broadcast over two transmitters to North America, and from 8th March 
1944 to enemy troops in the Western Pacific.75 In Indonesia, the Jakarta station76 
broadcast on short-wave to India, North America and Australia77 and the station in 
Makassar broadcast to Australia after December 1943.78 
Even as late as November 1944 the scale of the Japanese short-wave broadcasting 
operation throughout the occupied territories was enonnous. However, as some 
71 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 123 
72 Singapore 
73 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 123-4 
74 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 124 
75 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 123 . ' 
76 It was this station which was noted as Radio Batavia by British mom tors, and which broadcast the 
Australian prisoner messages in the Australian Home News Hour 
77 Kitayama: lfaiboku e no ~Hichi p 124 
78 Kitavama: lfaiboku e no Alichi p 124 
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broadcast by Japanese-controlled stations each day.79 
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Map 3: Japanese-controlled Short-wave radio stations 
79 Figure 7 overleaf is a summary their operations. There is also a table showing the number of 
stations broadcasting to each of the target regions in Appendix 2. p 259 
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Station Languages Target audience 
Radio Chongjin Russian Oriental U.S.S.R. (Korean Broadcasting Corp.) 
South-west China, French Indo-
Radio Taipei English, Cantonese, China, Vietnam, Eastern India, 
(Taiwan Broadcasting Corp.) Vietnamese, Fukien & Beijing Northern Australia, East Pacific. 
lOkw dialects of Chinese Relays of Radio Tokyo broadcasts 
for Bunna, India, overseas 
Chinese 
Radio Amoy Mandarin Chungking, overseas Chinese lOOkw 
Voice of Manchuria Western United States & Canada, 
Radio Hsinking 
English, Chinese, German, China, Europe, U.S.S.R. (Manchuria Telephone & Co-operation with Radio Kalgan 
Telegraph Co.) English, Russian in anti-Communist broadcasting. 
20kw 
Radio Kalgan Western & Northern China, Outer 
(Mongolian Broadcasting Chinese, Mongolian Mongolia, Chungking Corp.) Co-operate with Radio Hsinking in 
lOkw anti-Communist broadcasting 
Radio Peking 
(North China Broadcasting Chinese Chungking, Yenan Corp.) 
lOkw 
Radio Shanghai Chungking, "Chinese in a third (China Broadcasting Corp.) Chinese, English 
country," Australia 
lOkw,lkw 
Radio Canton Chinese Chungking (Taiwan Broadcasting Corp.) 
India, Australia, Enemy troops, 
Hindi, Tamil, English, Chungking, Europe, Middle East, 
Radio Shonan Mandarin, French, Arabic, Provisional Government of Free 
50kw Persian, Turkish India broadcasts 
Relays of Radio Tokyo European 
transmission 
Radio Saigon English, Hindi, Punjabi, Australia, India 
12kw Tamil 
Radio Bangkok Various Indian languages India 
5kw,2kw 
Radio Rangoon 
India, Chungking 
Hindi, Bengali, Chinese I.L.L. broadcasts lOkw 
"Radio Free Ceylon" 
Radio Manila English 
North America, Enemy troops in 
25kw,lOkw Western Pacific 
Radio Batavia (Jakarta) English India, North America, Australia 
lOkw 
Radio Makasar English Australia 
lOkw 
Figure 7: Short-wave broadcasting operations of the 
Japanese-controlled stations in Greater East Asia. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no lvlichi pp 122-124 
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Less tnan illl~C m0ui.:~~~ ~~(;: '~~: ::~::~ ~xpansion of short-wave broadcasting, however, 
the first reduction in overseas broadcasting was made as the deteriorating situation in 
both Japan and the Co-Prosperity Sphere made the over-stretched schedule impossible 
to maintain. On 1st February 1945, thirty minutes of Japanese language broadcasting 
was cut from Tokyo's East Asian broadcast. The reason was stated frankly: 
... We will have to cease (the transmission) ... on account of the 
difficulties in relays we are now experiencing due to local 
circumstances caused by developments in the war situation. 80 
At the same time as this reduction was effected the Japanese broadcasting authorities 
began to plan for emergency broadcasting should N.H.K. 's Uchisaiwaicho site be 
damaged or destroyed during an air raid. It was considered essential that the overseas 
schedule be maintained with as little disruption as possible. A studio was constructed 
under the Dai-Ichi Life Insurance building in Tokyo, and plans were drawn up 
immediately to dispatch two members of staff from the American Department and one 
from the Performance Department to the underground studio should the station be 
bombed out. They were to continue the transmissions with news and records until 
others could arrive. In such an emergency, it was agreed, Transmission Fourteen81 
could be omitted from the schedules. It was specified that broadcasts to the Western 
United States would consist of the "German Hour," "Humanity Calls" and "Postman 
Calls," while the "Zero Hour" programme, broadcast to Australia, and the Pacific 
would continue. 82 
On 4th May 1945, the day on which the Koiso-Yonai cabinet resigned, there was the 
first drastic reduction in the output of overseas broadcasts from Tokyo, which reduced 
the total daily usage time of the transmitters by eleven hours. 83 Under the plan, 
broadcasts to the United States and Greater East Asia were considered the most 
important. Hence, even before the defeat of Germany was announced, the early 
morning transmission for Europe84 was dropped from the schedules and an additional 
transmission for China was created, increasing the total broadcasting time to 
80 Genka Taa hasa jikoku-chu 22.30-23.00 (wa) ... senkyokyu no shinten ni tomonafu genchi 
(Nampa) no jija ni yori hotondo nyUchukei konnan naru ji tsuja no tame hitotoki kyUshi. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no lvfichi p 168 
81 For the Philippines and Indonesia 
82 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Alichi p 169 
83 Kitayama: Haiboku e no AJichi p 211 
84 Transmission Four, 04.00-07.00 
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CnungKmg UJ Io:n.y-llv~ l11111U\.\;;;;). :.. ':le former transmission to India and the Middle 
East85 was also dropped. In addition, the separate transmissions for the Eastern and 
Western United States86 were amalgamated forming two transmissions to North 
America.87 The new transmissions included the "Humanity Calls" and "Postman Calls" 
programmes, and were an hour longer than the previous transmission in order to 
include a new "huge propaganda projectile" in English and Japanese. 88 Hence, the 
new transmission schedule was as follows: 89 
Transmission 1 North America 00.00-02.00 (2 hours) 
Transmission 2 Middle East 02.15-04.15 (2 hours) 
Transmission 3 South America 05.00-09.00 (4 hours) 
Transmission 4 Chungking 09.30-10.30 (1 hour) 
Transmission 5 Philippines 09.30-10.30 (1 hour) 
Transmission 6 North America 11.00-17.00 (6 hours) 
Transmission 7 Europe 15.15-19.30 (4 hours 15) 
Transmission 8 Philippines and 17.30-19.30 (2 hours) 
Australia 
Transmission 9 South America 19.45-21.15 (1 hour 30) 
Transmission 10 Chungking 19.45-21.15 (1 hour 30) 
Transmission 11 India 21.30-23.45 (2 hours 15) 
Transmission 12 Southern Regions 21.30-00.00 (2 hours 30) 
An air raid on 21 st May 1945 destroyed the factory which supplied vacuum tubes for 
N.H.K. 's short-wave transmitters. The number of stockpiled tubes was sufficient to 
continue the overseas schedule begun at the beginning of May for two months but it 
was agreed that a further reduction in transmission time would extend this to three 
85 Transmission Seven, 10.45-11.45 
86 Transmission One, 00.00-03.40, Transmission Five, 07.15-09.15, Transmission Eight, 12.00-17.00 
and Transmission Fifteen, 22.00-23.40 
87 Transmission One, 00.00-02.00 and Transmission Six, 11.00-17.00 
88 senden no kyo dan 
The contents of the "huge propaganda projectile" were as follows: 
16.00 News in English 
16.15 Commentary in English (pre-recorded) Sunday: Saisho Fumi 
Monday: Morino Masayoshi 
Tuesday: Shiba Kimpei 
Wednesday: Mitsushio Hideo 
Thursday: Yamate Hiroshi 
Friday: Moriwake Kenichi 
Saturday: Shimauchi Toshio 
16.15 Music 
16.30 Commentary in Japanese 
16.40 Sunday/Saturday Editorial 
Monday/Thursday News on Parade (pre-recorded) 
TuesdaylFriday International Affairs (pre-recorded) 
Wednesday Tokyo Periscope (pre-recorded) 
16.50 News in English 
17.00 National Anthem and c1osedown. 
89 Kitayama: ffaiboku e no Michi p 211 
momms. 
17~ 
:L ij~ i~~ii~:i~c~,: ':;: ..... ~;:;;;~~~:''ltic, reducing the daily programming time by 
eleven hours forty-five minutes. The number of transmissions was reduced to nine as 
the former Transmissions Three, Four and Five91 were dropped. In addition, most of 
the remaining transmissions, were reduced significantly, although the "Zero Hour," 
'lIumanity Calls," ''Postman Calls" and "Free India" broadcasts continued as before in 
their respective transmissions.92 Although this reduction in transmission time was to 
prolong the life of the supply of vacuum tubes there does not seem to be any indication 
as to what, if any, plans existed for short-wave broadcasting after the three month 
period had elapsed. It is possible that the Japanese authorities hoped that a new 
factory to produce tubes could be established in that interval. However, it could also 
have been that by the end of May 1945 the unofficial view of Japan's decision-makers 
was that Japan could not prolong the war effort for significantly more than three 
months. Whatever the reasoning, this remained N.H.K. 's overseas broadcasting 
schedule in the latter months of the war: 93 
Transmission 1 North America 00.00-01.30 (- 30 minutes) 
Transmission 2 Middle East 11.30-12.30 (- 1 hour) 
Transmission 3 North America 12.45-17.00 (- 1 hour 45) 
Transmission 4 Europe 17.15-19.45 (- 1 hour 45) 
Transmission 5 Philippines and Australia 18.00-19.30 (- 30 minutes) 
Transmission 6 Chungking 19.45-21.15 (unchanged) 
Transmission 7 South America 20.00-21.15 (- 15 minutes) 
Transmission 8 India 2l.30-23.45 (unchanged) 
Transmission 9 Southern Regions 21.30-00.00 (unchanged) 
Re-evaluation of Propaganda Strategies for Overseas Radio 
Throughout the final year of the war, the propaganda strategies of the Japanese 
government were re-evaluated and altered as the war situation developed. On 
becoming Prime Minister in July 1944, General Koiso decided to create a new body to 
guide policy and public opinion in order to increase Prime Ministerial control, which 
was not sufficiently strong in the Cabinet Liaison Committee. The resulting Supreme 
War Guidance Committee consisted of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, the Army and the Navy, and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff. It met with 
the Emperor for the first time on 15th August 1944. The policy decisions agreed at the 
meeting were wide-ranging and included policies for the guidance of public opinion 
90 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afiehi p 235 
91 For South America, Chungking and the Philippines respectively 
92 See Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afiehi pp 235-6 
93 Kitayama: Ifaiboku e no .\fiehi p 236 
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within Japan and policies for propaganda to be used. in the occupied territories and 
overseas. As part of the latter, it was agreed that future plans for the independence of 
Indonesia should be promoted, along with propaganda to encourage the Soviet Union 
to remain neutral in the Pacific War. 94 A principle clause of the agreement was the 
"Strategy for Propaganda Towards the Enemy,,95 which stated that it was important to 
create divisions between the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China whilst 
providing "clarification of the war aims. ~,96 
In August 1944, the "Atrocity Campaign" re-surfaced in both Japanese domestic and 
overseas propaganda. It began with a report in the Asahi Shim bun that American 
soldiers on the front line in the South Pacific had paraded the head of a decapitated 
Japanese general in front of Japanese as part of a victory celebration.97 The campaign, 
entitled "American Barbarity," spread to broadcasting and on 6th Radio Tokyo 
reported that Japanese were indignant over a report from Zurich that Roosevelt had 
accepted a gift of a paper knife made from the bone of a Japanese soldier.98 A further 
broadcast to Germany included a commentary, "American Cannibalism" which 
accused Americans of keeping Japanese skulls and bones as souvenirs, and reported 
that American children played with the skulls as toYS.99 A later White House report 
that Roosevelt had returned the paper knife to Congressman Francis Walter, who had 
given it to hi~ was cited as proof that the Japanese accusations were true. lOO 
A new twist to the atrocity propaganda was its denunciation of American behaviour as 
anti-Christian. After reports about soldiers keeping bones as trophies appeared in the 
United States, the Catholic Church therelOl denounced it and this was taken up by 
propagandists in Japan. Japanese Catholic Archbishop Doi was reported as calling for 
94 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 81 
95 Taiteki Senden Baryaku 
96 sensa mokuteki no semmei 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 81-2 
97 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 83 
98 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 6th August 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1847, 7th August 1944 
99 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 9th August 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1850, 10th August 1944 
100 Japanese Overseas Service in German. 11 th August 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1852, 12th August 1944 
101 The report above. regarding bones being kept as souvenirs and children playing with skulls. was 
reported as having appeared in the journal of the Catholic Diocese of Missouri. and therefore true. 
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baroarism LV ue plifii;)i-l~G. "~~ i~a~~G li. ~kyo told Americans that the culprits would not 
escape God's judgement, warning that the decay of Europe began when European 
civilisation denied reverence to Christianity.103 It continued, "You Americans have 
sold your soul for materialism", but there was no explanation as to how the mutilation 
of Japanese bodies constituted "materialism.,,104 The "Atrocity Campaign" continued 
and in October the ''Real Values of Americanism" were discussed. A broadcast 
entitled "The Civilised Savages" claimed that the educated civilisation of Americans 
was only a veneer covering savage instincts. 105 The savage character of Americans 
was attributed to their impure blood, and this became a further slogan of the campaign. 
In fact a broadcast on the effect on Japan of an American victory cited the dilution and 
eventual obliteration of Japanese blood as one of the worst occurrences. 106 
A meeting of the Supreme War Guidance Committee on 5th October 1944 produced an 
agreement for a ''Policy on Crushing the Enemy's Ideological Strategy,,107 which 
included a three point plan to discredit the Allies' strategic medium-wave Japanese 
broadcasts from Hawaii, and Saipan which had begun in February 1944. 108 It sought 
to explain the war aims of Japan, whilst discrediting those of Britain and America, and 
warnings about the American broadcasts were published in Japanese newspapers. 109 
However, following the boosting of the Saipan transmitter to 1,OOOkc on 31 st 
December 1944, the Supreme War Guidance Committee decided, instead, to jam the 
American transmitter's signal. 110 This policy was extended to American medium-wave 
broadcasts from Iwojima, which began on 23rd February 1945. 111 
102 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 6th August 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, Number 1847, 7th August 1944 
103 As this broadcast was to Germany, it can probably be assumed that Nazi Germany was not 
included in the "decayed Europe" described by the commentator, but that it was a warning as to the 
moral standards of the Allied troops now in mainland Europe. 
104 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 9th August 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, Number 1850, 10th August 1944 
105 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 87 
106 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 88 
107 Teki-kawa Shiso Boryaku Hasai Hosaku 
lOS Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 146 
The committee was particularly concerned about these medium-wave broadcasts. Previous short-
wave American broadcasts were less threatening, as short-wave receivers were banned in Japan. 
However, the Japanese government had encouraged medium-wave listening to facilitate its own 
control of the population. Hence, American medium-wave broadcasts were potentially threatening. 
109 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 146 
110 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afichi p 148 
III Initially the short transmission was ignored as it clashed with a popular progranmle on the Greater 
East Asia network (Kitayama: Haiboku e no lYfichi p 184-) but it was jammed when length of the 
transmission was increased. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Alichi p 190 
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The "Policy Outline of Propaganda towards the Enemy,,,1l2 produced at the same time 
, 
specified the topics to be promoted in broadcasts to different enemies. Generally they 
dealt with the probable post-war situation in each country. According to Kitayama, 
broadcasts to the United States claimed that the reign of Roosevelt indicated clearly 
the "emptiness of any post-war management," and those to Europe reported British 
unease over American policy towards her after the war. 113 Radio Tokyo claimed that 
America's policy was to take over the governing of British colonial territories after the 
war, and sought to scare the British government into opposing the United States. A 
broadcast about the American "invasion" of India stated that American soldiers were 
paid three times as much as those from Britain, and claimed that they "overstepped the 
conventions observed by the British for many years ... (taking) ... half-caste girls into 
the best restaurants. ,,114 Broadcasts to neutral countries had a similar theme, and their 
inhabitants were warned that they would be caught between a power struggle between 
Britain and America and would be sacrificed by both. 115 
In February 1945, Radio Tokyo claimed in the "Humanity Calls" and "Postman Calls" 
programmes that what prisoners-of-war feared most was bloodshed. The aim was to 
heighten American fears of a protracted and bloody struggle. However, prisoner 
letters, which also continued to be broadcast, tended to undermine this. The prisoner 
letters were in the same kind of cheerful language as in earlier years. However, the 
principal difference in 1945 was that as American troops pushed northwards in the 
Pacific, prisoner-of-war camps in the Philippines and Indonesia were closed and the 
prisoners 'were moved to camps on the Japanese mainland. This meant that the 
gathering and recording of prisoner letters for transmission over Radio Tokyo was 
much simpler than previously, and there was now an opportunity to broadcast larger 
numbers of letters. Increasing numbers of letters using cheerful language undermined 
the claim that American prisoners were in fear of a long and bloody war. A letter from 
Staff Sergeant Vigil Maye is typical of the kind of letter, which continued to be 
broadcast: 116 
112 Tai-teki Senden H6saku Y6k6 
113 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Nfichi p 104 
114 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 5th October 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of TVorld Broadcasts, Number 1907, 6th October 1944 
115 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afichi p 104 ... 
116 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Lists and Reports Pertaining to, lmerIcan Pnsoners of H ar 
19./.1-5 24th January 1945 , . 
Dear Mother and Dad. I'm sending just a few words to say that I am 
well. The weather here is very much the same as at home and I feel 
much better than when I was in the Philippines. Please send my regards 
to all my family, have them write short messages, send pictures, and if 
possible another wonderful package like last year. Give my my (sic) 
best regards to all my friends. Do not worry, say 'hello' to Vivian, 
Frank Patterman, and all the Letterman gang. My prayers and hearts 
(sic) love to you always, from your son. 
The "Zacharias" Broadcasts 
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On 9th May1l7 monitors at Atagoyama picked up a broadcast by Captain Ellis 
Zacharias of the United States' Navy, which included a statement by President 
Truman. l1S It reminded Japan of the surrender of Germany, which speIt "Japan's 
inevitable defeat" but reassured listeners that this referred "only (to) Japan's military 
defeat. ,,119 The broadcast by Zacharias was the first of a significant series of fourteen 
recorded in Japanese and English and transmitted to Japan. In this first broadcast, 
Zacharias stated clearly why he had been chosen as America's official spokesman. He 
~ad spent considerable time in Japan, and had developed relationships with many high-
ranking Japanese officials, including former assistant Prime Minister, Admiral Yonai, 
and Nomura and Kurusu, the Japanese Ambassadors to Washington at the outbreak of 
war. He had been active in many diplomatic exchanges with Japan and mentioned 
many of his Japanese contacts in this first broadcast, in order to establish his credibility 
with the Japanese authorities, expressing confidence that "those ... who have known 
me personally will trust me. ,,120 He followed his own introduction with a statement by 
President Truman stressing ''Unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination 
or enslavement of the Japanese people.,,121 He concluded the broadcast by offering his 
listeners a choice; "Your future lies in your own hands. You can choose between a 
wasteful, unclean death for many of your forces, or a peace with honor.,,122 
117 It was broadcast soon after the surrender of Gennany was announced which was 8th May in the 
United States. 
N.H.K.: 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting p 119 
118 Kitayama claims that according to N.H.K.: H6s6 Goja Nen-shi it was monitored on 8th, but that 
records show that it was broadcast at 8pm on 8th in the United States, which was 9th in Japan. 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 230 . 
119 Zacharias. Ellis M.: Secret Afissions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer Appendix. p 399 
120 Zacharias: Secret A fissions Appendix, p 400 
121 Zacharias: Secret Afissiol1s Appendix. p 401 
122 Zacharias: Secret Afissions Appendix, p ~() 1 
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The second broadcast followed four days later. It repeated President Truman's 
statement, which was followed by a commentary pointing to criticism of the war's 
prosecution even within the Japanese High Command: 
It is ... clear to thinking Japanese that those who made the estimates 
three years ago and promised you quick victory over the United States 
are now trying to conceal the facts . . . . The shadows of . . . defeat are . 
. . evident in the communiques of your own High Command. 123 
The following broadcast followed a similar format and stressed that the United States' 
good treatment of prisoners-of-war contradicted the notion of extermination upon 
surrender, which was presented by the Japanese authorities. 124 
The fourth broadcast by Zacharias, on 27th May,125 did not repeat Truman's statement. 
It claimed that the Japanese people wanted peace, especially since their German ally 
had capitulated, but that Japanese leaders did not. It called on Japan to replace its 
leadership with leaders ''who have the best interest of Japan at heart [and will] 
repudiate these failures and embark on the only course which can save Japan.,,126 
The following day, the F.B.I.S. monitored a response to the broadcasts from Japan, 
noting that it believed the Japanese government had officially selected the person 
making the broadcast. This was the case. The three people chosen to make 
broadcasts were Oya Kusuro, Inagaki Kazuyoshi who had been involved in pre-war 
negotiations with the United States; and Inoue Isamu, the former editor of a Los 
Angeles newspaper. 127 The initial broadcast made no mention of the term 
''unconditional surrender," and was inserted into the schedule of Transmission 
Three. 128 The contents of this broadcast have not been established. However, Inoue's 
broadcast of 2nd June demanded clarification of the term ''unconditional surrender," 
and ended with the accusation that the call for Japanese surrender was because 
American soldiers in the Pacific wanted to go home. This lack of commitment was 
123 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, p 402 
124 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, pp 403-5 
125 26th May in the United States. Throughout this section I give the date in Japan, which is one ~Y 
later than in the United States. However, in his book Zacharias lists them as per the date III 
Washington. 
126 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, p 406 . 
127 Kitayama: "Shiisen to Taigai Hoso - Piisu Toku to Atoroshitizu" ["Overseas Broadcastmg and t~e 
End of the War - Peace Talks and Atrocities"] in Nfedia-shi KenkyU -lvfedia History, February 199). 
pp8-9 
12M For North America 
It was probably inserted in the 4.40pm commentary slot 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Ahehi p 244 
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compared to Japan and her allies in Greater East Asia which "wanted to join hands to 
build an international world structure which pressed on for world peace and human 
benefit." 129 It is probable that the theme of replies to Zacharias' broadcasts had not 
changed much in the period between the two, and that the earlier transmission had 
been similar in tone. The latter point of the Japanese reply was very similar to a point 
made in the 1943 East Asia Declaration. Much of the declaration dealt with Asian 
solidarity, but it too ended with talk of world peace. This was a reflection of the 
growing influence of moderate leaders in Japan. 130 
The fifth broadcast by Captain Zacharias was on 3rd June. It repeated the call for the 
Japanese people not to "follow leaders whose unbroken record of failure has ... 
brought their nation to the brink of disaster.,,131 It was followed by a further broadcast 
a week later, which sought to reassure people, that the unconditional surrender called 
for by Truman would mean only: 
The end of war . . . the termination of the influence of the military 
leaders ... provision for the return of soldiers and sailors ... [and] not 
the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.132 . 
The series of broadcasts continued on 17th when Zacharias reminded listeners of the 
good relations enjoyed by Japan and the United States in the pre-war period. He also 
sought to increase Japanese trust in him by mentioning his relationships with 
prominent Japanese, such as Rear Admiral Yokoyama Ichin), whom he had known in 
Washington. 133 
On 24th June Zacharias described the American victory In Okinawa, which he 
described as "a milestone in the Pacific War.,,134 On 1st July he stated that the 
equipment of the advancing American Army was superior to that of the Japanese 
Army, as Lieutenant General Kosuda Katsuzo, Head of Japan's Ordnance 
129 "sekai heiwa to jinrui no rieki no tame ni maishin suru kokusai kik6 0 k6chiku suru tame ni tagai 
ni te 0 musubitainoda" 
Kitayama: "Shiisen to Taigai Hoso - Piisu Toku to Atoroshitizu" p 9 . 
130 See lriye: Power and Culture pp 162-183 regarding the rising influence of moderate leaders In 
Japan. 
131 Zacharias: Secret AJissions Appendix, p 407 
13~ Zacharias: Secret .Afissions Appendix, p 410 
133 Zacharias: Secret Afissions Appendix, pp 410-12 
\3·1 Zacharias: Secret A fissions Appendix, p 412 
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Administration, had admitted in 1944,135 and concluded, "Time is running out for 
Japan.,,136 The broadcasts continued throughout July, appealing to Prime Minister 
Suzuki to make a wise decision for peace,137 and repeating the meaning behind 
''unconditional surrender.,,138 However, Japanese scheduled short-wave broadcasts 
continued to re-iterate that "The unconditional surrender slogan has no effect on 
Japan" whose citizens would "fight until we finally achieve victory.,,139 
Zacharias made his twelfth broadcast on 22nd July. In it he stated that there were two 
choices for the leaders of Japan: the virtual destruction of Japan followed by a dictated 
peace .. . [ or] unconditional surrender with its attendant benefits as laid down by the 
Atlantic Charter," which would bring renewed "peace and prosperity for Japan.,,140 
Scheduled broadcasts continued to deny that any plans for peace were being 
considered, such as one from Hong Kong on 22nd; 
Lately she (Chungking) has again been circulating peace rumors . 
about ... peace proposals made by Japan ... to alienate people from 
the military & destroy their will to carry on the war. . . . Such 
propaganda is far too transparent ever to be effective. 141 
However, the secret reply, broadcast by Inoue on 25 th, responded differently. It began 
with the declaration that Japan had "no problem" with a "liberal America" and seems 
to have attempted to sound out American officials as to what was meant by the term 
''unconditional surrender." At the end of the broadcast Inoue respond to Zacharias' 
mention of the Atlantic Charter with the news that Japan was now willing to talk about 
an end to the fighting: 142 
. .'. Should America show any sincerity of putting into practice what 
she preaches, as for instance in Atlantic Charter ... Jap. (sic) ... 
would automatically . . . follow in stopping of conflict . . . & then only 
sabers cease to rattle both in East & in West. 
135 He quoted Kosuda as complaining "As regards war materials, it is not so much that the ra~ 
materials are poor as that the general standard of the finished product is regrettably low ... The mam 
reason for this is the immaturity of Japanese manufacturing technique." 
Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, p 415 
136 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, p415 
137 8th July 1945, Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, pp416-17 
138 15th July 1945, Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, pp 418-19 
139 Broadcasts to North America on 13th and 16th July 1945 
Kitayama: "Shtlsen to Taigai H6s6 - Piisu T6ku to Atoroshitizu" p 10 
140 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, p 421 
141 The underlining is in the original 
United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Peace Talk Cards, Number 80, 22nd July 1945 
op cit: Kitayama: "Shftsen to Taigai H6s6 - Piisu T6ku to Atoroshitizu" p 11 
142 The underlining and the note form of the language are from the original. 
United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Peace Talk Cards, Number 117, 25th July 194-5 
op cil: Kitayama: "Shftsen to Taigai H6s6 - Piisu T6ku to Atoroshitizu" p 11 
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It was noted in America that Japan had stated that peace was now possible. 143 
The penultimate broadcast Zacharias made was on 29th July, following the issue of the 
Potsdam Declaration. He appealed to "both the leaders and the people of Japan" to 
"allow tranquillity again to return to the city and the countryside.,,144 
The final broadcast by Zacharias was on 4th August 1945, two days after the United 
States had decided that should peace not be forthcoming the 20th Air Force in Guam 
would arm a bomber with an atomic bomb and attack Hiroshima's factory and military 
areas.
145 The broadcast described the continued struggle of Japan as a problem of 
leadership and repeated that all hope for a Japanese victory was lost. In a final appeal, 
Zacharias stated: 
[Japanese leaders] must recognize their present situation, and take 
suitable steps to correct the tragic mistakes of the recent past. They 
must plan for their inevitable defeat and for Japan's future with 
whatever loyalty, intelligence, and courage they can still command. 146 
There was no immediate response broadcast by N.H.K. 
The End of the War 
On 6th August 1945 an American B29 bomber exploded the world's first atomic bomb 
over Hiroshima. At 1.30am the following day a monitor at Domei picked up an 
announcement by Truman that he had ordered the attack: "This bomb was . . . the 
most powerful bomb in history. It was an atomic bomb." This was reported 
immediately to Foreign Minister Togo. 147 
The C.I.B. devised a propaganda counter offensive the same day, deciding that whilst 
the domestic population should be encouraged to prepare themselves for the final 
battle for the mainland, in overseas propaganda, the atomic bomb was to be 
denounced as an inhuman weapon. There was some dispute between the C.I.B. and 
143 Kitayama: "Shiisen to Taigai Hoso - Piisu Toku to Atoroshitizu" p 11 
14-1 Zacharias: Secret Missions Appendix, pp 421-2 
145 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 272 
146 Zacharias: Secret Jvfissions Appendix, p 424 
The italics arc in the original. 
H7 Kitayama: flaiboku e no Afichi p 273 
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the Army Ministry, which wanted to omit use of words "atomic bomb," but eventually 
the term was used in both overseas and domestic propaganda. 148 
The transmission to North America149 carried a statement that a small number of B29 
bombers had carried out a raid on Hiroshima the previous day, and that use of a new 
kind of bomb, possibly atomic, was being investigated. 1so The transmission to Europe 
reported Truman's statement in its French language section. 151 The first full reports of 
the situation in Hiroshima, however, were not made until the following day. The 
French language report called the attack "indescribable" and declared that the "cruel 
result of the attack is such that one cannot distinguish between the men and women 
killed by fire." It accused the United States of disregarding the Hague Convention by 
attacking "open towns and defenceless civilians" and reminded its listeners of 
American accusations of Japanese inhumanity regarding much smaller scale attacks in 
China. 1s2 The German language section continued the attack on American inhumanity 
with an eyewitness report by a Domei correspondent. He declared that, 
The enemy . . . has revealed . . . this lust for the slaughter of innocent 
Japanese civilians. The Americans have . . . tom off the mask of 
humanity.ls3 
The following day the Japanese-controlled stations took up the denunciation of the 
attack. Radio Batavia reminded listeners of British and American protests of 
indiscriminate bombing over the use of V 1 and V2 rockets by Germany on London. 
These it claimed were "carefully aimed and . . . controlled by radio" and were much 
less indiscriminate than the "atomic bomb which the Anglo-Americans now produce 
with apparent irresponsibility of guilt." 154 In a show of defiance, Radio Shonan 
derided the West for finding atomic energy so new. It claimed that atomic power had 
148 See Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 274-5 
149 Transmission Three 
ISO Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 273-4 
lSI Tokyo in French, 7th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2213, 8th August 1945 
15~ Tokyo in French, 8th August 1945 th 
B.B.e.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2214.9 August 1945 
153 Tokyo in German, 8th August 1945 
B.B.e.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2214. 9th August 1945 
151 Batavia in English, 9th August 1945 
B.B.e.: Summaryo/World Broadcasts Number 2215, loth August 1045 
long been understOOd 10 Japan, ana threatened that Japan would retaliate in kind 
, 
employing ''weapons like the atomic bomb", attached to suicide bombers. 155 
On 9th August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and her troops entered 
Manchuria. The same day a second atomic bomb was exploded over Nagasaki. 
The second bomb was largely ignored by short-wave radio stations, which on lOth 
continued to describe children in Hiroshima in contradictory reports. An eyewitness 
account described the children probably accurately as a "pitiful sight" with "legs and 
bodies scattered.,,156 However, another report defiantly made light of the situation, 
claiming that children had received only minor burns, not even suffering any bleeding, 
and were now playing in the streets as before. 157 A further Radio Tokyo report of 12th 
August, anticipating some later historical writing, accused the American government 
of using the bomb in order to intimidate the Soviet Union. 158 
At 14.20159 on lOth August 1945 British monitors received the following transmission 
from Domei: 
The Japanese Government is ready to accept the terms enumerated in 
the Joint Declaration issued at Potsdam on 26th July, 1945, by the heads 
of the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and China, and later 
subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the 
said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the 
prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler. 160 
This information was repeated on short-wave radio to each transmission region over 
the next 24 hours. 161 The Allied reply stated that ''From the moment of surrender, the 
authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be 
subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.,,162 On 13 th August whilst 
the Japanese Government considered its response, Soviet troops attacked Chongjin in 
155 Singapore in English, 9th August 1945 
B.B.e.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2215, lOth August 1945 
156 Tokyo in English for Europe, 10th August 1945 
B.B.e.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2216, 11th August 1945 
157 Tokyo in English, 10th August 1945 
B.B.e.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2216, 11th August 1945 
158 Tokyo in English, 12th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2218, 13 th August 1945 
159 22.20 in Japan 
160 Domei in French and English for Europe, 10th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2216, 11th August 1945 . 
161 There is some confusion of memory as to whether the Domei report or a Radio Tokyo report 10 the 
Chungking transmission was the first 'to be broadcast, but all regions did eventually receive this news 
Sec Kitayama: lfaihoku e no Afichi pp 285-290 
1(;2 Kitayama: Ifaihoku e no Afichi pp 292-3 
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Northern Korea, and twelve of the radio station staff committed suicide, blowing up 
the station in an "honourable suicide explosion.,,163 
At 10.50am on 14th August the Cabinet and the Supreme War Guidance Committee 
met with the Emperor and heard that he had decided to comply with the terms of the 
Potsdam Declaration. It was decided that the Emperor should broadcast the decision 
himself at noon the following day. During the course of the day the Chiefs of Staff 
broadcast secret transmissions to the armies in the field instructing them to listen to the 
broadcast, and at 11 pm the Foreign Minister contacted the Ambassador to Switzerland 
telling him to indicate to the Swiss authorities that the Japanese Government would 
accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Between 11.20 and 11.50pm the 
Emperor made two recordings of the speech to be broadcast. 
Zealous elements of the military were opposed to surrender, and sought to continue 
the war for the Japanese mainland. Some of these sought to destroy these recordings 
to prevent the broadcast being made. On the night of 14th August they tried to take 
over the Imperial Palace, but when they failed to find the recordings, they took 
hostages and moved on to the N.H.K. studios.164 Their occupation of the studios 
lasted three hours, delaying the start of the domestic schedule. However, it had no 
effect on the short-wave schedule, which did not start until 11.30am.165 
The Emperor's broadcast was to be relayed simultaneously by all the stations in the 
Empire. However, broadcasters in Radio Batavia refused to carry the relay, as they 
feared that the surrender of Japan would jeopardise the promised independence of 
Indonesia, which had been strongly promoted in the spring and summer of 1945. 
Monitors in Australia instead picked up news items regarding food shortages, and one-
and-a-half hours after the surrender, heard a commentary from Radio Batavia 
proclaiming, "Asia Marches On. ,,166 Free India stations and Bangkok stations also 
refused to relay the message so the response of Radio Batavia could also have been 
163 "b k ku' JI a u gyo Sal . 
See N.H.K.: 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting p 124 and Kitayama: Haiboku e no Afichl P 2~~ 
164 For details of the events surrounding the Japanese surrender see Butow: Japanese DeCISIOn to 
Surrender PP 210-22-1- . . . 
165 See N.H.K.: 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting pp 129-30 and Kitayama: HQlboJ..1J e no Jfichl PP 
297-8 
166 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi PP 31-1--5 
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part of a co-ordinated refusal. Four days later, however, it was announced that the 
cease-fire order had been received in Jakarta and that the military administration 
disassociated itself from the Indonesian Independence Movement, which had refused 
to surrender. 167 
Overseas broadcasts in the days which followed the Emperor's broadcast, were largely 
concerned with the text of the Emperor's speech and the formation of a new cabinet 
under Prince Higashikuni, following the resignation of the Suzuki cabinet on 15th. On 
18th the transmission hours of Radio Tokyo were reduced. 168 Singapore's Free India 
broadcasts continued, and messages from Bose were read out calling for Indians "hold 
your heads erect and face the future with unending hope and confidence.,,169 
Towards the end of August there were also broadcasts to the Allied occupation forces 
about to take over areas of Asia. On 25th Singapore instructed the Japanese troops 
that the cease-fire included a ban on looting, and urged the Allies in Malaysia and 
Singapore to co-operate in keeping the peace. 170 The same day Radio Saigon 
appealed to Allied troops to give advance notice of medical supply drops for 
prisoners-of-war on Borneo. 171 
On 1 st September 1945 the American Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(S.C.A.P.), General Douglas MacArthur, arrived in Japan and a day later the formal 
surrender ceremony took place on the deck of the American battleship, Missouri. It 
was described in overseas radio broadcasts throughout the day.l72 The following day 
the second order given by S.C.A.P. announced the cessation of all radio transmissions 
in foreign languages after midnight, 3rd September 1945. The programme schedule 
167 Batavia in English for North America, 19th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2226, 21st August 1945 . 
168 This consisted of a thirty-minute reduction in Transmissions One (North Amenca), Three (N~rth 
America), and Eight (India) and an hour reduction in Transmission Five (philippines and Austraha). 
Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 325 
169 Singapore in English, 18th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2224, 19th August 1945 
170 Singapore in English for British forces, 25th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2231, 26th August 1945 
171 Saigon in English, 25th August 1945 
B.B. C.: Summary 0/ World Broadcasts Number 2231, 26th August 1945. nd 
172 See Tokyo in Russian, French for Indo-China, English for North Amenca, 2 September 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2239, 3rd September 1945 
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was further altered on 6th September, to nine daily transmissions. (Figure 8)173 
Kitayama claims that as a result of this S.C.A.P. order all these transmissions were 
only broadcast in Japanese. This was generally the case, although monitors at the 
B.B.C. recorded having listened to English language broadcasts from Radio Tokyo to 
North America on 20th and 25th September. 174 These seem to have been regular 
scheduled broadcasts, not transmissions of official messages by the American 
authorities in Japan, so it must be assumed that English language broadcasts were also 
permitted. In addition, broadcasts from the stations in Singapore, Saigon, Bangkok 
and Batavia were not covered by MacArthur's directive and these continued to 
broadcast in English. 
Transmission One North America 00.00-00.40 
Transmission Two China 10.3 0-11.1 0 
Transmission Three North America 13.00--13.40 and 
15.00-15.40 
Transmission Four Europe 17.00-17.40 
Transmission Five Phili ppines and Australia 18.00-18.40 
Transmission Six China 19.30-20.10 
Transmission Seven South America 20.00-20.40 
Transmission Eight India 22.00-22.40 
Transmission Nine Southern Regions 22.00-22.40 
Figure 8: N.H.K. International Department schedule from 6th September 1944 
Kitayama also claims that a Civil Censorship Division (C.C.D.) directive of lOth 
September superseded this and forced the cessation of all overseas broadcasting. He 
writes, too, that there was concern for Japanese working overseas, who needed the 
radio link to their homeland, but that the American authorities declared it impossible to 
maintain thiS.175 However, the monitoring reports of the B.B.C. show that overseas 
broadcasts continued throughout September 1945.176 The reports are much shorter 
than previous ones and are noted as having been monitored by the New Delhi station, 
but as the target regions continued to be noted as previously it must be assumed that 
the shortened transmission schedule of September 6th continued to be broadcast. The 
content of the broadcasts primarily concerned the reconstruction of Japan, such as 
173 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 326 
174 See Tokyo in English for North America, 20th and 25th September 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Numbers 2257 and 2262, 21st and 26th September 19~5 
175 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi p 326 . ' 
176 It is probable that they also continued into October. Needing a date to on which to stop, this stu~ 
has included material from the B.B.C.'s Summary of World Broadcasts only up to number 2267, 1 
October 1945. 
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reports on the Ministry of Education's proposed "science drive,,,177 and the resumption 
of treasury bill and government securities transactions. 178 
The role of short-wave broadcasting in the period after the surrender of Japan seems, 
therefore, to be somewhat unclear. Much of Japan was in turmoil in the period 
between the Emperor's speech and the arrival of the American occupation forces, so 
there can be little surprise that this turmoil extended to N.H.K. However, this is less 
understandable following the implementation of S.C.A.P. rule in Japan. The S.C.A.P. 
directives should have clarified the situation completely. Both Kitayama and the 
official history of N.H.K. state that short-wave broadcasting was banned early in 
September 1945.179 The B.B.C.'s Summary of World Broadcasts, however, shows 
that short-wave broadcasts continued to be made in Japanese and English throughout 
September 1945. There seems to be no explanation for this, for according to N.H.K. 
there was no short-wave broadcasting until experimental broadcasts were permitted in 
1949. 180 
By the end of September 1945 references to Japanese short-wave broadcasts in the 
Summary of World Broadcasts were increasingly infrequent and it may be assumed 
that this trend continued into October. It is possible, therefore, that early S.C.A.P. 
directives did not take effect immediately but gradually, in the confused situation in 
immediate post-war Japan. If this were the case, it would appear that although 
overseas broadcasting was the subject of the second S.C.A.P. order to be issued to the 
Japanese authorities, this order was less important and effective than it appeared. 
Perhaps the occupation government perceived some liberalism in the later Japanese 
broadcasts, and the responses to the "Zacharias Broadcasts," and felt that broadcasting 
would adjust itself gradually, hence it exerted less direct control than over other 
aspects of Japanese administration. 
177 Tokyo in Japanese, 7th September 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 2244, 8th September 1945 
178 Tokyo in Japanese for Europe, 19th September 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 2256, 20th September 1945 . 
179 The N.H.K. official history acknowledges that the instructions were then modified to allow short-
wave broadcasts to Korea, Taiwan and China for overseas Japanese. 
N.H.K.: 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting p 137 
180 N.H.K.: 50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting p 197 
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Chapter 8: Propaganda Themes 
The War in Asia 
During the China Incident and the Pacific War there were several themes regularly 
employed in Japanese overseas broadcasting. Some were not employed throughout 
the period, but were used intensively for a short time or to a specific target region, 
whilst others appeared in broadcasts to most regions throughout the war, albeit with 
varying intensity. 
The most important subject in Radio Tokyo news reports was the war situation, and 
war reports constituted the majority of news items in transmissions to all regions. 
Immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937, the Information 
Committee issued a directive stating that the propaganda line for overseas radio was 
that the Japanese were making the sacrifice in order to keep the peace, and oppose 
Communism in Asia. 1 Over the next four years there were frequent references to the 
fighting in China in reports to all the transmission regions. A commentary from May 
1941 is typical in its assessment of the situation in China: 
Recent Japanese war operations ... aimed ... to break the 
resistance of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime. The Chungking army is 
no longer a Regular Army, and one can hardly call it fit for battle. 
It has lost all hold over the Chinese people and its main function 
today is that of a smuggling gang, trying to secretly import 
merchandise through gaps in the Japanese blockade .... Chungking 
today suffers form an eighty-fold increase in the cost of living .... 
Chungking, which is no longer fit for fighting, is today faced with 
the alternative either to collapse or to amalgamate with the 
National Chinese Government in Nanking. 2 
There were of course elements of truth in this assessment, as the Chinese army did try 
to smuggle goods through the Japanese blockade, and Chungking China did suffer 
from high inflation. 
1 Kitayama: ShinjO Wan e no Michi p 200 
2 Tokyo in Gennan for Gennany, 13th May 1941 
B.B. C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 665, 14th May 1941 
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After the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941, war reports concerning 
China and the Pacific often constituted most of a newscast. 3 Often the reports took the 
form of 'war results,' lists of the numbers of dead and injured on each side, and the 
amount of enemy 'booty' (weaponry) captured by the Japanese.4 These had been 
given out occasionally in reference to the fighting in China before 1941. After Pearl 
Harbor, however, lists of 'war results' became increasingly frequent in broadcasts to 
all transmission regions. Most 'results' gave figures from a single battle or attack. 
However, occasionally there were huge lists of 'results' covering whole campaigns, 
which were perhaps intended to impress the listener when the on-going situation had 
reached a stalemate. In April 1942 Radio Tokyo reported the total Chinese 'war 
results' to the end of March 1942, from the start of the Greater East Asian War in July 
1937. The following list was read out on air: 
In 30 operations there were: 
58,313 enemy troops killed 
18,453 prisoners captured 
5 planes captured 
17 tanks captured 
1,470 automobiles captured 
309 railway cars captured 
3 torpedo boats captured 
201 (- ? -) or cannon captured 
1,363 machine guns captured 
12,443 rifles captured 
30 planes shot down 
4 gunboats sunk 
32 ships sunk 
This was contrasted with the reported Japanese losses of 536 killed and 6,382 
wounded. 5 
However, generally the reports concerned short time periods and small areas of battle, 
and Radio Tokyo continued to read out 'war results' until the end of the war. Even in 
August 1945 'results' continued to appear in news bulletins, although by this time they 
3 For example, the monitoring reports in the B.B.C. 's Summary of World Broadcasts for the first 
week of 1942 (numbers 897-903) show that 64% of news items listed in the reports concerned the 
!"~e reporting of 'war results' was not confined to the Japanese m~~. Durin~ the Battle ofB.ritain 
in the late Sununer and Autumn of 1940, posters at new stands in Bntam adverttsed results of au 
battles as "Their's 78, Ours 17," as though it was the scoreline from a football match. 
Paul Fussell: Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World War p 58 
5 Tokyo in English for Europe, 6th April 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 994, 7th April 1942 
(_ ? _) indicates that the word was inaudible to the monitor. 
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consisted of reporting the number of planes Japanese troops claimed to have shot 
down during recent American air raids. Radio Singapore reported on 30th July, that 
190 planes had been shot down or crippled on 28th, and more than 537 between 10th 
and 28th .6 
The reporting of 'war results' was the most frequent way that broadcasts from the 
Japanese-controlled station sought to impress upon listeners the power and strength of 
the Japanese Army. The enormous lists were impressive and tended to appear when 
there was little else of worth to report, particularly concerning the situation in China. 
However, the China Incident itself became the focus of Japanese reports when the 
situation in the Pacific worsened. In the latter half of the war, reports regarding the 
China War dominated the war report broadcasts. Only Radio Chungking was in a 
position to present an opposite view, in contrast to the huge naval battles in the 
Pacific, which appeared in the news reports of all the Allies. This meant it was easier 
to present the skirmishes in China as major victories with little contradiction. 
Japanese radio stations did report great Japanese naval victories in the Pacific battles 
in a similar way. However, when their propaganda position became untenable, a 
defeat was rarely admitted. Usually reports concerning that field of operation merely 
disappeared from the newscasts, often to be replaced with more optimistic news from 
China.7 
The War in Europe 
References to the European War in broadcasts by Japanese radio were not frequent. 
Soon after the outbreak of war in Europe Radio Tokyo expressed the astonishment of 
Japanese over the lack of hostilities during the period of the phoney war, and the 
desire of Japan to benefit from the war, particularly in the supply of canned goods.
8 
A 
later report in April 1940 expressed Japan's worries over the German invasions of 
6 Singapore in English, 30th July 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2205, 31st July 1945 
7 See Chapter 5 pp 110-117 above. 
8 Tokyo in English, 8th September 1939 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 23, 9th September 1939 
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Denmark and Norway and its apparent disregard for their neutrality.9 This was a 
strange propaganda line for Tokyo to take, as Japan had still not declared war on 
China, and the fighting there continued to be termed the "China Incident." 
In 1942 there was occasional reference to the dilemma over a second European front. 
The fighting between the Allies and Germany was concentrated in the U.S.S.R. where 
Russians were resisting a German invasion. The plan was to establish a Second Front 
in France in the West to draw German troops away from the East and attack Germany 
from two directions. A commando landing at Dieppe in August 1942 produced heavy 
casualties from heavy German fire, due to inadequate beach reconnaissance, and a lack 
of integration between air and sea bombardments of the French coast.lO Japanese 
broadcasts tended to highlight differences between Britain and the Soviet Union and to 
conclude that the establishment of a Second Front was unlikely as Britain was content 
to allow Russians to fight the war for her, without endangering any of her own troops. 
A statement by a C.I.B. spokesman in October 1942 claimed that whilst, ''For Russia, 
the Second Front question is a matter of life and death," Britain had "several million 
fully trained soldiers" garrisoned to defend the British Isles, and ''thousands of 
American soldiers . . . having nothing better to do [ than] . . . (?flirting) with women 
and meddling in purely British affairs." It concluded: 
To a practical people like the British, the creation of a Second Front 
(?with) the possibility of another Dunkirk is inconceivable. Such a 
disaster (?took place) at Dieppe, where the British sacrificed more than 
3,000 (?Canadian) youth for a futile, ... experience. ll 
When Italy's Badoglio Government surrendered to the Allies in September 1943, there 
was little reaction on Japanese overseas radio, and the only significant change to 
Italian broadcasts was the suspension of the weekly radio exchanges which were 
broadcast across the domestic network. 12 News programmes carried reports of the 
situation regarding Italian embassies and communities in Greater East Asia. Radio 
9 Tokyo in German for Europe, 10th April 1940 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 267, lO_11th April1940 
10 See Kenneth Macksey, Military Errors of World War Two p 179 
11 Tokyo in English for Australia and New Zealand, 30th September 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1171, 1st October 1942 
(? word) indicates a word supplied by the monitor as the original was inaudible. 
12 See Kitayama: Dai-Toa e no Michi pp 376-7 
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Tokyo reported that the Italian Embassy in Manchuria was being guarded, and that the 
Italian settlement in Tientsin was under the administration of the Nanking 
Government. 13 Reports in English concerned the return of Mussolini, who, Radio 
Tokyo reported, was "at Hitler's headquarters in Germany and [was] expected to form 
a new fascist government. ,,14 It is significant that whilst broadcasts for the German 
audience sought to reassure them that Italian people and property were being 
protected by Italy's former ally, reports in English made boastful claims about the re-
emergence ofMussolini, presumably to undermine Allied morale. 
The eventual establishment of the Second Front, by the D-Day landings in Normandy 
in early June 1944, received little more than a cursory mention in Japanese overseas 
broadcasts. According to Radio Tokyo, the "second front [was] opening according to 
German expectations" and the Allied landings were "exactly at the most fortified zone 
... [and it would] end in a second Dunkirk.,,15 A further line taken by Japanese 
controlled radio was that the Allies would "provide Germany with the spring-board 
she needs for a victorious general offensive [and had] walked into an elaborate death 
trap.,,16 Interestingly, the regular German commentator, Erwin Wickert, whilst not 
expressing it directly, implied that the fighting in the Pacific was a sort of "Second 
Front" for Germany, declaring, "Japan must inflict blows on the Allies in the East in 
order to relieve pressure on Germany.,,17 However, a week later he made a plea for 
Germans not to forget that the Pacific and European conflicts were one war, and 
occasionally to remember their allies in the East. 1S Presumably, the Japanese 
13 Tokyo in Gennan for Europe, 16th September 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1522, 17th September 1943 
14 See Tokyo in English for Europe, 15th September 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1521, 16th September 1943 
15 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 9th June 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1789, 10th June 1944 . . 
337,131 Allied troops were evacuated from Dunkirk across the English Channel m every available 
vessel ahead of the German advance in May and June 1940. This surrendered the European 
mainland to Germany. 
16 Radio Shonan in English for South West Asia, 7th June 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1787, 8th June 1944 
See also Japanese Overseas Service in German, 14th June 1944 
B.B.c.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1794, 15th June 1944 
17 Japanese Overseas Service in Gennan, 8th June 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1788, 9th June 1944 
18 Japanese Overseas Service in German, 15th June 1944 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1795, 16th June 1944 
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authorities were concerned that their monitors had heard only news about the 
European War in German radio broadcasts. 
The response of Japanese radio to the surrender of Germany in May 1945 was to 
declare that it would have no effect on the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. A 
commentary on 5th May declared, 
Japan now has no allies in Europe, everyone is an enemy ... Evil 
may temporarily prevail but it cannot completely destroy us . . . 
Japan will build a New Order19 
Other broadcasts claimed that Hitler's failure had been to achieve solidarity and 
collaboration amongst all the peoples of Europe. East Asians were, in contrast, 
described as united in their struggle. 20 
In a final comment on the war in Europe, Radio Shonan infoaried British troops in 
Asia in June 1945 that it had been the Soviet Union, not the British and Americans 
which had won the war in Europe.21 At that time, the Japanese government was 
unaware that the Soviet Union had agreed to declare war on Japan after the defeat of 
Germany, and the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement remained intact. Presumably 
the intention was, therefore, to imply that even if the troops, who were listening 
sacrificed themselves in .an invasion of Greater East Asia, it would be in vain as Britain 
and America could not hope for victory without the assistance of the Soviets. 
The Promotion of Japanese Culture 
The promotion of Japanese culture by short-wave radio was important to the Japanese 
government from the early 1930s. In 1932, the Head ofN.H.K., Iwahara Kenzo, had 
stressed the importance of clear short-wave broadcasts to the gaichi in order to 
encourage a policy of assimilation. 22 In 1933, the departure of Japan from the League 
of Nations over the League's refusal to recognise the state ofManchukuo left her in an 
19 Japanese European Service in Italian, 5th May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2119, 6th May 1945 
20 Japanese Overseas Service in Italian, 2nd May 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2116, 3rd May 1945 
21 Singapore in English for British troops in India and Burma, 7th JWle 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2152, 8th June 1945 
22 Kitayama: Shinja Wan e no lvfichi p 42 
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isolated position. The role of overseas broadcasting in expressing the Japanese 
viewpoint to the rest of the world hence became increasingly important. 
The first scheduled overseas broadcast proper from Tokyo on 1 st June 1935 was made 
in both English and Japanese, 23 an indication that the broadcasts were not merely 
intended for overseas Japanese. Unlike the B.B.C. Empire Service which at that time 
only broadcast in English for British abroad, the Japanese overseas service sought to 
foster an audience of foreign listeners and develop their understanding of the Japanese 
position through an appreciation of Japanese culture. Soon after the start of scheduled 
broadcasting, in July and August 1935, a series explaining the "Japanese Spirit" 24 and 
''National Structure,,,25 ''to Our Countrymen Overseas,,26 was transmitted to America 
in order to increase the awareness of American-born Japanese of their roots. 27 
Following the attempted military coup in Japan in 1936 known as the 26th February 
Incident,28 radio again became the primary tool the government used to restore the 
image of Japan abroad. Programmes broadcast included "Japan Presentation Hour,,,29 
which dealt with a different aspect of Japan each week.30 Whilst most of these 
programmes were aimed at North America, the promotion of the joint Japanese-
German film production, ''Atarashiki Tsuchi," by radio in February 1937, was aimed at 
German listeners. The film itself, and the radio promotion it received, sought to 
familiarise Germans with the culture of their ally, Japan. 31 
In August 1941, a further lecture series was broadcast to acquaint Germans with the 
national character and traditions of the Japanese. The first lecture was entitled "The 
Spirit of Chivalry" and outlined the principles of bushidcr2 for the German audience.33 
23 See Kitayama: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 112 
24 Nihon Seishin 
25 Kokutai 
26 Kaigai no D6h6 Sh6kun ni 
27 Kitayama: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 119 
28 See Chapter 2 pp 39-40 for a more detailed description. 
29 Nihon Sh6kai no Jikan 
30 Kitayama: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 149 . 
31 See Imperial War Museum Film Section: Summary Leaflet JYY 058; Daughter of the SamuraI 
32 The Samurai Code. It was re-discovered and promoted by the Japanese Government from the early 
twentieth century as propaganda, which encouraged and justified the actions of Japan. 
33 Tokyo in German for Germany, 2300 August 1941 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 767, 24th August 1941 
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At the start of 1939 a new drive was begun in the form of the "Japan Culture Series,,34 
which emphasised both the unique nature of the Japanese spirit, and the Japanese 
vision of aNew Order in East Asia.35 This drive was reinforced in 1939 with the 
introduction of weekly programmes in August and September. "Nisei Radio Hour" 
and "Let's Tune In" in the Western United States schedule presented traditional 
Japanese stories and talks by nisei in Japan, for the American audience. 36 
After the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941 the superiority of the 
Japanese character was frequently dted in overseas broadcasts to most regions, 
although it was often with the aim of intimidating the enemy rather than promoting the 
Japanese way. The following description of the Japanese and American navies is 
typical: 
A strong navy must have two essential qualities - durability and 
spirit ... The main success of the Japanese Navy is its solid 
strength against paper force . . . Although the U. S. has enormous 
natural resources and great wealth and can build a great navy, the 
present naval engagement has definitely shown how fragil [sic] it is. 
Due to haste of navy building, U.S. warships are mostly ill 
constructed ... Furthermore, U.S. economic strength is not very 
great. Therefore, although the U.S. Navy is superior numerically, 
its actual strength is very weak.37 
In April 1942, the superiority of the Japanese bushid6 was repeated in broadcasts to 
Britain. In describing the rescue of British sailors from HMS Exeter off Surabaya, in 
Java, Radio Tokyo reported, 
The British Commander wept ... [and] some of the rescued British 
sailors had brought their pets with them ... Many of the rescued sailors 
insisted on singing popular jazz songs to give vent to their feelings. 
The Japanese sailors looked (?agape) at them .... No wonder the 
British Navy always lost its battles with the Japanese.38 
Japanese language courses were a further tool used by Japanese overseas broadcasting 
used to inspire interest in Japan. A Japanese language course for English speakers was 
34 Nihon Bunka Shiriizu 
35 See Kitayama: Shinjil Wan e no Michi p 270 
36 See Kitayama: Shinjil Wan e no Michi pp 301-3 
37 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report; Official Radio Broadcasts, 
13th December 1941, pp HI-2 
38 Tokyo in English for England, 1 at April 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 989, 2nd April 1942 .' 
(?agape) indicates that the word supplied by the monitor as the original was maudible 
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conducted fortnightly over short-wave radio in 1940. It was broadcast first to the 
United States and then repeated in the European transmission. A Spanish version of 
the course was also broadcast to South America,39 and the full courses were re-
broadcast again before the start of the Pacific War. After the outbreak of war the 
Japanese language became important to the Japanese in the 'assimilation' of East Asia 
and Japanese became an important subject in the schools of Greater East Asia. News 
items gave occasional glimpses as to the success of the programme. In 1942 a report 
declared, 
Answering the ardent desire of the Burmese people for learning the 
Japanese language, a three month's course will be given at a newly-
opened Japanese school from 1st June. Over 800 Burmese have 
already applied for the course. 40 
Abdul Wahid, Radio Batavia's regular Indian commentator, made an unusual 
observation regarding the promotion of Japanese culture within Greater East Asia. He 
asked, ''Must the government and the governed be of the same religion? ... Japan 
does not try to impose Shintoism on Malays.,,41 As the broadcast was to India the 
implication, presumably, was that Britain had tried to impose her own religion on 
those she governed. This is an unusual argument for a Japanese station to use, and 
-from the records that are available, it seems as though this was the only occasion on 
which it was. Although the promotion of a religion may be included in campaigns to 
promote the culture of a country, this was not a theme used by Japanese radio. It 
seems that by 1943 some at least, including Wahid, had noticed this omission and 
thought it something, which in turn could be used to further promote the benign nature 
of Japanese rule. 
After the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea in the summer and autumn of 1942 the 
references to Japanese culture in overseas broadcasts dwindled. The superior spirit of 
the Japanese continued to be exalted, but largely in reference to the fighting ability of 
Japanese soldiers. Campaigns to increase listener numbers and familiarise them with 
39 Kitayama: Shinju Wan e no Michi p 312 
40 Tokyo in English for Europe, 29th May 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1047, 30th May 1942 
41 Batavia in English for India, 23rd March 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1345, 24th March 1943 
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the culture of Japan such as had taken place before the outbreak of war did not 
continue. This is not surprising as the station was now perceived by Allied listeners as 
'the enemy' and the sympathy a campaign of exposing the audience to Japanese 
culture was intended to generate would be extremely hard to create. In addition, the 
tactics of Radio Tokyo changed and the reporting of huge Allied losses became 
common. This could be expected to intimidate and perhaps impress an Allied audience 
more effectively than a programme of broadcasts describing the moral superiority of 
the Japanese. 
Moves towards Independence in Greater East Asia 
Throughout the war period, broadcasts concerning the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere contained two principal themes; those of Asian liberation from 
colonial oppressors, and the advances made in the development of each country's 
economy. Following the outbreak of war, Japanese-controlled stations throughout 
Asia encouraged anti-British feeling, in particular. Britain was described as the 
"greatest influence and power in the Far East" after Japan, supported by "Chiang Kai-
shek's 'running-dog' regime and the 'softened up' Netherlands East Indies.''''2 
America on the other hand was told that the Pacific was large enough that, "if both 
. sides [Japan and America] keep to their own business . . . peace in the Pacific is not 
difficult to maintain. ,,43 
The Japanese capture of Singapore, long described as Britain's impenetrable fortress, 
in February 1942 was celebrated widely by Japanese overseas radio. Victory 
broadcasts were made to all regions, such as one to Europe, which declared "the 
people of Asia today rise in a chorus of thanksgiving on this, the attaining of a freedom 
so long denied them. ,,44 
The prospect of achieving independence with help from Japan was an important 
propaganda theme used towards the countries of Asia. As early as January 1942, 
42 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
5th December 1941, p F4 
43 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
5th December 1941, p F4 
44 Tokyo in English for Europe, 15th February 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 944, 16th February 1943 
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Prime Minister T6j6 was reported as having said that Japan would encourage 
Philippine and Burmese independence in return for their co-operation within the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 45 This contrasted with the poor prospects 
for Philippine independence under the United States portrayed by Radio Tokyo. "The 
hope of Philippine independence," it declared in December 1941, "is far away," as '1he 
u. S., despite its promise of independence, is 'utterly ignoring the sincere desire of the 
Philippines. ",46 
When the Japanese entered Burma, in May 1942, Radio Tokyo reported "Burmans 
joyfully welcome Japanese in Mandalay.,,47 On 1st August 1943 Burma was declared 
'independent' under Ba Maw and Japanese radio broadcasts to all regions included 
celebrations and congratulations for the new state. On October 14th the same year the 
Philippines, too, became an 'independent' state, led by Jose Laurel. For both countries 
the nominal independence from Japan was accompanied by formal assurances that they 
would retain complete political, economic and military involvement in the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In radio broadcasts the moves to independence were 
portrayed as gallant actions by the Japanese. In a radio speech in November 1943, 
Laurel expressed his country's gratitude to the Japanese, and urged other Asian 
countries '10 fight Western imperialism and emancipate themselves. ,,48 
In 1945 it was Indonesia which was promised independence. A broadcast in July 
reported that the Sumatran Council had drafted a Declaration of Independence and 
made provision for the establishment of a League of Freedom and the raising of a 
native army.49 Broadcasters in Radio Batavia even refused to relay the Emperor's 
speech which explained the surrender of Japan on 15th August, as they feared that the 
surrender would jeopardise the promised independence of Indonesia. 50 
45 Tokyo in German for Germany, 23rd January 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 920, 24th January 1942 
46 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
6th December 1941, p A3 
47 Tokyo in German for Europe, 3rd May 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1021, 4th May 1942 
48 Japanese Overseas Service in English, 8th November 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1575, 9th November 1943 
49 Tokyo in German for Europe, 4th July 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2179, 5th July 1945 
50 Kitayama: Haiboku e no Michi pp 314-5 
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An important target for broadcasts which urged national independence was India. 
Broadcasts from Tokyo to India began in March 1942 at the time of the Cripps 
Mission and the heightening of the Civil Disobedience campaign led by Gandhi. 51 The 
arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose in Japan in June 1943 precipitated a huge increase in 
the number of broadcasts to the subcontinent. Bose was an eloquent speaker who 
used radio to deliver his message to Indians, both within India and in the rest of Asia, 
and to the rest of the world. Under his leadership the Provisional Government of Free 
India, which was established on 21st: October 1943, was given daily airtime in the 
schedules of the Singapore station to broadcast directly to India. In addition, the 
llL., also led by Bose, broadcast daily from the Rangoon station, and in March 1944, 
Rash Bihari Bose leader of the lI.L. in Japan, began 'Free India' broadcasts from 
Tokyo. These were in addition to the regular broadcasts made by Radio Tokyo and 
other East Asian stations, particularly Batavia, which broadcast to India. 
The themes of the broadcasts did not vary much throughout the war. Abdul Wahid in 
Batavia frequently urged Indian Moslems to accept the leadership of Gandhi, and 
urged the Moslem League to unite with Congress in order to achieve independence. 
In his first broadcast his appeal was that settlement of the Pakistan issue should be left 
until after independence was achieved; ''Why do they [Indian Moslems] want to divide 
India? ... Join hands with Hindus now and you can settle your differences later.,,52 
This remained the main theme of broadcasts from Batavia to India. 
Speeches made by Bose from both Singapore and Tokyo continually promoted 
independence. Even towards the end of the war he remained confident of Japan's 
ultimate victory and when a Japanese victory seemed too remote a possibility, he 
continued his broadcasts from Singapore, declaring, 
If India has not emerged as an independent State by the end of the 
war, our next plan should be a post-war revolution inside India. If 
we fail in that too, World War No.3 [sic] will give us another 
opportunity to strike for our freedom. 53 
51 See Chapter 4 pp 97-100 above 
52 Batavia in English for India, 29th August 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1139, 30th August 1942 
53 Singapore in English for India, 25th June 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2170, 26th June 1945 
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Even after the Japan's surrender Bose's tone remained defiant. His final message read 
over the Singapore station was, "The roads to Delhi are many, and Delhi still remains 
our goal. ,,54 
Reconstruction of Greater East Asia 
The second principal strand of propaganda relating to Greater East Asia concerned the 
reconstruction and development of the economies of the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
countries under Japanese administration. In part, this was in order to impress upon 
both Japan's allies and enemies that there had been minimal disruption to normal life as 
a result of the Japanese occupation. A report in April 1942 that horse-racing meetings 
had been recommenced in Hong Kong55 was typical of this type of broadcast. 
Broadcasts also sought to show that the former Western colonies had become 
increasingly productive once the inhabitants began to work for 'themselves' 56 rather 
than their imperial master. As the war continued, however, and shortages became 
widespread, the broadcasts were also to convey the image that the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere was not suffering through shortages. In so doing Japan sought to intimidate 
her enemies by implying that her capacity to wage war had not diminished. 
A regular theme of broadcasts, which sought to reassure listeners that all was well in 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere, was that of food production. In June 1942 it was reported 
that normal rice production had been resumed in Java57 and the following year, a 
300% increase in the Manchurian grain harvest was reported. 58 Even at the end of the 
war reports regarding food production continued to be monitored. At the end of July 
1945, Radio Tokyo reported "Yams and potatoes are to be grown in bombed areas of 
Tokyo. Osaka and Nagoya will follow."s9 The early broadcasts sought to indicate 
that life had largely returned to normal in the occupied territories, or to imply that 
54 Singapore in English, 18th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2224, 19th August 1945 
55 Tokyo in English for Europe, 19th Apri11942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1007, 20th April 1942 
56 "Themselves" being the Co-Prosperity Sphere, not the individual nation. 
S? Tokyo in English for Europe, 24th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1073, 25th June 1942 
58 Japanese Overseas Service in English for Britain, 14th November 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1581, 15th November 1943 
59 Tokyo in Japanese for the Japanese Empire, 26th July 1945 
B.B. C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2201, 27th July 1945 
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Japanese production methods were superior to the enemy's. However, the later 
reports were broadcast to convince the enemy that Japan was not suffering from food 
shortages, and could continue the war for the foreseeable future. Perhaps the 
reporting of vegetable plots in bombed out areas was also intended to show Japanese 
resourcefulness in the face of adversity. 
A similar pattern existed in the reporting of Japanese development of the natural 
resources of Greater East Asia. A typical commentary in November 1942 informed 
Australians of the wealth of natural resources, including silver, copper, lead, zinc, tin, 
cobalt, oil and virtually fat free beef now available in Burma. This was said to ensure 
that '1he natural resources of East Asia [would] revert to East Asians for fostering this 
war effort. ,,60 
Besides reporting the restoration of normal economic life and the development of the 
known natural resources of East Asia, Japanese broadcasts were also keen to present 
the listener with the impression that Japanese technology was more advanced than that 
of the Allies. Hence there were numerous reports which described both scientific 
advances and the resourcefulness of the Japanese. These included claims of a new 
Japanese synthetic fibre which was more durable than cotton and more moisture 
resistant than WOOI,61 and the development of pineapple leaf fibres for making fishing 
nets, ropes and bicycle tyres.62 
As the war progressed and the number of shortages increased, frequent claims of new 
Japanese inventions were made in order to suggest that Japan's capacity for war had 
not diminished. In a single week in January 1944, there were reports of new 
techniques which allowed for the construction of wooden aeroplane parts;63 a new 
anti-freeze to protect soldiers hands when they were working in sub-zero 
60 Tokyo in English for Australia, 29th November 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1231, 30th November 1942 
61 Tokyo in English for Europe, 23rd October 1942 
B.B.c.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1194, 24th October 1942 
62 Tokyo in Italian for Europe, 17th April 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1370, 18th April 1943 
63 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
18th January 1944, p AA2 
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temperatures;64 the development of non-flammable rubber;65 and a new method of 
extracting salt from sea water. 66 
Besides technical developments, there were also claims of medical advances in the 
latter part of the war. It was reported in August 1943 that Japanese scientists had 
developed "a 100% cure for tuberculosis ... [and] ... a 100% cure for morphine 
poisoning.,,67 The following month a commentary by Radio Tokyo detailed the 
success with which the Japanese had dealt with outbreaks of cholera in China. "J apan 
Beating the Cholera Scourge" claimed "Shanghai is free from cholera for the first time 
... [and following] ... anti-cholera inoculations in Peiping ... there have been less 
than 1,000 deaths. ,,68 
A further theme in broadcasts during the early part of the war, was that of the 
acceptance of Japanese ideas by the countries of Greater East Asia. Reports about the 
enthusiastic co-operation of citizens in reconstruction were made regularly, although it 
is impossible to ascertain from the broadcasts whether such co-operation was through 
desire to assist the Japanese, or a simple wish to return life to normal. Occasionally, 
however, there were intimations by Japanese radio stations that the native populations 
openly welcomed the new administration. In 1942, Radio Tokyo reported '1he 
Philippines are grateful to the Japanese ... [and] ... people are adopting Japanese 
surnames. ,,69 The following year, it was reported that the people of Burma "usually 
celebrate New Year on 3rd April but have decided to celebrate on 1st January with 
Japan as of this year.,,70 It was not stated that this had been something the Burmese 
had wished to do under British occupation. However, presumably it was hoped that 
64 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
19th January 1944, p AA2 
65 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
19th January 1944, p AA2 
66 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
24th January 1944, p AAI 
67 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report, Official Radio Broadcasts, 
2nd August 1943, P A2 
68 Japanese Overseas Service in Gennan, 28th September 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1534, 29th September 1943 
69 Tokyo in Italian for Europe, 25th August 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1135, 26th August 1942 
70 Tokyo in German for Germany, 3m January 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1266, 4th January 1943 
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the listener would reach the conclusion that native co-operation in Burma was much 
freer than it had been under the British; a sign that life was better in the Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Portraying the Enemy 
Britain and America 
Even before the outbreak of war in the Pacific the Japanese authorities developed 
plans for Radio Tokyo's portrayal of the 'enemy.' The anti-British campaign began 
within Japan over the death of a Japanese Maritime Customs Inspector in the British 
concession in Tientsin in April 1941.71 In December 1941 this campaign spread to 
broadcasts to South East Asia in order to persuade the local populations of the 
benefits of their countries' incorporation into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. 
Immediately before the outbreak of war, and in later commentaries, it was the Allies, 
particularly the United States, which were blamed for the conflict. The American and 
British governments were accused of unprovoked aggression against Japan, excluding 
her from her rights and denying her: 
The right to support a regime whose sole objective is to bring the 
joys of a civilized life, a Christian life, as it is called in the West, to 
a people long persecuted by brilliant and profiteering racketeers. 72 
Radio Tokyo broadcasts were eager to denounce American actions. In August 1943, 
Radio Tokyo aired a commentary regarding the United States entitled, "A Nation 
Without Scruple." It reported, "Mrs. Roosevelt has revealed Stalin told Hull that all 
American casualties amounted to what Russia suffered before breakfast." Like the 
Japanese accusations against the British, this report continued, ''This shows Americans 
let others fight for them . . . [it has] a lot of praise for Russia but nothing else." It 
concluded on the note, "if it can't use foreigners to fight it will use the downtrodden 
American minorities. ,,73 
7\ See Kitayama: Shinja-Wan e no Michi pp 287-8. 
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The lower social status of blacks in America was a further theme in Japanese radio 
propaganda. In January 1942, Radio Tokyo reported that America had decided to 
form a "negro corps officered by whites" which would ''be rapidly drafted into the 
Service to be used as shields to save the lives of white Americans. ,,74 American calls 
for an end to racism were said to be of no significance. They were, according to 
Radio Tokyo, only to ensure that blacks could be used in the war effort.75 A later 
commentary from Radio Batavia noted that although blacks were now doing the same 
work as whites, white disdain towards them remained. Discrimination against blacks 
in the United States meant that there was segregation in public buildings, and 
legislation to prevent inter-racial marriage. This, it continued with sarcasm, rendered 
blacks an 'untouchable' class76 in the very country, which claimed to be fighting for 
democracy.77 Of course, many of these accusations were true. 
Australia 
An important rum of Japanese propaganda early in the Pacific War was to split 
Australia from the Allied cause. Australian listeners were reminded that 
geographically Australia was closest to Asia, and her "logical place [was] within the 
Co-Prosperity Sphere.,,78 Britain was reported to be interested in Australia solely as a 
source of front-line troops. In December 1941 Radio Tokyo cited evidence from 
captured Australian soldiers that Britain used Australian troops in the Malayan 
campaign, while ''British home forces were 'engaged in the rear. ",79 In a broadcast to 
Australian troops Radio Tokyo appealed, "Go back to your peaceful homes in 
74 Tokyo in English for Europe, 8th Januaty 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 906, 10th Januaty 1942 
75 Tokyo in German for Europe, 1st June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1050, 2nd June 1942 . ' . 
76 Untouchables (Harijan) were members of the lowest of the caste in the Hindu SOCIal stratificatIon 
system. They handled animal products, rubbish and human waste, and so to touch or even to s~ 
them was thought to pollute. Discrimination against them was made illegal in 1947, when India 
became independent. 
77 Batavia in English for India, 13th March 1943 
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Australia and forget war!,,80 This theme was repeated in broadcasts regarding Malaya, 
Singapore and India. Over the battle for Singapore Radio Tokyo declared, 
The British Government confirms the English habit of fighting with 
the blood of others. Perhaps it is even proud of its intelligence in 
exploiting its own colonial peoples. Our compliments!81 
Australia was considered such an important propaganda target that the Japanese took 
unusual steps to try to ensure that Australians were exposed to Japanese propaganda. 
In June 1942, Radio Batavia began broadcasting letters from Australian and New 
Zealand prisoners, in the "Australian Home News Hour," to attract Australians to 
listen in to the station. Generally the letters described camp life and reassured the 
addressee (usually a close relative) that the prisoner was healthy and grateful to the 
Japanese for their good treatment. Often the letters also included the names of other 
prisoners in the camp, and asked the addressee of the letter to contact their relatives to 
reassure them that the prisoners were well. 82 Such was the concern of the Australian 
government, that in January 1943 it formed a body responsible for making a written 
copy of the letters and sending them to relatives addresses, thus negating the need of 
the Australian public to listen to the broadcasts. 83 
Allied Atrocities 
Accusations of atrocities committed by Britain and America were a regular theme in 
Japanese overseas radio propaganda after the outbreak of war in the Pacific. In 
December 1941 it was decided that it was important for Radio Tokyo to expose the 
British and American atrocities against Chinese in Hong Kong and Mindanao 
respectively. A series of talks was broadcast, beginning with "The Slaughter of 
Chinese At Mindanao - The Responsibility of the United States-Philippine Army," 
80 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Report; Official Radio Broadcasts, 
13th December 1941, p H4 
81 Tokyo in Italian for Italy, 11th February 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 940, 12th February 1942 
82 See Chapter 4, p 95 above 
83 See Mea: Japan's Radio War on Australia, p 166-172. .,,'" 
There were similar messages broadcast to North Amenca from Tokyo In the H~ruty Call,S and 
later "Postman Calls" broadcasts. These, however, tended to omit much of the detall of camp life and 
included more reminiscences of pre-war life 
See Chapter 4 pp 96-97 and Chapter 6 pp 147-149 above for a detailed description of these broadcasts 
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which accused American troops of carrying out a slaughter of Chinese women and 
children on Mindanao. 84 
The inhumanity of Allied bombing raids was a frequent theme in Japanese atrocity 
broadcasts, and the bombing of hospital ships was a regular accusation throughout the 
war. In January 1942 a commentary stated, 
Japanese submarines sank a Lexington-type aircraft carrier, but 
American submarines sank a hospital ship .... America does not 
know the words 'justice' and 'humanity. ,85 
This theme continued to appear throughout the war.86 A commentary m 1944 
explained ''The American Way and the Japanese Way:" 
When Japan sunk the Prince of Wales and the Repulse it allowed a 
rescue ship to reach the sailors, when it could have sunk it. . . . 
This was not an isolated incident. . . . America attacks hospital 
ships. 87 
Cruelty, Radio Tokyo concluded, was hereditary in the West, and although "the 
Anglo-Saxons always favour propaganda alleging inhuman acts, ... American crime 
statistics show that they are hardly ever committed by Japanese.,,88 
The Doolittle raid over Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Kobe of April 1942 was similarly 
denounced as an inhuman raid, which targeted hospitals, schools and temples. 
Broadcasts stated: 
School children were machine-gunned by the American raid and 
thirty innocent little children were wounded. . . . There was no 
damage to military installations and the only effect of the raid was to 
increase the patriotism of the people. 89 
This patriotism was described a few days latter when Radio Tokyo reported, "School 
boy dies in the American raid on Tokyo. His school-fellows have sworn to avenge 
84 Kitayama: Dai-T6a e no Michi p 57 
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themselves for his death."9O In October 1942, when the pilots, captured after the raid, 
were tried, Radio Tokyo assured listeners that the pilots, who had ignored the 
"principles of humanity" would be severely punished. 91 
In addition, Radio Tokyo was critical of the Allies' "indiscriminate bombing" of the 
European Axis powers. Professor Simoi, who was described as having lived in Italy 
and still having relatives in Rome, stated that the "Japanese sense affliction" regarding 
the raids on Rome in July 1943 and declared, "Unprecedented hate must rise from 
Rome's ruins.,,92 The raids were also described as attacks on Roman Catholicism as , 
the Vatican and the Italian government were deemed to be closely connected, the 
fascist leaders of Italy being Roman Catholics. Thus, the Catholic Bishop of Malacca 
was reported to have been indignant and sorrowful over the raids/3 and the Pope was 
said to have condemned them and other '1error raids" in Europe. 94 
A further theme used by the Japanese-controlled stations in their atrocity campaigns 
related to the mistreatment of Japanese prisoners and civilians. Accusations of British 
mistreatment of Japanese civilians appeared in March 1942 when the Japanese anny 
took control of a British hospital in Ipoh: 
The British gathered all the Japanese there together during Japanese 
air-raids and when the planes swooped down they put them directly 
in the line of machine-gun fire. When Japanese troops arrived the 
British staff tried to pretend that it had been a mistake, and offered 
the patients fresh bandages, but the Japanese refused, thinking they 
were poisoned.95 
Following the arrival of the first repatriation ships in late 1942, information about the 
domestic situation in Allied countries was gleaned from the repatriated Japanese and 
used in propaganda. The initial response was to denounce the internment of Japanese 
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on the West Coast of America. It began in the Autumn of 1942 with a series of talks 
entitled, "We Reveal American Inhumanity.,,96 In addition, a riot in the Manzanar 
Internment Camp near Los Angeles on 6th December 1942, which caused one death , 
fuelled the accusations that Japanese were being mistreated in the internment camps. 97 
A peculiar allegation of Allied cruelty was made in May of 1943, when Major-General 
Nakao Yahagi, chief of the Army Press Section, accused American troops of using 
poison gas during their attack on Attu island in the Aleutians. 98 The Chinese had 
accused the Japanese of making gas attacks in March 1943, but this had been denied 
by Radio Tokyo; 'Washington will not be tricked any more with Chungking'S lies of 
poison gas in Hupeh.,,99 It is possible that Yahagi' s accusation which was reported on 
Radio Tokyo, was triggered by this and previous similar Chinese accusations. 
However, accusations of poison-gas use seem not to appear elsewhere in Allied 
monitoring reports. It would seem, therefore, that it was not a theme, which N.H.K. 
or the C.I.B., which controlled the output of N.H.K., wished to embrace, and it 
remained the comment ofYahagi only, not the Japanese propaganda machine. 
In the latter part of the war, the images of American barbarity portrayed by Radio 
Tokyo became increasingly repellent. Accusations were made regarding American 
children playing with the skulls of Japanese soldiers 100 and Roosevelt accepting a bone 
paper knife.lO l 
Accusations of American inhumanity concluded in August 1945 with criticism of the 
dropping of the Atomic bombs. Radio Batavia cried, 
Remember the angry British and US protests against their (V 1 & 
V2) ... indiscriminate bombing ... How much more indiscriminate 
is the atomic bomb . . . 
96 Amerika no Hijind6 0 A baku 
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In the stunned numbness and the chaotic situation, which followed the attacks , 
however, Radio Tokyo did not use descriptions of the devastation as vividly as it had 
descriptions of American barbarity a year previously. It is true that news regarding the 
situation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was slow to reach the rest of Japan as all 
communication systems were destroyed in the blasts, and that the worst effects of 
radiation did not become apparent for months and years afterwards. However, the 
only definite picture the listener was given of the effects was that, "one cannot 
distinguish between the men and women killed by fire. ,,102 
In contrast to its denunciation of Allied atrocities, Japanese overseas radio refuted 
British and American accusations of Japanese atrocities. In February 1942 Radio 
Shanghai reported, 'lhe American Red Cross says American prisoners-of-war in the 
Far East live in excellent conditions.,,103 The following month Japanese radio strongly 
denied British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's accusations of atrocities committed 
by Japanese in Hong Kong following its surrender. According to Radio Tokyo: 
In a feeble but desperate effort to conceal the myriad defeats, which the 
British Forces have suffered in the Pacific, Eden made an effort to 
make the Japanese look atrociously cruel and degenerate in the conduct 
of war. 104 
In order to confirm that Allied prisoners were well treated by the Japanese, there were 
regular references made to their condition. In April 1942, Radio Tokyo reported that 
American troops in the Philippines were "starving and trailing to prisoner-of-war 
camps" for better conditions. l05 As confirmation of this, the prisoner letters broadcast 
from Batavia always described life in the Indonesian camps favourably. Many 
described a prisoner vegetable garden, medical facilities or classes established by the 
prisoners themselves and encouraged by the Japanese. One by Lieutenant Rohan Rivet 
was typical in nature: 
102 Tokyo in French, 8th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 2214, 9th August 1945 
103 Shanghai in Russian for Russia, 27th February 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 956, 28th February 1942 
104 Tokyo in English for Europe, 11th March 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 968, 12th March 1942 
105 Tokyo in English for (?America), 17th Apri11942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1005, 18th April 1942 
The food is boring but my health is good .... We have ... classes in 
the camp and I teach French .... I have suffered no violence [from the 
Japanese.] 106 
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In June 1942, it was also reported that all I.I.L. and wounded Filipino prisoners were 
to be released by the Japanese army to return to their families,107 as a further 
demonstration of Japanese good treatment of prisoners. 
Assurances of Japanese good treatment of prisoners continued throughout the war, 
and early in 1944, Japanese radio sought to explain why Allied stations made claims of 
atrocities against Japan. Amongst the reasons it included, "to make barbarism 
reciprocal, by establishing the Japanese as an accomplice," "to cover up their 
government's 'inhuman acts' against Japanese civilian internees," and '10 cover up 
their tracks in preparing some future 'real atrocities' which they have already plotted 
against Japan.,,108 
A Borrowed Theme 
Throughout the war Radio Tokyo used a propaganda theme which seems to have been 
borrowed from Japan's Axis ally, Germany; that of anti-Semitism. Despite its 
importance in Nazi ideology, anti-Semitism was not an important element in Japanese 
thought and propaganda. The Jewish community in Asia was small and the presence 
of the imperial powers was a much more significant concern. Hence, within Japan and 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, anti-Semitic slogans did not appear and 
the national hatred of Jews, which was central to German policy, was absent. Indeed, 
in his book, Die Macht Des Radios,109 the most significant work in German regarding 
wartime broadcasting, Willi Boelke notes that even after the Japanese occupation of 
Shanghai in 1937, emigrant Jews with German passports were welcomed to the city. 110 
It was nationality, not race, which was the important factor, and even if these Jews had 
106 Batavia in English for Australia and New Zealand, 21st June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1070, 22nd June 1942 
107 Tokyo in Italian for Europe: 25th June 1942 
B.B.e.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1074, 26th June 1942 
108 United States Records of the F.B.I.S.: Special Reports #113, "Japanese Atrocities Against War 
Prisoners. " 
109 Willi A Boelke: Die Macht des Radios: Weltpolitik und Auslandsrundfunk 192-1-1976 [The Power 
of Radio: International Politics and Overseas Broadcasting] (Ullstein, 1977) 
110 Boelke: Die Macht des Radios P 432 
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fled persecution in Germany, their German nationality made them welcome to the 
Japanese. 
Despite this, however, a thread of anti-Semitic propaganda ran through the overseas 
broadcasts of Japanese-controlled stations throughout the war. As it did not stem 
from a Japanese policy it must be concluded that it was one of the "stereotypes, cliches 
and watchwords [borrowed] from the arsenal of National Socialist Propaganda."lll In 
January 1942, a commentary declared "When the American people realise they have 
been duped by the policy of the Jewish element it will be too late." The rest of the 
commentary derided the American army for having to offer a cash incentive of $500 
per Japanese aeroplane destroyed, in order to induce troops to fight,112 and the Jewish 
theme was not continued. It would seem therefore that anti-Semitism was no more 
than a political gesture, something without emotional substance for most Japanese, and 
so there was no explanation or elaboration. 
A particularly peculiar commentary broadcast to India in March 1943 was entitled 
''What One Jew Did For England." In it Radio Batavia briefly described the life of 
Trebitch Lincoln, an ethnic Jew who changed religions several times in his quest for 
power and influence, as a pseudo-messiah. 113 This, declared Radio Batavia, "is the 
kind of Jew for whom the English, Australians and Americans are asked to despoil 
their homes" and continued that the three countries would "do better to take action to 
improve the lives of their own slum dwellers. ,,114 As the broadcast was to India, 
perhaps the aim of this story was to imply that Indians were among the "slum 
dwellers" who should be considered. 
III "Stereotype, Klischees und Parolen aus dem Arsenal der NS-Propaganda" 
Boelke: Die Macht des Radios p 439 
112 Tokyo in English for The United States and Europe, 30th January 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 927, 31st January 1942 
113 See Bernard Wasserstein: The Secret Lives of Trebitch Lincoln 
Radio Batavia said he had posed as a Christian priest in Canada, served as a Member of Parliament in 
Britain and been tried as a German spy in World War One, although he had served only a short 
inte~ent. He later posed as an anti-Semite in Germany, a Soviet Bolshevik in China and a 
Buddhist monk in Burma. 
114 Batavia in English for India, 25th March 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts Number 1347, 26th March 1943 
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It is interesting that many of the references to Jews were made in broadcasts for India 
from Batavia. It is possible that this was on account of the situation in Palestine in the 
early 1940s. Under the British mandate administration, Jews had been migrating to 
Palestine in the 1920s and 30s, and this had led to the Arab revolt (1936-9). A report 
issued by the Peel Commission in 1937 had advocated the partition of Palestine into 
separate Jewish and Arab states, although this had not been carried out before the 
outbreak of war in 1939. At the end of 1942, a Radio Batavia commentary stated that 
Britain was likely to agree to sending more refugee European Jews to Palestine, which 
would "oust the Arabs."u5 In one commentary Abdul Wahid declared that Britain 
always favoured Jews, who were the cause of the present Arab problems. 116 It is 
possible, therefore, that Japanese propaganda regarding Jews was used, not to cause 
fear and hatred of Jews in the same way that German propaganda intended, but 
because it was felt that Indians could relate to the experiences of Arabs. Both were 
ruled by Britain, and Japanese-controlled stations suggested that Arabs already 
resident in Palestine were being out-numbered by immigrant Jews with the 
encouragement of Britain. Perhaps the implication was not that "Jews are Evil," but 
that rather, if Britain could dictate changes to countries under its administration, 
against the wishes of the local populace, ''What Will Britain Inflict on India in the 
Future?" In addition, there was a significant Moslem community in India, which 
naturally opposed Britain's policy in the Middle East. The Radio Battle for India was 
intense,117 so it is plausible that propaganda about Jews would be used, along with 
other more common themes, to persuade Indians that India would do better to join 
Japan in order to evict the British. 
A further point to note is that in Japanese anti-Semitic propaganda, Jews were equated 
with capitalism. A broadcast from Singapore to Australia urged, '" Australia for 
Australians!' should be your cry, not' Australia for the Shylocks of New York and the 
City of London. '" 118 Anti-Semitism was a concept borrowed from Nazi Germany 
without much genuine belief. Its equation with capitalism in the mind of the Japanese 
115 Batavia in English for India, 28th December 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1260, 29th December 1942 
116 Batavia in English for India, 21st April 1943 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 1374, 22nd April 1943 
117 See Chapter 4 pp 97-100 and Chapter 5 pp 124-126 above. 
118 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pp 102-3 
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propagandists rendered useful an otherwise less than useful theme, which could be 
inserted into broadcasts from time to time, to give them more impact, and make them 
more memorable. This kind of borrowing gave the impression of close Axis 
collaboration over propaganda. Boelke's conclusion, however, that, "In reality, ... 
each partner made its own propaganda [and] borrowed the propaganda expressions of 
the other when they crossed their path,,1l9 seems to be borne out. Hence, anti-
Semitism was a theme, which could be added to existing anti-capitalist propaganda for 
emphasis, but it had very little meaning. 
The propaganda themes traceable in Japanese overseas radio propaganda are many and 
varied. In her book, Japan's Radio War on Australia, L.D. Meo identifies seven 
general themes120 used in broadcasts to Australia, which she discusses in some detail. 
In a wider survey of this nature, it is not possible to investigate all the propaganda of 
all the Japanese overseas radio stations in great detail. However, there were general 
themes, which were common to most transmission regions and time periods. These 
themes seem readily distinguishable in a survey of available material~ and provide a 
clear insight into the aims of Japanese radio broadcasts and the mode of thought of 
Japanese propagandists throughout the war. 
119 Boelke: Die Macht des Radios PP 439-440 
120 Australian Self-Interest, Fear, Gratitude to Japan, Pride and Vanity, Prejudice, Jealousy and 
Anger, War Weariness and Nostalgia, and the Forming of Trade and Political Circles. 
See L.D. Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pp 92-127 
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Chapter 9: 
How Effective was Japanese Wartime Short-wave Propaganda? 
Propaganda Analysis 
As mentioned at the beginning of this study, definitions of propaganda vary. 
However, certain essential elements remain; that propaganda is an attempt by one 
party to influence or manipulate another party into thinking and behaving as the first 
party wishes. 
In order for a propaganda campaIgn to be deemed successful there are several 
considerations, which need to be taken into account. Firstly, the target audience must 
be in a position to receive the message, so the appropriate means of communication 
must be selected. A further consideration is that successful propaganda is related to 
the prevailing mood of the time, l and to the beliefs, values and personalities of the 
audience as "messages have greater impact when they are in line with existing 
opinions, beliefs, and dispositions.,,2 Different people react in different ways to 
propaganda messages depending on how the messages are perceived to link with what 
readers or listeners already know. Hence a recognised and prestigious expert is 
considered more credible than an unknown voice, because the audience already has a 
perception of the person from previous experience.3 In addition, the use of symbols, 
both verbal and visual, can create a sense of authority with which to impress the target 
audience. 4 
The success of a propaganda campaign, however, must finally be measured by whether 
the changes desired by the propagandist can be perceived in changes in behaviour in 
the target audience over the time period allocated by the campaign organiser. In an 
I Jowett and O'Donnell: Propaganda and Persuasion p 155 
2 Jowett and O'Donnell: Propaganda and Persuasion p 163 . . 
3 See Carl I. Hoyland and Walter Weiss: "The Influence of Source Credibility on CommurucatIOn 
Effectiveness" in 
Katz (ed.): Public Opinion and Propaganda pp 337-347 
4 Jowett and O'Donnell cite the use of visual symbols such as a flag, or verbal symbols such as the usc 
of language associated with authority figures like parents, teachers, heroes or gods. 
Jowett and O'Donnell: Propaganda and Persuasion pp 166-7 
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advertising campaIgn, which is the form of propaganda cited most frequently by 
modem studies, the rate of success is assessed by questionnaires, opinion surveys, and 
in the sales figures of the product. However, such data is rarely available to the 
historian, particularly the historian assessing wartime propaganda campaigns. 
In war, few of the pre-requisites for a successful campaign exist. The source, if it is 
disclosed, S immediately creates suspicion in the minds of a target enemy audience, 
which is unlikely to be wholly appeased by the voice of a famous or prestigious 
person. In addition, the situation of war often increases the general patriotism of the 
belligerent peoples, rendering enemy propaganda less likely to relate to the beliefs and 
values held by the general target audience. A consequence of this is that changes in 
behaviour may occur in a significantly smaller percentage of the audience than under 
normal circumstances, rendering it harder to detect. This difficulty in detection is 
increased as material is often destroyed or concealed by participants in a war. Many 
fear their change in thinking may be discovered and punished by their own side. At the 
end of the war, the defeated side may try to prevent war crimes trials occurring by 
destroying evidence. 
Naturally, there are exceptions to this. Many of these difficulties do not occur when 
the target is an audience in a neutral country, which is not necessarily hostile and so 
may perceive the propaganda message more openly. Colonial subjects, too, may 
perceive a propaganda campaign differently, as a message which does not relate to the 
beliefs of the belligerent, may still appeal to the colonial subjects of that country. 
Acceptance of the message, though, may still have to remain concealed from the 
colonial ruler. In these cases the task of the propagandist may be generally easier 
because the conditions may make the message more acceptable. 
Despite these difficulties, analysis of wartime propaganda is not impossible. The range 
of analysis may have to be limited in nature, depending on the material available, but 
certainly general conclusions may be drawn, and for certain well-documented 
campaigns a more detailed analysis may be made. This chapter deals with specific 
5 For a discussion of "Black Propaganda," when the source is concealed. see Chapter 4, pp 93 ff 
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campaigns made by Japanese short-wave radio, for which material regarding the 
audience response exists, such as the ''Tokyo Rose" broadcasts and those made by 
pnsoners. It also draws, in a more general way, on the responses to Japanese 
campatgns made by Allied propagandists, in order to infer the effects Japanese 
overseas radio was perceived in having at the time. 
Broadcasts to Australia 
Letters written by prisoners were read out over Japanese-controlled radio stations 
from early in the Pacific War6 in order to attract listeners to these stations, particularly 
in Australia. By February 1942 1,100 prisoner letters had been written for random 
broadcase from Tokyo, in order to ensure that once attracted, the listeners remained 
tuned in to Radio Tokyo, so as not to miss a letter. In June 1942 the station in Batavia 
also began broadcasting prisoner letters, along with lists of the names of prisoners in 
camps in Indonesia. The letters were censored, and were usually similar, largely 
describing scenes of life in the camp. However, there was enough personal 
information included in the letters for the listeners at home to assume that they were 
genuinely written by the named prisoner.s 
This presented problems for the Australian government, which became increasingly 
concerned that Australians were, in fact, tuning into Japanese stations in increasing 
numbers to hear news of friends and relatives. In November 1942, W. Macmahon , 
Ball, the chairman of the Government's sub-committee on enemy propaganda 
expressed this growing fear: 
It is not possible to estimate with any precision the number of 
regular listeners . . . but it seems safe to assume that they have won 
a very wide and interested audience . . . We have had a number of 
insistent requests . . . for information about the content of these 
broadcasts, and about times and frequencies . . . We have evidence 
that in some parts of Australia the relatives of prisoners are 
listening to a large number of Japanese-controlled sessions in the 
hope that they may pick up some information about prisoners. 
6 Kitayama records that the first letter, from Lieutenant Borden, was read out on 19th December 1941 
See Chapter 4, p 94 above 
7 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Toa e no Afichi p 126 
8 Meo: Japan's Radio JFar on Australia p 168 
Bearing in mind the large number of Australian prisoners in 
Japanese hands, it seems reasonable to assume that some tens of 
thousands of Australian listeners are deeply interested in these 
broadcasts. 9 
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In response to this concern, the sub-committee sent a questionnaire to the A.I.F. 
Women's Association in November 1942, asking for information regarding the 
listening habits of the Association's members. Three of the Association's officials 
attended a sub-committee meeting to present their findings. Their answers indicated 
there was indeed significant interest in the Japanese broadcasts among their members. 
Although it was admitted that listening was restricted to those who had both short-
wave receivers, and the leisure time to listen to the radio for prolonged periods, the 
A.I.F. officials indicated that as far as they were aware, "everybody that has a short-
wave set and leisure does listen in, and communicates with those who cannot listen," 
and that available figures showed a definite increase in interest. 10 
The sub-committee was also interested to know if '\inofficial listening bureaux" 
existed, which listened and passed on messages to the addressees of letters. The 
Association's findings indicated that the Prisoner-of War Relatives Association did 
carry out that service, and that many of the relatives of prisoners relied on others 
listening in for them, even if there was no specific roster organised. 11 The officials at 
the meeting cited examples of members who had been contacted by several people 
following the broadcast of a relative's letter. One, described as Mrs. B., had received 
a radio letter from her husband from Tokyo. In response "she was telephoned by over 
sixty people, received letters from twenty-five, including letters from South Australia, 
New South Wales and Queensland, [and] six people whom she did not know called on 
It thus appeared that the Australian government was correct in its suspicions regarding 
the audience for broadcasts of prisoner letters from Japanese-controlled stations. This 
9 Appendix to the Minutes of the sub-committee on enemy propaganda meeting of 3rd November 
1942 
op cit.: Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pp 166-7 
10 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 167 
11 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pp 167-8 
12 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 168 
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heightened its concern over the reactions of listeners to Japanese news and 
information. Most authorities assumed that listeners would subscribe to the view that 
''the Japanese wouldn't say all these things if there weren't some truth in them.,,13 The 
idea, which the Australian government sought to refute most clearly, was that there 
would not be any damage to Australia resulting from a Japanese victory. Australian 
official sources hence emphasised, both on the radio and in the press, the ill treatment 
of prisoners by Japanese, and atrocities committed by them in their exploitation of 
occupied territories. 14 In addition, in January 1943, the jamming of enemy short-wave 
broadcasts was considered, but the idea was dropped under technical advice that it 
would be impracticable. 
The problem of growing listener numbers to the Japanese broadcasts remained, 
however. In January 1943, the sub-committee on enemy propaganda received a 
service recommendation that the text of the letters should not be disclosed to the 
addressee, but that they should be merely informed that Radio Batavia claimed that 
their relative was a prisoner. The sub-committee wholly rejected this recommendation 
as it considered that this would not only fail to curb short-wave listening, but would, 
rather, foster it. In his rejection of the proposal, W. Macmahon Ball added, "It is idle 
to suppose that a wife or mother to whom a prisoner's letter is broadcasts will be 
satisfied with anything but the full text of the letter." Instead, he proposed "if the 
relative knows that the full text is recorded under the best technical conditions, and 
that it will be sent on without delay, this will remove the biggest incentive to direct 
listening. ,,15 
This formed the basis of the sub-committee's counter proposal - that after verification 
of the prisoner's name and any others mentioned in the letter, the full text of the letter 
be sent to the addressee without delay. It was also stated that this change in policy 
would need to be accompanied by official announcements in the press, so that people 
would realise there was no need to listen in. 
\3 This was the view expressed to a monitor by the wife of a business executive, who was a veteran of 
World War One. 
Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 168 
14 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pp 168-9 
15 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia p 170 
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Meo claims that there is "little or no evidence upon which to base an opinion as to 
long-term effects of Japanese propaganda, or even short-term effects. ,,16 The lack of 
evidence for further fears over Australians listening to Japanese broadcasts after 1943 
seems to imply that, as far as the Australian government was concerned, the danger 
had subsided. It is probable that most people returned to their usual favourite stations , 
and as the war situation for Japan worsened, and Japanese claims conflicted so clearly 
with Allied claims, even those who remained listeners believed less and less in the 
Japanese version of events. Indeed, as the situation in the South Pacific continued to 
deteriorate, Radio Batavia stopped broadcasting prisoner messages, as the prisoners in 
Indonesia were moved to camps further north. 
However, the reaction of the Australian government to the prisoner broadcasts of the 
Japanese is an indication of their effectiveness. The Japanese were not alone in 
broadcasting prisoner names and letters, clearly identifying the addressee and the 
sender, in order to personalise their message. German stations listed names of war 
prisoners in order to draw enemy listeners to German radio programmesl7 and in 1945, 
during the Allied advance on Berlin, the Allied station, Radio Luxembourg, broadcast 
a programme for Germans entitled, "Letters Which You Do Not Receive." In it a 
female presenter read out love letters found on the bodies of dead German soldiers, 
again clearly identifying the writer and the addressee, in order to lower the morale of 
the German home front. 18 The personalisation of messages in broadcasts was, then, a 
recognised method of rendering the broadcast acceptable to the enemy audience. The 
findings of the A.I.F. Women's Association, that those who had both a short-wave 
receiver and time to listen tuned in regularly to Japanese-controlled stations, confirmed 
that this was indeed the case in Australia. Hence the concern of the Australian 
government to ensure that this increasing trend was reversed is understandable. It 
seems evident then that the use of prisoner letters and lists of names was an effective , , 
tool in drawing Australian listeners to Japanese stations. Not only does the statistical 
16 Meo: Japan's Radio War on Australia pI7I 
17 Doob: "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda" in 
Katz (ed.): Public Opinion and Propaganda p 513 . 
18 In the end it was stopped, not because it was considered ineffective, but rather because It was 
considered to be in bad taste. 
Doob: Public Opinion and Propaganda p 326 
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work carried out at the time confirm that the number of listeners was high, but the 
concern of the government to find a means of preventing listening indicates clearly that 
the method was an effective propaganda tool. 
The Radio Battle for India 
One of the major propaganda battles of the Pacific War was the one between Japan 
and Britain over India. The Japanese radio attack began from Tokyo in December 
1941, partially based on advice by leader of the I.I.L., Rash Behari Bose. 
From the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941 and throughout 1942, when 
the political situation in India seemed particularly critical for the British, the 
propaganda offensive towards India was waged intensely by both sides. Following the 
heightening of tension in India after the arrest of Gandhi and Nehru by the British 
authorities in August 1942, Radio Tokyo began a ''Propaganda Offensive,,19 on India 
and Britain .. Broadcasting time to India was increased and broadcasts were modified 
so that the messages could permeate all classes of Indian society. There were two 
main points in the plan - to recruit more Indians to broadcast on Japanese radio, as 
N.H.K. did not have available people able to speak all the Indian languages in which it 
wished to broadcast;20 and to ensure prompt reporting of disturbances in India, as the 
British controlled New Delhi broadcasting station enforced a forty-eight hour delay in 
reporting such incidents. 21 The offensive was spearheaded by a series of talks to India, 
which warned against both Britain and the United States. There were also speeches 
which portrayed India as part of Asia and rightfully in alliance with Japan, and those 
which praised the Indian Spirit, much as the Japanese and Asian Spirits were extolled 
in other overseas broadcasts.22 
During 1942, there was a real feeling on both the British and Japanese sides that the 
anti-British disturbances in India would erupt into violence. Indeed, the Japanese saw 
this as an opportunity to extend the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere across the 
19 Send en K6sei 
20 See Chapter 4 p 98 for details of the problems encountered with Indian language broadcasts. 
21 Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Toa e no Michi p 202 
22 See Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Toa e no Michi pp 257-260 
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subcontinent. The increase in radio propaganda to India, not only from Tokyo but 
also from stations in the surrounding Japanese occupied territories, was a natural 
response to this. If the population of India was, as it seemed, already openly hostile to 
British rule, the objective of harnessing that hostility and creating a Japanese-backed 
revolution, did not appear too difficult to achieve. 
This revolution did not occur. In a broadcast on 8th July 1942, Gandhi accused Japan 
of an "unprovoked attack on China" which lay waste "mercilessly to a great and 
ancient country,,,23 and declared it unwise for India to be reliant on Japan. Although 
Radio Tokyo ignored the comments, they made an impact on Indians in India and 
therefore reduced the perceived credibility of Japanese broadcasts there. The arrival 
of Subhas Chandra Bose in Singapore and the establishment of the I.N.A. and Azad 
Hind broadcasts may have raised the expectations of some Indians. By this time, 
however, broadcasts to India appeared only occasionally in the monitoring reports of 
the B.B.C., an indication that British concern over the situation in India had 
diminished. The feeling of impending internal crisis had subsided, and the changing 
war situation showed the Japanese army not to be the all-powerful force it had in 
1941-2. Hence whilst Japanese-backed broadcasts to India continued until the end of 
the war, the reality of the war situation undermined the credibility of their claims. 
However, early in the war the British had certainly been extremely concerned about 
the effect of Axis broadcasting on India. Japan was not the sole source of radio 
propaganda that Britain perceived as threatening. Although B.B.C. reports concerning 
German broadcasting to India were scathing24 they admitted that, 
23Kitayama: Rajio Tokyo: Toa e no Michi p 200 
24 A report dating from early in the war described German broadcasts as divided into two 
"compartments: " 
1. The translation of items from other German broadcasts. These, by reason of their remoteness 
from Indian affairs, are probably extremely tedious to uneducated listeners. 
2. Items specially written for the consumption of Hindustani-speaking listeners. Both are couched 
in simple language, and are plain statements of fact or fiction, whichever suits ~~n 
propaganda at the moment: but the noticeable difference between the two 'compartments hes In 
the sentiments expressed. German broadcasts are never dulcet in tone, and are usually 
reminiscent of the hymn of hate of the last war. But their special items in Hindustani by reason 
of their poisoned malice, . . . can only offend most Indian opinion." 
A formal appraisal of the strength of German broadcasts in Hindustani, dating from the early part of 
the war 
op cit. W. 1. West (ed.) George Orwell: The War Broadcasts, Appendix C. p 290 
By reason of the excellent reception from German transmitters the 
. ' 
entertamment value of the colourful content of their broadcasts and 
the pleasure afforded by the comparison of German and British 
versions of news items, they undoubtedly attract may listeners [in 
the uneducated classes]. 
It also recognised that, 
German 'Hindustani' announcers are excellent broadcasters. Their 
delivery is well-timed, and the language employed easily 
understood . . . They are undoubtedly potentially dangerous. 25 
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In 1942, concern over this danger was considerable in the light of Japanese victories in 
Malaya, Singapore and Burma, which resulted in Japanese troops reaching the Indian 
border. The growth of the protest movement inside India itself similarly caused 
concern, for India was extremely important to Britain in terms of prestige, war 
manpower and raw materials. Both Japan and Germany, then, played significant roles 
in determining the structure of British broadcasting to India. 
In late 1944 and 1945 despite the setbacks of the Indian National and Japanese armies, 
in Burma and the South Pacific, and the surrender of Germany, Subhas Chandra 
Bose26 remained confident that Japan would ultimately win the war. Bose believed 
that the only way India could achieve independence was through armed struggle and 
''would broadcast from Radio Singapore putting forward his ideas of another armed 
attack and blaming the Indian National Congress for its 'defeatist attitude. ",27 During 
June and July 1945, he broadcast almost daily at length on the subject of the Simla 
Conference, which had been called by the Viceroy, Wavell, for members of Congress 
and the Moslem League.28 On the 18th Bose commented that he had "no doubt that 
25 A formal appraisal of the strength of German broadcasts in Hindustani, dating from early in the 
war 
op cit. W. J. West (00.) George Orwell: The War Broadcasts, Appendix C, p 291 
26 Bose had established Azad Hind broadcasts to India from Singapore after his arrival from Germany 
in June 1943. Besides the Singapore station which was the centre of Japanese broadcasting to India, 
the Tokyo, Hsinking, Rangoon and Batavia stations made regular transmissions to India, and Tokyo 
established a "Free Indian Hour" similar to Radio Shonan'sAzad Hind broadcasts. 
27 AM. Nair: An Indian Freedom Fighter in Japan p 261 
28 The Conference discussed Wavell's offer that the Viceroy's Executive Council be made up almost 
exclusively of Indian political leaders until the end of the war, but it failed to achieve an agreement. 
Congress refused to accept equal numbers of Congress and Moslem League members in the ~ouncil, 
saying it would undermine the position of Congress Moslems, and the Moslem League contmued to 
press for the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. 
See Stanley Wolpert: A New History of India pp 338-343, and W. H. Moreland and Atul Chandra 
Chatterjee: A Short History of India pp 545-554 
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acceptance of the offer would seriously jeopardise all chances of securing even self-
government,,29 and on 25th he asserted, 
If India has not emerged as an independent State by the end of the 
war, our next plan should be a post-war revolution inside India. If 
we fail in that too, then World War no. 3 (sic.) will give us another 
opportunity to strike for our freedom. 30 
It would appear that the establishment of B.B.C. broadcasts to counter Axis 
broadcasts is a measure of the success which Japanese broadcasts to India did achieve. 
Although early in 1942 it appeared that few of the Indians to whom the broadcasts 
were aimed owned radio sets,31 the B.B.C. employed George Orwell to produce 
cultural programmes for intellectuals in India. It granted him permission to use 
"impressive processions of literary men and professors,,,32 such as T.S. Eliot and E. M. 
Forster,33 in his broadcasts. This is an indication of the importance attached to these 
B.B.C. broadcasts. The India Section of the B.B.C.'s Eastern Service was established 
at this time, in order to assuage India Office worries that ''the B.B.C. was not doing 
enough to counteract the propaganda offensive from the Germans. ,,34 
It is noted that Orwell was disappointed that the British Government was not doing 
more to reassure the Indian Congress that independence would be achieved after the 
war.35 This is perhaps an indication that very little B.B.C. broadcasting time was spent 
explaining the British view of the future to India, whilst much of the time was spent 
countering the claims of the Axis stations. It would appear, therefore, that the 
B.B.C. 's India broadcasts were largely reactions to the broadcasts made by Japan and 
the other Axis powers. 
29 Provisional Government of Free India (Shonan) in English for India, 18th June 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 2163, 19th June 1945 
30 Singapore in English for India, 25th June 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary of World Broadcasts No. 2170, 26th June 1945 
See Chapter 8 p 200 
31 Bernard Crick: George Orwell: A Life p 283 
32 Laurence Brander, op cit. Crick: George Orwell: A Life p 284 
33 Crick: George Orwell: A Life p 284 
34 Michael Sheldon: Orwell: The Authorised Biography pp 371-2 
35 Crick: George Orwell: A Life p 284 
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In the short-term, the Japanese propaganda broadcasts to India did not result in the 
changes in behaviour, which the propagandists hoped for within the time-scale which 
, 
the Japanese intended. Thus, according to the definitions of propaganda given above, 
the campaign must be viewed as a failure. 
That is not, however, an entirely accurate view of the situation. The influence of Bose 
was not hampered noticeably by his association with the Japanese, and his broadcasts 
reached a large section of the population. After the war British plans for India to have 
dominion status ultimately proved untenable, India became a Dominion in 1947 and a 
Republic in 1950.36 
Whatever the reaction within India to Japanese and Indian nationalist broadcasts, it 
would appear that their effect on the British government was considerable. 
Broadcasts by Japan and the other Axis powers caused considerable concern in 
Britain, and resulted in the British establishing B.B.C. broadcasting to India which 
seemed constantly to react to these broadcasts, and not to lead in a "radio offensive." 
This was, naturally, not the primary aim of the Japanese propagandists, but it is an 
indication that the broadcasts were not entirely ineffective, and that the British clearly 
recognised their potential influence. 
Broadcasts to Enemy Troops 
Early in the war, the propaganda team of Section Eight of the General Staff under 
Major Tsuneishi Shigetsugu, became responsible for producing propaganda to 
demoralise enemy troops. Apparently convinced that American men thought of little 
other than women and sex, leaflets were produced for dropping over Allied zones, 
which showed ''bosomy hometown girls languishing in diaphanous nightgowns, pining 
away for their absent boyfriends - and often succumbing to fleshy temptations with 
36 Independence was achieved in 1947. However, between .1947 and 194~ I~dia was under the 
nominal authority of a British-appointed governor-general, while a new constitution '~'aS framed, th.e 
former princely states incorporated and the former colonial states restructured. Hence It was not until 
1950 that India was proclaimed a fully independent federal republic. 
Hutchinson Encyclopedia, 1995 Edition, P 528 
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other men. ,,37 As far as the recipients of these leaflets were concerned, they were 
amusing, but ridiculous. 
However, the same team was also responsible for "psychological warfare" by radio 
and eventually for "Zero Hour." In the early stages of the war, the simple 
broadcasting of the truth regarding the Japanese victories was enough to make a clear 
impression on the minds of listeners. Even before the Japanese military situation 
began to deteriorate, however, there were problems with the perceived effectiveness of 
these broadcasts. Initially, Tsuneishi and his staff had little concept of the difference 
between domestic propaganda, and that to be broadcast overseas. Under pressure 
from extremist elements in the government, which insisted that the broadcasts contain 
the same concepts of "mystical nationalism" promoted in domestic programmes, 
broadcasts included references to the "holy war" being fought by the "sacred soldiers 
of Japan." Indeed, Tsuneishi and his team even considered assembling a group of 
actors who would recite Shinto prayers on the overseas transmission.38 This displayed 
a remarkable lack of understanding regarding both the enemy audience, and the 
techniques necessary to wage a successful propaganda campaign. 
A further problem confronted by this team was that there were few native English 
speakers to write scripts. Many of the news items broadcast, had first to be translated 
into Japanese, to be compiled into news and commentary scriptS.39 After this the 
scripts were passed on for translation into the language for broadcast. Hence, the 
version for broadcast was often very different from the original. 4O In addition, the lack 
of fluent English writers resulted in many "howlers" being noted by enemy monitors. 
A report in Autumn 1943 said, "With the exception of one dead, all on the exchange 
ship were in the best of spirits." Even in the Summer of 1944, reports stated that ''The 
confounded enemy at Chittagong is awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. ,,41 
Futhennore, there were equally few fluent English speakers to present the 
37 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 66 
38 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 66 
Preswnably these would have been for Japanese troops and Japanese overseas . 
39 The news items would come from DOmei, the army and navy information burea\lx, the ForeIgn 
Ministry, the German DNB News Agency, and Italy's Stefani News Service 
40 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 68 
41 Moo: Japan 's Radio War on Australia. p 265 
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programmes, and many of the announcers were untrained in presentation. Hence, 
problems over pronunciation also occurred regularly, and Australian monitors noted 
"imitation" being read for "intimidation," defied" for "deified," and even "slumbering" 
for "submarine.,,42 It is little wonder that, as Duus states, "most Allied soldiers 
regarded the wartime Japanese news broadcasts as a big joke.,,43 It was under these 
conditions that it was decided to recruit Allied prisoners-of-war with experience in 
broadcasting to produce a better quality of programme for the enemy soldiers. 
In 1942, Charles Cousens, Wallace Ince and Norman Reyes, who had been captured in 
Singapore and Corregidor were brought to work on Japanese broadcasts.44 Although 
at first the prisoners merely corrected the grammar and syntax of Japanese-prepared 
scripts, the huge numbers of mistakes prompted them to suggest that they write the 
scripts, and they were allowed to do this. In 1943, new technology allowed the 
Japanese army to monitor American medium-wave transmissions, so listening-posts 
could detect news of local disasters. 45 As a result of these two developments, plans 
were made to transmit the programme "Zero Hour.',46 It began on 1st March 1943, 
and its aim was to make American troops in the South Pacific homesick and 
demoralised. Tsuneishi's team hoped that the insertion of accurate, but bad, news 
from home, which the troops were unlikely to hear from other sources, would 
discourage them, and lower their morale. However, the light entertainment and jazz 
slots, which were interspersed with news, were intended to encourage listening. In 
addition, the timing of the programme was carefully planned, so that it would come on 
air, as the troops were relaxing after their evening meal. 47 
The new programme format was highly successful in quickly generating a following 
among the American troops in the South Pacific. Only four months after it had begun 
an American news report from Guadalcanal stated, "Tokyo has been beaming a 
42 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 68 
43 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 67 
44 See Chapter 6 pp 138-9 
45 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 76 
46 For a full discussion of the development of the "Zero Hour" programme, see Chapter 6 pp 138-1~~ 
47 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 77 
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program called "the Zero Hour" direct to the Russell Islands and Guadalcanal. The 
fellows like it very much . . . ,,48 
The three prisoners-of-war involved in the broadcast were in a position to try to 
sabotage the Japanese material. Their aim was that as a cheerful entertainment 
programme, "Zero Hour," would boost the morale of its listeners, rather than lower it. 
Hence, when plans for expansion were discussed in November 1943, and it was 
decided to include increasing amounts of demoralising propaganda, Cousens 
persuaded the staff to allow him to choose the new announcer. He chose Iva Toguri, 
With the idea that I had in mind of making a complete burlesque of the 
program, [her voice] was just what I wanted - rough, . . . a voice that I 
have described as a gin fog voice. It was . . . anything but a femininely 
seductive voice ... a comedy voice that I needed for this particular job. 49 
The voice and patter of "Orphan Ann" was very distinctive when compared with the 
voices of Radio Tokyo's other female presenters, and the popularity of "Zero Hour" 
among the American troops in the South Pacific increased further. 50 The seeming 
success of "Zero Hour" gave rise to other programmes written and performed by the 
Allied prisoners at Bunka Camp, such as "Hi no Maru Hour," later ''Humanity Calls," 
and "Postman Calls. ,,51 
After the war, Iva Toguri gave an interview to reporters52 from Cosmopolitan 
magazine, stating that she was the only ''Tokyo Rose. ,,53 However, despite declaring, 
"There is no Tokyo Rose; the name is strictly a GI invention,,,54 the United States 
Government pursued her after the end of the war in a witch-hunt for ''Tokyo Rose." 
The vigour with which it did so would suggest that the Japanese radio propaganda 
campaign had been highly successful in its demoralising of American troops. The trial 
48 New York Times, 29th June 1943 
op cit. Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 77 
49 Testimony of Charles H. Cousens, 15th August 1949 
op cit. Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific pp 80-81 
50 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the PaCific p 81 
51 For a fuller discussion of these broadcasts see Chapter 6 pp 145-152 
52 Clark Lee and Harry Bunbridge " 
53 Iva signed their contract for an exclusive interview, which stated that she was the only . T~kyo 
Rose." In return she was promised $2,000 plus any money which might arise from other pubhcatIons 
or from film rights. 
Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific pp 22-3 
54 Howe: The Hunt for "Tokyo Rose" p 65 
229 
cost the government over half-a-million dollars55 and Iva Toguri spent over six years in 
prison56 and a further twenty years as a stateless person. 57 
The evidence, however, does not seem to support the supposition that the campaign 
was successful. Such was the popularity of the "Zero Hour" programme with the 
troops, that after Iva had claimed to be "Tokyo Rose," even her official questioning by 
the Eighth Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (C.lC.) was disrupted by "an endless 
stream of [ American] soldiers and officers of all ranks" who ''began to parade in and 
out of the room asking for Iva's autograph.,,58 In fact, the interrogation was 
interrupted by Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth 
Army, who called Iva to his office in order to meet her and have a souvenir 
photograph taken with her. 59 This celebrity status60 would not commonly be expected 
for a messenger delivering enemy propaganda. The "Zero Hour" programmes did, in 
fact, seem to have the opposite effect from what was intended, and generally their 
value as entertainment for bored and war-weary soldiers was considerable. They 
seemed, then, to have played a role in keeping the morale of these soldiers up, rather 
than lowering it. It would appear that the prisoners' greater experience in 
broadcasting to westerners, particularly that of Cousens, ensured that they controlled 
the output of the programme with considerable success. 
To denounce "Zero Hour" as a complete propaganda failure by the Japanese would, 
however, be somewhat inaccurate. In terms of propaganda effectiveness as defined 
above that is a correct verdict. However, it became one of the few Japanese overseas 
55 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 1 
56 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 225 . 
57 She was finally released in January 1956, and was pardoned in 1976, re-gaining her Amencan 
citizenship. 
See Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific pp 226-233 
58 Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 30 . 
59 During the war Eichelberger had ordered a B-29 bomber to drop a packag~ of the l~test hit .~rds 
addressed to Tokyo Rose, in a bombing run over Tokyo. Iva knew nothing of this, but It IS an 
indication of the popularity of the broadcasts. 
Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 30 . 
60 It was envied by "Zero Hour" producer Oki Kenichi, whose wife had :!,so been a presenter on ~dio 
Tokyo. At a press conference for all the Allied correspondents on 4 September 1945'.,he saId to 
Filipe d'Aquino, Iva's husband, "I should have told them my wife's name instead of yours. 
Testimony of Filipe d' Aquino, 6th September 1949 
op cit. Duus: Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific p 29 
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radio broadcasts, which succeeded in appealing widely to its target audience. Even 
before the outbreak of war, broadcasts to North America were rarely listened to 
outside the Japanese community. In Europe, Japan's radio agreements with Germany 
and Italy allowed for the relay of regular exchange broadcasts on the domestic 
networks, but there is little to suggest that the broadcasts were particularly popular. 
In addition, according to the monitors' notes in the B.B.C.'s Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Japan's European transmissions often seemed to be plagued by a lack of 
power, and sections were often inaudible. The prisoner letters were a popular 
enticement to Australians, but they were less a shaped programme than insertions 
between news reports. 
"Zero Hour" was, then, the first Japanese overseas programme that was truly popular 
amongst its target audience, because it succeeded as an American-style programme. 
Since the start of overseas broadcasting in 1935, Japanese programme producers had 
frequently realised that the type of programme needed for western listeners differed 
enormously from the programmes which featured in the domestic schedules, and 
several efforts had been made to increase the amount of jazz music broadcast. In 
"Zero Hour," Radio Tokyo finally seemed to have achieved success in this respect, 
creating a -programme which appealed to the American troops it targeted, because it 
was a programme so like those at home. However, in allowing the prisoners the 
freedom to create the kind of programme which appealed so completely, the Japanese 
also allowed them to dilute much of the propaganda element of the programme. In the 
end "Zero Hour," despite its achievements, failed in precisely that task it was 
established to perform. 
How effective was Japanese wartime overseas radio propaganda? 
Radio propaganda was considered of the utmost importance by all the belligerent 
nations during World War Two. As the scope of warfare differed from previous wars, 
and exposed millions of civilians to unprecedented bombings, so the battle for the 
civilian mind became as important as the one for that of the combatant. Japan was no 
exception in developing overseas radio for propaganda use. In fact, as Japan had been 
involved in an undeclared war in China since 1937, the role of radio in the battle to 
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win the minds of those involved in the war, and in justifying the Japanese position to 
non-belligerents, had been developing prior to the start of World War Two. 
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, it would appear that some forms of 
propaganda towards Asia met with some success. The leaders of the Burmese 
independence movement turned to Japan for assistance in overthrowing British rule, in 
exactly the manner that the Japanese and IN.A. broadcasters appealed for Indians to 
do in 1942. Like I.L.L. leaders, Aung San and Illa Myaing61 travelled to Japan. In 
1940, they met Japanese army representatives, and the following year established the 
Burma Independence Army (B.I.A) which entered Burma alongside the Japanese in 
December 1941.62 However, this cannot be attributed to radio propaganda. The 
desire for freedom from British rule was well established before the independence 
movement turned to Japan for assistance, and there was a clear division amongst its 
members, even after Aung San had visited Japan, over co-operation with the 
Japanese. 63 In fact Aung San's was a pragmatic view, that the independence 
movement should accept help from wherever it was offered, and monitor the situation 
as it developed. Aung San's turning towards Japan, was not, therefore, the result of a 
radio propaganda campaign by the Japanese, but the result of the perceived growing 
strength of Japan in Asia. However, a propaganda campaign is rarely conducted 
through a single medium in isolation. The radio broadcasts of Japan must have 
contributed to the development this perception of Japan as an Asian ally with sufficient 
power to overthrow Britain, but was accompanied by newspaper and eyewitness 
reports from China, and the position of Japan in world politics. 
In Japanese occupied Indonesia where the dissemination rate of radio sets was only 
0.15% even following a drive to re-distribute captured sets formerly owed by Dutch 
61 He was later known as Yan Aung. . 
62 This was described as "an occasion of great pride and joy to the Burmese, who felt that at last thelT 
national honour had been vindicated" 
Aung San Suu Kyi: Freedom from Fear and Other Writings p 16 
63 Aung San Suu Kyi: Freedom from Fear p 14 . 
Even Aung San was not overly enamoured of the Japanese, admiring the "patrioti~m, ~l~~mes~ an~ 
self-denial of the Japanese people," but disliking the '''barbarity' of some of thelT mtlitanst Ylews 
and shocked by "their attitude towards women. " 
Aung San: Burma 's Challenge 
op cit. Aung San Suu Kyi: Freedomfrom Fear p 14 
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households64 the Japanese erected radio speakers on towers or in treetops to ensure 
that the radio message was heard by the population at large. This is an indication of 
the importance attached to radio propaganda, not only in influencing the future actions 
of a nation, but also in controlling the actions of the population once occupation by the 
Japanese had begun. Such radio towers, erected in public places such as markets, 
railway stations, large streets, parks and squares, had been used successfully within 
Japan itself in the dissemination of information and opinions.65 In Indonesia, however 
the "singing trees" were popular principally for the broadcast of music. Aiko 
Kurasawa notes that a Javanese providing information about the Japanese occupation 
stated: 
When the Japanese broadcast music in Java, many people would listen, but 
when propaganda commenced, some walked away, saying: "Nihong-
Bohong" (Nippon-Lies).66 . 
As only "some walked away," presumably some stayed to listen, but there is little 
evidence regarding its effect. The Japanese utilised films, plays, traditional Indonesian 
performing arts, songs and kamishibar-67 as well as radio to carry out their campaign of 
persuasion in Indonesia. The effect of this assault through all the available media was 
greatest amongst the uneducated and the younger generation.68 However, the 
Japanese faced considerable language problems in Indonesia, as most people spoke 
local dialects rather than Bahasa Indonesia.69 It may be assumed, therefore, that the 
radio campaign, which relied solely on language, was less effective than other media, 
which were more visual. 70 
Broadcasts to Latin America were generally dominated by condemnation of United 
States' actions and attitudes. These were intended to dissuade the countries of South 
America from following the United States into declaring war on Japan. Each Latin 
American declaration of war was treated with pseudo-sympathy, and blamed not on 
64 Kurasawa Aiko: Mobilization and Control: A Study o/social Change in Rural Java, 1942-1945, 
Vol. 1 P 367 
65 Gordon Daniels: "Japanese Domestic Radio and Cinema Propaganda, 1937-1945" 
in K.R.M. Short (ed): Film and Radio Propaganda in World War Two p 296 
They were also widely used in Asia where literacy rates were low. 
66 Kurasawa: Mobilization and Control Vol. 1 p 368 
67 These were picture story shows 
68 Kurasawa: Mobilization and Control Vol. 1 p 378 
69 Kurasawa: Afobilization and Control Vol. 1 P 376 
70 Kurasawa: Mobilization and Control Vol. 1 pp 377-8 
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that country, but on United States' pressure. Hence declarations of war by Brazil and 
Uruguay were described in August 1942 as being made "through economic 
necessity.,,71 Argentina was held up as an example to the rest of South America for 
"remaining strictly neutral despite American bribes"n whilst the other countries of 
Latin America were warned of American economic imperialism. 73 In the short-term 
these propaganda themes would seem to have had little general effect, despite the 
large Japanese communities, in Brazil in particular. Within weeks of Pearl Harbor all 
the countries of South America except for Argentina and Chile broke off relations with 
Japan.74 However, it is probable that one effect of the stream of Japanese propaganda 
to South America was to heighten United States' fears regarding the position of South 
American countries. A possible result of this was to stimulate United States' 
economic aid to the region in order to prevent its alignment with Japan. If this were 
the case, the propaganda would seem to have had a greater effect on the United States 
than on its target audience. 
The effect of Japanese radio propaganda on the main Allied powers is somewhat easier 
to analyse, as data collected by them remains in a more complete state. However, here 
too, it would be difficult to isolate the propaganda disseminated by radio from other 
factors. In enemy countries there were, naturally, few other media, which Japan could 
utilise to present her viewpoint in the same way as in the occupied territories. The 
world situation, however, was seen by listeners to either confinn or deny Japanese 
claims. In the first six months of the war the enormous Japanese military successes 
were sufficient in themselves to convince the foreign audience of Japan's military 
strength. The radio reports made were often exaggerated, but the listener would be 
impressed as radio propaganda was confirmed by events. The credibility of these 
broadcasts so concerned the Australian government that its sub-committee on enemy 
7\ United States' Record of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Analyses of Propaganda Concerning Latin America, 
22nd_24th August 1942 
72 United States' Record of the F.B.I.S.: Daily Analyses of Propaganda Concerning Latin America, 
6th October 1942 
73 See for example "The United States wants South America as a Colonial Possession" and "Japan is 
liberating Greater' East Asia but the United States wants slaves," United States' Record of the 
F.B.I.S.: Daily Analyses of Propaganda Concerning Latin America, 8th and 21st Octo~r 1942., ~n? 
"Wallace's recent speech shows the true extent of American exploitation in degrading Boh\la, 
Weekly Analyses of Shortwave News and Propaganda Concerning Latin America, 25th May 1943 
74 CaIvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard: Total War, p 214 
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propaganda was charged with finding a way to prevent the public from tuning in. It 
accepted that listeners were principally concerned with obtaining news regarding 
captured relatives and friends, but wished to find a means of reassuring them of their 
well-being without exposing them to Japanese propaganda. The source of the 
propaganda was, then, perceived as credible. Concern that the thought processes and 
behaviour of listeners would be modified under the suggestion of this source, was 
sufficient to warrant a government survey of listening habits, and the establishment of 
a system of transcribing and sending the prisoners' radio letters to their families. 
Later in the war, the situation began to tum against Japan. The continued exaggerated 
radio claims of Japanese successes became less credible, as the reports made by 
Japanese radio stations strayed further from what the listener. perceived to be the 
reality of the war situation. In 1942, when the anti-British demonstrations in India 
were at their peak the B.B.C. monitoring reports, which were distributed among the 
relevant departments of the British government, reported Japanese broadcasts to India 
in considerable detail. However, despite the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose from 
Germany in June 1943, and his increased activity to promote Indian independence, 
later monitoring reports mentioned broadcasts to India less and less frequently. 
Generally, the full text 6f a Bose speech or a particularly interesting commentary 
would appear, but the monitors no longer reported more general news. This would 
have been at the request of the government, which received the reports. Presumably 
by this time, the British government's concern over the situation in India had lessened. 
The worst of the demonstrations were over and its fear of impending internal crisis had 
passed. In addition, the Japanese army had received several setbacks in the Pacific and 
was perceived as having to fight to maintain its current positions. The possibility of a 
Japanese invasion of India appeared less likely, so the credibility of the radio 
propaganda was reduced; resulting in the British government's diminished concern 
over it. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of Japanese radio propaganda during World War 
Two, it is necessary to return to the considerations for a successful propaganda or 
advertising campaign cited previously. Firstly, it is necessary for the target audience to 
be in a position of receiving the message. In radio broadcasts the Japanese utilised the 
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only media which could reach an enemy audience, and they devised methods of 
rendering Japanese stations appealing, in order to encourage listening. Hence, the 
light entertainment of "Zero Hour" appealed most to American troops isolated on the 
islands of the South Pacific, and letters from Allied prisoners-of-war was an effective 
method of encouraging listeners to tune in from Australia. In territories, which the 
Japanese occupied, radio propaganda was employed alongside other forms of 
propaganda, so that there would be a greater chance that the audience would 
encounter the message in at least one form. 75 In territories, where it was considered 
the audience for radio broadcasting was too small, such as in Indonesia, methods were 
devised for public listening, to increase the numbers of people encountering the radio 
broadcasts. Japan also signed "radio pacts" with her major allies, including Germany, 
Italy, and Thailand. These allowed for the regular relay of Japanese programmes on 
the domestic network of these nations, and the relay of their programmes on the 
Japanese network, ensuring that the audience in the countries allied to Japan also 
regularly heard Japanese broadcasts. In this respect, then, Japan's preparations to 
ensure that her radio propaganda was heard were very thorough. 
The second consideration is that successful propaganda is related to the prevailing 
mood of the time, and to the beliefs, values and personalities of the audience. This 
proved to be the principal problem for Japanese propaganda. In wartime, broadcasts 
from the enemy are unlikely to conform to the beliefs and values of the majority of the 
audience. There may be an element, which is opposed to the war, or supports the 
enemy but it is unlikely to be large or powerful. It is also highly probable that such an 
element, or a group, which is perceived as such, will be strongly controlled by the 
government, as Japanese Americans were during World War Two. Hence, the 
broadcaster begins at a disadvantage. Japan's disadvantage was compounded by the 
fact that Japan was perceived as having started the war by making the first unprovoked 
strike against the United States at Pearl Harbor. All the Japanese stations continually 
asserted that the economic sanctions placed on Japan during the 1930s and early 1940s 
75 This is the more common method for co-ordinating a propaganda or advertising campaign. It is 
usual for an advertiser, for example, to promote a product simultaneously through advertise~ents 
placed on the television, radio and billboards, in newspapers and magazines, and even through direct 
mail, or public distribution of samples. 
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had, in fact, been the provocation for the war, leaving Japan no other option but war 
and some United States planners preparing for the post-war period would have partly 
concurred in this. However, the Pearl Harbor attack was a psychological barrier in the 
minds of the enemy audience, which could never be completely surmounted by 
Japanese propagandists. 
As important as the pre-conceived beliefs of the audience in the development of a 
propaganda campaign is its perception of the situation at a particular time. A 
propaganda campaign which is perceived as anachronistic, is unlikely to be as 
successful as one, which is closely attuned to the time in which it is conducted. 76 
Often, the only support a radio propagandist has in relating to an enemy audience is 
the reality of the war situation, as there is no other medium under his control through 
which his claims will be confirmed. Hence, at the beginning of the Pacific War the 
claims of Japanese stations that the old order in Asia was ended were confirmed by the 
rapid expansion of Japanese control and the seeming inability of both the British and 
the Americans to halt it. Japanese reports erred on the side of exaggeration even then, 
but their claims were generally credible. It is unsurprising, then, that the Australian 
government was concerned that Australians should not be exposed to arguments 
which might convince them that a Japanese invasion of Australia was inevitable. There 
was little military evidence to suggest otherwise. In addition, the Australian 
government's periodic warnings about invasion by Japan may have indirectly helped 
the Japanese radio propaganda. 
In the same way, the British government's concern over the unrest in India in 1942 
was related to the reality of the situation at that time. Once the serious threat of revolt 
and revolution had passed, broadcasts from Japanese-controlled stations urging Indian 
uprisings were not deemed sufficiently threatening for the government to consider 
them regularly, and monitors' reports on them became infrequent. For an audience, 
which does not have access to other versions of the situation, relating the propaganda 
to the true situation is less of a concern to the propagandist. 
76 Thus, old television advertisements which may have very been successful in the 1950s, seem 
irrelevant and boring to an audience in the 1990s. 
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Hence, in Japanese-controlled territories, where short-wave receivers were banned 
, 
there were few other means of learning a version of the situation different from that of 
the Japanese version. Here "news" of the '1:rue situation" was manipulated so that it 
"confirmed" the propaganda. It can also be assumed that this was the case in the 
presentation of the Pacific War by Japan's allies. Hence, Axis listeners to Japanese 
stations were less likely to perceive a conflict between the version of events portrayed 
by Japanese radio and what they perceived as the '1:rue situation," than listeners in 
Allied or neutral countries. 
The model stated, however, that the success of a propaganda campaign must finally be 
measured by whether the changes desired by the propagandist can be perceived in 
changes in behaviour in the target audience. This is not a simple consideration, for the 
short-wave radio activity of the Japanese during the Pacific War cannot be viewed as a 
single campaign. There were different campaigns at different times and to different 
audiences. The campaign to Asia before the outbreak of war in the Pacific probably 
contributed to the initial favourable attitude of many Burmese towards Japan. Possibly 
the most successful of Japanese propaganda campaigns was that of the prisoner letters 
used to attract Australian listeners to Japanese broadcasts. However, once the 
Australian government had developed a system for circumventing the need to listen, 
listener numbers dropped rapidly. Other Japanese radio campaigns were less 
successful in changing the behaviour of the target audience. Radio sets in India were 
few, and accompanied by Gandhi's public denunciation of Japan's actions in China, the 
threat of a successful invasion of India by the Japanese and Indian National Armies 
was perceived as more serious by London than New Delhi. In addition, the "Zero 
Hour" and other broadcasts written by prisoners for Allied troops, failed wholly in 
altering the thinking of their audience, instead boosting its morale. Despite advances 
in technology and developments in the use of radio propaganda, it would appear then 
that Japanese radio propaganda was doomed to follow the same path as Japanese 
military fortunes in the Pacific War - initial successes were later followed by valiant 
but ineffective campaigns. 
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Conclusion 
In both popular and academic circles, the Japanese war effort has often been 
considered as somewhat "primitive" or "pre-modern" when compared to those of 
Germany, Britain and the United States. This is in part because Japanese wartime 
propaganda often created an image of "pre-modernity", by making frequent references 
to "pre-modern" ideas such as Bushido. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Pacific War as a 
whole has been of less interest to European scholars than to their American 
counterparts, but even in North America, studies of propaganda have tended largely to 
ignore Japan's efforts as less important and less skilful than those of the other 
belligerents. 
It is true that the Japanese wartime government contained no individual comparable to 
Josef Goebbels in Nazi Germany. As the Nazi party's second most famous speaker 
after Adolf Hitler from 1932/ Goebbels was a central figure in the German 
administration and as Minister for Propaganda, personally directed German 
propaganda in all its forms. Such a figure did not exist in Japan, where there were no 
charismatic figures of the kind that comprised the leadership of Nazi Germany. In 
Tokyo, the Minister for Communications headed a workforce of civil servants who 
controlled the various propaganda activities of the Japanese government. Different 
Divisions and Sections were responsible for different areas of the operation, and none 
of the Ministry's campaigns became the personal responsibility of the Minister. 
Naturally, Goebbels did not work alone and had groups of propagandists which 
produced much of the Nazi material. However, he was clearly recognised as the 
person in charge of propaganda in Germany, and for him "radio was ... the most 
important instrument of propaganda.,,2 Hence, he personally appointed all the 
directors of radio during the war,3 and required that he be consulted before news be 
released by radio.4 From 1941 he also insisted that radio commentators and news 
editors attend his ministerial conferences to ensure they understood his views. 5 
1 Robert Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 55 
2 Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 176 
3 Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 177 
4 Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 179 
5 Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p179 
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The Japanese system of propaganda control was spread further by the existence of 
several bodies, external to the Ministry of Communications, which were responsible 
for selected areas of information and propaganda. Both the Army and Navy Ministries 
had their own Information Departments, which issued communiques and statements 
regarding military matters independently of the Ministry of Communications. In 
addition, in 1936 the Cabinet Information Committee, later the Cabinet Information 
Bureau, was established. This body controlled many of the areas relating to 
censorship. Comprising representatives of each of the Ministries, and the media and 
reporting directly to the cabinet, its role was to relieve the pressure of censorship from 
the Ministries by allowing for easy discussion between the representatives of all the 
Ministries which needed to be consulted over a given issue.6 
This system would be expected to create conflicts in propaganda, as the large number 
of individuals involved meant that there was more scope for differences in 
interpretation than in the German system. However, this does not appear to have been 
the case. The Ministry of Communications had representatives on the C.I.B. and 
consequently was aware of all C.I.B. decisions. In addition, the daily meetings of the 
C.I.B. included the Prime Minister, a serving military officer, and representatives of 
the Army and Navy Ministries. Hence, it was also aware of military propaganda 
policy. There was, therefore, less likelihood of a divergence between the propaganda 
line of the Ministry of Communications and that of the other Ministries than would 
first appear. 
In fact, it would seem that the Japan's system of propaganda control was closer to the 
systems employed by both Britain and America than that of Germany. Here, too, it 
was the bodies in charge of propaganda, which were important rather than an 
individual. In Britain, the Ministry of Information and the Political Warfare Executive 
(P.W.E.),7 established in 1941, formulated propaganda campaigns, and in the United 
6 See Chapter 2 pp 41-42 for further details . . 
7 Like the C.I.B., the P.W.E. was established to bridge the propaganda gap betwee~ different .bodies. 
It was to create a unified propaganda policy towards Europe, uniting Special Opera~o?s 1 (which ~d 
been given the task of "setting Europe alight" and was answerable to the secret Miruster f~r Speclal 
Operations) and the B.B.C. 's European Service (which answered to the Ministry of InfonnatIon.) 
Michael Balfour: Propaganda in War 1939-41 pp 90-91 
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States, the Office of War Information (O.W.I.) controlled the propaganda output of 
the American media. In all of these cases, although distinguished individuals may have 
served on the bodies, they did not formulate policies alone, and it was the organisation 
which accepted responsibility. 
On balance, broadcasting was probably more important than other media in 
disseminating Japanese propaganda overseas, as it did not require the physical export 
of film reels or newsprint in order to reach its audience. In Japanese occupied 
territories short-wave broadcasting was secondary to other media, including local 
broadcasting. However, broadcasting remained the only means of reaching a potential 
audience in an enemy country, and the only practicable way of maintaining frequent 
contact with the audience of an ally given the transport problems, which were 
inevitable in wartime. 
Overseas broadcasting in Japan began later than in most European countries. 8 
However, when it began its output power was 50kw, which was second only to that of 
the B.B.C. 's Empire Service.9 Over the decade which followed, the number of 
transmitters and their output power were further boosted as the operation expanded. 
It was only in February 1945, that the first contraction of N.H.K.'s overseas radio 
operation occurred. This ensured that the Japanese transmissions remained some of 
the most powerful in the world, ranking with German, British and American stations 
throughout the war. Technologically, therefore, one cannot justify dismissing 
Japanese overseas radio propaganda as unimportant, for it's output was as strong and 
its transmissions as far-ranging as those of the other belligerent nations during World 
War Two. 
The lack of research into the propaganda produced by Japanese broadcasters belies the 
fact that much of the propaganda was very sophisticated. Despite its late beginning, 
Japanese overseas broadcasting displayed sophistication common to all the major 
8 Overseas broadcasting proper began in 1935, seven years after the first overseas station in Hollan~ 
began broadcasting, three years after the B.B.C. 's Empire Service, and two years after the Nazl 
station at Zeesen 
9 See Chapter 2 p 34 
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belligerents. Japanese propagandists were aware that different peoples reacted 
differently to material and presentation styles, and attempted to adapt broadcasts to 
the culture of each target country. Hence, from the beginning of broadcasting in 1935, 
English was used in broadcasts along with Japanese. Within a year French and 
German had been added to the schedules of the European transmission, and Radio 
Tokyo maintained a policy of broadcasting news bulletins in several local languages on 
each transmission throughout its period of operation. At its height in November 1944, 
Radio Tokyo broadcast daily in twenty languages to fifteen transmission regions. lO 
This awareness of the potential of radio to reach the peoples of the world was one 
which Japan shared with Nazi Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union, all of 
which used foreign language broadcasts in their overseas schedules to propagate their 
own ideology. It was Britain which initially seemed unconcerned by this potential, and 
which maintained a policy of only broadcasting in English for five years after the start 
of the B.B.C.'s Empire Service. 
It is conceivable that Britain was aware of the potential of foreign language 
broadcasting, but continued to broadcast only to British nationals and educated 
foreigners because it felt that the stability of its Empire was secure. Italian broadcasts 
to the Middle East in 1937 threatened this assumption, and the Arabic Service was 
inaugurated to counter Italian propaganda. Japan's Empire, as it existed in 1935, II 
was not as extensive or as well established as that of Britain, and the assumption that 
broadcasting in foreign languages was unnecessary, was not made. Radio Tokyo 
sought to justify the Japanese position and to detail Japanese views to the world, in 
languages which the world would understand. These were important features of 
Japanese overseas broadcasting, as they were in Nazi, American and Soviet 
broadcasting. 
A related question is how far the flexibility of content and style of Japanese broadcasts 
appealed to overseas listeners. Early Japanese broadcasts followed a pattern similar to 
Japanese domestic broadcasts, which tended to consist of newscasts, political speeches 
10 See Chapter 7 p 167 . . 
11 In 1935 Japan ruled Korea, the Liaotung Peninsular, Manchuria, Sakhalm, Tanvan and the 
Mandated Islands in the South Pacific. 
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and commentaries by prominent political figures. Music tended to be martial in nature , 
and after the outbreak of fighting in China this tendency increased, especially as 
American and British music were prohibited. 12 Japanese broadcasters however , , 
became increasingly aware from their surveys of listeners in overseas countries that , 
this was not popular amongst overseas listeners, and broadcasts were adapted to suit 
the tastes of the target country. The clearest example is that of broadcasts to the 
United States. N.H.K. sought to employ nisei, as their use of idiomatic American 
English was considered important in attracting the American audience. The most 
noticeable feature of the American transmissions, however, was N.H.K. 's frequent 
attempts to imitate American ''DJ-style'' programmes. The first suggestion that 
Japanese broadcasting was not sufficiently entertaining to attract American listeners 
was made in 1936 and this self-criticism was made several times over the ten years of 
Radio Tokyo's operations. Jazz music, considered the worst example of Western 
musical decadence, was completely prohibited in Japan. However, overseas 
broadcasts to America and American troops in particular, broadcast jazz programmes 
throughout the war. Each time it was suggested that broadcasts were unappealing to 
Westerners, jazz broadcasting was deemed to be the answer. In 1941, a Japanese jazz 
band, the New Order Rhythm Orchestra was even established at N.H.K. to record live 
performances for the American transmissions. 13 
It was in the programme, "Zero Hour," that N.H.K. finally produced a programme of 
the ''DJ-style'' type, which successfully imitated the style of the popular American 
broadcasts, which it had been attempting to recreate. The fast, idiomatic, slang 
English used by the prisoners to confuse the censor, and the upbeat music and banter 
of the "Orphan Ann" spot closely resembled the type of programmes broadcast by 
many American domestic stations. This is reflected in its popularity amongst the 
American troops in the South Pacific, who were unable to pick up their favourite 
home stations. "Zero Hour" was written and performed by prisoners, and Iva Toguri, 
12 Jazz and swing were banned as being symptomatic of Western decadence. It is un~lear w.hether 
classical composers from the Allied nations were actually banned, but in reality theu mUSIC. was 
virtually always overlooked in preference to music by German or Italian composers. Interestmgly 
Goebbels and Himmler also banned jazz from German broadcasting for the same reason. 
Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 181 
13 See Chapter 3 pp 71-2 
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a nisei. It would appear that the difference in style was too great for Japanese writers 
to completely comprehend, and that this kind of programme could, in the end, only be 
produced by those who were entirely familiar with American tastes, and who had 
listened to this kind of programme over long periods. 
However, the failure of Japanese scriptwriters and presenters to produce an entirely 
successful broadcast of this nature should not detract from previous Japanese attempts 
to produce a "DJ-style" jazz programme. Japanese broadcasters and propagandists 
understood that a different style of broadcasting was essential to attract American 
listeners to Japanese broadcasts, and that the same was true of other audiences. 
Consequently, they attempted to recreate broadcasts, which would appeal to local 
tastes. Hence, Japanese broadcasts contained celebrations of local festivals in 
transmissions to South America and South East Asia, where Japan portrayed itself as 
respectful of local customs. Japanese broadcasts also stressed Japanese respect for the 
Vatican and its criticism of British bombing raids, which damaged churches, to the 
predominantly Catholic South American communities, a theme, which rarely appeared 
in broadcasts to other regions. This ability to adapt the programmes and themes, 
along with the use of local languages in transmissions, is a clear indication of the 
sophisticated nature of Japanese overseas broadcasting. Japanese broadcasting did not 
have the strong ideological standpoint of stations such as Radio Moscow, which had 
been established in 1929 partly to promote world revolution in the Soviet style. Nor 
did it have the superior attitude of British broadcasting, which even when it began to 
broadcast in foreign languages, continued to do so in the style of British broadcasts, 
with little adaptation to the tastes of local audiences. Without the ideological 
constraints of Soviet radio or the inflexibility of the B.B.C., Japanese broadcasts 
showed a sophisticated and flexible approach to propaganda similar to that of 
Germany. This would seem to contradict the perceived role of Japanese radio 
propaganda as unimportant, as indicated by its absence in research by Western 
scholars. 
In the long run the refusal of the B.B.C. to bend to outside pressure to reshape its 
broadcasts helped to ensure that its propaganda was successful because it was 
perceived to be the impartial truth by many listeners. In response to Foreign Office 
complaints it even asserted, "The omission of unwelcome facts of news and the . . . 
suppression of truth runs counter to the corporation's policy.,,14 Radio Tokyo did not 
have the reputation for impartiality and truth, which the B.B.C. did. However, it is 
important to note that many minor reports in news bulletins were based on truth, 
although these were reported as secondary to the exaggerated military claims, which 
emanated from the Army and Navy Ministries' Information Sections. 
It is useful to examine items other than those referring to military matters, which made 
up much of the news bulletins. These were selected by programme producers at 
N.H.K. and not by military advisors. Naturally, all the scripts were approved by the 
C.I.B. before they could be broadcast, and presented the Japanese viewpoint, but it is 
interesting to note that in many cases Radio Tokyo broadcasts which were less than 
favourable to the Allies contained many probable "truths." One of the clearest 
examples is the treatment of Japanese internment camps in the United States by 
Japanese broadcasts. Perhaps predictably, the camps were denounced as inhuman. 
However, the facts used to illustrate the point were undeniable: that Japanese interned 
in the camps were put to work on fanns and that a riot had occurred during a protest 
at Manzanar camp near Los Angeles in 1942. The conclusion that Americans were 
"inhuman" may be an exaggerated one. However, one must agree with the Japanese 
broadcasters that American officials had been at best "heavy handed" in dealing with 
this section of their own public for such a riot to occur. In addition, the use of tanks 
to quell the riot could be viewed similarly.I5 This was not something that would have 
been widely reported by the Allies, but the factual reporting, and the subsequent 
conclusion made by Japanese radio, would have appeared at least plausible to a 
listener already suspicious of American intentions. 
Factual material regarding some statements made in Japanese broadcasts would have 
been unobtainable to Japanese script-writers, but often their statements were astute 
assumptions made after observing relationships between the Allies. Japanese 
broadcasters mentioned, from time to time, that there were problems in the capitalist-
14 Tom Hickman: What did you do in the War, Auntie? The BRe at War 1939--15 p 19 
15 See Chapter 5 pp 132-3 
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communist alliance of the Allies, both between Churchill and Roosevelt and Stalin, and 
between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. These included accusations that Chinese 
Communists hampered Nationalist operations in China to sway the domestic balance 
of power in their direction, and that the dropping of atomic bombs by the United 
States on Japan, was principally to intimidate the Soviet Union. 16 Hard evidence for 
such claims would have been unobtainable. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it 
is clear that the alliances between capitalist or nationalist regimes and communists 
presented some serious conflicts of ideology, which would remain unresolved 
throughout the war. Indeed, post-war events confirmed that these Japanese 
assumptions were largely true, and that wartime alliances were temporary ones 
between ideological enenues, who would become bitter rivals in different 
circumstances. 
Other favourite topics of Japanese news items included Britain's concerns over the 
British Empire and her apparent lack of concern towards its members. Early in the 
Pacific War, Japanese claims that only one quarter of ''British'' troops in Malaya 
comprised British nationals, are borne out by post-war figures. 17 The Japanese could 
gather accurate figures of prisoners in Malaya. However, they made assumptions 
based on these figures and applied them to British actions elsewhere. Hence, similar 
accusations, that Britain was content to let people from other countries do her fighting 
for her, were made concerning front line troops in Africa and later mainland Europe. 
A further field of propaganda material where Japanese broadcasts probably contained 
a good proportion of truth was in the reporting of achievements in the rebuilding of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, although this is impossible to verify. 
Often, particularly as the war situation deteriorated, these reports provided the "good 
news" element in Japanese broadcasts. Many of the reported achievements were fairly 
unimportant other than to the local population, and it is doubtful whether the average 
target listener overseas would really be interested, for example, in the building of a 
16 See Chapter 7 pp 184 
17 See Chapter ~ p 87-88 
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hydro-electric plant in Surabaya. 18 The propaganda value of such reports was in 
conveying an image of well being and normality within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is 
probable, therefore, that the developments described in reports did occur, for they 
would have held so little interest for overseas listeners that to invent lies regarding 
them would have probably amounted to wasted effort. 
Broadcasts which reported this kind of "selective truth" were probably more common 
in Japanese overseas broadcasts than those which lied directly.19 Reports on the 
situation in America, such as those regarding the Japanese internment camps, were 
often gleaned from Japanese returnees and foreign press reports, and then presented as 
the 'lruth" from a Japanese perspective. Similarly, broadcasts regarding the situation 
in Japan and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere probably reported a'lruth" 
which would present the Japanese in a favourable light. Naturally, the selection of 
news items was important, and any reports, which could have been construed as 
damaging to Japan or the image of Japan, were rejected. In essence it was the 'lruth" 
that was reported, but not the "whole truth." 
This reporting of the "selective truth" was not exclusive to Japanese wartime 
broadcasters. It was common to all the belligerents during the war and to any closed 
society since, which has wished to present an image of peace and well being to the 
outside world. During the war, the B.B.C. gained the reputation for ''truthful'' 
reporting and in 1941 the Danish Nazi newspaper, Feadrelandet, claimed ''Many 
people have more faith in bulletins from London than in the words of the Bible.,,20 It 
was, in fact, a B.B.C. plan to report more damaging 'lruth" than other belligerents, 
with the result that "if there is a disaster, we broadcast it before the Germans claim it . 
. . And when the tide turns and the victories are ours, we'll be believed. ,,2l The 
Japanese broadcasts were less 'lruthful" than the B.B.C.'s would appear to be from 
the above, in that reports of failures were never admitted. However, aside from the 
18 Tokyo in English for Europe, 18th June 1942 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts, No. 1067, 19th June 1942 
19 This is excluding those which, repeated the military information supplied by the Army and Navy 
Ministries' Information Sections, and which are dealt with below. 
20 Hickman: What did you do in the War, Auntie? p 127 
21 Hickman: What did you do in the War, Auntie? p 106 
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reports of military operations, which were not generated by N.H.K., the reporting of 
direct lies was limited and less obvious than those of the Nazi propaganda machine. 
Goebbels was contemptuous of those for whom his propaganda was devised, declaring 
"propaganda has nothing to do with truth, but everything to do with victory. ,,22 
Goebbels made statements which directly opposed previous claims. He would, in 
regard to Hitler's tactical alliance with the Nationalists, "speak of the unified 'National 
Opposition' as if he had never attacked the reactionaries, just as he had praised Hitler 
after 1926 as if he had never attacked him as a 'petit bourgeois betrayer of 
socialism. ",23 It must be assumed that if he made two diametrically opposed 
statements, at least one of them had to be a lie. By way of contrast, Japanese 
statements issued through the C.I.B. and N.H.K., rather than the Army and Navy 
Ministries, seem to have been more consistent, and in many cases, probably truthful, 
even if the conclusions were over-exaggerated. 
The false claims of the Japanese Army and Navy Ministries, however, should not be 
ignored as inconsequential. Despite the probable "truth" of most non-military 
broadcasts, descriptions of the military situation in the Pacific War constituted much of 
the broadcast time in Japanese short-wave programmes. All broadcasts contained 
news segments which invariably reported on the latest war developments. These were 
exaggerated unnecessarily even while the Japanese forces were inflicting huge defeats 
on Britain and the United States. Thus: 
Not content with the success of their sneak attack [on Pearl Harbor] 
Japanese propagandists exultantly announced that the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet had been virtually annihilated. And at least once a month 
thereafter, with monotonous regularity, Tokyo reduced the United 
States to 'the rank of a third-class sea power'. Thus every time a 
major naval engagement took place in the Pacific, Japan's zealous 
propagandists were compelled to refloat Uncle Sam's fleet so that it 
could again be sent to the bottom by the fabulous Japanese Navy.24 
Rolo was a Briton writing in 1944, before the end of World War Two, so the tone of 
the language he used about the Japanese is understandable. His obvious bias 
220p cit. Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 74 
23 Herzstein: The War that Hitler Won p 53 
24 Roto: Radio Goes to War p 173 
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notwithstanding, Rolo' s claims regarding broadcasts seem to be born out by 
monitoring reports of Japanese broadcasts in the first months of the war. The rapid 
victories of an Asian power at Pearl Harbor, on the Malay Peninsula, in Singapore, the 
Philippines and Indonesia were scarcely believable to the reeling world powers. That, 
in itself, was excellent propaganda. However, the Japanese habit of exaggerating even 
these victories, by claiming to have destroyed greater amounts of shipping and aircraft 
than was the case, left Japanese propagandists with the need to justify further battles, 
both in domestic and overseas propaganda. If the United States fleet had been 
virtually annihilated at Pearl Harbor, where did it obtain sufficient ships to warrant 
further attacks by the Japanese? 
After the Battle of Midway in mid-1942, as the military situation began to turn against 
Japan, this propaganda error became increasingly difficult to sustain or to overcome. 
Not only did it become clear that much of the American fleet remained intact, but the 
victories which had allowed the Army and Navy ministries to sustain this line were 
reversed and the supposed '1hird rank" navy of the United States began to inflict 
defeats on the Japanese. Domestic broadcasts could conceal this while American 
bombers were still out of range of Japan, as information was not available to the 
Japanese people from outside, and short-wave receivers were illegal. In overseas 
broadcasts, however, the denials of American victories, and the portrayals of Japanese 
defeats as victories,25 succeed only in alienating the foreign audience, which had 
alternative sources of news to compare with Radio Tokyo's statements. 
The military communiques of the Army and Navy Ministries were probably the least 
sophisticated propaganda used by N.H.K. in its overseas broadcasts. Programmes 
written by professional broadcasters, despite being censored, showed an understanding 
of the need for credibility in appealing to an audience. Many of the early attempts at 
programmes, which appealed to foreign tastes, were not particularly successful, for a 
variety of reasons. These included a lack of writers and announcers with the necessary 
language skills, and a failure to appreciate fully the differences in programming styles 
25 It was, for example, claimed that the Battle for the Solomon Islands produced the "wholesale 
destruction of the Anglo-Anlerican fleet." 
Rolo: Radio Goes to War p 174 
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between different countries. However, the fact that there were these differences and 
that they had to be accommodated in the broadcasting schedules, was recognised, and 
new programmes were continually developed to this end. Hence, the prisoner 
broadcasts, "Zero Hour" and "Hi no Maru Hour," were developed along with the 
broadcasting of prisoner letters. Regular musical exchanges were made with 
Germany, Italy and the countries of Greater East Asia, and local festivals and saints 
days were celebrated in broadcasts to South America. All of these were established in 
order to attract each audience and to convey a message of empathy to it. In turn, the 
audience was expected to accept the credibility of Japanese news reports and listen to 
propaganda speeches with at least a less than suspicious mind. The propaganda of the 
Army and Navy ministries undermined the positive effect of these broadcasts. Their 
over exaggeration at the beginning of the war meant that the propaganda line soon 
became unsustainable. The portrayal of setbacks26 as victories comparable to Japan's 
initial victories, served only to undermine any successes achieved by other 
programmes and to alienate potential listeners. 
One surprising feature of Japanese broadcasts was the accurate prophecy of events and 
tendencies made from time to time. During the course of presenting propaganda 
Japanese radio made several Claims regarding the post-war world, which eventually 
proved broadly accurate. Radio Tokyo claimed that the British Empire would be 
broken forever by the war and that America's policy was to take over the governing of 
British colonial territories after the war.27 In the years after World War Two, Britain 
no longer had the power or wealth to sustain a world-wide empire, and although it 
retained Hong Kong until 1997, the majority of the territories of the former Empire 
gradually achieved their independence. 28 Yet they did not become colonial 
possessions of the United States. However, in much of the world, particularly the 
Middle East, the United States replaced the weakened Britain as the most influential 
Western power. 
26 No belligerent ever admits to a defeat! 
27 See Chapter 7 p 177 . . ' . 
28 India became independent in 1947, Bunna in 1948, and Malaysia (Including Smgapore) m 1963. 
Singapore became a separate independent state two years later. 
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After the dropping of the atomic bomb Radio Tokyo accused the American 
government of using the bomb in order to intimidate it's future enemy, the Soviet 
Union/9 not to end the war with Japan. This is a theory on the use of the atomic 
bombs, which has been widely discussed by some historians. That the Soviet Union 
and the capitalist nations would be enemies when released from their uneasy wartime 
alliance was perhaps clear to many in 1945. However, until suspicion of government 
motives became prevalent in the 1970s it was inconceivable in people's minds that the 
United States might have sought to display its technological superiority by dropping 
atomic bombs unnecessarily. 
A frequent Japanese plea to Australia was that it belonged to Asia and would 
ultimately be abandoned by Britain. In the early 1940s it was far from clear that 
British power would diminish. However, with the loss of its empire in the post-war 
years Britain saw Europe as increasingly important, and in 1973 entered the European 
Economic Community, damaging many of its trade ties with Commonwealth countries. 
As a result Australian trade links within Asia, particularly with Japan, were developed. 
Now Australia has become a Pacific Rim rather than a colonial economy. To listeners 
in the 1940s the idea of such events may have seemed ridiculous propaganda, but on 
occasion Japanese propagandists perhaps inwittingly foretold the long-tertn future with 
considerable accuracy. 
The output of Radio Tokyo was generally sophisticated and showed a clear 
understanding by broadcasters of the potential for overseas radio propaganda. They 
recognised the need to appeal to an audience, and to be perceived as credible by it. 
Even before the outbreak of war the role of overseas radio was to explain the Japanese 
standpoint to the world, particularly after Japan left the League of Nations in 1933, 
over her invasion of Manchuria two years previously.30 Japan's development of 
overseas broadcasting was wide-ranging and after the outbreak of war, the fears of 
other governments towards ie l suggested that it was potentially a very effective 
29 Tokyo in English, 12th August 1945 
B.B.C.: Summary o/World Broadcasts Number 2218, 13th August 1945 
30 See Chapter 2 pp 29-30 
31 See Chapter 9 pp 217-221 for details 
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propaganda tool. Originally N.H.K. hoped to emulate the B.B.C., but it was forced 
out of B.B.C.-style colonial isolationism at the outset. However, it continued to 
follow a path between that of the B.B.C.'s '1ruth" and the blatant exaggerations and 
lies of Nazi stations. Unfortunately, it was forced to transmit unamended military 
propaganda issued by the Information Sections of the Army and Navy Ministries, 
which showed little understanding of the complexities of propaganda. 
A further obstruction to the success of Japanese overseas radio propaganda was the 
lack of listeners amongst groups who may have been expected to tune in. 
Atmospheric conditions frequently rendered radio signals to Europe unreliable and 
Japan did not have a system of relay stations across the world as Britain did. Although 
stations in Greater East Asia, particularly the Singapore station, relayed broadcasts, 
the extent of Japanese occupied territory was not as conveniently situated as that of 
British territory, all being within Asia, and this limited the range of even relayed 
broadcasts. Germany relayed Japanese broadcasts across the German domestic 
network according to broadcasting agreements between the two countries, but there 
was no German co-operation in relaying broadcasts across Europe. Hence, the 
number of listeners in Europe, even amongst those who wished to listen regularly, was 
low. The American policy of interning Japanese Americans also had an adverse effect 
on Radio Tokyo's potential for success as internment limited access to radio receivers. 
German Americans, unlike the Japanese community in America, were not interned and 
radio transmissions from Nazi Germany had a considerable following amongst the 
German American community, which could listen in freely. Pre-war evidence suggests 
that if Japanese Americans had been able to tune in, many would have listened to 
Japanese broadcasts. However, the policy of internment was to deny Radio Tokyo its 
largest potential overseas audience by denying Japanese Americans access to short-
wave radio receivers. 
A broader issue, which must be considered, is the extent to which Japanese wartime 
overseas radio propaganda had any lasting influence on post-war international 
thinking. This is difficult to determine. For many who lived through the war, it was 
the Allied image of the Japanese which remained, and many continue to hate Japan for 
its treatment of prisoners-of-war and for Japanese ferocity in combat. It is possible 
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that this may be due in part to Japanese portrayals of themselves as a warrior people, 
but it has much more to do with information learnt about Japanese camps at the end of 
the war. The occasional reference to race issues in the United States in broadcasts to 
American troops in particular, showed an awareness of the divisions in American 
society. It is unlikely, however, that Japanese radio broadcasts had much to do with 
growing awareness of them within America. However, it is possible that Japanese 
attacks on white superiority influenced the colonial peoples of Asia who gained their 
independence in the years after the war. In addition, N.H.K. staff were sent 
throughout the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to train Asian staff and 
develop Asian broadcasting. It is possible that this training produced a group of 
experienced radio broadcasters in some Asian countries who were able to produce 
high-class programmes in the years following the war. 
Despite the growing understanding and sophistication of propaganda techniques at 
N.H.K., Radio Tokyo failed to achieve its potential as a successful propaganda station. 
It was hampered by factors both within Japan and externally. The lack of foreign 
experience of many of its early programme producers and a shortage of announcers 
with foreign language skills meant that N.H.K. needed time to develop broadcasts 
which would appeal to different audiences around the world. In the long term this 
experience which was gained during the war placed Japan in a position of leadership 
amongst post-war broadcasters in Asia, and ensured that overseas radio was 
redeveloped quickly at the end of the occupation period. The lack of Japanese-
controlled areas in which to build relay stations and the American policy of internment 
ensured that the audience was small in most regions outside the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, which was not considered "overseas" in terms of broadcasting. 
Ultimately, however, Radio Tokyo was caught in the rivalry between the Army and 
Navy which eventually undermined much of the war effort. In the end, the defiant 
language of military propaganda served to ensure that it was perceived as incredible, 
and was therefore largely ignored, both by general wartime audiences, and by later 
scholars. 
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Archive Material 
Besides the Kitayama work and other secondary sources, the material for this research has 
come from several notable sources. Much of the detail of actual broadcasts was from the 
B.B.C. 's Monitoring Reports,l daily records of all foreign broadcasts picked up by the 
monitoring station, now at Caversham near Reading, and dating back to 1939. During the 
war these reports were distributed daily to the Foreign Office, the Ministry of 
Information, and other government agencies interested in foreign propaganda or involved 
in countering it. These are notes in English made by the monitor regarding the important 
items in a broadcast. Sometimes the full text of a speech or news report was included, but 
more usually the reports consist of notes regarding, presumably, what those receiving the 
reports had specified as important topics. As a source for the historian, the reports are, 
therefore, not flawless. Whilst most of what is written is probably a fairly accurate 
summary of what was said (and occasionally there are even notes as to the tone or 
presentation of the announcer), often there are large sections of the broadcast which are 
missing. Presumably, these were considered unimportant by the agencies, which received 
the report. However, it does mean that the Summary of World Broadcasts does not give 
a full picture of the radio propaganda reaching Britain. It is, hence, impossible to tell how 
long a given Japanese propaganda campaign, for example, continued, as once it became 
considered unimportant or ineffectual by the British propaganda agencies, items from that 
campaign ceased to be included in the monitoring reports. 
In addition, to these limitations, there is also a problem of subjective bias in the 
monitoring reports. They were written by monitors, who listened to the broadcasts in the 
languages in which they were transmitted, and compiled summaries in English. Naturally, 
a translated version of a report will often differ slightly from the original, owing to 
1 There are three full sets of these monitoring reports of which I am aware. One at the B.B.C.'s Written 
Archives also at Caversham, one in the Imperial War Museum in London, and one at the London School 
of Economics' Egham Depository Library in Egham, Surrey. I consulted copies in the two former .. In ~he 
te~1 of this study I have used the term Summary of World Broadcasts, in n:ference to the morutonng 
reports, as this how they are termed by the B.B.C. However, at the other locaoons the reports are knmm 
merely as the B.B.C. 's Monitoring Reports. 
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different linguistic nuances in the two languages. In addition, it was the responsibility of 
the individual monitor to summarise the broadcast, and in some of the reports it is possible 
to detect which summaries were compiled by the same monitor, through similarities in 
style. This means that there is some subjective bias in the reports unwittingly added by 
the monitor, and that in some cases the summary is fairly detailed, and in others less so. 
Despite these limitations, however, the Summary of World Broadcasts offers a daily 
account of short-wave broadcasting, which is unique, and of immense value. 
Besides the Summary of World Broadcasts, the B.B.C. Written Archive holds files of 
letters and other documents relating to the B.B.C. 's contacts with Japan. Whilst these are 
not extensive, particularly for the pre-war and war period, their contents are of interest. 
The files contain brief letters between the B.B.C. and N.H.K., and memos between the 
B.B.C. in London and its station in New Delhi, regarding Tokyo broadcasts. Most of 
these seem to have been made fairly irregularly, and often the files contain no further 
correspondence on a given subject. However, probably the most interesting documents in 
these files are a series of communications between N.H.K and the B.B.C. regarding 
preparations for the B.B.C.'s participation in the celebrations to commemorate the 
opening of a new broadcasting complex in Tokyo in 1939.2 They include telegrams 
continuing the schedule and even the Japanese translation of the B.B. C. 's greetings, hand 
written by the Japanese Press Attache in London. 3 
The second major source of material for this research was the United States' National 
Archives in Washington D.C.4 The volume of material relating to wartime radio 
broadcasting which still remains in the United States, is vast. The National Archives 
contain special reports written for different departments at various stages of the war, and 
separate lists of prisoner broadcasts besides the general daily, weekly, monthly and 
quarterly transcripts and summaries. There is a comprehensive guide to the contents of 
2 See Chapter 3 pp 60-61 . . 
3 This had been filed upside down by the Written Archives and had remam~ unno~ced for some years. 
4 The material relating to wartime radio monitoring is not housed in the mam archive but at a smaller 
holding store at Suitland, Maryland. 
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the archive and for those wishing to find something specific there are indexes to the 
transcripts and the sound recordings. 
However, the material is not without its flaws. As it does not appear in one daily report, 
it is difficult to follow a chronological path through the war period. Often a series of 
reports which seems to have been discontinued at an arbitrary date will merely have been 
renamed and later reports bearing the new name will reappear under a different heading. 
These changes of name, and perhaps distribution, occurred during the war, and usually the 
last few reports of a series often announced the coming changes. However, the guide to 
the archives does not explain that one section, is a continuation of the reports in an earlier 
section, under a different heading. It would, thus, be relatively easy for a researcher, to 
miss the second half of a series of reports by assuming that the later reports no longer 
exist. 
A further difficulty with the daily and weekly reports is that they are concise summaries. 
Unlike the Summaries of World Broadcasts, the reports contain analysis of the 
broadcasts, consisting of the "highlights" of overseas broadcasts with some detail in a 
later section. They do not state when in the running order of a programme an item 
appeared, and tend to draw themes of Japanese broadcasts together, not always clarifying 
which Japanese-controlled stations made a claim or in which order a statement was made 
from stations in the Far East. The researcher, therefore, must work from analysis 
produced with the intention of providing counter-propaganda, rather than analysing the 
contents of a broadcast itself These limitations, however, are offset by the value of the 
quantity of material, which has been preserved by the National Archive. Given sufficient 
time to navigate one's way around the collections of files, there is a vast amount of 
material relating to not only Japanese wartime overseas radio broadcasting, but that of the 
rest of the world, too. 
The archive, which contains least material pertaining to Japanese overseas broadcasting in 
the 1930s and 40s, is that ofN.H.K. itself This is not as surprising as it first appears, for 
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much official documentation from the war was destroyed by the Japanese in August 1945 
during the period between the surrender and the arrival of the American occupation 
forces. As overseas radio was the most important overseas propaganda tool, much 
documentation relating to programmes and policies was destroyed in this period. In 
addition, since most of the material which does remain, is in pre-1945 Japanese it presents 
a huge language barrier to the Western researcher. 5 For, these reasons the material which , 
does remain is also very interesting. 
Much of the material pertaining to actual broadcasts is related to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941. There is a list of news reports and one of commentaries from 
December 1941. Generally, both lists give titles of items without further explanation or 
elaboration, but often there is a section entitled "Special News" in the former list which 
does report some of the details attached to a few of the headlines. These lists, however, 
do not continue beyond December 1941. The reason for this is unknown, but it must be 
assumed that records were still kept from 1942, and that they were destroyed or taken to 
the United States at the end of the war. 
Other material at the N.H.K. archive is in the form of magazines published by N.H.K., 
rather than that of material directly relating to the broadcasts themselves. Issues of the 
official domestic N.H.K. magazine, H6s6 [Broadcasting], remain from July 1937 to 
September 1941, as do the issues of its replacement, H6s6 Kenkyli [Broadcasting 
Research] from October 1941 to December 1943. These were the serious public 
magazines published by N.H.K., and they contained articles relating to both the technical 
and programming sides of N.H.K., both in domestic and overseas broadcasting. 
Naturally, as they were not popular magazines, not only were they written in pre-1945 
5 The American occupation government in its revision of education simplified the Japanese language. and 
writing system. Most Japanese can read pre-1945 Japanese fluently (it is not l~e Anglo-Saxon IS to 
native English speakers) but it sounds very antiquated to them. Most non-natIve J~panese speakers, 
however, will have not studied pre-1945 Japanese, and will, therefore, have some consIderable 'problems 
in translating parts of the material. Generally, the linguistic rules governing ~~y of ~e differences 
which appear in pre-1945, will not appear in modem grammar books, and there IS httle atd to be sought 
in producing a translation. 
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Japanese, but they were written for the educated classes and so the language is more 
sophisticated, rendering translation harder. The final set of magazines held by N.H.K. are 
the programme schedules produced for distribution amongst the overseas audience. 
Published monthly, each edition often had three versions, one in English for North 
America, one in English, French and German for Europe, and one in Spanish for South 
America. The magazines contained articles about special broadcasts, which were to be 
aired during the month and letters from listeners, along with a full programme schedule 
and a list of frequencies. The N.H.K. archives contains those from January 1940 (Number 
43) to February 1941, and two odd examples from August 1943 and May 1944. They do 
not contain all the editions for each month. 
The final major source of primary material for this study was Mr. Kitayama Setsuro, 
author of Rajio Tokyo. In an interview, he indicated the scale of material held by the 
N.H.K. archive, and the best way to approach much of it. He also kindly provided copies 
of material from his private collection of broadcasting memorabilia, acquired from people 
he had interviewed during the course of his own research. The song, The Daring Young 
Man of the Flying Japanese, written by a prisoner in 1945 was one such piece. 
One major source of material not consulted directly in this study, were the monitoring 
reports of the Melbourne Listening Post in Australia. These formed the basis of the only 
major work in English on Japanese overseas broadcasting, L.D. Meo's Japan's Radio 
War on A ustraiia,6 which concentrated on one area of the operation. The consultation of 
this work has proved to be sufficiently detailed to provide the overview of short-wave 
broadcasting contained in this present study. 
6 L.D. Meo: Japan 's Radio War on Australia (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne. 1968) 
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Target Regions of Japanese-Controlled Overseas Broadcasting 
Target area Stations broadcasting 
Tokyo, Batavia, Makasar, 
Australia Saigon, Shanghai's East 
Asian station, Shonan, 
Taipei 
Tokyo, Amoy, Canton, 
Hsinking, Kalgan, Peking 
Chungking China (which also broadcast 
specifically for the Chinese 
Communists) Rangoon, 
Shanghai, Shonan, Taipei 
Enemy troops in the South 
Tokyo, Manila, Shonan Pacific 
Europe Tokyo, Hsinking, Shonan 
Tokyo, Bangkok, Batavia, 
India Rangoon, Saigon, Shonan, 
Taipei 
Middle East Tokyo, Shonan 
Tokyo, Batavia, Hsinking, 
North America Manila, 
Tokyo, Chongjin, 
Russia Hsinking, Kalgan 
South America Tokyo 
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Modern and World War Two Names for People and Places 
Many of the names of places have changed since World War Two. Of these many 
were changed when countries achieved independence, the former colonial names being 
replaced with local names. Places occupied by the Japanese were often given a 
Japanese name, which was not used after the end of the war. In addition, in recent 
years the Pinyin system for transliterating Chinese into Roman letters has replaced the 
former Wade system in the People's Republic of China. Below is a list of the World 
War Two names as they appear in this study, and their modern equivalent. 
China 
Ethiopia 
Indonesia 
Myanmar 
Amoy 
Canton (city) 
Canton (province) 
Chungking 
Dairen 
Hankow 
Hsinking 
Kalgan 
Manchuria 
Mao Tse Tung 
Mukden 
Nanking 
Peking 
Sian 
Tientsin 
Taichung 
Abyssinia 
Batavia 
Celebes 
Xiamen 
Guangzhou 
Guangdong 
Chongqing 
Dalian 
Hankou 
Changchun 
Zhangjiakou 
Dongbei 
Mao Zedong 
Shenyang 
Nanjing 
Beijing 
Xian 
Tianjin 
Taizhong 
Ethiopia 
MakasarlMacassar 
NetherlandslDutch East Indies 
Jakarta 
Sulawesi 
Ujung Pandang 
Indonesia 
Burma 
Moulmein 
Rangoon 
Myanmar 
Maulamyaing 
Yangon 
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Taiwan 
Formosa Taiwan 
Singapore 
Shonan Singapore 
Russia 
Karafuto Sakhalin 
Stalingrad Volgograd 
Vietnam 
Saigon Ho Chi Min City 
Appendix 4 
Song for Broadcast 
Written by Prisoner-of-War: 
The Daring Young Men of the Flying Japanese 
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1) Cnce 1 was happy but now :':'-m for-lorn, 
like an old coat that is tat-tered and worn, 
left on this ioland and to weep and to QOurn, 
Be-trayea by my squad-ron that's gone, 
Oh these a-cas 1 had they were hand-some, 
and I tried all I knew, them to please, 
But we nev-er could par-ry one wee-bit so well, 
agains t man of "The Flying J ap' ness 1" 
He flies thru' the air with the greatest of ease, 
The daring young man of the "Flying Japanese", 
his actions are graceful, he fights as he please', 
and my a-ces he blasted a-way. 
2) He'd play with my ace like a cat with a mouse, 
his guns would dis-tress every plane of my house, 
per-haps he is bet-ter des-cribed as a louse, 
but we got the works just the same, 
He'd smile from a-bove on our a-ces be-low, 
and one night he bombed us from up high, 
he blew us lQI all up, and he hol-lered "Ban:r;ai" , 
&8.he turned up his nose in the sk-y! 
He flies thru' the air with the greatest of ease, 
The daring young man of the •••••••••••••• 
3) 1 wept and I whim-pered, I sim-pered for weeks, 
while we spent our time fly-ing like clum-sy freaks, 
my tears were like hail-stones that rolled down my cheeks, 
A-las, and A-lack, and A-las-ka! I yelled to this guy 
the black me-nace and said, 
'~I' 11 see that you'll get your des-erts! 
hi~ thumb to his nose he puts up with a Sneer, 
he sneered onco again and said "NERTS 1" Oh 1 
He flieo thru' the air .•.•..•••.•••••.• 
4) The one night to To-kyo he loo-red US in, 
filled us with bom-bard-ments of worst shell-ing, 
that started us off on our way to roo-in, 
we made a sup-reme sac-ri-fies, 
then my boys went on strike and say 
"Hero is your rai!le, I'll gladly for-gi".re and for-get." 
they quit all their hustle anc then with-out shame, they say 
''May be la-ter, not yet!" Ouch! 
He flies thru' the air ............... .. 
5) One night I as un-ual went to Bee our squad-ron, 
1 found there no one but me-chanics a-1 
I asked for my and soon was made known to my hor-ror 
that they'd flown a-way, with-out a-ny con-science 
they fled in the night, all of there with gre2_t-est of ease, 
from way way up high thoy had sent down a-word, 
to the ground "Join the Flying Jap-anese!" O-o-W! 
He flies thru' the air ••••...••..••..•• 
6) Some time af-ter that they flew o-ver us high, 
to my sur-prise 1 saw there in the sky, 
a sight I'll ne'er for-get, which made my throat dry, 
we're raided by B Twenty Nines! 
he'd taught'em acro-ba-tics and how just to Bomb, 
to help him blast us at his side. 
He'd painted on them em-blems of Elsing Sun, 
and here they come as the Jap-anese! 
N01l, they fly thru' the air with the greatest of ease 
with the daring young man of the "Flying Jap-nese", 
their actions are graceful, they fighted as they please, 
and that'~ what's be-como of mY force. 
Word~ by HA ,[,',OOD HANSELL 
The ex-commander of the 
21at Bombing Squadron 
on the InlrunJ of Guam 
Mu~ic by Walter O'Keefe 
the Ilroadway Hill billy 
"Tho man 0 r th'J fly i rv;; t ;:-ap.ne" 
AnschlujJ 
Austria. 
Asahi Shim bun 
Azad Hind 
B.B.C. 
B.I.A. 
bushido 
C.I.B. 
C.C.D. 
D6mei 
F.C.C. 
gaichi 
Hakk6Ichiu 
Hi no Maru 
horspiele 
Hoso 
I.I.L. 
I.N.A. 
I.R.A.A. 
kempei 
monagatari 
naichi 
N.E.I. 
nisei 
N .H.K. (Nippon H os6 Kyokai) 
State 
O.W.I. 
P.W.E. 
V.O.A. 
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Glossary 
Political or economic union' in , 
particular the Nazi anneXIng of 
Japanese newspaper 
Free India 
British Broadcasting Corporation 
Burma Independence Army 
samurai spirit of honour 
Cabinet Information Bureau ( Japan) 
Civil Censorship Division (United 
States Occupation Government) 
Japanese News Agency 
Federal Communications Committee 
(United States) 
The regions of Japanese control not 
included in the naichi 
''Eight Corners of the Wodd under 
One Roof" A slogan used to imply 
universal Asian brotherhood. 
The Japanese flag 
radio plays 
Broadcasting. An N .H.K wartime 
magazme 
Indian Independence League 
Indian National Army 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association 
Japanese Secret Police 
traditional Japanese folk tales 
The main Japanese islands, the Ryukus 
and Karafuto 
N ethedands East Indies 
second generation Japanese born 
abroad 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation. 
broadcasting corporation collecting 
licence fees for revenue. 
Office of War Information 
(United States) 
Political Warfare Executive (Britain) 
Voice of America 
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